



Newsletter of the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies

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**Newsletter of the Institute of Slavic,
East European, and Eurasian Studies**

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Eurasian Studies

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Notes from the Director

Dear Friends and Colleagues,

Summer witnessed an important transition at ISEEEES with Professor Yuri Slezkine stepping down after a decade as Director. Yuri accomplished many things during his tenure, but perhaps none as important in the long term as successfully shepherding the Institute through the financial crisis. We thank Yuri for his valuable service and intellectual leadership and look forward to his continuing involvement with ISEEEES.

Our faculty/graduate student lunchtime seminar series continued to be very successful this semester. This year we have asked a handful of former Institute-affiliated graduate students who are now leading scholars in the field to discuss their intellectual trajectories in the context of trends in their disciplines and in the study of our region. This semester we were pleased to welcome back Veljko Vujacic, Associate Professor of Sociology at Oberlin College; Barry Ickes, Professor of Economics and Associate Head, Department of Economics, The Pennsylvania State University; William Nickell, Assistant Professor, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures at the University of Chicago; and Marc Howard, Professor of Government at Georgetown University.

This fall our Carnegie-supported Field Development Project concluded by bringing one young scholar each from Armenia and Georgia to Berkeley for a two-week working visit. These scholars worked with our faculty and graduate students to produce a field reading list, an undergraduate lecture course and/or graduate seminar syllabus, and a field survey, all with the goal of providing the fellows with expertise in their particular field of social science scholarship and preparing them to train future generations of qualified social scientists back in their home countries. This semester's fellows were Malkhaz Toria from Ilia State University in Georgia and Tamara Vardanyan of Yerevan State University in Armenia. More information can be found on the last page of the newsletter.

ISEEEES welcomes new visiting scholars and visiting student researchers this Fall semester from Belgium, Japan, Korea, Poland, and the United States. Please see the next page for a detailed list of our visitors and their research topics.

Mark your calendars for some of our upcoming events in 2014. The annual Colin Miller Memorial Lecture is scheduled for Thursday, February 27 at 4 p.m. at the Alumni House. Our guest speaker will be Professor Valerie Bunce, Aaron L. Binenkorb Professor of International Studies and Professor of Government at Cornell University. The 38th annual Berkeley-Stanford Conference on Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies will be held on Friday, March 7, at Stanford University. The theme of this year's conference is "Emancipation." The annual Peter N. Kujachich Lecture on Serbia and Montenegro will be held on Tuesday, April 1, at 5:15 p.m. at the Alumni House. This year's speaker will be Mr. Saša Srećković, Senior Curator at the Ethnographic Museum in Belgrade. Lastly, the ISEEEES Outreach Conference is scheduled

for Saturday, April 26 at the Faculty Club. The topic of this year's conference is "Liberalism and Its Discontents," and we are planning an interesting line-up of speakers for our daylong event.

We look forward to seeing you at these and other happenings throughout 2014. Be sure to check our website <http://iseees.berkeley.edu/> for upcoming events and updates to the calendar.

Sincerely yours,

Jason Wittenberg
ISEEEES Acting Director
Associate Professor of Political Science

Campus Visitors

Tadashi Anno is a Visiting Scholar with ISEEEES during the 2013-2014 academic year. Dr. Anno is a former BPS-affiliated student, who obtained his Ph.D. in Political Science in 1999. He is currently an Associate Professor of Political Science at Sophia University in Tokyo. His main research interest is in nationalism and its role in states' domestic and foreign policies, particularly in the context of Northeast Asia. While at Berkeley, he will be working on a book manuscript on great-power nationalism and foreign policy in Russia and Japan in the late-nineteenth to early-twentieth centuries.

Harry Bastermajian is a Visiting Student Researcher with ISEEEES during the 2013-2014 academic year. Mr. Bastermajian is currently a Ph.D. candidate in Islamic History and Civilization at the University of Chicago. While at UC Berkeley, he will be doing research for his dissertation, Armenian Identity Formation in the late Ottoman Empire: 1908-1909.

Ben Dhooge is a Visiting Scholar with ISEEEES during the 2013-2014 academic year. Dr. Dhooge is a postdoctoral researcher (Research Foundation – Flanders) at Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium. His main research interests are Andrei Platonov, Russian literary Avant-Garde, and Russian émigré culture. While at UC Berkeley, he will be doing research on the reception of linguistic experiments in literature in inter-war Russian émigré literary criticism.

Manuela Gretkowska is a Visiting Scholar with ISEEEES during the 2013-2014 academic year. Ms. Gretkowska is an accomplished writer and public intellectual, holding an M.A. in Anthropology from L'École des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris, France, and an M.A. in Philosophy from Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland. She is the founder of the Polish Women's Party. She has written numerous books and screenplays. While at UC Berkeley, Ms. Gretkowska will gather research for a book on life in Berkeley during the time of the late Polish Nobel Laureate poet Czesław Miłosz, who was a professor in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures at UC Berkeley.

Yongwha Kim is a Visiting Scholar with ISEEEES for the year of 2013. She holds a PhD in Russian historical linguistics from Moscow State University. Dr. Kim is a Professor in the Department of Russian Language and Literature at Chungbuk National University in Cheongju, South Korea. Her research at UC Berkeley will focus on the diachronic aspect of the variability of genitive plural noun forms in the Russian language.

Typical Tin-Pots: Wealth without Welfare in Azerbaijan

Marcy E. McCullaugh

Ph.D. Candidate, Political Science, UC Berkeley

In May 2012, Azerbaijan hosted the Eurovision Song Contest, an annual competition held among many active members of the European Broadcasting Division. In preparation for this event and the influx of foreign media, competitors, and spectators, the Azerbaijani government embarked on a massive construction campaign to renovate parts of downtown Baku and build Crystal Hall, the site of the contest. A *Transitions Online* investigative report found that this was the most expensive Eurovision in history, where the state spent upwards of 550 million manat (\$720 million) on costs directly and “indirectly” related to the song contest.¹ By comparison, Russia, Norway, and Germany, the respective 2009, 2010, and 2011 Eurovision hosts, each spent approximately \$40 million in preparation for the contest. In addition, the report found that funds previously allocated for pensions and improving the country’s water and sanitation systems were diverted in order to construct Crystal Hall. One cabinet order specifically earmarked 50 million manat (\$62.5 million) to be diverted from a project aimed at renovating the country’s decaying network of water pipes for Crystal Hall; another order shifted 50 million manat from the State Social Protection Fund for Eurovision-related costs.

Diverting money from social welfare projects and pensions to build Eurovision stages is one of many examples that would lead us to classify Azerbaijan as a predatory “petro-state.” Conventional wisdom suggests that autocrats, who are unconstrained by institutions and with unlimited access to resource wealth, siphon off these funds for themselves and rent-seeking elites at the expense of delivering goods to citizens. Over the course of the last decade, there has been little evidence of desire on the part of the Azerbaijani government to engage in redistribution under Heidar Aliev (1993–2003) and his son Ilham Aliev (2003–present). Health, education, and social security expenditures have remained consistently low as a percentage of GDP and decreased drastically over time as a percentage of total government spending. Yet, in a comparative context, welfare spending trends in Azerbaijan warrant further explanation. Throughout the post-Soviet region, welfare expenditures decreased significantly amidst wrenching budgetary and institutional crises in the 1990s. Then, starting

in the early 2000s, the economic picture changed dramatically for the petroleum-rich Soviet successor states—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan—as a result of sustained high oil prices. Even with the significant resources available to them since the early 2000s, however, the commitment to reinvigorate welfare spending has diverged markedly across these cases. The extreme variation in welfare effort is puzzling considering the fact that these countries are roughly comparable in terms of regime type, natural resource wealth, and levels of development. While Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have emerged as the lowest spenders, welfare expenditures in Russia under Vladimir Putin have increased substantially since the early 2000s, driven largely by new social policy initiatives aimed at increasing pensions, salaries for health and education workers, and expanding benefit categories. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan fall roughly in the middle between these two extremes.

