



University of California, Berkeley

ISSN 1536-4003

Newsletter of the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies

Spring 2011
Volume 28, Number 1

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Eurasian Studies

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Notes from the Director

The Times of Trouble are over! "Interim Director" John Connelly has been forced to retreat, and legitimate power has been restored. I am grateful to General Jeff Pennington and Admiral Ned Walker for their steadfast loyalty during the difficult times of foreign occupation and for their brilliant leadership of the resistance movement. Andrei Dubinsky continued to produce the ISEES newsletter from his temporary Taiwan headquarters; Libby Coyne coordinated the acts of sabotage in and around Stephens Hall. My hosts at the Hoover Institution at Stanford did everything in their power to make my time in exile less painful. Their failure is due to the inherent limitations of the no-fly-zone policy, not their lack of compassion. I vowed I would be back. The day has come. Let us rebuild together!

The day-to-day activities at the institute have been reinvigorated. Our faculty/graduate student lunchtime seminar series *Turning the World Upside Down: Reassessing the Causes and Consequences of Radical Transformations in Eurasia and Eastern Europe* continues to be very successful. Seminars this semester have been led by Professor Carla Hesse (History and Dean of Social Sciences), Professor Jason Wittenberg (Political Science), Professor Jan de Vries (History), and Professor Harsha Ram (Slavic Languages and Literatures).

In addition, this spring our Carnegie-supported Field Development Project has brought four scholars from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia to Berkeley for a two-week working visit. These scholars work with our faculty and graduate students in producing a field reading list, an undergraduate lecture course and/or graduate seminar syllabus, and a field survey, all with the goal of providing the fellows with expertise in a particular field of social science scholarship and preparing them to train future generations of qualified social scientists back in their home countries.

It continues to be a busy spring semester, and I would like to thank all of you who have been attending our events and participating in our various academic and outreach efforts. On February 10, Professor Grzegorz W. Kołodko, former finance minister and deputy premier of Poland and a key architect of Poland's successful economic reforms, delivered the annual Colin Miller Memorial Lecture. In his talk entitled *Truth, Errors, and Lies: Politics and Economics in a Volatile World*, Professor Kołodko drew upon his experiences in Poland and East Central Europe to underscore the necessity of conceptual and theoretical innovation. His talk was recorded and is available as a podcast on the ISEES website.

ISEES hosted the 35th annual Berkeley-Stanford Conference on Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies on Friday, March 4. This year's topic—*Varieties of Post-Socialism*—elicited presentations by faculty from both universities, including: Alexei Yurchak (Anthropology, UC Berkeley), Greg Castillo (Architecture, UC Berkeley), Tom Roberts (Introduction

to the Humanities, Stanford), John Connelly (History, UC Berkeley), Edith Sheffer (History, Stanford), Steve Fish (Political Science, UC Berkeley), Ned Walker (Political Science and BPS, UC Berkeley), and David Holloway (History and Political Science, Stanford).

The 11th annual Peter N. Kujachich Lecture in Serbian and Montenegrin Studies was held on Thursday, April 14 in the Heyns Room of the UC Berkeley Faculty Club. Svetlana Rakić, professor of art history at Franklin College, spoke on the art of Studenica Monastery and its close relationship with the founding fathers of the Serbian church and state.

The theme of this year's annual Outreach Conference for Educators was The Fall of the Soviet Union, 1991-2011. This day-long conference, which is open to K-12 teachers, community college and university educators, and the

general public, was held on Saturday, April 30, in the Toll Room of the UC Berkeley Alumni House. Conference speakers, including UC Berkeley faculty and invited guest lecturers, addressed the political, economic, social, cultural, and international pressures which brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union and looked at the reverberations of this collapse over the last twenty years.

For more information about these and other happenings, please visit our website and events calendar at <http://iseees.berkeley.edu/>. I look forward to seeing you at many of our events.

