



Newsletter of the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies

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**Newsletter of the Institute of Slavic,
East European, and Eurasian
Studies**

University of California, Berkeley
Institute of Slavic, East European, and
Eurasian Studies
260 Stephens Hall # 2304
Berkeley, CA 94720-2304
iseees@berkeley.edu
<http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~iseees/>

Editors: Stella Bourgoïn and Barbara
Voytek.

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Submit mailing changes to the above
address or call (510) 642-3230.

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your comments and suggestions.

Notes from the Director

This has been a very eventful and enjoyable year for all of us. I would like to thank our speakers, students, friends, visitors, associates, faculty, staff, and curious onlookers for providing us with so much timely information, intellectual stimulation, and lively companionship.

It is time to say goodbye to our visiting scholars: Dr. Svetlana Adonieva (Fulbright scholar from St. Petersburg), Denis Alexeev (Carnegie Fellow from Saratov State), Daunis Auers (Fulbright from Latvia), Maya Haber (independent scholar from London), and three Junior Faculty Development Program scholars from the former Yugoslavia—Zoran Cirovic from Belgrade and Kresimir Krnovic and Sanja Potkonjak from Zagreb. We wish you all the best and hope to see you again someday. Thank you all!

Also leaving, I am afraid, is our administrative analyst, Patricia (Pat) Stevens, who is moving to the office of the Executive Vice Chancellor. Pat has been a wonderful employee and remains a great friend. We wish her all the best in her new job.

The newest member of our team is Gloria Ore, who will be taking on Pat's responsibilities. We are very happy to have Gloria at ISEEEES; please stop by to say hello when you get a chance.

Thank you all again! Have a good summer and come back for more in the fall.

Yuri Slezkine
ISEEEES Director
Professor of History

Public Lectures in 2005–06

Cosponsored by ISEEEES

Svetlana Adonieva, Folklorist and Anthropologist, St. Petersburg University and ISEEEES Visiting Scholar, “*Dukh Pushkina*” and “*Muzhskie i zhenskie vozrastnye klassy, vozrastnye krizisy i rechevaia praktika: Traditsionnye strategii povedeniia v post-sovetskoii krestyanskoii Rossii*”

Ronelle Alexander, Professor, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, “Divided We Stand: The Fate of Serbo-Croatian”

Denis Alexeev, Associate Professor of History, Saratov State University, Russia and ISEEEES Visiting Scholar, “Russia’s ‘Strategic Partnership’ with the United States: Toward a New Level of Relations”

Daunis Auers, Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Latvia and ISEEEES Visiting Scholar, “Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the European Union: Whither Baltic Unity?”

Polina Barskova, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, “Dissonant Novelists, Echoing Novels: Transformations of Tradition in *Lolita* by Vladimir Nabokov and *Doctor Zhivago* by Boris Pasternak”

Brian Boyd, Distinguished Professor, Department of English, University of Auckland, “Evolution and Fiction: The Odyssey”

Keith Brown, Assistant Professor of International Studies, The Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, “Only Connect: Macedonia, Global Citizenship, and the Clash of Civilizations”

William Brumfield, Professor of Russian Studies, Tulane University, “The Revival of Russia’s Spiritual Heritage: The Tikhvin-Dormition Monastery and the Return of the Tikhvin Icon”

Oleg Budnitskii, Professor, Institute of Russian History, Moscow, “The Causes of Pogroms, or Gunshots from Behind”

John Chapman, Department of Archaeology, University of Durham, UK, “The Exploitation of Salt in Eurasian Prehistory”

Lucy Der Manuelian, the Arthur H. Dadian and Ara Oztemel Professor of Armenian Art, Tufts University, “Diamonds, Dragons, and Crosses: The Story of Armenian Rug Weaving”

Ales Erjavec, Professor and Research Director at the Institute of Philosophy, Scientific Research Center of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Ljubljana University, “The New Conditions of Art: The Case of Central and Eastern Europe”

James Felak, Associate Professor, Department of History, University of Washington, “Roman Catholic Strategies of Survival in Slovakia, 1945–1948: The Cases of Four Activist Priests”

Robert Frost, Professor of Early Modern History and Head of the School of Divinity, History, and Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, “‘Anarchy Is Our Strength’: The Principle of Unanimity and the Dangers of Majority Voting in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 1569–1795”

Maya Haber, Ph.D. Candidate, School of History, Classics, and Archaeology, Birkbeck College, University of London and ISEEEES Visiting Scholar, “Social Science Fiction: The Art of Choosing a Typical Village in the Soviet Countryside”

Igal Halfin, Department of History, Tel Aviv University and Fellow, the Shelby Cullom Davis Center for Historical Studies, Princeton University, “The NKVD’s Dialogical Imagination: The Politics and Poetics of Stalinist Interrogations”

Ana Hofman, Faculty of Art, Department of Ethnomusicology, University of Nis, Serbia, “Gendered Tradition: The Role of Female Singers in the Musical Practices of Southeast Serbia”

Brian Horowitz, Associate Professor of Russian and Director of the Jewish Studies Program, Tulane University, “Jewish Intellectuals in Late-Czarist Russia: Culture, Education, and Politics”

Sergei Ivanov, Professor of Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, Moscow State University and Senior Research Associate, Institute of Slavic Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, “Ivan the Terrible vs. Nicholas the Blessed: The Holy Fools and the Muscovite State”

Alla Kassianova, Department of International Relations, Tomsk State University and Humanities and International Studies Fellow, Stanford University, “The Russian Defense Industry Under Putin”

Gail Kligman, Professor of Sociology and Director of the Center for European and Eurasian Studies, UC Los Angeles, “Class Warfare and the Politics of Difference: Collectivization in Romania, 1949–1962”

Michal Kopecek, Institute of Contemporary History, Prague and Fulbright Visiting Scholar, Endicott College, “A Culture of Emancipation, National Interest, or Solidarity? The Idea of Central Europe After 1989”

Volodymyr Kulyk, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, National Academy of Sciences, Ukraine, “Reconstructing Common Sense: Soviet Nationalities Policy and Post-Soviet Ukrainian Ideologies of Language and Ethnicity”

John P. LeDonne, Associate, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University, “Ethnicity, Identity, and Violence in Russia’s Borderlands: The Eighteenth Century”

Mark Lipovetsky, Associate Professor, Department of German and Slavic Languages and Literatures, University of Colorado at Boulder, “Strategies of Violence in Soviet Culture: Mythical and Divine”

Leonid Livak, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, University of Toronto, “France’s Russian Secret: Russian Emigrés in French Cultural Life, 1920–1940”

Arek Marciniak, Professor of Archaeology, University of Poznan, Poland, and Former Secretary of the European Association of Archaeologists, “Small-scale Social Changes Among Early Farmers in the European Neolithic: House, Cattle, and Food”

Sergei Markov, Deputy Head of the Commission on International Cooperation, Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, “Putin’s Policy Trends”

Nouritza Matossian, Biographer of Iannis Xenakis and Arshile Gorky, “Why Arshile Gorky Changed His Name: A Case of Mistaken Identity”

Markar Melkonian, Author of *My Brother’s Road: An American’s Fateful Journey to Armenia*, “My Brother’s Road”

Andrei Melville, Vice Rector, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, “Russian/American Relations: Collisions and Prospects”

Robin Feuer Miller, the Edytha Macy Gross Professor of Humanities and Professor of Russian and Comparative Literature, Brandeis University, “The Elephant in the Garden: *Crime and Punishment* in the Classroom”

Marc Nichanian, Associate Professor, Columbia University, “The End of Armenian Futurism”

Riccardo Nicolosi, Department of Slavic Studies, University of Constance, Germany, “*Mikrokosmos novogo: Kunstkamera, Peterburg i simvolicheskii poriadok petrovskoi epokhi*”

Razmik Panossian, Director of Policy, Programs and Planning, Rights and Democracy, Canada, “The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars”

Serge Petroff, Historian and ISEEEES Associate, “Report from the Oblasts: The Volga and the Urals”

Pavel Podvig, Research Associate, Center for Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, “Spy Mania in Russia”

Victor Shnirelman, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences, “The Politics of Name in the North Caucasus: A Struggle Over the Alan Heritage”

Timothy Snyder, Associate Professor, Department of History, Yale University, “A Cold War in Miniature: The Polish-Soviet Secret War for Ukraine, 1926–1939”

David Stone, Assistant Professor, Department of History, Kansas State University and Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, “Trotsky and the Red Army: Building the Soviet State, 1918–1925”

Ronald Suny, Professor of History, University of Michigan, “Looking Anew at the Young Stalin: The Making of a Bolshevik”

Maria Todorova, Professor of History, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, “The Mausoleum of Georgi Dimitrov as a *Lieu de Mémoire*”

Dashtseveg Tumen, Professor of Anthropology and Archaeology, School of Social Sciences, National University of Mongolia, “Recent Archaeology of Xiong-nu and Mongol Period, Mongolia”

Ilya Vinkovetsky, Assistant Professor, Department of History, Simon Fraser University, Canada, “Was There Such a Thing as Russian Colonialism?”

