I participated in a two-week field survey workshop at the University of California, Berkeley (UCB) from April 22 to May 5, 2007. The workshop gave me the opportunity to continue my research of European politics, to improve my syllabus of the undergraduate course “Foreign and security policy of the European Union”, to review the key literature, theoretical approaches, and methods employed in European Studies and to explore innovative teaching and research techniques.

I worked with an assigned UCB faculty member - Dr. Jason Wittenberg, Assistant Professor of the Department of Political Science and a graduate student - Susanne Wengle, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science. Prof. Jason Wittenberg is a specialist in the area of Eastern-European Studies provided the expert assessment of my syllabus and gave me recommendations for my future research work. I had several meetings with other specialists who share a focus on European affairs in their research and teaching activities:

Dr. Beverly Crawford – Associate Director of UC Berkeley’s Institute of European Studies and an expert in German foreign policy. In our conversation I learnt about the Institute and about the research initiatives in various areas of political, economical, social and cultural aspects of European integration.

Dr. Nicholas Ziegler - Associate professor of political science. Professor Ziegler’s research interests lie primarily in European politics, especially the policy of Germany and France. Dr. Ziegler teaches courses and seminars on the politics of European Integration and we exchanges ideas on the most problematic issues of European politics and transatlantic relations. I also attended a lecture by Dr. Ziegler on the global role of the EU and a panel discussion with Nick Ziegler and Darren Zook on foreign policy of the US, EU, and China.

Professor Vinod Aggarwal - Department of Political Science. Professor Aggrawal is an expert on the politics of trade and finance. I was especially interested in the research of Dr. Aggarwal on European Union trade strategies, economical policy of the EU in different geographical areas and his analysis of regionalism in Europe and other regions.

I also met Dr. Giacomo Chioza, Assistant Professor of Political Science, who analyses publics' attitudes towards the US and examines the problems of anti-Americanism, Dr. Ron Hassner, Assistant Professor of Political Science. I also met with graduate students of the Political Science Department, Ed Fogarty and Tobias Schulze-Cleve.
The conversations with UCB professors with professional expertise in my area of research helped me deepen and enrich my understanding of European politics. With their help I improved the syllabus of my course, its structure and theoretical base. The number of sources and other resources that I will draw on for my course was substantially increased. At the UCB library I collected a lot of documents and materials on foreign and security policy of the EU and transatlantic relations. I discovered some interesting new aspects of American foreign policy analysis in the area of European integration.

**US-European Security Cooperation: A Field Survey**

*Approaches to similarities and differences in the foreign policy of the US and Europe*

The US and the European Union are currently the two most powerful players on the international stage. European and American researches and policy-makers have always paid interested in the idea of Transatlantic Western Community. Generations of scholars have been working on the issue of transatlantic relations and many of them agree that the strategic partnership between the USA and the European Union is central for the development and stabilisation of the contemporary international system. North Americans and the Europeans have always identified themselves with reference to a shared set of values: the «Western civilization». Due to this common heritage, as well as due to close economic, historical, and cultural ties and a wide range of other shared values, ideals and objectives, it seems natural that a transatlantic partnership is something essential for both partners. The history of transatlantic relations is full of examples of successful cooperation between the US and Europe. Thanks to the American-European partnership, the Atlantic region became one of the most integrated and globalized areas of the world. At the same time, the history of US-European relations is also a history of various and nearly continual crises. In some cases the USA and the EU act separately and distinctly in accordance with their distinct perspectives. It is clear that their perceptions of themselves and their view of world affairs are not alike.

These different perspectives also influence foreign policy analysis. The external priorities of the allies often influence their foreign policy analysis. American and European analyses of transatlantic relations have some peculiarities and sometimes their approaches to understanding their mutual relations differ. As the only remaining superpower, the US has considerable political and economic influence on the rest of the world and thus often assumes a global perspective. The
global outlook of the US and its wide range of interests in countries all over the world often
determine American foreign policy analysis. These approaches promote the idea of American
leadership and emphasize the exceptional and indispensable character of the US as an international
actor. Since Europe is a region of paramount importance in a global American foreign policy
strategy and for US security, transatlantic relations has become one of the most important spheres of
interest for American scholars. European foreign policy analysis, on the contrary, often maintains a
regional focus and a regional perspective on security. The EU is a more inward-looking power that
concentrates its attention on regions in close proximity to Europe. However transatlantic relations is
also a key foreign policy priority for the EU and an important area for scientific analysis and
research.