In this article, I highlight the role that elite cohesion plays in shaping redistributive social policies. Different degrees of unity and conflict among political and economic elites, which I identify as high officials in the regime and wealthy capitalists, affect the autocrat’s perceived level of threat and sense of security about his position. When elites are divided, the autocrat’s perceived level of threat is high. In order to counterbalance this potential risk and guarantee security, the autocrat attempts to buy the loyalty of allies in society-at-large through high social spending. The public thus becomes a strategic beneficiary of the redistribution of resource rents and provides the autocrat with legitimate support. The autocrat then leverages this societal allegiance to deter threats by potential opponents. Conversely, when elites are unified, the autocrat’s perceived level of threat is minimized. In the absence of potential challenges from within the elite, the autocrat does not depend on societal allies to ensure the continued stability of his position, so welfare spending remains low. I demonstrate my argument using the empirical case of Azerbaijan. Ultimately, this analysis offers a framework for understanding how policy decisions are made in politically closed regimes, a subject largely overlooked in the literature on authoritarianism.

¹ Shahla Sultanova (2012), “In Eurovision Spending, Azerbaijan is a Clear Winner.” *Transitions Online*. Retrieved from <http://www.tol.org/client/article/23107-in-eurovision-spending-azerbaijan-is-a-clear-winner.html>.

Welfare Spending in Azerbaijan

The collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in a period of economic and political instability in Azerbaijan, which was accompanied by the loss of the social safety net that guaranteed basic access to health and welfare services for Soviet citizens. In addition, Azerbaijan entered into a full-scale war with Armenia in 1992 over ethnic tensions in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh.² Heidar Aliev brokered a peace deal with Armenia in 1994, but two years of armed conflict demanded that already scant economic resources be devoted to the war effort. Between 1990-1995 Azerbaijan's real GDP contracted by almost 60 percent, and total social spending as a percentage of GDP fell from 14.2 percent in 1990 to 6.6 percent in 1995. Following a ceasefire in 1994, one year after Heidar Aliev returned to power, the government's primary policy focus was on restoring political and macroeconomic stability.³ As a result of the ceasefire, which represented an Armenian military victory even though the conflict remains unresolved, Azerbaijan lost approximately 20 percent of its territory and was forced to support a new population of 750,000 refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who fled the region and the surrounding border areas.

In the latter half of the 1990s, political stability returned to Azerbaijan as Heidar Aliev centralized and consolidated control, and the economy began to grow steadily as a result of foreign investment in the country's oil and gas sectors. Azerbaijan has enjoyed one of the highest economic growth rates in the world, with real GDP growth averaging 14 percent per year between 1997 and 2009. In 2006, real GDP growth peaked at 35 percent, the highest in the world and nine times the world average in that year. Oil and gas revenues as a share of GDP grew from 28 percent in 2000 to 45 percent in 2009, and in 2011 petroleum exports accounted for 95 percent of export earnings.⁴ As a result of oil windfalls, total budgetary spending grew 22 times from 2000-2012, but the share of state budget expenditures on the social sector relative to total state spending dropped from 42.9 percent in 2000 to 21.2 percent in 2011. These decreases in spending have

occurred across the health, education, and social security sectors, even though a vast majority of Azerbaijanis use public health and education systems and rely on pensions and social benefits to subsidize all or part of their income. Following the precipitous drop in welfare expenditures as a percentage of GDP between 1990 and 1995, spending on the social sector increased slightly to 7.7 percent of GDP in 1999, but then began to fall steadily both during and after the presidential succession in 2003. From 2000-2008, total spending fell from 6.9 to 5.3 percent of GDP. Spending as a percentage of GDP increased slightly in the midst of the global financial crisis, but has since leveled off at about 6.4 percent since 2010. Projected budgetary expenditures for 2012 and 2013 suggest that social spending will remain more or less constant, with slight decreases in education and social security and a slight increase in health.

In a comparative context, Azerbaijan remains one of the lowest social spenders in the world. For example, at 0.82 percent of GDP in 2008, Azerbaijan tied with Afghanistan in having the fourth lowest public expenditures on health in the world, outspending only Myanmar (0.23%), Guinea (0.77%), and Chad (0.77%).⁵ In 2008, public education spending in Azerbaijan (2.4 percent) was the ninth lowest in the world in terms of percentage of GDP, on par with Guinea and Bangladesh and barely outspending Laos.⁶ Pension spending in Azerbaijan is the lowest in the entire post-communist region.⁷ In addition to overall spending levels, salaries for medical and education workers as well as pensions have remained stagnant in Azerbaijan. In real terms, doctor and teacher salaries are less now than they were in the Soviet period and "are barely enough to support a family with one dependent."⁸ The government has not introduced or implemented any new social programs in the last decade that increase the amount of resources directed toward society and, in addition, "side" payments and bribes for services are more prevalent in Azerbaijan than other countries in the region. For example, out-of-pocket health expenses are estimated to be double those in other post-Soviet countries.⁹ In sum, the government of Azerbaijan under

² Nagorno-Karabakh is a land-locked region within Azerbaijan. Up until the late Soviet period, its population, which consisted of 75 percent ethnic Armenians and 25 percent ethnic Azerbaijanis, lived in relative peace (although ethnic tensions led to acts of brutality on both sides in the early 20th century). Conflict in the region first erupted in 1988 between Armenian secessionists and Azerbaijani troops.

³ European Commission (2011). *Social Protection and Social Inclusion in Azerbaijan*. Baku, Azerbaijan.

⁴ World Bank (2013). *World Development Indicators*. Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved from <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ World Bank data on public education spending as a percentage of GDP were available for 124 countries for 2013.

⁷ World Bank (2012). *Pension Expenditure Database*. Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved from <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALPROTECTION/EXTPENSIONS/0,,contentMDK:23231994~menuPK:8874064~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:396253,00.html>.

⁸ World Bank (2010). "Azerbaijan Living Conditions Assessment Report." Report No. 52801 AZ. Washington, DC: World Bank, p. 65.

⁹ Ibid.

Heidar and Ilham Aliev has callously ignored investing in the health, education, and social welfare of its citizens. The next section explains why Azerbaijan's rulers have neglected to share the wealth from oil profits by examining the linkages between elite cohesion and the Alievs' welfare policy preferences.

Elite Cohesion in Azerbaijan

Welfare spending variation in mineral-rich authoritarian regimes results primarily from the presence or absence of divisions within a country's political and economic elite hierarchy. The fragmentation or cohesion of high-ranking regime officials and wealthy capitalists affects the autocrat's perceived level of threat to his position, which shapes his welfare policy-making strategies. The autocrat perceives divided elites as threatening and destabilizing, in which case he attempts to guarantee popular support for himself through generous welfare provision. A loyal citizenry counterbalances the threat posed from within the elite, as any potential opponent would be loath to unseat a popular leader. In contrast to this scenario, unified elites generate a low level of perceived threat to the autocrat, who therefore minimizes welfare spending because he does not need societal allies to maintain his hold on power.