Sincerely yours,

Yuri Slezkine
ISEEES Director
Jane K. Sather Professor of History

Yugonostalgia on Wheels: Commemorating Marshal Tito across Post-Yugoslav Borders^{1*} *Two ethnographic tales from post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina* Larisa Kurtović

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Year 2011 marks the twentieth anniversary of the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The violent and tragic dissolution of this multinational federation, up to that point thought to be one of the more successful and moderate Eastern European state socialisms, continues to be of great interests to scholars and various publics across the world. Much has been written about possible causes of the Yugoslav conflict, about ethnic cleansing and war crimes, and about the contradictory processes of reconstruction and “democratization” that followed them. The tumultuous end of South Slav unity would seem to have completely destroyed the political imaginations that fueled its unique socialist project.

Given the severity of the traumas that the 1990s left behind, it may come as a surprise to learn that since the early 2000s, at various sites across former Yugoslavia, thousands of its former residents still come together to celebrate the history of this now dissolved country and its different socialist holidays. In so doing, they also extol the person and project of the late Yugoslav president-for-life, Marshal Tito, and work to keep alive the values of antifascism and multinationalism central to his particular variety of “actually existing” socialism. The participants in this at times perplexing phenomenon—people who have come to be known as *Yugonostalgics*—play a central role in this exploratory piece. Each year, for occasions such as the former Day of Youth—Tito’s symbolic birthday—large numbers of visitors make pilgrimages to his native village of Kumrovec in Croatia in order to mark the now defunct holiday through song, dance, and socialist iconography in the company of other former Yugoslavs with whom they share a longing for times past.

Celebrations of various socialist anniversaries and former holidays have become a tradition throughout the region, thanks to the initiative and planning of a growing network of Josip Broz Tito Memorial Societies (Udruženja Josip Broz Tito),² whose affiliates and chapters continue to appear in various parts the former federation. The first such societies emerged in Croatia around 1996, notably in the capital of Zagreb and the traditionally leftist region of Istria, even though the first massive celebration in Kumrovec took place only in May 2000. Shortly after, the idea to found such organizations traveled outside of Croatia and continued to spread to all parts of Bosnia, Serbia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Montenegro. Various other antifascist and veterans associations, many of which have existed since the socialist era, aid the organization of such manifestations, overlap in membership, and closely collaborate with these societies. Various other groups, serious and playful, interested in celebrating and preserving the memory of Yugoslavia concurrently emerged.³ They wish to sustain the memory and certain aspects of the political project that despite its serious limitations helped modernize Yugoslavia, develop its economy, provide social services, and create a sense of pan-national unity. The fact that the violence of war and the uncertain postsocialist “transition” destroyed many of those accomplishments only reinforces the commitments of Yugonostalgics to keep alive the memories of the socialist era.

Since 2006, as a part of my dissertation in the Department of Anthropology, I have been studying such initiatives, interviewing dozens of self-professed

*See endnotes on page 22

Yugonostalgics, and attending their gatherings. Because the geographic focus of my research is Bosnia-Herzegovina specifically, I put into spotlight in this piece the JBT Societies that formed in this particular post-Yugoslav state, zooming in on two chapters in Sarajevo and Banja Luka. Given the fact these two Bosnian cities—one dominated by Bosnian Muslims and the other by Bosnian Serbs—have come to symbolize the nationalist discord at the heart of the country's ongoing political crisis, the parallel attention I give to these two sections of the same organization seeks to usurp commonly held wisdoms about the relationships between inhabitants of two "entity" territories created by the Dayton Accords.⁴ In addition to charting out the political landscape on which these societies operate, I also chronicle two ethnographic journeys to meetings of "Titoists" and other Yugonostalgics, which I undertook in 2009 and 2010. In so doing, I seek to accomplish several tasks at once.