Gyorgy Vlasenko, Independent Russian Film Director and Poet, “Russian-American Neo-Conservatism vs. Liberal Traditions of the Arts”

Michael Wachtel, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, Princeton University, “Pushkin, Byron, and the Fates of European Romanticism”

Stephen Wheatcroft, Professor and Deputy Head of the Department of History, University of Melbourne, “Recent OGPU/NKVD Materials and the Nature of Stalinist Repression, 1922–1953”

David Wolff, Slavic Research Center, Sapporo, Japan, and Visiting Professor, Department of History, UC Berkeley, “World War Zero? The Post-Mortem on the Russo-Japanese War Centennial”

Conferences and Other Events in 2005–2006 Cosponsored by ISEEEES

- July 6–8 and 11–13, 2005 *BH-SSP Summer Institute for Teachers*: “Empires in American and World History: Virtuous Institutions or Necessary Evils?”
- July 25–29, 2005 *ORIAS Summer Institute for Teachers*: “Personal Narratives: Using Primary Sources in the Classroom”
- September 14–October 20, 2005 *Art Exhibit*: “Kazakh: Paintings by Saule Suleimenova,” Kazakh painter
- September 24–25, 2005 *Conference*: “Modes of Contemporary Central Asian Culture”
- October 4–14, 2005 *Art Exhibit*: “Modern Visions from Mongolia,” featuring work by Mongolian visual artists S. Tugsoyun, J. Munkhtsetseg, and M. Erdenebayar
- October 7, 2005 *Conference*: China, Russia, India: Investing in Emerging Markets
- October 12, 2005 *Panel Discussion*: “Modern Art from Mongolia”
- October 14, 2005 *Conference*: “Petipa, Tchaikovsky, and the *Sleeping Beauty*”
- December 7, 2005 *Seminar*: “Art, Artists, and Popular Culture in Contemporary Russia”
- February 15, 2006 *Sixth Annual Peter N. Kujachich Lecture in Serbian and Montenegrin Studies*: Lenard J. Cohen, Professor, Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University, Canada, “Embracing Democracy: Political Change in Southeast Europe”
- February 22, 2006 *Film Screening*: *66 Seasons* (Peter Kerekes, 2003), San Francisco Jewish Film Festival
- March 3, 2006 *Annual Stanford-Berkeley Conference*: “Glasnost Evaluated: 1986–2006”
- March 5, 2006 *Roundtable Discussion*: “Perspectives on the Armenian Genocide and Freedom of Speech”
- March 17–19, 2006 *14th Annual Interdisciplinary German Studies Conference*: “Ossi, Wessi”
- March 30–Saturday April 1, 2006 *Fifteenth Biennial Balkan South Slavic Studies Conference*
- April 3, 2006 *Film Screening*: United Nations Association Traveling Film Festival, “A Statement of Hope and Courage”
- April 7, 2006 *Annual Colin Miller Memorial Lecture*: Stephen Kotkin, Professor of History and Director of the Program in Russian and Eurasian Studies, Princeton University, “Eurasia Without Eurasianism”
- April 21, 2006 *Symposium*: “New Research into Armenian-Turkish Relations (1908–1923)”
- April 29, 2006 *Annual Teacher Outreach Conference*: “Russian Classics in the Classroom: Teaching About Russia Through Literature”

Off-Center: Towards the Problem of Marginality in the Early Soviet Film

Polina Barskova

Polina Barskova received her Ph.D. from the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures in spring 2006. She will be an Assistant Professor of Russian Literature and Film at Hampshire College in the fall. Ms. Barskova also has authored 6 books of poetry. The present article is a fragment of her doctoral dissertation "Enchanted by the Spectacle of Death: Forms of the End in Leningrad Culture (1918–1934)."

The year 1925 entered the history of the Soviet film as the year of Sergei Eisenstein's *Battleship Potemkin*. A year later, another film about a revolutionary ship was supposed to emerge on the "red" screens—its preliminary title was *The Sailor from Aurora*, and the authorship was entrusted to the group of young and daring artists who called themselves FEKS: Factory of the Eccentric Film Actor. This group included people who later defined the fates of the Soviet cinema: Georgii Kozintsev, Sergei Gerasimov, Sergei Yutkevich, Andrei Moskvin. This time, however, the result of their effort was so ideologically disappointing from the point of view of censors, that the film was denied its original title. According to the Soviet censorship, this work was not worthy to bear the name of the *Aurora*, not even worthy to show the close-up of the legendary cruiser, the shot from which allegedly marked the beginning of the October Revolution of 1917. Glavrepertkom (The Main Repertoire Committee) suggested to the Sovkino and Leningradkino film studios that "we re-cut the film, taking out the scenes of the travel abroad, the scenes with the submarine, and the close-ups of the *Aurora*."¹

The scenes were taken out, and the end result received the name *The Devil's Wheel*. Without any intention to compliment the taste of Glavrepertkom, one may notice that this title much better suits this amazing work of film art, as aesthetically breathtaking as the eponymous attraction. The film tells the story of the downfall of a doomed building at the outskirts of Leningrad, the delinquent and artistic inhabitants of which attempt to seduce and subvert a young sailor from the *Aurora*, Vanya Shorin. The picturesque depiction of the agony of this *marginal* house becomes the semantic, aesthetic, and emotional center of the film, leaving the *Aurora* line in a faint shadow. In reality, it was *The Devil's Wheel* that spent the major part of its filmic life, until very recently, in the shadow of films of Eisenstein and other mainstream giants. This study will watch FEKS' films

closely and *comparatively* in an attempt to answer such questions as: what did it mean, in the relation to the Soviet cultural process of the 1920s, to be marginal? What are the specific features of the works of that time that were defined—from outside and from within—as marginal?

A. Eccentric composition

One of FEKS' ideologists, Sergei Jutkevich (who would be renowned later as a devoted Soviet film and theater director) described the ideal plot in his "chapter" of the FEKS manifesto:

Risk, courage, violence, chase, revolution, gold, blood, laxatives, Charlie Chaplin, catastrophes in the air, on the water and on the firm ground, amazing cigars, operetta divas, all kinds of shady enterprises, skating rinks, American boots, horses, wrestling, little singers, somersaults on bicycles, and a thousand of the thousand events that make beautiful our present day! ...²

How did FEKS hope to combine this rather extravagant understanding of the ideal plot with the demands of their day? What was their perspective on and interpretation of "our beautiful present day"? FEKS' film from the end of the 1920s can be described as a politically correct plot set in an eccentric frame, a frame that suddenly becomes the prevailing component, thus forcing "the general line" out to the periphery of the film and away from the recipients' attention. In *The Devil's Wheel*, the moral downfall of a sailor from the *Aurora* is overshadowed by a distraction: a lingering, savoring look at Leningrad's dark demimonde.³ While the legendary cruiser shows up in the film for only a few brief moments, the underworld is depicted abundantly, with knowledge, understanding, and pleasure. The viewer is shown lowly bars, flophouses, and the "Coliseum" of Leningrad NEP idlers, Narodny (People's) House.

In the film *SVD* (1927; the abbreviation stands for “Soiuz Velikogo Dela,” or the Union of the Great Deed⁴) one sees the Decembrist Revolt (1825) frivolously framed by the realms of the circus and the bordello. A passion for the circus was common for FEKS and their onetime guru, Sergei Eisenstein.⁵ Circuses ideally realized the spirit of eccentricity. The authors “just” had to hide their revolutionary protagonist from Tsarist government prosecution in a vagrant circus booth. This plot twist gave the authors the possibility of showing all kinds of circus attractions, just what young Jutkevich enumerates with such excitement: “horses, wrestlers, somersaults on bicycles.”

Another locus of the protagonist’s hide-and-seek happens to be a provincial bordello, where he finds himself—naturally—by mistake. There, the protagonist becomes an object of derision for the prostitutes and their clients. FEKS (again, like their mentor Eisenstein⁶) liked to play with different aspects of sexuality and show it in grotesque, outré mode: such as the hyperbolized sex appeal of the underage *fille-fatale* Val’ka in *The Devil’s Wheel* (this story is, first of all, a story of carnal seduction!).⁷ Such are the types of Paris operetta divas in *New Babylon* (1929). After all, sexual attraction is one of the most obvious and effective kinds of attraction, and FEKS rushed to include it on their juicy menu.

In *New Babylon*, the last relatively unorthodox film by FEKS, the viewer witnesses the defeat of the French Commune (1871). Typically for this phase of FEKS’ output, the massacre and the rise of consciousness among the masses are depicted against a background of “ideologically inappropriate” phenomena: operetta, cancan, and the shadowy world of Toulouse Lautrec. All these attractions inevitably become distractions. Instead of following the central—and usually rather bleak—revolutionary plot line, the viewer gladly loses himself among picturesque swindlers, corpulent prostitutes, and fearless circus-actors.

The viewer witnesses an obvious inversion of the center of gravity: the narrative margin with its embellishments becomes more important for both the filmmakers and the audience than the main story at the film’s presumed center. In *The Devil’s Wheel*, the emotional center shifts to what was supposed to be on the fringes of the film. Thus, the politically correct *bildungsroman* of the sailor from the *Aurora* turns into a crime novel, a melodrama with an adventure plot overlaid with the elements of a delinquent burlesque. Vigilant Soviet critics immediately noticed this ideological “misbalance”: “The return of the sailor looks like cheap propaganda, badly sewn into the Soviet threads of *The Devil’s Wheel*; memories of the October revolution are out of place here; authors just use them as their cover to sell us their contraband, a totally delinquent film.”⁸ The

watchful critics felt a gap between the two levels of this narrative: FEKS, in their ardor, could not (or perhaps would not) find adequate connective tissue for the plot of their dream and the plot of the new Soviet reality.