In Azerbaijan, elites under the Aliev dynasty are united as a result of low ruling coalition factionalization and near total overlap of political and economic elites. Other than a brief respite from 1987–1993, Heidar Aliev ruled Azerbaijan for nearly thirty years, first as the First Secretary of the Communist Party from 1969–1987 and then as president of the independent republic from 1993–2003. Following his death in December 2003, Heidar's son, Ilham, succeeded him and has been in office ever since. Upon returning to power in 1993, Heidar Aliev "utilized the informal networks he had cultivated" for nearly forty years prior to the Soviet collapse as a KGB officer and leader (1944-1969) and then as First Secretary of the Azerbaijani SSR (1969-1987) to surround himself with loyal ministers, state agency directors, presidential administration staff, and advisors.¹⁰ Similar to Syria's Bashar al-Assad, when Ilham Aliev became president following his father's death, the majority of top-level elites who had been installed in the

1990s "continued to toe the Aliev line" by remaining in their posts and insulating the new president.¹¹ Over the past decade, Ilham Aliev's regime has coalesced into a symbiotic political coalition based on family networks and mutual business interests.¹² Heidar and Ilham Aliev drew extensively from their family network to fill political positions (including, most obviously, the presidential succession from father to son). A significant number of high-level elites are close relatives of the Aliev family or other top-ranking officials. In a survey conducted in 2006 of eighty nine prominent elite members, Alieva and Torjesen found that 10 percent were a close relative of the Aliev family and 19 percent were related to another top-ranking official.¹³ The Aliev family's political dominance in Azerbaijan for over forty years, coupled with extensive kinship ties among political elites, has served to minimize factionalization. Over the past decade, Ilham Aliev's regime has coalesced into a symbiotic political coalition based on family networks and mutual business interests.¹⁴

Azerbaijan is also a case in which there is near total overlap of political and economic elites, because economic resources and political power are concentrated in the same hands. An independent business class failed to emerge in Azerbaijan due to limited privatization in the 1990s and the adoption of state ownership of the petroleum sector.¹⁵ This enabled the regime "to pocket significant wealth without making major concessions to reformers."¹⁶ The country's oligarchs mostly consist of members of the Aliev family, Pashaev family (the president's in-laws), and "ministers who have been promoted by and are allied to the president because of close business interests."¹⁷ They include Kamaladdin Heidarov, the Minister of Emergency Situations (2006-present) and former Head of the Customs Committee (1995-2006), as well as Ziya Mammadov, the Minister of Transportation (2002-present). Together, the extended Aliev, Heidarov, and Mammadov families control almost the entire Azerbaijani economy through state and proxy companies, including: the petroleum, construction, agricultural, tourism, insurance, and banking sectors; food production, supply, and imports; and passenger transport and cargo shipments.¹⁸ In short, the Alievs' have structured and maintained a system whereby politics and the

¹⁰ Scott Radnitz (2012). "Oil in the Family: Managing Presidential Succession in Azerbaijan." *Democratization* 19 (1): 62.

¹¹ Henry E. Hale (2005). "Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia." *World Politics* 58 (1): 149.

¹² International Crisis Group. (2010). "Azerbaijan: Vulnerable Sustainability." Europe Report No. 207. Retrieved from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/caucasus/azerbaijan/207%20Azerbaijan%20-%20Vulnerable%20Stability.pdf>.

¹³ Leila Alieva and Stina Torjesen (2007). "The Insignificance of Clan in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan." Unpublished manuscript.

¹⁴ International Crisis Group (2010).

¹⁵ The 1994 "contract of the century" enabled the state to maintain ownership of the country's oilfields while allowing foreign companies to help develop them. See Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal (2010). *Oil is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁶ Scott Radnitz (2010). "The Color of Money: Privatization, Economic Dispersion, and Post-Soviet 'Revolutions.'" *Comparative Politics* 42 (2): 139.

¹⁷ International Crisis Group (2010), 8.

¹⁸ Ibid.

economy are run by a select few who reap substantial financial benefits in exchange for absolute loyalty to the ruling family. No wealthy business elites independent of the dictator exist, which greatly reduces the possibility of challenges to the president.

A unified elite in Azerbaijan produces a low level of perceived threat to the Aliev regime. Prior to Ilham Aliev's accession to the presidency following his father's death in 2003, there were no documented cases of internal threats to Heidar Aliev's authority after an attempted coup in 1995. Since 2003, only two high-level elites, former Minister of Health Ali Insanov and former Minister of Economic Development Farhad Aliev (no relation to the ruling family), were dismissed from their ministerial posts and arrested for "reputedly refus[ing] to recognize Ilham Aliev's inheritance."¹⁹ Apart from this incident, there is little additional evidence to suggest that the Alievs have faced extensive internal threats to their power.

Since welfare spending decisions are made in a vacuum in Azerbaijan as a result of weak and ineffective policy-making institutions, welfare budgets reflect the autocrat's preferences.²⁰ Because of Azerbaijan's cohesive elite structure, the Aliev regime does not have a perceived need for societal allies. Indeed, the Alievs do not seem to be concerned with securing popular support by means of welfare spending in election or off-election years. As I noted above, between 2000-2011 consolidated budget expenditures on health, education, and social welfare policy decreased by over half. Following the Rose Revolution in neighboring Georgia in 2003, education and social policy expenditures declined as a percentage of GDP. After the arrests of Ali Insanov and Farhad Aliev in 2005, state budget expenditures on health, education, and social policy as a percentage of total budget expenditures decreased by 1.1 percent, 4.8 percent, and 1.5 percent, respectively, and total social spending as a percentage of GDP continued to decline, reaching a low of 5.3 percent of GDP in 2008.

Azerbaijan's social spending response to the global financial crisis in 2008-2009 is particularly revealing with regard to the level of insecurity surrounding the autocrat. More than any other exogenous shock, major economic downturns have been

identified as destabilizing to democratic and authoritarian regimes alike.²¹ In authoritarian regimes, poor economic performance "diminishes the bargaining power of autocrats, increases the strength of the opposition, destroys the bargains struck between leaders and their supporters, and leaves ruling groups vulnerable to defections."²² Azerbaijan possessed the available funds to offset the potentially calamitous effects of the crisis; indeed, oil revenues make "efforts at fiscal pacification more effective."²³ In Azerbaijan, total social spending as a percentage of GDP increased, but by a considerably lower amount (0.9 percent of GDP) than other petroleum-rich countries in the region, including Russia, where total social spending increased by 4 percent, and Kazakhstan, where expenditures increased by 2 percent.

A potential complication with this argument is that social spending is not the only "reward" autocrats can use to guarantee popular support, even in countries that have access to large and unconstrained revenue streams. Another way in which leaders can gain popular support is through ideological or nationalist appeals.²⁴ It is arguable, then, that the Aliev regime in Azerbaijan is attempting to secure popular support through this mechanism. The government has pursued a sustained propaganda campaign to generate and exploit hatred of its neighbor, Armenia, along with fomenting fear and nationalist anger over Nagorno-Karabakh, an area of land within Azerbaijan's national borders that has been officially occupied by Armenia since 1994. As the propaganda machine sets out to define Azerbaijan in terms of its opposition to Armenia and all things Armenian, officials use the conflict over the disputed land more as a superficial excuse to explain away the country's problems (including low welfare spending) than as an appeal to national greatness.²⁵ In a comparative perspective, Azerbaijan's spending on the military as a percent of GDP is 3.4 percent, compared to 4.3 percent in Russia.²⁶ In addition, Russia arguably has more of a leg to stand on than Azerbaijan when it comes to using war and terrorism as an excuse for the country's problems. This is due to the protracted conflict in Chechnya that lasted until April 2009, the invasion of Georgia in August 2008, and ongoing terrorist attacks since the mid-1990s.

¹⁹ Radnitz (2012), 66.

²⁰ Even though an official budgetary process involving the social welfare and finance ministries, parliament and the presidential administration exists, budgetary decisions are made de facto by the autocrat.

²¹ See Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi (2000). *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

²² Raj M. Desai, Anders Olofsgard, and Tarik M. Yousef. (2009). "The Logic of Authoritarian Bargains." *Economics & Politics* 21(1): 96.

²³ Michael Lewin Ross (2001). "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics* 53 (3): 334.

²⁴ Beatriz Magaloni and Jeremy Wallace (2008). "Citizen Loyalty, Mass Protest and Authoritarian Survival." Unpublished manuscript.