First, I briefly introduce the larger field of study of post-socialist nostalgia, the widespread and documented phenomenon of longing for certain aspects of life during socialism, of which Yugonostalgia is one specific variant. By focusing on these organized and planned gatherings at symbolic and historical sites, I bring into light particular kinds of practices of commemoration and longing that I have coded here as "official" Yugonostalgia. Hence, I leave outside of the scope of this paper the myriad of other manifestations of this phenomenon, including creative and artistic interpretations of Yugoslav symbols, new patterns of economic collaboration across post-Yugoslav borders that Tim Judah recently named "Yugosphere,"⁵ and (for the most part) personal narratives about the "good life" during socialism, which shape regional political subjectivities. Even though I have limited my exploration in such a way, I want to emphasize that I see Yugonostalgia as a heterogeneous and complex phenomenon, whose many practices and forms are best studied in the contexts in which they emerge and for the effects they produce. The stories I tell here present only one aspect of a much larger set of issues.

Finally, I tell the story of "official" Yugonostalgic practices and their practitioners from the vantage point of the postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav republic that paid the highest price—in violence, displacement, and destruction—for the break up of Yugoslavia. Bosnia historically played a very special role in the Yugoslav socialist imaginary because it was the only republic with no clear national majority, and as such, presented a demographic microcosm of the entire federation. Moreover, Bosnia's rugged lands provided the terrain on which much of the Partisan resistance took place during WWII. As a result of this, a number of commemorative gatherings observed by Yugonostalgics today take place on its present day territory. For example, the birth of *Tito's Yugoslavia* is celebrated in the Bosnian town of Jajce on the anniversary of the Second Congress of AVNOJ (Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia), which

took place on November 29, 1943. The majority of key WWII battles, such as the Battle of Sutjeska and the Battle of Kozara which I mention in this paper, took place in Bosnia. The violence of the 1990s displaced the significance of this socialist history. The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement divided Bosnia into administrative territories that provide a complex system of interethnic accommodation. Moreover, as a result of wartime ethnic cleansing and postwar exchanges of property, for the first time in its modern history, the populations in these units are ethnically homogenous. Due to these overlapping histories, these commemorative gatherings, which celebrate the history and accomplishments of socialist Yugoslavia and Marshal Tito, possess a special kind of tragic irony and pile on additional layers of political and ideological complexity.

Ultimately, this essay argues that Yugonostalgia, particularly in its formal (official) instantiations, is a political phenomenon in so far as its practitioners seek to become political players and promote specific sorts of political aspirations. Even though these organizations do not advocate the restoration of Yugoslavia, their activities promote the preservation and reemergence of alternative political and ideological imaginaries, which not only work to protect the memory of a compromised past but also to use past experiences to argue for and work towards reformed political futures. Moreover, such organizations sometimes operate in close proximity and collaboration with various socialist and social democratic parties, engage in different sorts of regional rivalries, and form alliances on the basis of tacit or unrecognized strategic misunderstandings. Yet these organizations are not only political because they operate within a field of political relations shaped by both nationalism and struggles for leadership and legitimacy. As I argue in the section entitled "Bread and Games," these groups invest in celebrations, anniversaries, and feasts precisely because they understand that politics is not only about ideology but also about ordinary human experiences and forms of belonging that can be formed out of it. Carnival-like events celebrating the memory of Yugoslavia manage to call into being forms of solidarity and relatedness that surpass the political boundaries created by the violence of 1990s. In the last ethnographic part of this text, narrating a tale of two traveling buses and my Yugonostalgic companions, I cautiously pose the question of whether this alone is enough to create lasting political ramifications for the region. There, I highlight the contradictions and ambivalences that are often a part of participation in such celebrations, leaving open the question of whether these forms of commemoration and meeting enable hope or despair.