B. Eccentric Hero

Following the rules of the crime melodrama game, Kozintsev and Trauberg filled their early films with unforgettable representatives of the underworld, grotesque and somewhat frightening, yet touching and lively:

In *The Devil’s Wheel*, according to the rules of the genre, special attention is paid to the image of the eccentric villain ... A conjurer-robber, played by Sergei Gerasimov,⁹ always makes sure that his snow-white shirt cuffs are perfect before his performance ... And even when he dies, in bloody rags, he repeats his favorite gesture: he sets right his non-existent shirt cuffs and falls dead.¹⁰



Sergei Gerasimov as romantic villain in *SVD*

While FEKS failed to create an interesting positive hero,¹¹ they offered a negative type that was both humane and charismatic. The “conjurer-robber” from *The Devil’s Wheel* has a polysemantic pseudonym: *Chelovek-Vopros*. This

pseudonym can be understood and translated in different ways: man / person / individual – question / problem / issue. My understanding is that FEKS reflected their anxieties regarding the gradual disappearance of the individual in Soviet art of the end of the 1920s through this image and his “name.” Through this grotesque and yet charming protagonist, FEKS reminded their audience of the possible extinction of the individual as the main subject or problem of art. Looking for points of intersection between works by Eisenstein and works by FEKS, *Sailor from Aurora* can be perceived as a kind of attempt to create a marginal reality in relationship to another famous “ship” film of the time, *Potemkin* (1925), where individual lives were replaced with crowd scenes and the thrills of the plot were rather impersonal and politically sublime.

One of the reasons that the Question-Man is sympathetic is that he embodies the creative, artistic element in *The Devil's Wheel*. He is a conjurer, a circus performer, and the agent of eccentricity in the film: he attracts attention like a magnet, robbing the central hero of this attention. At the end, Vania Shorin loses the spectator's sympathy as well as his girlfriend's sympathy, but regains the ideological favor of the *Aurora* cruiser in the dim light of Leningrad sunrise.¹² When the irresistible Question-Man dramatically falls with his citadel-house, the spectator experiences this closure as the real climax of the plot, “the real end of the story.”¹³ This final scene is highly and, I suppose, intentionally parody-like and theatrical: Question's demise is not a short or easy one. Similar to the tenor in Italian opera, whose final aria with the dagger in his chest lasts for another fifteen minutes, the likable villain of FEKS manages to demonstrate his most unforgettable grimaces while dying (I suppose it was precisely these grimaces that were evaluated by the Soviet critic as



Final grimaces of the Question-Man

“pathological”). The fact that his death interrupts this amazing spectacle leaves the spectator sad and frustrated. In this grimacing gesture, the audience of *The Devil's Wheel* loses its true hero.

C. Eccentric Position

The early FEKS themselves recognized their position in contemporary culture as off-center. Trauberg writes that his creative partner Kozintsev liked to quote the American actress Ellen Terry: “In order to be eccentric, you have to be aware of where the center is.”¹⁴ Trauberg continues in a humble and vague tone: “We were not aware where the center was ... Our contemporaries: Maiakovskii, Eisenstein, Dovzhenko knew. That's why we cannot be called their equals. They were—the center itself. We were in the orbit. But not outside the center!”¹⁵ What does this ambiguous and self-contradictory positioning mean: not in the center, yet not outside of it? Where is this mysterious place? I argue that FEKS tried desperately to find an aesthetic and ideological niche where they could hide from the all-penetrating eye of the center. Though trying to be ideologically correct and choosing appropriate subjects for their films, these young artists could not help simultaneously betraying the values of the center with devices and ideas that could then exist only at the margin. Serving two masters would lead Kozintsev, Trauberg, and their motley crew to total Sovietization during the 1930s, but in the 1920s FEKS' relationship with the center was still ripe with controversies. Undoubtedly, at the beginning FEKS were heavily influenced by “Muscovites” (especially, Eisenstein). FEKS never negated this line of heredity: “FEKS began as Eisenstein's disciples. They reminded us of the rabble in his *Strike*.”

The drastic change in our FEKS' life happened when Kozintsev and Trauberg returned from Moscow where they saw *Strike* by Eisenstein. In his memoirs, Gerasimov retrospectively ascribes his teacher's humble yearning for political correctness: “‘Everything that we've done before was rubbish. This should be finished with!’—they told us with enthusiasm and excitement.”¹⁶

What do Eisenstein's *Strike* (1924) and *The Devil's Wheel* have in common, and how are these works different? The famous rabble episode in *Strike* feels like a savory appendix to the main body of the film. In this episode, the despicable capitalist owners of the factory call for the help of the local delinquent element in order to disrupt the workers' strike. Eisenstein shows urban scum with his usual physicality; it consists of freaks and dwarfs, barrel dwellers who hang cats and hunt their lice. Retrospectively,

one can see it as Eisenstein's farewell homage to the infatuations of his youth: the circus and the sometimes-scandalous avant-garde theater [*Na vsiakogo mudretsa dovol'no prostoty* (1923) "The Sage"]. The main display in the film, however, in spite of the director's whims and wild fantasies, is the faceless collective of the factory that replaces individual protagonists and the generalized event of the strike that stands in for a plot. The main difference between Eisenstein's and the FEKS' approaches to the



Famous rabble scene from Eisenstein's Strike. Life in barrels.

grotesque is evident from the space it occupies in their works. While Eisenstein obviously enjoyed his deviant distractions, he reins them in tightly, denying them screen time and centrality in the story. Indeed, his rabble episode lasts several minutes at most. The FEKS simply cannot resist the shady charms of their criminal subjects. Kozintsev lovingly describes the carnivalesque process of film shooting:

What have we turned the peaceful corridors of Leningradkino into! Respectable people stumbled over dwarves, dodged giants ... Dirty beggars snuffled ... Everywhere, something was disappearing, somebody was getting robbed. Silent people lay on the pavestones covered with just some old rug ... Gloomy gazes surreptitiously followed us everywhere ... Dirty homeless children crawled among the ruins.¹⁷

But they feared admitting their marginality, even to themselves, and reinvented their position as a mitigated version of the center's position. While FEKS deluded themselves with fantasies of some proximity to the desired center, official critics of the time immediately felt that FEKS were not "one of them," and that, in fact, they were ideological outsiders, if not enemies:

The Devil's Wheel is not beneath criticism; it's outside criticism. Pre-revolutionary street papers published such novels for literate street sweepers ... *The Devil's Wheel* is a good example of this "Van'ka's" literature. This is pulp fiction: cheap, vulgar, boring, trying to "stick" to our Revolution!¹⁸

Significantly, the critic denies locating FEKS on the vertical ideological axis: "they are not beneath," but "outside" Soviet film criticism. I suspect that this verdict, this spatial situation, was quite acceptable for both sides. The position allowed FEKS to construe themselves as some kind of friendly aliens that from their remote orbit enthusiastically observe the politically correct doings of the center. Once Soviet critics placed FEKS on the margin of their ideological "estate," they could justify ignoring the Leningrad weirdoes. This "leaving FEKS in peace" can be understood as such only in the Soviet context: instead of a campaign of persecution, the Soviet critics turned up their noses from the grotesque visions of Kozintsev, Trauberg & Co. This "secret pact of non-aggression" lasted until the 1930s and resulted in a happy ending, Soviet style: with their *Maksim Trilogy*, the former FEKS members demonstrated their ultimate devotion to the ideas of center.

Notes

¹*Letopis' Rossiiskogo kino*, 1863–1929, p. 529.

² FEKS, *Manifest*, Petrograd, 1922, p. 8.

³ On this matter, one outraged *apparatchik* Bliakhin wrote: "one gets an impression that there is no other youth in Leningrad but for all kinds of rabble, robbers and petty thieves." *Letopis' Rossiiskogo kino. 1863–1929*, Moskva, 2004, p. 523.

⁴The witty protagonist-villain creates a pun significantly changing it into "Soiuz Velikogo Dela" (Union of the Merry Deed).

⁵ In his seminal essay "Montage of attractions" (1923), Eisenstein toyed enthusiastically with the circus devices that he used and abused in the "Sage." After enumeration of the extravagant circus numbers, Eisenstein concludes: "The real school of the editor are the cinema and, importantly, the music hall and the circus." Sergei Eisenstein, "Monazh attrakcionov" in *Montazh*, Moskva, 1998, p. 20. For a discussion of the connection between Eisenstein's conception of the "montage of attractions" and FEKS, see Mario Verdone, *La FEKS*, Paris, 1968, p. 15.

⁶ For the most up-to-date and relevant analyses of Eisenstein's treatment of and obsession with carnal matters, see: Anne Nesbet, *Savage Junctures: Sergei Einstein and the Shape of Thinking*, London, 2003.

continued on page 18

University Library News

Acquisitions by Slavic and East European Collections

Allan Urbanic, Berkeley's librarian for Slavic and East European collections, reported very exciting news from the spring semester. The Associate University Librarian for Collections along with the Collections Council invited proposals by the campus collections for acquiring items too costly for their regular budgets. All nine proposals submitted by Slavic Collections were approved. The items that Allan was able to purchase were not previously available in any University of California collection, totalled over \$120,000, and covered a wide range of historical and cultural topics. The ISEES Title VI grant contributes funds for acquisitions by Slavic Collections, including a small portion towards this purchase.

Here is a list with a brief summary of the items purchased.

Anti-Soviet Newspapers: 1918–1922

The set contains 493 titles on 91 reels of microfilm. The newspapers were in the possession of the Russian National Library but only recently were made available to scholars. The largest part of the collection is the White Movement papers published in territories controlled by its armies. The second group is papers that were published in territories occupied by the Red Army but whose editorial position was anti-Bolshevik. The last group contains a small number of titles that were published in Harbin, China. A finding aid entitled *Nesovetskie gazety 1918–1922. Katalog sobraniia Rossiiskoi natsional'noi biblioteki* (St. Petersburg, 2003) was compiled by G. V. Mikheeva.

Religious Dissent in Russia: Old Believers and their Cultural Heritage

The collection is comprised of three installments numbering almost 1,500 microfiche. Installment I consists of 24 periodicals published from 1905 to 1918. Installment II contains 27 Cyrillic books published between 1906 and 1916. The final installment covers 72 titles of Old Believer secular literature from the same time period.

Muslims in Russia

"This collection introduces the uniquely varied and poorly explored Russian Muslim population during one of the most dynamic periods of their history (1861–1918).