American globalism vs. European regionalism is only one of the numerous factors shaping
European and American approaches. There are many different opinions about the similarities and
differences between Americans and Europeans. Frances Burwell, analysing transatlantic behavior,
argues that there are a few main dichotomies that lead to vastly different European and American
approaches. In addition to the one that we have already mentioned, she also refers to (1) European
multilateralism vs. American unilateralism and (2) US military options vs. Europe’s non-military
measures. These dichotomies provide an interesting tool and the reference points to understand
some of the conflicting trends across the Atlantic and formulate conditions for more effective
partnership. Keeping these dichotomies in mind, can help us explain diverging opinions of the two
partners in the face of regional conflicts, for example.

**Different approaches to regional conflicts**

Regional conflicts are important issue, because are the most difficult tests for transatlantic
relations. According to Frances Burwell, the United States tends to act alone, unilaterally, according
to its interests and at its own discretion when confronted with regional instabilities. Consultations
with allies and international organizations are of minor importance. The US acts as a super power
rapidly reaching decisions in order to counter any aggression. The US chooses military solutions.
Military instruments are perceived as much more effective and let achieve expected purposes more
rapidly. In contrast, Europeans act jointly, in concert, they take a multilateral approach to formulate

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1 Burwell Frances G: Cooperation in US-European Relations // The United States and Europe in the Global
a coordinated response. The EU prefers to develop its activity in the framework of international organizations, often within the United Nations system, where Europeans assume an active role in managing the peacekeeping operations. Europeans stress “civilian” options - political and economic. They exert political pressure and encourage negotiated solutions. For Europeans, effectiveness and rapidity of actions do not justify a military response.

The US-European alliance has become the object of intense scrutiny as a result of the Iraq war. Many scholars are trying to explain the reasons of transatlantic disagreements and the limited scope of cooperation between two partners. Academics have proposed a number of arguments to in response to the recent deterioration of relations between the transatlantic partners. They have tried to show the differences in the strategic cultures of the US and the EU. European scholars have reinforced the image of the US as a unilateralist and militaristic power. American scholars, on the other hand, often portray Europeans as weak and unreliable partners. There are some specialists, who – in my eyes – have been exaggerating the differences between the transatlantic partners on security strategy. They argue that effective US-EU cooperation may be impossible. Divergent world views of the American and Europeans view lead these experts to the conclusion that the USA and the EU are incompatible and the NATO is out-of-date. Michael Lind, for example, argues that the differences between the US and Europe in their values, geopolitical interests and policies are deep and growing.² Moreover, he posits that the ideas of Europe and Western community actually compete with each other. This, according to Lind, is the reason why the two partners have difficulties in finding a transatlantic consensus in foreign policy.³ According to Lind: “recognition of the geopolitical differences between the US and Europe will lead to the erosion of the idea of a transatlantic “West”. Disagreements over goals and methods between the US and Europe “are bringing about the end of the Western alliance in its familiar form”. ⁴ He also asserts that “the idea of the West or the Atlantic Community was devised to rationalize the NATO alliance of the US and Western Europe against the Soviet bloc during the Cold War… Never plausible, this conception of the West is now obsolete”⁵. Finally, Lind argues that the US and Europe “need not be rivals in world politics, but they are unlikely to be partners in the twenty-first century”.⁶

³ Ibid. – P. 35.
⁴ Ibid. – P. 25.
⁵ Ibid. – P. 34.
⁶ Ibid. – P. 41.
Robert Kagan also focuses on the differences in American and European outlooks in his much-quoted article on the famous “Mars vs. Venus” approach. The author argues, “it is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. On the all-important question of power — the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power — American and European perspectives are diverging”. Many of Kagan’s arguments concur with the ones that we have already characterized, such as Lind. He agrees that when confronting adversaries, Americans choose military solutions and tend to act unilaterally. He also thinks that they are less inclined to act through international institutions, and they are more skeptical about international law. Here are some additional opposite characteristics of Americans and Europeans that we can find in the article of Robert Kagan:

1. Americans generally see the world divided between good and evil, between friends and enemies. Europeans believe that they see a more complex picture and approach problems with greater nuance and sophistication.