²⁵ This is an impression based on the author's interviews with over ten officials and bureaucrats in Baku, Azerbaijan from December 2010 through April 2011.

²⁶ World Bank (2013).

Conclusion

This article explores the theoretical argument that Azerbaijan's cohesive elite structure results in low welfare expenditure levels. After 1995, neither Heidar nor Ilham Aliev faced destabilizing threats to their rule because of low factionalization among members of the elite, as well as the concentration of political and economic power within the hands of the country's top officials and their families. The case of Azerbaijan demonstrates that united elites, and resulting low levels of conflict among them, generate lower social spending since the dictator can primarily depend on patronage and repression to sustain his rule. In the last decade, the sharp divergence between soaring economic growth from oil and gas exports and declining welfare expenditures demonstrates that Azerbaijan's rulers have not needed to cultivate a loyal constituency.

Ilham Aliev is currently on track to be president for life, but the lack of redistribution to society and genuine popular support for Aliev could have potentially destabilizing effects on Azerbaijan's authoritarian regime. First, the patronage system in Azerbaijan that keeps elites satisfied depends almost entirely on continued access to petroleum rents for ready cash. As of 2008, Azerbaijan had saved "less than one-tenth of its total oil revenues."²⁷ Like all resource-rich authoritarian regimes, a sustained drop in oil prices may lead to a loss of loyalty for the dictator. If the regime cannot manage its revenues and the state has no reserves should oil prices fall and remain low for years, then Ilham Aliev could no longer pay off his cronies. In the absence of popular support, mass defection may occur with or even without civil unrest.

Second, Azerbaijan continues to experience a high incidence of popular unrest, which in recent years has been violently suppressed by the authorities. For example, between January and June 2011, at the height of the Arab Spring, ten protests organized by marginalized opposition parties and activists occurred in downtown Baku. Each event drew several hundred to over a thousand people, and hundreds of protesters and activists were beaten and arrested throughout this period. Most recently, a string of protests "denouncing what many see as an increasingly corrupt and overbearing government" occurred throughout January 2013, and "many believe Azerbaijan is in for a lot more political turmoil" in the lead-up to presidential elections in October 2013.²⁸ On January 17, 2013, one thousand shopkeepers demonstrated in Baku to protest rent increases by the managers of Azerbaijan's shopping center (who are very likely connected to top government officials), and five thousand more kept their shops closed in support of the protestors. Beginning on January 23, thousands rioted in the town of Ismayilli, about 100 miles from Baku, and ended up setting fire to a motel owned by the son of the Minister of Labor and Social Protection, as well as the local executive authority's residence and several cars. The protestors were dispersed with water canons and tear gas, which then sparked a rally in Baku to express solidarity with the Ismayilli protestors. The frequency of clashes and willingness on the part of both protestors and police to use violence "are expected to grow as anti-government sentiments mounts" in the lead-up to presidential elections in October, in which Ilham Aliev is expected to win a third term as president.²⁹

²⁷ Jones Luong and Weinthal (2010), 241.

²⁸ Claire Bigg and Arifa Kazimova (January 30, 2013). "Azerbaijan's Hot January: Unusually Bold Protests Challenge Government." *RFE/RL*. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan-month-of-protests/24888023.html>.

²⁹ Arifa Kazimova and Daisy Sindelar (March 13, 2013). "Brutal Police Crackdowns in Azerbaijan, Courtesy of Western-Made Weapons." *RFE/RL*. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan-brutal-crackdown-western-weapons-lrad/24927720.html>.

Faculty and Student News

Rhiannon Dowling will be doing research in Russia on a Fullbright-Hays DDRA fellowship in 2014. Her article titled "Communism, Consumerism, and Gender in Early Cold War Film: The Case of Ninotchka and Russkii Vopros" was published in Vol. 8 of *Aspasia: The International Yearbook of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern European Women's and Gender History*.

Victoria Frede published a review of "A Herzen Reader" in the Times Literary Supplement, October 11, 2013 edition. Over the summer, she attended a conference at Basel University in Switzerland on autobiography and imperial subjects. She spent most of July conducting research in the Moscow archives.

David Frick spent a week in October presenting his book *Kith, Kin, and Neighbors: Communities and Confessions in Seventeenth-Century Wilno* in a series of lectures in three cities in Lithuania sponsored by the US Embassy.

Cammeron Girvin published his article titled "Addressing Changes in the Bulgarian Vocative" in *Noel, Patrizia & Barbara Sonnenhauser*, eds. 2013. He spent the summer doing dissertation research in Sofia and Belgrade and assisted with a project between Sofia University and UC Berkeley on Bulgarian dialectology. He presented his paper titled "Ironic Language Play on Bulgarian Facebook" at the Congress of the International Society for Ethnology and Folklore in Tartu, Estonia in July and received a Professional Development Fellowship from the Berkeley Language Center for Fall 2013.

Chloë Kitzinger organized the panel *Characters on the Margins in Dostoevsky and Tolstoy* at ASEES - New Orleans in November 2012. She also published the article "This Ancient, Fragile Vessel: Degeneration in Bely's *Petersburg*" in *Slavic & East European Journal* 57:3, Fall 2013.

Tony Lin received a Course Improvement Grant for his class on Music and Literature. In October, on a Fulbright-Hays grant in Moscow, he played a piano recital at the Russian State University for the Humanities to commemorate the 164th anniversary of Frédéric Chopin's death.

Harsha Ram gave three talks this year: "Drinking Songs: Vernacular Culture and Literary Modernism," the keynote address at UC Berkeley's Undergraduate Comparative Literature Symposium in August, and "Aesthetic Modernism and the East/West Encounter" at the University of Sydney, Australia, and the University of South Wales, Australia.

Gerard Roland gave the keynote address "The Unfinished Reforms in Central Asia and the Caucasus: What next?" at the IMF-World Bank Conference in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan this May.

Brandon Schechter was on a Fulbright scholarship in Moscow and St. Petersburg until June 2013. Over the summer he gave two presentations, one in Paris titled "Government Issue: The Material Culture of the Red Army 1941-1945," and one in St. Petersburg titled "Rifle and Spade: Things and People at War."

Małgorzata Szajbel-Keck received a DAAD Research Grant to do dissertation research on Polish, Sorbian, and Czech languages at Zentrum für Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft (ZAS) in Berlin and received a lecturer position at the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt, Germany, where she will be teaching a course on Polish contact linguistics in the Fall 2013 semester. She gave two presentations, one titled "Can We Eat Our Soup Cold in Poland? A Fresh Look at Secondary Predication in Polish" in Hamilton, Canada, and one titled "Small Clauses, Relators, and Secondary Predication" at the Eighth Annual Meeting of the Slavic Linguistics Society, October 25-27, 2013, in Szczecin, Poland.

Recent Graduates

Robia Charles was awarded a Ph.D. in May 2013 by the Department of Political Science for her dissertation "Secular Regimes and State Engagement with Religion in post-Soviet Eurasia."

Sarah Garding was awarded a Ph.D. in May 2013 by the Department of Political Science for her dissertation "Courting the Nation Abroad: Diaspora Political Incorporation Policies After Communism."

Theocharis Grigoriadis was awarded a Ph.D. in December 2012 by the Department of Political Science for his dissertation "Essays on Political Economy of Religion."

Andrej Krickovic was awarded a Ph.D. in December 2012 by the Department of Political Science for his dissertation "Ties That Do Not Bind Russia and the International Liberal Order."

Larisa Kurtovic was awarded a Ph.D. in December 2012 by the Department of Anthropology for her dissertation "Politics of Impasse: Specters of Socialism and the Struggles for the Future in Postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina."

FLAS Fellowship Awards

Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) fellowships enable US citizens and permanent residents to acquire a high level of competency in modern foreign languages. FLAS funding for Russian and East European languages comes to UC Berkeley through a Title VI grant from the US Department of Education to ISEES. Applications are accepted through the Graduate Fellowship Office.