Materials published in Russia both at the center and on the periphery reflect the picturesque palette of life of Muslims in the Russian Empire, as well as the positions of their public and political figures" (from the collection brochure). The set consist of 11 serial titles contained on 39 microfiche and 49 microfilm reels.

Slavonic Bibles

The bibles in this collection, published in two sets, were filmed from the holdings of the Moscow State University Library. There are 125 titles in the collection on 1,600 microfiches representing complete bibles, New Testaments, Psalms, Acts of the Apostles, and other examples of biblical literature. Included are the first Slavonic Bible published by the Belorussian printer Franciscus Skorina and the several titles printed by Ivan Fedorov.

Jewish Cultural Renaissance in Imperial Russia: Rare Russian-Jewish Publications from the Late 19th– Early 20th Century

"In 1917, there were more Jews living in the Russian Empire than anywhere else in the world. The Jewish population in Russia had grown from 1.6 million in 1820 to 5.6 million in 1910. This collection provides insights into such questions as: What did it mean to be Jewish and Russian, Jewish and modern? Should Jews acculturate, and if so, into which regional or European culture? Which language should Jews speak and teach their children? And what was the relationship between the elite and the popular, the Jewish and the Slavic, the literary and the historical research?" (from the collection brochure). Forty-eight titles are represented on 678 microfiche.

Dissent in Poland

This collection was filmed from the archives of the KARTA Center, which was founded in Warsaw in 1982. The collection documents the history of opposition and dissent in post-World War II Poland. Its three main components are: 1) the Solidarity Movement, 2) the Eastern Archive which concentrates on the fates of Polish citizens who were persecuted in the USSR between the years 1939 and 1956, and 3) the Opposition Archives which focuses on the

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Faculty and Student News

Neil Abrams, Ph.D. candidate in political science, and **Nicole Eaton** and **Christine Evans**, Ph.D. candidates in the history department, were each awarded funding for 2006–07 from the Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad Program.

Sener Akturk, Ph.D. candidate in political science, published an article entitled “Between Aristotle and the Welfare State” in the April 2006 issue of *Theoria*. Sener also received his department’s Peter Odegard Memorial Award for AY 2005–06.

Boris Barkanov, Ph.D. candidate in political science, participated in the Arizona State University Institute for Qualitative Research Methods in January 2006. He presented a paper on the production of academic economic thought at Moscow State University from 1985 to 2000.



George W. Breslauer (Peg Skorpinski photo)

George Breslauer, professor of political science, is taking up the position of Executive Vice-Chancellor and Provost of UC Berkeley beginning July 1. He was previously the Executive Dean of the College of Letters and Science and Dean of Social Sciences.

Kristen Ghodsee (Ph.D. in education, 2002) is the author of *The Red Riviera: Gender, Tourism and Postsocialism on*

the Black Sea (Duke University Press, 2005). Kristen will spend the 2006–07 academic year as a fellow in the School of Social Science at the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study.

Everyday Life in Early Soviet Russia: Taking the Revolution Inside, which was coedited by **Christina Kiaer** and **Eric Naiman**, was published in late 2005 by Indiana University Press. Kiaer, an associate professor of art history at Columbia University, is a UC Berkeley alumna, and Naiman is an associate professor in the comparative literature and Slavic departments here at Berkeley. Among the contributors were **Evgenii Bershtein**, **Lilya Kaganovsky**, and **Boris Wolfson**, all Ph.D.s from our Slavic department.

Julia McAnallen, Ph.D. candidate in the Slavic department, received a Graduate Division Summer Grant for research on Slavic cognitive linguistics.

Amy Moore, Ph.D. candidate in comparative literature, presented a paper on contemporary Ukrainian literature at a graduate student symposium in March 2006, which was sponsored by the University of Toronto’s Centre for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies.

Elena Morabito, Ph.D. candidate in Slavic languages and literatures, presented a paper on Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian linguistic corpora at a conference sponsored by the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, in February 2006.

Yuri Slezkine, professor of history and ISEEEES director, received the Ronald S. Lauder Award for Eastern European Studies for his book *The Jewish Century* (Princeton University Press, 2004). This recognition was part of the 2005 National Jewish Book Awards, which were presented by the Jewish Book Council in April 2006.

Victoria Smolkin, Ph.D. candidate in history, was awarded a Social Science Research Council Pre-Dissertation Research Fellowship for research in Russia and a summer grant from Berkeley’s Graduate Division.

Cinzia Solari, Ph.D. candidate in sociology, contributed “Professionals and Saints: How Immigrant Careworkers Negotiate Gendered Identities at Work” to the June 2006 issue of *Gender & Society* [20(3): 301–331].


Jarrold Tanny, Ph.D. candidate in history, presented a paper, "Tough Jews in Odessa," at a November 2005 conference in Odessa. The conference was entitled "Odessa and Jewish civilization."

Richard Taruskin, professor of music, was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in spring 2006. He is the author of the six-volume work *The Oxford History of Western Music* (2005).

Susanne Wengle, Ph.D. candidate in political science, received a grant for 2006–07 from the William Davidson Institute for Social Research to conduct fieldwork on electricity privatization in Russia.

Robert Wessling (Ph.D. in Slavic, 1998) is now the interim program officer for Stanford University's Introduction to the Humanities Program. In August 2006, Robert will serve as the study leader of the Trans-Siberian Rail Program, organized by the American Museum of Natural History in Washington, DC. He'll provide lectures to a group traveling on the Trans-Siberian railroad.

Jason Wittenberg, assistant professor in the Department of Political Science, is the author of the recently published volume *Crucibles of Political Loyalty: Church Institutions and Electoral Continuity in Hungary* (Cambridge University Press, 2006).



Upcoming Events

July 16–23, 2006. *Performance:* The Russian National Orchestra will perform at the Festival del Sole in Napa Valley. At Lincoln Theater, 100 California Dr, Yountville; times vary by date. Fees: \$45-125. Tickets are available through the Lincoln Theater Box Office, (707) 944-1300 or through Ticketweb, <http://www.ticketweb.com/>. Contact: Festival del Sole, <http://festivaldelsole.com/napavalley/> or (212) 994-3537.

Friday, July 21, 2006. *Performance:* The San Francisco Symphony will perform works by Shostakovich, Tchaikovsky, and Prokofiev. At Davies Symphony Hall, 201 Van Ness Ave, San Francisco, 8 p.m. Fees: \$15-64. Tickets are available through SFS Ticket Services at (415) 864-6000 or <http://www.sfsymphony.org/>. Contact: San Francisco Symphony, <http://www.sfsymphony.org/> or (415) 552-8000.

Saturday, July 29, 2006. *Festival:* Fort Ross Heritage Day, celebrating Russian America at Fort Ross. The festival includes Orthodox Christian liturgy in St. Nicholas Cathe-

dral, musical and dance performances, and historical demonstrations. At Fort Ross State Historic Park, 19005 Coast Highway One, Jenner, 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. Fees: Park admission is free. Parking: \$20 per car, \$15 seniors. No dogs, please. Contact: Fort Ross State Historic Park, (707) 847-3286 or <http://www.fortrossstatepark.org/>.

Wednesday, September 6, 2006. *Performance:* The San Francisco Symphony's Opening Gala concert will feature works by Stravinsky and Dvorak. At Davies Symphony Hall, 201 Van Ness Ave, San Francisco, 8:30 p.m. Single tickets for the 2006–07 season go on sale August 28. Contact: San Francisco Symphony, <http://www.sfsymphony.org/> or (415) 552-8000.

Save the Date!

Wednesday, October 11, 2006. *Annual Fall Reception.* In the Toll Room, Alumni House, 4 p.m. Sponsored by ISEES.

Russia's "Strategic Partnership" with the United States: Predetermined Breakup?

Denis Alexeev

*Denis Alexeev is an associate professor of history and international relations at Saratov State University in Russia and a professor of the Academy of Military Studies of the Russian Federation. He was a visiting scholar with ISEEEES during spring 2006 with support from a Carnegie Research Fellowship.**

Criticisms. Where from here?

Historically, relations between Russia and the United States have gone through periods of ascent and decline, from Cold War to rapprochement, depending on changing political priorities and differing national interests. During the Putin presidency, the two countries verged on very promising times of close friendship, but by the beginning of 2006, bilateral relations reached probably one of the most difficult and ambivalent phases since the Kosovo crisis in 1999. Mutual criticisms have become commonplace and can be seen and heard not only in the public media, but also in offices of high-ranking officials and political leaders in both countries.

Commentators tend to explain this phenomenon with a variety of reasons. Many of them include Russia's authoritarian drift, the creation of a system of so-called "managed democracy" with extremely strong and irresistible "vertical power" as its backbone, state control over some media, and the creation of conditions that make the proper functioning of political opposition impossible. Others are talking about the US's overwhelmingly strong desire to promote democracy globally and its aspirations to acquire the exclusive monopoly on determining what democracy really is. Many observers also mention that continuing US criticism of Russia's internal policy combined with the US striving to intervene and play a greater role in the post-Soviet space simultaneously undermine Russian interests. All of these factors produce nothing but American doubts in Russia's choice to be a reliable and predictable partner, as well as nationalism and anti-Americanism in Russia.

At the same time, some scholars stress that these disagreements, which lie on the surface and which became

an obvious reason for contemporary harshness in US-Russia relations, are just the tip of the iceberg. The real causes of this situation are more diverse and of a more complicated nature—a nature that is rooted in the Cold War, as well as in the political culture, mentality, and methods of state-building that have existed in both countries for centuries, and that now results in misunderstanding and frustration.

This paper argues that US-Russia relations in the post-Soviet period have a strong and developing potential for inconsistency, something that has become more and more obvious during the second term of the Putin and Bush presidencies. The "strategic partnership" supported by these presidents has proven to be a kind of desire for the impossible and a grasping at the unreachable, based primarily on the personal relationships and personal views of two leaders. Following this pattern, it is not surprising that relations between the two countries have become so complex and ambivalent.