2. The United States, is less patient with diplomacy, it tends to seek finality in international affairs. The US has demand for “perfect” security and wants problems solved, threats eliminated. Europeans have a higher tolerance for threats. They are more tolerant of failure, more patient when solutions don’t come quickly etc.

Recognizing that these characteristics are oversimplified, Kagan nevertheless believes that “on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less.” Many of Kagan’s arguments remain controversial. In my eyes, there is one very important observation of the author: these differences in strategic culture do result from differing national characters or mentality of Americans and Europeans. They resulted from their power disparities, and their unequal potentials on international stage. He thus argues “When the United States was weak, it practiced the strategies of indirection, the strategies of weakness; now that the United States is powerful, it behaves as powerful nations do. When the European great powers were strong, they believed in strength and martial glory. Now, they see the world through the eyes of weaker powers. These very different points of view, weak versus strong, have naturally produced differing strategic judgments, differing assessments of threats and of the proper means of addressing threats, and even differing calculations.

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8 Ibid.
of interest”. Thus, Kagan argue, the approach of the United States is derived from its military power. The European one is based in part on their lack of military capabilities. Kagan’s article aroused a wave of comment on both sides of the Atlantic. Most of the critical comments insisted that transatlantic relationship is not only about “power and weakness”. Eric Jones believes that Kagan’s research “focuses too much attention on the preponderance of American military might and it exaggerates European military weakness”.12

According to Michael Lind, a more peaceful strategic culture of the EU is also the result of European integration. EU members are not as jealous about their national sovereignty in today’s world. They are used to solving their problems in the framework of European institutions and became the strongest defenders of multilateral approach.10 Robert Kagan also believes that European reluctance to use force is a consequence of European integration: the European pattern of integration did not require power; its mission was to oppose military power.11

In sum, analyzing the recent literature on transatlantic relations, we come to a conclusion that only a few authors speak about the end of Atlanticism. Different American and European manners in managing international issues are clearly visible, as well as major risks for the relationship. But most transatlantic crises were managed by allies and then overcome. Despite the sometimes very harsh disputes, the transatlantic relations are highly unlikely to deteriorate completely. Most experts recognize the diversity between Americans and Europeans, but they ultimately do not reject the transatlantic unity. On the contrary, they feel that the transatlantic dialogue should be more ambitious and try harder to find common grounds.

Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, for example, have called to save the alliance: “American and European interests and values… remain highly similar. They were never identical… But these very real differences never prevented the alliance from maintaining a successful overall strategy to confront the common challenge of the day or a sense that Americans and Europeans were fundamentally on the same side of history”.13 Andrew Moravcsik a professor of Politics of Princeton University and a recognized expert on European and transatlantic affairs notes: “The

9 Ibid.
recent war in Iraq has triggered the most severe transatlantic tensions in a generation, dividing Europeans and Americans from each other and themselves. Pundits proclaim daily the imminent collapse of three vital pillars in the institutional architecture of world politics: NATO, the UN, and even the EU. And yet some form of transatlantic cooperation clearly remains essential, given the vast mutual interests at stake.”

Another expert of transatlantic relations Reginald Dale argues: “…there is even the possibility of a substantial improvement in relations, provided each side makes a stronger effort to understand the other’s positions – and focuses on the strengths of those positions rather than their weaknesses.”

We can also refer to Robert Kagan once again. Emphasizing the depth of the transatlantic divide, he nevertheless believes that “the United States and Europe share a set of common Western beliefs. Their aspirations for humanity are much the same, even if their vast disparity of power has now put them in very different places”. Moreover, some experts argue that despite serious political transatlantic tensions, there does not exist fundamental differences between the US and Europe about the use of power in the international sphere. Professor Justin Vaisse believes that the demise of the Bush doctrine of 2002, a doctrine based on ideas that are not shared by most Europeans, makes way for improved transatlantic relations.