Awards for Summer 2013

Sarah Cramsey, Department of History, received funding to study Czech at the Summer School of Slavonic Studies in Prague, Czech Republic.

Jennifer Flaherty, Department of Slavic Languages & Literatures, received funding to study Russian with the American Councils Study Abroad – Russian and Area Studies Program in St. Petersburg, Russia.

Kate Marple-Cantrell, Department of City and Regional Planning and International Area Studies, received funding to study Serbian at the Summer School of Serbian language in the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Novi Sad and at the Serbian Language and Culture Workshop in Belgrade.

William Jenkins, Department of History, received funding to study Hungarian at the Summer Language Workshop at Indiana University.

Kevin Kenjar, Department of Anthropology, received funding to study Croatian at the University of Zagreb's Summer Croatian School at the Center for Mediterranean Studies in Dubrovnik and at the Ling Cro Program in Zadar and Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian at the Association for Language and Culture, 'Linguists/Lingvisti,' in Sarajevo.

Mark Kettler, Department of History, received funding to study Polish at the Summer Language Institute at the University of Pittsburgh.

Emiliana Kissova, Department of History, received funding to study Russian at the School of Russian and Asian Studies at Moscow State University in Russia.

Simona Schneider, Department of Slavic Languages & Literatures, received funding to study Russian through the Extra Class Language Center in St. Petersburg, Russia.

Christina Schwartz, Department of Slavic Languages & Literatures, received funding to study Russian at Middlebury College.

Yana Skorobogatov, Department of History, received funding to study Russian at the School of Russian and Asian Studies at Moscow State University in Russia.

Awards for Academic Year 2013-2014

Megan Barickman, Department of Slavic Languages & Literatures, received a fellowship to study Polish at UC Berkeley.

Erin Coyne, Department of Slavic Languages & Literatures, received a fellowship to study Romanian at UC Berkeley.

Brian Egdorf, Department of Slavic Languages & Literatures, received a fellowship to study Czech at UC Berkeley.

Jennifer Flaherty, Department of Foreign Languages and Literature, received a fellowship to study Russian at UC Berkeley.

Megan Niedermeyer, School of Law, received a fellowship to study Serbian at UC Berkeley.

Ethan Nowak, Department of Philosophy, received a fellowship to study Russian at UC Berkeley.

Lilija Rudis, Department of Architecture/Urban and Regional Planning, received a fellowship to study Russian at UC Berkeley.

Christina Schwartz, Department of Foreign Languages and Literature, received a fellowship to study Czech at UC Berkeley.

John Sylak-Glassman, Department of Linguistics, received a fellowship to study Russian at UC Berkeley.

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Architecture 270	History of Modern Architecture	Castillo, G.
History 2	Comparative World History <i>Foodways: A Global History</i>	Frede, V.
History 103B P 006	The 'Stans: Central Asia in the Soviet Empire	Shaw, D.
History 171A	Russia to 1700	Kollmann, J.
History 285B	Europe <i>European Intellectual and Cultural History in the Long 19th Century</i>	Frede, V.
Philosophy 24	Freshman Seminar: <i>Reading Dostoyevsky's The Brothers Karamazov as an Answer to Our Current Electronic Isolation</i>	Dreyfus, H.
Political Science 3	Introduction to Empirical Analysis and Quantitative Methods	Wittenberg, J.
Political Science 191 P 004	Junior Seminar <i>Foundations of Political Thought and Action</i>	Fish, M. S.
Political Science 200	Major Themes in Comparative Analysis	Fish, M. S.
Slavic R5A	Tall Tales, Ghost Stories, and Science Fiction: The Realistic Unreal	Dyne, T.
Slavic R5B	'Wild' West/'Savage' East: Life on the American and Russian Frontiers	Papava, S.
Slavic R5B	Home and Exile in Polish Poetry	Huerta, J.
Slavic R5B	Dialogue and Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment	Johnson, Z.
Slavic 24	The Brothers Karamazov: Let's Read It Together	McLean, H.
Slavic 24	The Mystery and Fascination of the Balkans	Alexander, R.
Slavic 39N	Travellers: Fiction, Travelogue, Memoir	Frick, D. A.
Slavic 45	Nineteenth-Century Russian Literature	Golburt, L.
Slavic 131	Literature, Art, and Society in 20th-Century Russia	Ram, H.
Slavic 134A	Gogol	Golburt, L.
Slavic 134R	Research in Russian Literature	Golburt, L.
Slavic C137	Introduction to Slavic Linguistics	Kavitskaya, D. A.
Slavic C139	Language Spread	Nichols, J. B.
Slavic 170	Survey of Yugoslav Literatures	Alexander, R.
Slavic 171	Readings in Yugoslav Literatures	Alexander, R.
Slavic 181	Readings in Russian Literature	Muza, A.
Slavic 210	Old Church Slavic	Frick, D. A.
Slavic 246A	Russian Modernism (1890s-1920s)	Matich, O.
Slavic 246B	Contemporary Russian Literature (1920-present)	Barskova, P.
Slavic 281	Aims and Methods of Literary Scholarship: Slavic Languages And Literatures	Paperno, I.
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Transnationalizing Croatia's Nascent Opposition, 1989-1991

Sarah Garding

Ph.D. Candidate, Political Science, UC Berkeley

One of the most distinctive aspects of Croatia's exit from Yugoslavia is the role that the diaspora¹ played in party competition and state building. Analysts have noted the close ties that formed early on between Croatian emigrants and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the party that dominated political life throughout the 1990s.² As an early patron of the HDZ, the diaspora endowed the party with an estimated four to eight million dollars for its inaugural election campaign in 1990. The HDZ, in turn, rewarded its major diaspora supporters with plum positions in the party, government, and state apparatus.³ The HDZ government also granted highly preferential citizenship access to ethnic Croats outside of Croatia, and reserved nearly ten percent of parliamentary seats for diaspora representation.

How did these close ties develop between a homeland party and the diaspora? As Yugoslavia's economic and political crises escalated in the late 1980s, a handful of political aspirants from Croatia began to visit diaspora communities. Croatia had no shortage of dissidents and cultural elites who could have garnered strong diaspora support, particularly those who were involved in the 1971 Croatian Spring movement. These figures included Marko and Vladimir Veselica, Vlado Gotovac, Slavko Goldstein, Mike Tripalo, Savka Dabčević-Kučar, Franjo Tuđman, and Dražen Budiša. This suggests that there was nothing inevitable about the strong ties that developed between Franjo Tuđman and the Croatian diaspora. If anything, some of the other giants of the Croatian Spring had greater name recognition than Tuđman.

This article reconstructs the diaspora-HDZ partnership. The first part analyzes the post-World War II cleavages in the diaspora, and illustrates how conflicting aims prior to World War

II gave way to post-World War II goal consensus. At the same time, despite their shared goal, diaspora political organizations had fractious relations and diverging tactics, and thus no single diaspora organization could legitimately speak or act on behalf of all others. Instead, it was a homeland political organization, the HDZ, which corralled and channeled diaspora political support. The second part of the article reconstructs the transnational organizing of Franjo Tuđman and his HDZ party from 1987-1991.

From Conflict to Consensus

Croatia's diaspora is the product of over a century of mass emigration. By 1914, an estimated 350,000 to 600,000 Croats had emigrated from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.⁴ The majority went to the United States, where they engaged in agriculture and fishing or, to a greater extent, settled in emerging mining and industrial centers.⁵ Successive waves of emigration followed in the interwar period, World War II, during the socialist Yugoslav period, and since the collapse of Yugoslavia.

