**Forms and Instruments of Autocracy Promotion**

*(working draft)*

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Policy fields</th>
<th>Logic of influence/mechanism</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Instruments</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>International monitoring</td>
<td>Legitimation (external)</td>
<td>To what extent and how do observation missions support authoritarian regimes symbolically (in order to encourage them)</td>
<td>1.1 Election observation/-Assessment/Recognition</td>
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<td>1.2 Observation of other political processes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development policy</td>
<td>Aid (technical/financial)</td>
<td>To what extent and in what form does development cooperation aim at strengthening of authoritarian structures and forces?</td>
<td>2.1 Political institutions/government consulting</td>
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<td>2.2 Political actors (non-democratic parties)</td>
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<td>2.2. Support of anti-democratic NGOs</td>
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<td>Diplomacy</td>
<td>Protection (international/political)</td>
<td>To what extent and in what form do authoritarian clients (states/ regimes) be protected against sanctions of Western democracy promoters or be confirmed/encouraged in their “originality”?</td>
<td>3.1 Public statements on political processes</td>
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<td>3.2 Opposition to international sanctions</td>
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<td>3.3 Regime-supporting statements in bilateral documents</td>
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<tr>
<td>International cooperation</td>
<td>Incentive (material)</td>
<td>To what extent do the political conditionalities of Western democracy promoters be undermined through international cooperation or authoritarian tendencies be supported?</td>
<td>4.1 Political cooperation</td>
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<td>4.2 Military and security cooperation</td>
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<td>4.3 Economic cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military action</td>
<td>Coercion (physical)</td>
<td>To what extent does the use of physical (military) force aim at establishment/support of an authoritarian rule or at overthrowing a democratic government?</td>
<td>5. Military intervention</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence operation</td>
<td>Subversion (subtle)</td>
<td>To what extent do secret service activities aim at strengthening anti-democratic forces or at overthrowing a democratic government?</td>
<td>6.1. Covert financing of local target groups</td>
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<td>6.2. Support of underground organizations</td>
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<td>6.3. Terror, sabotage</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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1 The schema is mainly based on classification criteria of democracy promotion developed in the PRIF project „The Promotion of Democracy as a Risk Strategy“.  

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Reading List


McFaul, Michael 2010b: Importing Revolution: Internal and external Factors in Ukraine’s 2004 Democratic Breakthrough, in: Bunce, Valerie/McFaul, Michael/Stoner-Weiss,


Nygren, Bertil 2010: The Rebuilding of Greater Russia: Putin’s Foreign Policy Towards the CIS Countries, Abingdon/New York: Routledge.


Popescu, Nicu 2006: Russia’s Soft Power Ambitions, CEPS-Policy Brief, Nr. 115.