Among the authors who cherish the principles of the Atlantic Alliance is the American scholar Charles Kovacs. Describing the evolution of US foreign policy and US-European relations in the XXth – XXIst centuries, Professor Kovacs examines the main trends and factors that caused transatlantic strains over time. He argues that both sides differ on the means, but agree on the goals. In his eyes, a greater cooperation between the EU and the USA is necessary to solve contemporary global problems. Since the paper is written from an American perspective, the author rejects a concept of multipolarity, characterizing it as a nineteenth century pattern of thinking. Considering the future of transatlantic relations, he posits that US–EU convergence is possible if the allies rethink their positions and if “the Europeans (and the Russians) realize that a nineteenth century model of international relations, consisting of competing power blocks seeking areas of influence, is
irrelevant to the globalized twenty-first century”.\textsuperscript{19} Charles Kovacs also emphasizes some factors that will improve the transatlantic partnership and repair the damage in the relations between allies. Common economic interests, lessons learnt from the Iraq war and the EU extension are among them. He believes that the EU accession of the new Eastern European member states will contribute to the US-EU convergence, because new member states tend to be pro-American.\textsuperscript{20}

The lessons to be learnt from the war in Iraq are also thoroughly examined in a number of publications. One of the lessons is that is put forth for the US is the following: America should reject unilateralism, become more attentive to the international community and its Europeans allies. Lessons for Europeans are numerous. Many experts show concerns that transatlantic disputes negatively affect intra-European politics. As Nanette Neuwahl asserts: “Trying to build a strong Europe against the USA will divide Europe and this has no future in present-day society”.\textsuperscript{21} Laurent Cohen-Tanugi fully agrees that US-EU divisions apply to European unification, “which has probably suffered even greater damage than transatlantic relations as a result of the Iraqi crisis”.\textsuperscript{22} Thus, it is argued that European opposition to the US does not contribute to European unity, but produces European division and weakness.

The role of the US and Europe in their partnership: opinions on the “division of labor”

Scholars do not all share the same views on the role of the EU in a new transatlantic relationship. Views diverge on the question whether Europe should improve its military capabilities or keep its specialization. In fact, among the scholarship on transatlantic relations, American and European experts often diverge on issue of “the division of labor” between the US and Europe. Most Europeans would prefer to keep its specialization on soft security, placing more emphasis on peacekeeping, preventive measures, post-conflict reconstruction, and leaving ‘hard’ security missions for the US. American authors often tend to reject “the division of labor” and insist that Europeans should be prepared to fight in high intensity conflict. Daniel Hamilton, the Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations, at SAIS, for example, argues that ‘division of labor’ is a false

\textsuperscript{18} Kovacs, Charles: US-European Relations from the Twentieth to the Twenty-first Century // European Foreign Affairs Review. – 2003. – nr. 8. – P. 455.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid. – P. 453.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid. – P. 454.
\textsuperscript{21} Nanette, Neuwahl: The Atlantic Alliance: For Better or for Wars. . . // European Foreign Affairs Review. – 2003. – nr. 8. – P. 431.
\textsuperscript{22} Cohen-Tanugi, Laurent: An Alliance at Risk: The United States and Europe since September 11. – Baltimore, 2003. – P. xiii.
choice, that “reinforce European inwardness, diminish US influence in Europe, generate new resentments, and corrode our partnership”\textsuperscript{23}. It is feared that such a division would lead to a divorce «by reinforcing European tendencies to think all conflicts can be managed through civilian power and reinforcing American tendencies to apply military solutions to non-military problems».\textsuperscript{24} The real choice for the author is to work on minimizing of the respective weaknesses of the allies and align their respective strengths. For this purpose, the allies have to integrate new tasks into their strategic cultures: Europe has to translate its political and economic weight into strategic power and enhance its military capabilities, and the US should equip itself for more effective pre- and post-conflict capabilities.