During the twentieth century, one of the most important shifts in Croatian diaspora politics was from conflict to consensus over the *Croatian Question* of whether Croatia should be part of a Yugoslav state or completely independent. Until the 1960s, diaspora political organizations had varying answers to the *Croatian Question*. In the early 1900s, explicitly political and homeland-oriented diaspora organizations formed in opposition to Magyarization policies in Croatia-Slavonia.⁶ They advocated for more autonomy within the Dual Monarchy or outright independence. During World War I, a growing number

¹ Following Shain and Barth (2003), I define *diaspora* as "a people with a common origin who reside, more or less on a permanent basis, outside the borders of their ethnic or religious homeland – whether that homeland is real or symbolic, independent or under foreign control. Diaspora members identify themselves, or are identified by others...as part of the homeland's national community[.]" C.f. Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth, "Diasporas and International Relations Theory," *International Organizations* 57 (Summer 2003), 452.

² Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War*, 3rd ed. (London: Penguin Books, 1996); Paul Hockenos, *Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Darko Hudelist, *Tuđman: Biografija* (Zagreb: Profil, 2004); Laura Silber and Allan Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia* (London: Penguin Books, 1995).

³ Ivan Koprić, "The Croatian Public Administration is in a Stormy Period," *Hrvatska javna uprava* 9, no. 3 (2009), 609-616.

⁴ The conservative figure comes from Ivan Čizmić et al, *Iseljena Hrvatska* (Zagreb: Golden Marketing, 2005), and the larger from George Prpic, *The Croatian Immigrants in America* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1971).

⁵ Ljubomir Antić, *Croats and America* (Zagreb: Hrvatska matica iseljenika, 1997); Čizmić et al 2005.

⁶ Croatia-Slavonia was under Hungarian jurisdiction, while coastal Dalmatia and parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina fell under Austrian administration.

of emigrants supported the creation of a South Slav state, thanks in part to the efforts of the London-based Yugoslav Committee. The Committee was an influential group of political émigrés that lobbied the Allies to back a postwar Yugoslav state. It dispatched representatives to emigrant communities worldwide to mobilize material and political support. Two massive pro-Yugoslavia congresses were held in North and South America.⁷ The largest fraternal organization in the United States donated more than \$10,000 to the Committee's work.⁸ However, the Yugoslav idea was not wholly embraced by emigrants; many Croats abroad supported an independent Croatia. The pro- and anti-Yugoslavia fault lines ran through the press and associational life, and fissured many existing institutions.⁹

Although the *Croatian Question* continued to divide the diaspora after World War II, by the 1960s, political organizations had more or less converged on a shared position. There was no longer a strong base of support for a Yugoslav state, and the major diaspora organizations now fully backed outright independence. The transformation within the diaspora can be seen in the left, the nationalist center, and the right:

The Left

Croatians involved in socialist parties and the United States labor movement were a strong constituency of support for both the post-World War I and post-World War II Yugoslav states. In part, the cooperation of Serbian, Slovenian, and Croatian immigrants in American leftist parties and labor organizations made them more predisposed to support a state built on interethnic cooperation. After the establishment of the fascist Independent Croatian State (NDH) in 1941, left-leaning Croats in the United State. became vocal critics of the new regime and voiced strong support for Tito's Partisans and his vision for a second Yugoslavia.¹⁰ Many emigrants without a strong leftist orientation also supported Tito.

However, the pro-Tito cleavage in the politically active diaspora declined over time. The Cold War, the weakening of American socialism, and the crackdown on the Croatian Spring were largely responsible for this transformation. By 1970, only one Croatian leftist paper remained in the United States.¹¹

Moreover, the constant stream of fresh arrivals from Croatia painted a dramatically different picture of Tito's Yugoslavia from the rosier accounts in official Yugoslav media targeting emigrants. Thus, by the 1960s and 1970s, the Croatian diaspora left, which was the strongest bastion of support for Yugoslavia after World War II, was much weakened.

The Right

The fascist Ustasha movement that seized control in wartime Croatia had partial origins in the émigré scene. Ante Pavelić, future leader of the NDH, fled Yugoslavia in 1929 as a secretary of the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP). Pavelić set up guerrilla camps in Italy, and his associates recruited Croatian emigrants in Europe to train at them. In 1931, a Pavelić ally traveled to South America to establish the first pro-Ustasha Croatian Defender organization. Argentina alone had forty chapters, and another twenty branches were organized in the United States.¹² These and other diaspora organizations on the right unequivocally advocated Croatian independence, in contrast to the nationalist center and the left.

As Tito's Partisans converged on Zagreb at the close of World War II, hundreds of thousands of NDH officials, their families, and civilians fled Croatia. Now in diaspora communities, they reinvigorated the political right. In Argentina, to which Pavelić and many other officials fled, the Croatian Liberation Movement (HOP) was formed in 1956. It called for an independent Croatian state encompassing territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The HOP also had chapters in Australia, Europe, and North America.

Another organization, the Croatian National Resistance, was established by a high-ranking Ustasha official who fled to Spain after the war. The organization grew quickly, especially in Western Europe. Its leaders came to the conclusion that a viable, independent Croatia would not be possible without national reconciliation between Croats who had fought on opposing sides during World War II: the pro-Yugoslav Partisans and the pro-independence Ustasha.

Thus, whereas the Croatian diaspora's left wing was consistently pro-Yugoslavia, the diaspora's right was

⁷ Čizmić et al 2005, 319-20.

⁸ Matjaž Klemenčič, "Josip Marohnić," in *Making It in America: A Sourcebook on Eminent Ethnic Americans*, ed. Elliot Robert Barkan (Santa Barbara: ABC CLIO, 2001).

⁹ Antić 2002, Prpic 1971.

¹⁰ Jure Krišto, "Communist Penetration of Croatian American Organisations During World War II," *Review of Croatian History* 5 (2009), 169-188.

¹¹ Prpic 1971. While many emigrant Croats neither loved nor loathed Tito's Yugoslavia, they tended to be less active in diaspora political organizations, and more active in fraternal organizations.

¹² Čizmić et al 2005.

consistently pro-independence. The more radical organizations even hatched schemes to “liberate” Croatia from Yugoslavia and embraced violent tactics like airplane hijackings, invasions, and assassinations.¹³ These organizations remained active when Tuđman visited North America in 1987.

The Nationalist Center

Situated between the pro-Yugoslav left and the pro-independence right was the nationalist center, where divisions over the *Croatian Question* persisted long after World War II. For much of the twentieth century, the nationalist center in the diaspora coalesced around the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS). Under the first Yugoslav state (1918-1941), the HSS advocated more autonomy for Croatia within Yugoslavia but never fully or explicitly backed independence. Emigrant Croats’ support for the party was consistently strong. In 1919, a large assembly convened in Cleveland to create the Croatian League, whose program essentially reiterated that of the homeland HSS.¹⁴ League chapters were organized in diaspora communities worldwide.¹⁵ Another pro-HSS organization, the Croatian Circle, was created in 1928 and supported homeland nationalist parties.¹⁶ However, there were differences among these and other nationalist center organizations on whether Croatia should continue to be part of Yugoslavia or pursue independence.¹⁷

After World War II, HSS leader Vladko Maček went in to exile. At first, the HSS continued to vacillate on the *Croatian Question* and clashed with the right-leaning organizations that envisioned an independent Croatia at any cost.¹⁸ The postwar HSS leadership initially supported the continuation of Yugoslavia but a democratic one in which Croatia had autonomy. After Maček’s death in 1964, however, an important change took place within the HSS. Maček’s successor, Juraj Krnjević, led the HSS to fully support Croatian independence for the first time.¹⁹

The HSS was not the only organization in the nationalist center. The crackdown in 1971 on the nationalist Croatian Spring movement in Croatia enraged diaspora communities worldwide.