Modern goals and agendas vs. the Soviet legacy

When he came into power, Putin brought with him the lessons of Yeltsin's politics and demonstrated Yeltsin's pragmatism, understanding the necessity to overcome Russian disintegration and economic decline and respecting the fact that forming a partnership with the West is inevitable. He also understood that despite their ambitions and rhetoric, European countries have neither powerful instruments nor the will and desire to oppose the global leadership of the United States. This forced the Russian president to attach primary importance to US-Russia

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relations. At the same time, as a successor to the Soviet Union, Russia carried forward its legacy, certain obligations, and some instinctive patterns in bilateral relations with the United States.

1. How relations with the US plays an important role for Russian self-identification.

If we looked at the number of bilateral agreements signed between the US and Russia during the last several years, we would find that a significant portion of them touch upon the most “global” problems of contemporary security. The same concerns prevail in many current initiatives that deal with security, putting the focus on three major fields of cooperation: controlling the strategic balance of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), nuclear nonproliferation, and fighting international terrorism. The nature of these issues lends a certain color to the general background of bilateral relations between Russia and the United States.

Apparently, cooperation with the United States remains crucial for Russia in a large number of issues, from terrorism to energy security. It forces Russian leaders to maintain a calm tone in response to criticism of their internal policy. Western and particularly American recognition is still important for Russian political leaders, which most of them seek for legitimating and sustaining the international authority of the Russian state. At the same time, Russian politicians and experts insist on keeping the “equal character” of partnership viable, which at times, in their opinion, has proven to be questionable or inadequate.¹

2. Striving for engagement. Isolation is not in Russia’s interests, and US support is a very important if not the crucial factor.

Its current stage of economic development has allowed Russia to set up broader goals in its foreign policy. If Russia has not totally overcome its previous years of decline and political degradation, today, in many ways, it at least demonstrates positive dynamics towards normalization. This gives some grounds for analysts to assert that “considering Russia’s history, intellectual resources, size, huge natural resources and, finally, the level of development of its Armed Forces, this country will not agree to the status of a state that is ‘led’, it will seek to establish itself as an independent center of a multipolar world.”² At the same time, the more ambitious of Russian goals can hardly be reached without deep engagement into the system of international relations and security, something that appears difficult without the support of the United States.

Hence, one of the major Russian goals is closely connected to the intent of gaining positive dynamics in its relations with the United States, aiming for US support to give Russia the credibility to return to the club of global powers. Emerging as a global power makes the enduring Russian idea of multipolar international relations more sensible. (It is suitable to mention here the nostalgia of some Russians for the Soviet Union’s strength and of Putin’s speech that described the USSR’s collapse as the major geopolitical disaster of 20th century.³) Reaching this ambitious objective, in the opinion of many Russian leaders, will give additional support and legitimacy to strengthening their power inside the country. Achieving these goals requires, along with political will, adapting new patterns for international behavior and for Russia’s self-positioning on the international scene, requirements that are not yet fully understood by the Russian elite.

Recent developments, however, show a lack of modern attitude among the elite towards Russian foreign policy. The Russian political elite tends to revive to some extent the model of Soviet behavior in dealing with its American and other Western partners. The key features of this policy may be described as follows:

- Strong emphasis on nuclear weapons as a key protection against threats (sustaining the old nuclear potential and developing new weapons, the “First Strike” option, reflected in Russian military doctrine, etc.);
- Use of economic instruments as a tool for Russian foreign policy to apply pressure;
- Supporting or developing relations with ambivalent, if not rogue, regimes (in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Southern Europe) for strengthening this nation’s position in the international arena;
- Creating and developing alliances and coalitions aimed at the promotion and assurance of national interests and military power, such as the Collective Defense Treaty and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (particularly with Belarus, China, Kazakhstan, and Armenia).

This kind of practice produces a rather difficult situation for Russian decision makers. They are forced to strike a balance between new goals and realities and old methods. The extent to which it is possible to combine the two is very difficult to tell. Using these kinds of instruments may be successful for the short term and highly questionable in the long run. One of the possible examples in support of this thesis was expressed by Andrey Piontkovsky, the leading expert of the Institute of Systems

Analysis, who compared Russia's policy of support for the Hamas leadership in the Palestinian Authority with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact before World War II, stressing that this practice of negotiating with terrorist organizations has no future and that "anti-Western" terrorist rhetoric may be easily used against Russia when it is needed.⁴

So it seems to be a difficult task for contemporary Russian leaders to combine old and new tendencies. Apparently, old Soviet techniques of making foreign policy seem the most suitable way to today's Russian elite. By making itself feel relatively strong economically, Russia can start taking back its significant status on the international scene. This combination of a Soviet past and the post-Soviet present created the unique nature of the Russian political elite today, and apparently this nature will remain a determinant in the years to come.

US views on cooperation. Why Russia matters.

It is worth saying that there were two major American attempts of rapprochement with Russia. America's early enthusiasm to make Russia a "partner," which existed at the beginning of 1990s and was promoted by the Clinton Administration, was finally replaced with disappointment in Russia's inability for quick transformation. Clinton's strategy was criticized as having the wrong attitude. This strategy was, as Zbigniew Brzezinski put it, an example of "idealistic optimism" and "flawed in its assumptions, focused on wrong strategic goals and dangerous in its likely geopolitical consequences."⁵ A second attempt to establish a "strategic partnership" was possible after changes in the Russian leadership and the image of Russian elite and after dramatic events of 9/11.

Clearly, there are several reasons for the United States to be concerned with having positive dynamics in bilateral relations, which fit into its overall set of national interests. Included are the following:

1. Managing strategic stability and cooperation on nonproliferation of WMD and the systems of their delivery remains the most crucial point in international political and military discourse, as repeatedly confirmed by many American politicians and commentators. Excluding Russia from this dialogue would inevitably undermine the credibility and success of such efforts.
2. The war on terrorism also offers some space for close cooperation, including sharing intelligence and preventing terrorist groups from possessing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. However, in recent times there have been difficulties that under-

mine the very promising dynamics in cooperation after 9/11.

3. Despite a dramatic loss of political weight after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia continues to play an important role in the international political arena and will continue to affect all existing mechanisms of international security on institutional (UN, NATO, OSCE, etc.) and purely geopolitical levels. Hence, changing Russia's place within the greater system of Eurasian security inevitably attracts the attention of the US. Both of the possible scenarios—Russia's decline or acquiring a stronger position—are factors that should be taken into consideration. Russia's borders with the EU, China, Japan, and the Caucasus will continue to exert influence on US foreign policy because of America's strong economic and political ties with its allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.
4. American concerns about its energy security may also be connected to Russia. Russia's continuing ascent as a strong exporter of natural resources, particularly oil and gas, as well as Russia's involvement in several important energy projects in Eurasia, including the Caspian Basin, makes this country at least one among the most influential players in this field in the years to come.

Over the course of time and in response to changes in the international environment, including transformations that occurred both inside and outside Russia, two major strategies began to shape America's policy toward Russia. The nature of these tendencies was clearly outlined by an American group of high-ranking policy makers and influential scholars: "Some have suggested a narrower focus: choose one or two interests—nonproliferation, for example—and keep disagreement over Russia's growing authoritarianism from undermining cooperation on these priorities. Others favor a process of disengagement—exclude Russia from forums, especially the Group of Eight (G8), that are supposed to reflect common values."⁶

At the same time, many specialists in Russia stress that neither of those strategies has long-term successful implications. An effective approach to dealing with Russia should be more complex, to include instruments that focus not only on the external, but also on Russia's more sensitive internal policy. The nexus between the nature of Russia's current regime and the national interests of the United States has become more obvious. Using the words of Goldgeier and McFaul: "Let's stop pretending that Russia's deteriorating domestic politics are unrelated to Russia's increasingly antagonistic and anti-American

foreign policies. The same autocratic regime is responsible for both.”⁷ Hence, only a systematic kind of approach would be effective. In the short term, such an approach would help to diminish the negative consequences of Russia’s authoritarian drift. In the long run, it may help to make Russia less antagonistic and more predictable.

Wrong expectations and perceptions form a peculiar ground for relations

Interestingly enough, the history of US-Russia relations since the end of Cold War is based on wrong expectations and perceptions by both parties.

First, at the beginning of 90s, Russia’s new political elite, as well as many everyday Russian citizens, was hoping that after the end of global ideological confrontation Russia would remain a priority in the American political agenda. Second, Russia’s declaration of support and adherence to democratic values would inevitably mean its relatively fast drift toward the West, which in turn would be welcomed by yesterday’s rivals. Third, Western countries and particularly the US would eventually recognize and be willing to sustain Russia’s superpower status, which was an integral part of the image of Soviet Union.⁸ In reality, the euphoria of victory in the Cold War produced the opposite views in the United States. Russia was perceived as the party who lost the global competition and who should accept its relatively weak status for a long time, if not forever.

The initial stage of differing attitudes toward bilateral relations was replaced by another set of disappointments:

- Economic reforms and a free market did not produce any momentous democratization of the Russian state and the creation of a civil society.
- Russian democratic rhetoric proved to be an instrument for legitimating of status of the new Russian elite and a prerequisite to keep receiving Western (particularly American) political and financial support, while at the same time, the Russian elite was conducting outrageous privatization of national property and distributing the control over major natural resources among a close circle of future oligarchs.
- Meanwhile, the United States preferred to turn a blind eye to the ineffective policy of Yeltsin’s team of young reformers and the enormous level of corruption they reached—and at times the US even championed it.⁹

- Disillusion among the Russian public, growing anti-Americanism, and Russia’s continuing dramatic economic decline in the second half of 90s provoked in the United States the spread of the idea (especially among the Administration and Congress) to “forget” and/or “ignore” weak and insignificant Russia.