Laurent Cohen-Tanugi also calls on the EU to assume fully its responsibilities on the world stage: “Europe needs to become at last a responsible and credible player in world affairs and… in order to do so it must develop a common foreign policy and defense capability”. Cohen-Tangui is confident that “in policing the planet, the United States would be better off with a stronger, more autonomous Europe on its side, rather than being left alone to face increasingly widespread and virulent hostility from the rest of the world”\textsuperscript{25}. Andrew Moravcsik advocates a completely different point of view with regard to the question of the “the division of labor.” Throughout his various papers he reveals that a successful alliance should be built on the division of labor, complementarily and specialization between allies. Moravcsik emphasizes that the United States is only one superpower in military matters, and Europeans should accept this fact. But in contrast to its effective military establishment, the US is weak in manipulating civilian power. In this sphere the EU is a dominant and indispensable player. The author refers to the EU as the “Quiet Superpower” and believes that “Europeans already wield effective power over peace and war as great as that of the United States, but they do so quietly, through “civilian power.”\textsuperscript{26} More than that, the Moravcsik is concerned about Europe’s attempts to develop its power projection capabilities and argues that Europeans should give up their defense schemes. His supports this argument with the following points: (1) Militarization betrays European ideals and interests, (2) Europeans are hardly ever able to create a serious high-intensity force, (3) They can not come to an agreement on conditions for its use, (4) The US does not need high-intensity assistance, it desires peacekeepers etc.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23} Hamilton, Daniel: Three Strategic Challenges for a Global Transatlantic Partnership // European Foreign Affairs Review. – 2003. - nr. 8. – P. 544.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Ibid. – P. 545.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Cohen-Tanugi, Laurent. Op. cit. – P. xiv-xv.
\end{itemize}
Moravcsik thus considers “the division of labor” as a key factor for transatlantic reconciliation. He argues that European focus on civilian and low-intensity military power would strengthen Europe’s global role and its influence vis-à-vis the United States: “Only a frank recognition of complementary national interests and mutual dependence will elicit moderation, self-restraint, and a durable willingness to compromise”. He also admits that military force does not have the decisive positive impact on global politics: “a half century from now, historians may well look back on the post-cold-war era and conclude that Europe’s quiet achievements contributed as much to world peace as did American military dominance”.

The published works of Andrew Moravcsik also reveal an interesting feature of American foreign policy analysis: American skepticism of any serious European defense and security policy. We can also observe that formulating the lessons of Iraq war and offering their suggestions about how to diminish transatlantic tensions, the experts can not come to unanimity. Some of them are advocate the “division of labor”; others think that emancipation of Europe in military sphere is required. There are many discussions if Europe does have such a potential to make itself strong enough, to create the political role, strengthen its political-security influence and to acquire the capacity for autonomous actions. Daniel Hamilton is still optimistic about this issue. He believes that “in some distant future the Union may become an effective strategic player, but even then it is still likely to share more interests than differences with the USA”.

In conclusion, there is no one single view on the EU among American scholars. At the same time, Europeans also diverge in their transatlantic orientation. There are Europeanists as well as Atlanticists among intellectuals and policy-makers. Interestingly, both European and American scholars raise the same questions in their research, which can be summarized as follows: (1) what perceptions shape transatlantic strategic relationship? (2) Are the differences between Americans and Europeans fundamental? (3) How have the terrorist attacks of September 11 affected American view of the world and transatlantic partnership? (4) Can the European integration in the area of security lead to multipolarity and how will it influence US-EU relations? (5) Have there been fundamental shifts in the transatlantic relationship since the start of the war in Iraq that would

27 Moravcsik, Andrew: Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain. – P. 80.
28 Moravcsik, Andrew: The Quiet Superpower.
justify speaking of fundamentally new relations in today's world? (6) How would this renewed partnership look like? Underlying the arguments in response to all these questions, both European and American analysis tend to demonstrate that the US and the EU are not rivals in any fundamental sense. Their shared strategic interests outweigh their differences and Europe remains the most natural partner for the USA.