Most staged some sort of protest or sit-in. As had happened so often before, homeland crisis prompted diaspora organizations to try to coordinate their efforts. To this end, the Croatian National Council (HNV) was established in 1974 to gather delegates from diaspora organizations, with the notable absence of the right-wing HOP and the HSS. The HNV was officially nonpartisan, and backed the independence of Croatia.²⁰

Thus, by the 1980s, although the diaspora political organizations were far from united in their beliefs, they exhibited cohesion in terms of their goal of Croatian independence. At the same time, existing diaspora organizations lacked the prestige, broad popularity, and legitimacy to take on a leadership role or speak for the diaspora. These two conditions helped pave the way for the dominance of Tuđman’s HDZ in the diaspora.

The HDZ’s Diaspora Support

Franjo Tuđman’s introduction to the diaspora came in 1966, when he spent several months in the U.S. At the time, Tuđman was a member of the League of Communists, a former Partisan general, and a Tito ally. Tuđman met with numerous émigrés, including several well-known intellectuals and political emigrants.²¹ His introduction to the ideological landscape of the North American diaspora would prove useful two decades later.

Over the next two decades, Tuđman became involved in the Croatian Spring movement, spent time in jail because of his dissident activities, and authored several books that touched on nationalist themes. During this time, Tuđman called for reconciliation between Croats divided by World War II battle lines. This idea was introduced in diaspora circles long before; indeed, it was a position that was more or less settled on in the diaspora by the late 1970s.²² Nevertheless, Tuđman’s embrace of reconciliation helped him build support abroad.

As mentioned above, it was not inevitable that the Croatian diaspora should have favored Tuđman over other dissidents. He had less name recognition than other Croatian

¹³ On these campaigns, see Hockenos 2003.

¹⁴ Čizmić et al 2005; Prpic 1971.

¹⁵ Čizmić et al 2005.

¹⁶ Prpic 1971.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Čizmić et al 2005.

¹⁹ Ibid. However, by the 1980s, the HSS was weakened by an internal rift. One camp supported the London-based Krnjević, who was president of the worldwide HSS, while the other supported Mladen Zorkin, the president of the HSS in Canada. Despite attempts at reconciliation, the HSS was a divided, weakened, and graying organization (Author interview with former diaspora journalist, Zagreb, Croatia, December 10, 2009).

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Hudelist 2004.

²² Author interview with HDZ diaspora activist #2, Zagreb, Croatia, November 11, 2009; Hudelist 2004.

dissidents, and his Partisan general background hurt, rather than helped, his attempts to win over the most vehemently anti-communist émigrés. The simple, yet crucial, difference was timing. Tuđman visited North America when the diaspora was increasingly mobilized by events in Yugoslavia, and dissident visitors from Croatia were rare. Indeed, what distinguished Tuđman from his peers was that he got his passport back in 1987, more than two years before Budiša, Veselica, and other opposition figures, whose passports had been confiscated after the Croatian Spring.²³ He was thus the *only* dissident abroad during a critical period. For Dražen Budiša, leader of the opposition HSLs party during the 1990s., this discrepancy was decisive:

I was one of the last [dissidents] in Yugoslavia to get a passport – in late 1989...The HSLs had already existed for half a year, and I only got my passport then...I was later criticized. How could I allow other [dissidents] to go abroad and not go myself? The reason why I didn't go was simply that I could not go.²⁴

Perhaps more importantly, by the time Budiša and his fellow HSLs leaders received their passports, it was clear that the diaspora had its favorites – the HDZ. When Vlado Gotovac and Slavko Goldstein went to North America to solicit resources, the HSLs's more ambiguous position on the *Croatian Question* clashed with the diaspora's resolution of the *Croatian Question*.²⁵ Budiša reports that the HSLs did not receive diaspora funding, and the party only had a few short-lived overseas branches.²⁶

Once Tuđman's passport was returned in 1987, acquaintances in Canada financed a one-month visit for Tuđman in June.²⁷ The official purpose of Tuđman's 1987 visit was to deliver lectures on nationality at several Canadian universities. This diaspora speaking tour greatly increased Tuđman's name recognition. For instance, at a packed University of Toronto auditorium, the audience spontaneously interrupted his lecture

with several standing ovations. As a major diaspora newsletter observed, "One gets the impression that there has never been such a successful lecture [delivered in the diaspora]."²⁸

Tuđman's social engagements were even more important for his political future, because they allowed him to rub elbows with successful businessmen who later made campaign donations to the HDZ and participated in the party's diaspora branches. They were some of the earliest and most important patrons of the future party.²⁹

In addition to these entrepreneurs, Tuđman also met with individuals from the more right-wing émigré circles.³⁰ One such figure was future defense minister Gojko Šušak, who hosted the Tuđmans in Ottawa. Their 1987 introduction forged a deep bond that would endure throughout the 1990s.³¹

The Tuđmans made a second trip to North America in 1988. Their itinerary included stops in twenty-some cities in Canada and the U.S. Ante Beljo, a Canadian Croat who later played an important role in organizing HDZ branches in the diaspora and Bosnia-Herzegovina, took the lead in organizing the Tuđmans' itinerary.³² Once again, Tuđman used the occasion to network and recruit allies. The Tuđmans' Toronto host recalled an "army of people" invading his home every night for endless dinners and parties held in honor of the guest.³³ The tone of the 1988 visit was noticeably more political.³⁴

Information on Tuđman's North American visits generated interest in European diaspora communities, and in the fall of 1988 he visited Germany and Austria to deliver lectures and establish a support base in Western Europe. Tuđman met Zdenka Babić-Petričević, a Croat in Germany who would become one of the HDZ's most active emigrant organizers.³⁵

In the summer of 1989, after the HDZ's public debut in Zagreb, the party intensified its organizing activities abroad. The first international branch was established in Zurich in July.³⁶ One

²³ This discrepancy has led some to suspect the hand of the Udba in Tuđman's early access to the diaspora. Hudelist 2004; Mate Meštrović and Pera Zlatar, *Mate Meštrović: u vrtlogu hrvatske politika* (Zagreb: Golden Marketing, 2007).

²⁴ Author interview with former HSLs leader Dražen Budiša, Zagreb, Croatia, June 30, 2010.

²⁵ Author interview with former diaspora journalist, Zagreb, Croatia, December 10, 2009; author interview with former HSLs official, Zagreb, Croatia, June 8, 2010.

²⁶ Author interview with former HSLs leader Dražen Budiša, Zagreb, Croatia, June 30, 2010.

²⁷ Hudelist 2004.

²⁸ "Dr. Tuđman u Torontu," *Nova Hrvatska*, no. 13 (1987), 5.

²⁹ Hudelist 2004.

³⁰ Ivica Radoš, *Tuđman izbliza* (Zagreb: Profil, 2005).

³¹ Hudelist 2004; Radoš 2005.

³² Karlo Mirth, *Život u emigraciji* (Zagreb: Hrvatska matica iseljenika, 2003); Ankica Tuđman, *Moj život s Francekom* (Zagreb: Večernji list, 2006).

³³ Radoš 2005.

³⁴ Hudelist 2004; Jakša Kušan, *Bitka za Novu Hrvatsku* (Zagreb: Oktobar Keršovani, 2000).

³⁵ Tuđman 2006.