Consequently, along with other conditions, the “forget Russia” path led to dramatic events of discord immediately upon the beginning of the NATO-led military operation in Yugoslavia. The protesting voice of economically weak and politically unstable Russia was hardly heard in the United States, and the best then–Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov could do was turn back his plane over the Atlantic and refuse to accept American financial support for Russia’s post-default economy.

Putin’s ascent to power created another set of wrong expectations and perceptions. The events of 9/11 and Putin’s open support for the US and its antiterrorist campaign gave a lot of credibility to his repeated claims of closeness to the West, and that, in turn, gave Russia a certain indulgence for the war in Chechnya, which was represented by Russian officials as one of the fronts in the global war on terrorism.

With that in mind, Russia expected to gain American support in the economic and political spheres, yet it didn’t receive any favors in sensitive issues like repealing the Jackson-Vanick Amendment, NATO enlargement, and economic disputes over steel and agricultural products, the WTO, and so on. In fact, Russia received little in exchange. Very soon Chechnya ceased to be the only satisfactory concession. Additionally problematic were the US’s active and undisguised policy in the former Soviet republics, its support for the color revolutions, and growing possibilities of extending US military positions and presence in Eastern Europe with the support of new NATO members (Poland, Romania, Bulgaria). All of these have created a certain suspicion about the place and role the United States seeks in the post-9/11 world and whether these positions will be gained without any serious harm to Russia’s national interests.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to add that the United States chose to be relatively calm about Russia’s internal policy. Active Russian support for the US-led antiterrorist coalition was a satisfactory sign of Russia’s move in the “right direction.” For quite some time Russia was not perceived as an “issue requiring a policy.”¹⁰ Many Western analysts, officials, and scholars have repeatedly stressed that Putin’s Russia sought to move from a “periphery of uncertainty” and “troubled economic hardship” toward the core states that enjoy “democratic peace.” Putin’s policy

aimed for an unquestioned pro-Western orientation and positively differed from the Yeltsin period.¹¹ A large number of Western observers were comfortable believing that Russia was moving in the right direction; however, some commentators realized what the true driving force was.

Over the course of time, the reality became more or less clear: Russia was trying to surmount Yeltsin's legacy of disintegration and uncertainty and to become more powerful and influential. Pro-Western orientation was just an instrumental attribute for this policy, something necessary to achieve the above-mentioned goals. Assuring the personal power of those who became Russia's new elite was also one of the main priorities, and pro-Western rhetoric was necessary for Russia's recognition by Europe and the US. But the question of whether the West would be comfortable with a stronger and more powerful Russia was left out of the discourse. This question seemed to be delayed, as nobody expected that dealing with a more powerful and West-suspicious Russia would become a reality so soon. The idea that "Russia turned decisively to the West while at the same time recasting its Eastern policy" had become a widespread belief in the West.¹² But there was unwillingness or inability on the part of the West, and in the United States in particular, to realize that Russia's way of preserving such a policy might be contradictory with the preferable image of this country. The reemergence of active Russian policy towards Iran, Palestine, and China as well as Russia's position on the American invasion in Iraq has shown some controversial reactions. For Russian decision makers, active Eastern and Western policies proved to be difficult to combine, if not mutually exclusive.

The emergence of serious controversy in the perception of the long-term goals in Russia's foreign policy has a relatively simple explanation. The nature of the political regime in Russia led to the situation when, de facto, the only noticeable figure in Russian foreign policy is Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. His Western counterparts have watched him and listened to his speeches at summits and high-level meetings, but what was going behind him inside Russia over a long period of time seemed less important. There was a widespread feeling of normality as soon as Russia had a leader who repeatedly declared adherence to Western values. The wake up was severe! Many people in the American ruling elite realized that not only did they feel uncomfortable with Russia's transformed policy, but also they have neither leverage nor tools strong enough to influence Russian foreign and—most importantly—internal policy, which according to many commentators is a source of problems with Russia today. The wrong image of Russia

in the early days after Yeltsin has become obvious today. "We (the US) thought that we can choose between the options to cooperate with Russia or to ignore it. Now it becomes clear that we cannot ignore Russia, and it becomes more and more difficult to cooperate with Putin."¹³

For a long time American experts would make a real distinction between Russian foreign policy under Putin and anti-Western sentiments among average Russians. "A key dilemma is that public opinion has become nationalistic and assertive even during the times of economic growth."¹⁴ This was considered as one of many "paradoxical" trends that exist in contemporary Russia. However, through more detailed analysis it can hardly be defined as a trend that has its basis only in the rudiments of the Cold War and the troubled economic and liberal-democratic reforms of the 90s. During the past several years this image was purposefully and graciously supported by the Putin administration, politicians in the State Duma, and the mass media. Nevertheless, the US and many other Western democracies prefer to keep silent or not to pay any serious attention to it.

The consequences of these mistakes have proven to be unpleasant and to some extent irreversible. The Russian state moved from democracy toward a conservative society suspicious of Western values. This US-suspicious sentiment has become a widespread phenomenon among not only average Russians, but also among the elite. "Democratic reforms" in the Western sense are perceived as inapplicable to today's Russia. Recent criticisms about human rights violations in Russia that were expressed in the *Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2005* (published by the US Department of State) and the ideas reflected in the US's newly adopted National Security Strategy met with sharp reaction in Moscow. "Distortion of facts," "double standards," "prejudicial nature" against Russia, and "stimulation of Russia-hating sentiments in American society"—these are just some examples of terms used by Russian diplomats in reply to the critics.¹⁵ The same opinions and expressions may be heard in Putin's administration, the State Duma, and even academia.

The United States, on its side, also needs to take steps to avoid turning Russia into a serious problem. Even experienced American scholars and diplomats confess that for the last 15 years America was wrong about its idea of Russia's prospects. The problem is that the United States started with the premise "what we have now is going to continue."¹⁶ Combined with the uncertainty of how power will be transferred in 2008, the situation becomes very uncomfortable for American strategists and policy planners. Difficulties in finding a compromise with Russia on a number of critical issues finally has shown American

decision makers that its rhetoric and attitudes about today's Russia need to be changed.

Conclusion

We can see understanding and growing agreement within the American political and academic establishment that US-Russia relations cannot be seen through the narrow prism of asking simple questions about common values. Interestingly enough, similar opinions are beginning to spread among Russians. A very enthusiastic belief among Russia's political elite and academia that the creation of an anti-terrorist coalition would eventually lead Russia to a new level of rapprochement with the United States has been replaced with a gradual understanding of the deep diversity of interests (especially in the field of national security) that may seriously damage any positive achievement already made. This understanding forced Russian commentators to stress the necessity of keeping away from strict definitions in the characterization of bilateral relations. It may, in many circumstances, be misleading and incorrect to establish strict frameworks of "partnership," "strategic partnership," or even "alliance." Wrong perceptions about the nature of the countries' relations may inevitably lead to frustration and disappointments.

In my view, recognizing the necessity to seek new attitudes in bilateral relations is growing in both Russia and the United States, and that sets a promising background for the creation of new patterns of pragmatic cooperation and dialogue, which will be beneficial for both nations. This may be defined as a tardy, but at the same time positive, signal of a growing understanding of each other. However, along with some positive things, grows awareness of the strong diversity not only in "virtual" field of values, but also in more practical and down-to-earth issues like long-term national interests.

Today some journalists and commentators speak about a revival of the old Cold War spirit in US-Russia bilateral relations. It is hard to believe that either party is seriously interested in making the situation worse. Nonetheless, today we face a new phenomenon that describes the contemporary state of affairs. Located at the intersection of national interests, values, and geopolitics, US-Russia relations today clearly requires adapting new strategies that may help to avoid all previous disadvantages. History shows that many of the failures between Russia and the United States were due to misperception and wrong assumptions and expectations. The question of whether both parties learned some lessons from history remains open. Contemporary features of US-Russia relations,

according to Alexei Bogaturov, are "dynamic stability" based on the formula of "agree to disagree."¹⁷

Some of America's criticisms of Russia today are not always weighted enough or aimed at the issues that really require criticism. Moreover, in many circumstances, the United States has lost its credibility to be a critic of Russia. Russia, on the other hand, often demonstrates inadequacy. Unbalanced patriotism and a yearning to get back the status of being a great power, to a large extent, nourish this inadequacy and transform Russia into the state that is difficult to deal with. A better way to conduct bilateral relations needs to be found, and old mistakes must be avoided. It is unclear for now what kind of relationship the United States is willing to build with a stronger and more powerful Russia. What kind of policy will allow Russia to remain strong and powerful yet will not damage the spirit of partnership with the United States? What kind of policy does the US expect from the Russian side, and can Russia actually meet these expectations while continuing to focus on the protection of its national interests? Today's Russian and American elite are again destined to look for answers to difficult questions.

Notes

¹ On the issue of "equal partnership," see Vladimir Dvorkin, "Strategicheskaya Povestka Dnya. Partnerstvo v Bor'be s Ugrozami: Chto Ostalos'?" [Strategic Agenda. Partnership in Dealing with Threats: What remains?], *Russia v Globalnoi Politike* 6 (November-December 2005): 184-96.

² "Yevgeny Primakov Russia and the U.S. in Need of Trust and Cooperation," *Russia v Globalnoi Politike* 1 (January-March 2006): 135.

³ "President Putin's Annual Address to the Federal Assembly," April 25, 2005. Available at <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029_87086.shtml>.

⁴ Andrei Piontkovsky, "Pakt Lavrova-Mashalya" [The Lavrov-Mashall Pact], *Grani* (March 13, 2006). Available at <<http://www.grani.ru/Politics/Russia/m.102995.html>>.