³⁶ Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, *Deset godina HDZ: spomen knjiga* (1999).

of the party's Zagreb leaders, Vladimir Šeks, toured Australia in September to deliver lectures and preside over HDZ branch foundings in several cities.³⁷ The aforementioned Zdenka Babić-Petričević presided over the inaugural congresses of more than ninety branches in West Germany.³⁸ Branches could be found in cities as far and wide as Vancouver, Canada; Johannesburg, South Africa; Buenos Aires, Argentina; and Malmo, Sweden. The North American diaspora scene was particularly well organized, with dozens of branches in the United States and Canada. The first North American Convention was held in Cleveland in January 1990.³⁹ By 1991, the HDZ boasted of having 366 branches in Croatia, 184 branches in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 210 branches outside of Yugoslavia.⁴⁰

Remarkably, diaspora branches drew membership from the nationalist center organizations *and* the right wing. Rather than invest in repairing the factional HSS, many HSS members and leaders jumped ship to join the HDZ.⁴¹ In some cases, entire memberships of HSS chapters and right-wing organization chapters would vote to join the HDZ en masse. The president of the right-wing HNO opted to subsume the entire organization within the HDZ.⁴²

Drawing members with a range of backgrounds and views, these diaspora branches provided crucial resources for the HDZ's inaugural campaign. Estimates of total HDZ resources for the 1990 election range from four to eight million dollars, most of which came from diaspora donors. These included small individual contributions to large donations from wealthy individuals and organizations. A number of individuals made contributions in the tens and even hundreds of thousands of dollars, and they were later rewarded with plum positions in the government, party, and state apparatus.⁴³ For instance, Šeks returned from his 1989 visit to Australia with a check for \$100,000 AUD tucked away in his shoe. The money had been donated to help the HDZ secure a fully equipped office in Zagreb.⁴⁴ A prominent figure in the Croatian diaspora scene of the 1970s and 1980s recalled diasporans showing up to HDZ events with bags full of money to donate.⁴⁵ The party's "Golden Book" (*Zlatna*

knjiga HDZ-a) published the names of members who donated \$1,000 AUD or more.

The diaspora quickly came to be regarded as the HDZ's territory, and the party carefully guarded it. After the HDZ, the Veselicas' Croatian Democratic Party (HDS) was the most successful in the diaspora, but they only had a handful of external chapters. After its poor performance in the 1990 elections, Marko Veselica, one of the HDS leaders, lamented the party's late arrival to Australia:

The HDZ formed some sort of monopoly on Australian territory, giving the impression that it was the only Croatian party, that they had covered all issues concerning Croatia... As a result of that attitude and of our late arrival, naturally it was very difficult to develop strong contacts in Australia, get support there, and in some way remove the blockade to our party and overcome distrust. A lot of unreliable information, forgeries, and falsifications were circulated [by the HDZ] to disqualify me and other heads of the HDS.⁴⁶

Impact on Politics

The concentration of Croatian diaspora support in one party, the HDZ, deeply impacted party resources, ideology, and competition. First, the unequal distribution of material resources across the new parties distorted party development. The vast majority of the estimated four to eight million dollars in the HDZ's 1990 campaign war chest came from the diaspora. This massive sum allowed it to outspend other new parties by up to 40:1. The money was used to launch a modern election campaign and build a vast support base in and outside of Croatia. This in turn helped the party gain momentum and win a commanding victory in the 1990 elections, thus ushering in a decade of rule. Diaspora material aid, then, distorted the resource balance among parties and gave a strong edge to a single party.

Second, the HDZ-diaspora partnership impacted the party program. The HDZ platform and HDZ officials' speeches were peppered with references to the Croatian diaspora, calling for a closer partnership and homeland return. These overtures reinforced the highly ethnicized view of the political community

³⁷ "Nastupi g. Vladimira Šeksa u Melbourneu," *Hrvatski vjesnik/Croatian Herald*, September 29, 1989.

³⁸ "HDZ u Njemačkoj," *Glasnik HDZ* no. 6, (1990), 55; "Nove organizacije HDZ-a u Švicarskoj i SR Njemačkoj," *Glasnik HDZ* no. 7 (1990), 37; HDZ 1999.

³⁹ "Tisuću Hrvata na konvenciji HDZ u Clevelandu," *Glasnik HDZ* no. 7 (1990), 17.

⁴⁰ HDZ 1999.

⁴¹ Čizmić et al 2005.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Kušan 2000.

⁴⁴ Čizmić et al 2005; Meštrović and Zlatar 2007.

⁴⁵ Author interview with former diaspora journalist, Zagreb, Croatia, December 10, 2009.

⁴⁶ Marko Veselica, "Izvištaj sa puta po Australiji i Kanada," *Hrvatska domovina*, October 13, 1990, 13.

that crystallized under HDZ rule in the 1990s. Additionally, the party program was also shaped by the presence of diaspora returnees in the HDZ leadership. Nearly 30% of the members of the HDZ organizing committee for the 1990 Congress were returnees.⁴⁷ This was the committee that selected speakers, organized proceedings, and worked out some of the key themes for the highly public Congress. Nearly 15% of the 63 individuals selected for the party's Central Committee at that Congress had a diaspora background.⁴⁸ Several diaspora returnees in particular were allegedly influential in the hardline faction within the HDZ that supported intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁴⁹ Thus, the diaspora had strong influence in shaping party – and hence government – policy.

Finally, diaspora input shaped party competition. The diaspora's strong material support helped relieve the HDZ of the need to cooperate with other new parties. The latter parties'

limited resources and memberships prompted them to form an opposition coalition. The plurality of views within the coalition moderated the coalition's positions on the future of Yugoslavia and relations with the Croatian Serb minority. The HDZ, by contrast, could afford to compete alone in the 1990 elections, mobilize nationalist sentiment, and take a more brazen stance on the future of Yugoslavia.⁵⁰ More importantly, by running alone and winning with a strong plurality, the HDZ was able to rule alone and heavy-handedly. What if the HDZ had not had its strong resource advantage? Although it is impossible to know for certain, the HDZ may have been less successful in organizing within Croatia. It may have been forced to compete as part of the opposition coalition, and rule in a coalition government. This, in turn, could have affected key policies and the course of Croatia's exit from Yugoslavia.

⁴⁷ "Predsjedništvo Sabora," *Glasnik HDZ-a*, March 1990, 9. This figure excludes Bosnian Croats without an emigration background.

⁴⁸ "Sabor je izabrao," *Glasnik HDZ-a*, March 1990, pg. 11. This figure excludes Bosnian Croats without an emigration background.

⁴⁹ Hockenos 2003; Hudelist 2004.

⁵⁰ Technically, the HDZ was in a coalition with several minor parties in 1990, but it clearly called the shots and effectively ran alone.



Save the Date



*Upcoming events during the Spring 2014 semester***

- 1) **The 29th Annual Colin Miller Lecture with Valerie Bunce**
Thursday, February 27, 2014, 4:00pm, Toll Room, Alumni House
- 2) **The 38th Annual Berkeley-Stanford Conference - "Emancipation"**
Friday, March 7, 2014, Bechtel Conference Center, Encina Hall
Stanford University
- 3) **The 14th Annual Peter N. Kujachich Lecture with Saša Srećković**
Tuesday, April 1, 2014, 5:15pm, Toll Room, Alumni House
- 4) **The 39th Educator Outreach Conference - "Liberalism and Its Discontents"**
Saturday, April 26, 2014, Heyns Room, Faculty Club

***Please note that event details may change. Updates will be sent out by email and can be found online at <http://iseees.berkeley.edu/>.*

Carnegie Scholars Program: Fall 2013

The Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, in collaboration with the Centre for Advanced Studies and Education (CASE) at the European Humanities University and the Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC), has organized the fifth two-week-long workshop for promising scholars from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The workshop is funded by a generous grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. During the Fall 2013 semester, ISEEEES hosted the following scholars:

Malkhaz Toria is an Assistant Professor in the College of Arts and Sciences at Ilia State University, Tbilisi, Georgia. He holds a Ph.D. in History from Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Georgia. During the Carnegie Scholars Program, he developed a syllabus on political and symbolic borders in the Abkhazia region of Georgia under the guidance of Professor Edward Walker.

Tamara Vardanyan is an Assistant Professor in the Faculty of History at the Yerevan State University, Armenia. She holds a Ph.D. in History from Yerevan State University. During the Carnegie Scholars Program, she developed a syllabus on the manifestation of nationalism in the South Caucasus at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries under the guidance of Professor Stephan Astourian.