⁵ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Premature Partnership," *Foreign Affairs* 74:2 (March/April 1994): 68.

⁶ "Russia's Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do. Uncorrected Proofs," Report of an Independent Task Force. Council of Foreign Relations, 2006, pg. 5. Available at <<http://www.cfr.org/publication/9997/>>.

⁷ James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "Russia's No Democracy. So what?" *Washington Post* (April 7, 2006). Available at <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/07/AR2006040701972.html>>.

⁸ For more on this, see E. Y. Batalov and V. A. Kremenyuk, “Soperniki ili Soratniki” [Competitors or Companions-in-arms] in Nikolai Shmelev, ed., *Rossia Mezhdru Vostokom I Zapadom: Mosty v Budushee* [Russia between East and West: Bridges to Future], Moscow: Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniya, 2003, p. 211.

⁹ See Janine R. Wedel, “Tainted Transactions: Harvard, The Chubais Clan, and Russian Ruins,” *The National Interest*, No. 59 (Spring 2000): 23–34.

¹⁰ Comments by Stephen Sestanovich, at the Council on Foreign Relations’ General Meeting: Russia Task Force Rollout with John Edwards, Jack Kemp, and Stephen Sestanovich, March 7, 2006. Available at <<http://www.cfr.org/publication/10061/>>.

¹¹ Richard Sakwa, *Putin: Russia’s Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, pg. 208; Dmitry Polikhanov and Richard Timmins, “Russian Foreign Policy under Putin,” in Cameron Ross, ed., *Russian Politics Under Putin*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2004, p. 227–8.

¹² Richard Sakwa, op. cit., pg. 229.

¹³ Todd Lefko, “Za Rossiey. Pereotsenka tsennostey” [Behind Russia: Values Revisited], *Rossiiskie vesti* (December 22, 2004). Available at <<http://www.ebiblioteka.ru/sources/article.jsp?id=7203924>>.

¹⁴ Dmitry Polikhanov and Graham Timmins, op. cit., p. 229.

¹⁵ See, for example, Commentary by Mikhail Kamynin, the spokesman of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, regarding the US State Department’s 2005 *Country Report on Human Rights Practices*, March 10, 2006. Available at <http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/5ADFBD49B0B2343BC325712D004E4786>; Russian MFA Information and Press Department Commentary Regarding the Russian Section of the National Security Strategy of the United States, March 20, 2006. Available at <http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/B089D4E727DBCC74C3257137005C5883>; Russian MFA Information and Press Department Commentary Regarding a Resolution of the US Congress House of Representatives, March 18, 2006. Available at <http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/46659FB657D2F62DC3257137004CEF0B>.

¹⁶ Comments by Stephen Sestanovich, op. cit.

¹⁷ Alexei Bogaturov, “Chem udivit Bush? Novaya voina ne sdelat liderstvo SSHA menee nepriemlymym” [What Kind of Surprise is Bush Preparing? A New War Won’t Make US Leadership Less Unacceptable], *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (November 29, 2004).

Early Soviet Film, continued from page 8

⁷ Eric Naiman perceptively describes the carnal attractions of *Devil’s Wheel*: “Valia’s connection to the flesh ... is demonstrated by a scene in which her father, a butcher punches Valia and she falls into a slab of meat.” Naiman, *Sex in Public*, p.189, fn. 28.

⁸ V. Blium, “Chertovo Koleso,” *Izvestiia*, March 28, 1926. Curiously, critics felt the same way about the writings of other non-orthodox authors of the time, for example—about Veniamin Kaverin: “And these several lines are all that Kaverin was able to say about his epoch and revolution ... In this “frame” he included everything necessary for the novel with robbery and adventures: kidnappings, drag, duels, fights, murders by mistake, mysteries ...” “O Tvorchestve Veniamina Kaverina,” *Literaturnyi gomunkulus*, p. 40.

⁹ Sergei Gerasimov (21.05.1906 – 26.11.1985), renowned film director, screenwriter, and actor, made an amazing career: from being FEKS’ favorite actor he grew into the director of the Victory parade on the Red Square in 1945.

¹⁰ Kozintsev, “Glubokii ekran,” p. 95.

¹¹ That FEKS were unable to create a convincing positive hero betrays their close connection with Russian classical literature where the lack of the positive hero was a constant problem. A decade later, Socialist realism cloned positive heroes with the frightening zeal. It is worth noticing that in the same way as the roles of the charming villain in early FEKS films is given to Gerasimov, the roles of the positive hero is given to Pyotr Sobolevskii. Thus, they created two constant types.

¹² The famous shady look of the early FEKS films was invented by their legendary cameraman Andrei Moskvin. Trauberg describes his style as “all is shadow and chiaroscuro.” See “Barthelemy Amengual: Interview with Leonid Trauberg” in Ian Christie, *Futurism, Formalism, FEKS*, New York, 1978, p. 30.

Another valuable source on Moskvin is Iakov Butovskii, *Andrei Moskvin—Kinooperator*, Petersburg, 2000.

¹³ Russel Reising, “Loose Ends: Aesthetic Closure and Social Crisis” in *Narrative Dynamics*, Ohio, 2002, p. 318.

¹⁴ Ellen Terry (1848–1928), celebrated theater actress, mother of Gordon Craig.

¹⁵ Leonid Trauberg, “Fil’m nachinaetsia,” in *Sobranie sochinenii*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1988, p. 86.

¹⁶ Sergei Gerasimov, “O Grigorii Kozintseve, moiom uchitele,” in Kozintsev, *Sobranie sochinenii*, p. 10.

¹⁷ Grigorii Kozintsev, “Glubokii ekran,” in *Sobranie Sochinenii*, p. 92.

¹⁸ V. Blium, “Chertovo Koleso,” *Izvestiia*, March 28, 1926.

Outreach Programs

Teaching About Russia Through Literature

“Russian Classics in the Classroom: Teaching About Russia Through Literature,” this year’s teacher outreach conference, took place on Saturday, April 29. The topic appealed to language arts and social science teachers at the high school and community college levels, school librarians, and even an ESL instructor of adults who wanted to better understand the culture of her Russian students.

Gregory Freidin, a professor in Stanford University’s Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, kicked off the conference with a presentation entitled “Why Russian Literature Matters—and How.” He discussed the point of connection between the historian and the poet, between the words “history” and “story” in Russian—the actual and truth. Other presentations during the conference touched on this formulation again and again. The concept of popular sovereignty was introduced to Russia during a time that its literature was flourishing. Although the Russian state tried to subsume the power of authors, their literature continued to serve the people. Over time, Freidin pointed out, Russian authors became equated with the nation, making literature inseparable from Russianness.


Harsha Ram, professor in our Slavic department, spoke next about Pushkin’s work, which he characterized as not only approachable but a joy to read. He spoke mainly on *Eugene Onegin*, Pushkin’s novel in verse that charms students with the rhythm of its particular stanzaic form and with its classic plot of boy meets girl. Ram suggested giving students two different translations of the novel to introduce them to the art of the translator. The novel also works well as an introduction to poetry (for example, compare the Onegin stanza with the structure of a sonnet) and to the great Russian novels that would follow. Literacy is another theme to explore, as the character Tatiana grows from a naive follower of plots to a skillful reader

of cultural codes. In fact, *Eugene Onegin*’s plot has been called an encyclopedia of Russian life, albeit a fictional one.

Irina Paperno, another of our Slavic department professors, presented “Tolstoy in the Classroom,” introducing us to his working style and sharing ideas for presenting him to students. Paperno described how Tolstoy struggled throughout his career with the inability of language to adequately describe his thoughts and of literature to adequately represent the entirety of an experience. For example, he wrote diaries that kept track of tasks he planned for the future and of the outcome of past events, but these reports could not capture the present. Tolstoy’s *History of Yesterday* attempted to describe a 24-hour period, but after he carefully laid the groundwork for that time frame, the book ended at the very beginning of the day. Tolstoy’s work would repeat this pattern of going back to explain and then ending at its intended beginning; *War and Peace* is a good example of that. Paperno suggested assigning students to write their own descriptions of a day. In his literary works, Tolstoy learned how to see, how to describe, and how to convey feelings with words, giving his impressions of people’s actions. But history is unable to fully describe how—and why—events occur.

Robin Feuer Miller, the Edytha Macy Gross Professor of Humanities at Brandeis University, presented “The Elephant in the Garden: *Crime and Punishment* in the Classroom.”

Because reading literature is an endangered activity in the United States, the elephant in Miller’s title is to get students to love reading—not only in the classroom, but throughout their lives. To quickly engage students, teachers can create analogies between the new text and a text or genre that students think they already know. For example, *Crime and Punishment* can be compared to a Greek or Shakespearean tragedy, as Konstantin Mochulsky does in his volume



Dostoevsky: His Life and Work (Princeton University Press, 1971). When an instructor engages with a critique of a text and presents points of disagreement or departure, this serves as a model for students to make their own informed opinions about the text. Miller also discussed what she called “the portability of reader insight,” how students can use a text to form meaningful questions about life and human interaction. In a way, making good readers serves a civic function. Miller suggests going through part one of *Crime and Punishment* slowly and carefully to ensure that students will embrace the entire novel.

Boris Wolfson, assistant professor of Slavic languages and literatures and comparative literature at the University of Southern California, spoke next on “The Secret Life of Chekhov’s Plays.” Chekhov has a reputation of writing boring plays in which nothing happens. Wolfson both acknowledged that belief and countered it during his presentation. Many schools of thought about Chekhov incorrectly restrict his work to narrow categories. Instead, Wolfson holds that Chekhov’s plays have a secret life that students should investigate like a (quiescent) detective story. Tension between the characters mounts in the second act of each play, but in the third act, when the inevitable happens, it is usually a disappointment to the reader—for example, a gun that is fired misses its intended victim. The very thing that Tolstoy struggled with, laying the groundwork for a story, is not mentioned in Chekhov’s plays, but it is always hidden one level below the script, a plausible and undefined explanation for the tension that develops during the play. Getting students to see this secret life of Chekhov’s plays shows them, in Wolfson’s words, that “there is a rich and fundamental life of the text that is much more interesting than the life that happens in the text.”

The conference ended with Olga Matich, one of Berkeley’s Slavic professors, and a group of her graduate students presenting “Teaching Russian Modernism: Andrey Bely’s *Petersburg* on the Web.” Matich and her students are creating a website connected with the novel that consists of itineraries on a map of St. Petersburg during the period of the book. A work of modernism, Bely’s novel fragments its events in space and time. While teaching this material can be more challenging than other periods of Russian literature, *Petersburg* excites students as a kind of thrilling detective story, with its terrorist plot and assassination attempt, multiple layers of subplots, and occasional moments of surrealism. The website project Matich and her students have undertaken is too large and ambitious for high school students to handle as a routine class assignment, but it has interesting pedagogical applications. The website allows readers to navigate in a non-linear fashion, a way of moving that is very familiar to high school students today, and exploring the text resembles physically

exploring a city, complete with meanderings and moments of discovery. Each graduate student took a theme related to the novel and created a text and a spatial itinerary. For example, one theme dealt with transportation such as electric trams. How does electricity and mass transit affect urban living conditions in early 20th-century Russia, and how does that compare with conditions in the United States at the same time? This project demonstrates that the novel contains numerous points to depart from the fictional text in order to make connections to both themes and events in history.

Further reference:

For suggested translations of *Eugene Onegin*, see the conference bibliography, which is available as a PDF at <http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~iseees/outreach3.html>.

In her discussion of literacy in the United States, Robin Feuer Miller made reference to the following report:

Reading at Risk: A Survey of Literary Reading in America. Research Division Report #46. National Endowment for the Arts, 2004.

And on the importance of reading and inspiring students to read:

Denby, David. *Great Books: My Adventures with Homer, Rousseau, Woolf, and Other Indestructible Writers of the Western World*. Simon & Schuster, 1997.

Parini, Jay. “The Well-Tempered Seminar.” *The Chronicle of Higher Education* 1:46 (23 July 2004).

Nussbaum, Martha C. *Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life*. Beacon Press, 1997.

Chekhov’s four major plays are *The Seagull*, *Uncle Vanya*, *The Three Sisters*, and *The Cherry Orchard*.

A description of the *Petersburg* website project was published in the fall 2005 issue of this newsletter (Vol. 22, No. 3). That issue is available as a PDF on the ISEES website at <http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~iseees/publications2.html>.

Stella Bourgoin is the ISEES outreach coordinator.

Fellowship and Other Opportunities

ISEEES Travel Grants provide limited travel support for academics and ISEEES-affiliated graduate students. Up to \$400 is awarded to those presenting a paper at a meeting of a recognized scholarly organization. Awards are made on a first-come, first-served basis, and priority is given to those who did not receive ISEEES funding in the past two academic years. To apply send request with budget to: Barbara Voytek, ISEEES, UC Berkeley, 260 Stephens Hall # 2304, Berkeley CA 94720-2304.

The **Drago and Danica Kosovac Prize** is open to UCB undergraduates for an outstanding thesis (senior or honors) in the social sciences or humanities that researches some aspect of Serbian history or culture. Graduate research in Serbian history and culture may be considered. Applications include submission of the written work and three letters of recommendation. No deadline. Contact: Barbara Voytek, ISEEES, UC Berkeley, 260 Stephens Hall # 2304, Berkeley CA 94720-2304; Tel: 510-643-6736; bvoytek@socrates.berkeley.edu.

Coordinating Council for Women in History

The **CCWH/Ida B. Wells Award** provides \$500 to a woman who has advanced to candidacy and is working on a doctoral dissertation at a US institution. The dissertation topic must be historical but not necessarily in a history department. Deadline: 9/1/2006. Contact: Professor Montserrat Miller, Award Committee, Department of History, Marshall University, Huntington WV 25755; millerm@marshall.edu; <http://theccwh.org/wellsapp.htm>.

The **CCWH/Berkshire Conference of Women Historians Graduate Student Fellowship** provides \$500 to a woman who is a history grad students at a US institution and has completed all work up to dissertation stage. Deadline: 9/1/2006. Contact: Professor Gina Hames, Awards Committee, Department of History, Pacific Lutheran University, Tacoma WA 98447; hamesgl@plu.edu; <http://theccwh.org/>.

Fulbright-III

Fulbright-III and Other Grants for Graduate Study Abroad fund round-trip travel, tuition, books, and a stipend for one academic year. Applicants must be US citizens holding a B.A. or equivalent. Deadline: a September deadline will be announced. Contact: Fulbright

Program Advisor, Graduate Fellowships Office, 318 Sproul Hall # 5900; Tel: 510-642-0672; http://www.grad.berkeley.edu/fellowships/fellowships_deadlines.shtml.

Kosciuszko Foundation

The **Metchie J. E. Budka Award** provides \$1,500 for outstanding scholarly work in Polish literature (14th Century to 1939) or Polish history (962 to 1939). The competition is open to grad students at US universities and to postdocs in their first three years. Deadline: 7/19/2006. Contact: Metchie J. E. Budka Award, The Kosciuszko Foundation, 15 E 65th St, New York NY 10021-6595; Tel: 212-734-2130; Fax: 212-628-4552; thekf@aol.com; <http://www.kosciuszkofoundation.org/>.

Library of Congress

Kluge Center Fellowships provide \$4,000/mo for 6-12 months for residential research in the collections of the Library of Congress. Scholars who have received a terminal advanced degree within the past seven years in the humanities, the social sciences, or in a professional field such as architecture or law are eligible. Exceptions may be made for individuals without continuous academic careers. Applicants may be US citizens or foreign nationals. Deadline: 8/15/2006. Contact: John W. Kluge Center Office of Scholarly Programs, Library of Congress LJ 120, 101 Independence Ave SE, Washington DC 20540-4860; Tel: 202-707-3302; Fax: 202-707-3595; scholarly@loc.gov; <http://www.loc.gov/loc/kluge/>.

Society for Slovene Studies

The **Rado L. Lencek Graduate Student Prize** awards \$1,000 for the best paper in any discipline written by a grad student on a topic involving Slovene studies. Slovene citizens and students studying in Slovenia are not eligible to apply. Deadline: 9/15/2006. Contact: Professor Timothy Pogacar, Editor, Slovene Studies, Bowling Green State University, Dept of GREAL, Bowling Green OH 43403; <http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/~ljubljan/gradprize.html>.

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Fellowship Opportunities, continued from page 21

UC Berkeley

Academic Progress Awards provide one semester of funding to grad students who will take their qualifying exams in the next semesters and who have not been awarded University or extramural funding. Students are required to register and may not be employed during the semester of the fellowship. Deadline: a September deadline will be announced. Contact: Graduate Fellowships Office, 318 Sproul Hall # 5900; Tel: 510-642-0672; http://www.grad.berkeley.edu/fellowships/fellowships_deadlines.shtml.

University of Michigan

The **Michigan Society of Fellows** awards an annual stipend of \$49,635 for 3 years to those who have received a Ph.D. in the last two years or will complete during the current year. Fellows are appointed as Assistant Professors in appropriate departments at the University of Michigan and as Postdoctoral Scholars in the Michigan Society of Fellows. They are expected to be in residence during the academic years of the fellowship, to teach for the equivalent of one academic year, to participate in the informal intellectual life of the Society, and to devote time to their independent research. Deadline: 10/6/2006. Contact: Michigan Society of Fellows, University of Michigan, 3030 Rackham Bldg, 915 E Washington St, Ann Arbor MI 48109-1070; Tel: 734-763-1259; society.of.fellows@umich.edu; <http://www.rackham.umich.edu/Faculty/society.html>.

Woodrow Wilson Center

East European Studies Short Term Grants provide up to one month of specialized research in Washington, DC for grad students, postdocs, and scholars. Grants do not include residence at the Wilson Center. Deadline: 9/1/2006; also 12/1, 3/1, 6/1 each year. Contact: East European Studies, Woodrow Wilson Center, One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington DC 20523; Tel: 202-691-4000; Fax: 202-691-4001; kneppm@wwic.si.edu; <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/>.

Library News, continued from page 9

Polish underground between the years 1944 and 1990. The collection is comprised of 100 microfilm reels.

The Crimean War, 1853–1858

Taken from the holdings of the Russian State Military History Archive, the collection contains correspondence between Alexander II and his military staff, various reports on troop movements and intelligence, military orders, and statistics and reports on casualties and prisoners of war. The collection also contains a large number of maps and battle plans. Accompanying the 98 reels of microfilm is a guide with introduction by David Goldfrank, professor of European history at Georgetown University.

The Russo-Turkish War, 1877–1878

An even larger collection from the Russian State Military History Archive than the one mentioned above, this includes a wide variety of correspondence and military communications, daily logs, reports on prisoners, and the propaganda circulated among the Russian soldiers. Also included are plans for the post-war economic reconstruction of the region. The material is contained on 150 microfilm reels.

The United States and the Russian Civil War: The Betty Miller Unterberger Collection of Documents

On 25 microfilm reels, the collection documents the United States, the Allies, and the Russian Civil War with emphasis on the Czech-Bolshevik Conflict, the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Czech Liberation Movement, and America's first effort to stop Japanese imperialism in Eastern Siberia and Manchuria. An accompanying guide provides contents to the reels and includes an extensive introduction and bibliography.

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University of California, Berkeley
Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies
260 Stephens Hall # 2304
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