Yugonostalgia as a form of postsocialist longing and emergent politics of the future: a short summary

Like in the rest of the postsocialist world, the development of a phenomenon that would become known as Yugonostalgia surprised many observers inside and outside of former Yugoslavia, while nevertheless becoming a

frequent theme of chatter in various global and regional media. Those who understood socialist states to be nothing but totalitarian regimes appeared puzzled over the professed and widespread longing for a time that seemed synonymous with oppression and suffering.⁶ Some sought explanations in the widespread dispossession and economic hardship that the fall of socialism had engendered,⁷ or more specifically, with the loss of status of certain groups of people in the new economies.⁸ Admittedly less surprised were others who recognized that state socialisms produced their own creative and pleasurable forms of life, which were at once enabled by and irreducible to “the regime.”⁹ In this literature, postsocialist nostalgia became a fluid, multifaceted, generative, and complex phenomenon, shedding new light on the attachments, forms of sociality, and agency that socialism had successfully produced while providing critical insight into the inadequacies of existing market democracy.¹⁰ The phenomenon at times provided a reaction to the devaluation of socialist era experiences and forms of life,¹¹ while also indexing the emergent material and symbolic struggles which inspired Dominic Boyer to propose a view of “nostalgic” practices as a type of forward-oriented “politics of the future.”¹²

The dual orientation of nostalgia towards the past and the future made it a particularly attractive site for critical scholarship on postsocialist transformation. In the spirit of critical inquiry, Shevchenko and Nadkarni have argued that postsocialist nostalgia brings together an entire array of practices and contexts, whose political intentions and purchase must be carefully evaluated.¹³ The slippery character of the analytic category makes it imperative to distinguish and situate the many forms and varieties that postsocialist nostalgia takes, and pay close attention to the differences in particular national and social contexts. After all, the phenomenon of “Ostalgie” in Eastern Germany,¹⁴ which first became the center of academic writing, emerges in a very different context and with different ends than Yugonostalgia. The interest in nostalgia for Yugoslavia has also grown in the last several years, leading to the publication of a series of works in the West but also in the region, particularly in Slovenia, where this phenomenon has drawn a lot of attention. The studies of Mitja Velikonja, for example, have pondered the question of how come Slovenes, who escaped the Yugoslav dissolution virtually unscathed only to become EU citizens and inhabitants of the most prosperous post-Yugoslav state, long for socialist Yugoslavia?¹⁵ Croatian ethnologists have studied in fine ethnographic detail the practices of commemoration of Marshal Tito in Kumrovec¹⁶ while many external observers have posed the question of whether this phenomenon may provide the blueprint for various forms of counter memory and alternative postwar politics.¹⁷ Most observers of Yugonostalgia hesitate to give this phenomenon much conventional political agency, focusing instead on the playful appropriations of symbols, personal reflections, commercial activities, and other practices, which their

informants describe as “not political.” But as Škrbić-Alempijević and Velikonja have argued, the very insistence on the non-political nature of these practices betrays the fact that they have the potential to be read as political.¹⁸ My intervention here contributes to such problematization but also brings into foreground many of those difficult political issues Yugonostalgia often raises, which in the context of postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina acquire a different sense of urgency. The unresolved political questions, as well as the scale of violence that happened in Bosnia, place it in a very different category from any other newly independent post-Yugoslav state. This vantage point renders existent typologies of nostalgia (i.e., restorative vs. reflective, authoritative vs. innovative) inadequate. As will be clear towards the end, I hesitate to read into any form of nostalgia some kind of inherent emancipatory political potential or frame it in terms of resistance. I prefer to instead ethnographically analyze the moments where this longing for the long-gone socialist state begins to produce both projected and unanticipated effects.

Political terrains of post-socialist memory: “official” practice of Yugonostalgia in postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina

I begin this exploration of “official” forms of Yugonostalgia by attending specifically to the groups of registered Titoists that exist on the territory of contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina. In mapping out the terrain on which these groups operate, including their goals and alliances, I show that certain kinds of Yugonostalgic practices indeed take a rather conventional political form. Yugonostalgics become specific kinds of recognizable political actors by forming citizens associations and by creating both acknowledged and unacknowledged alliances with certain political parties. However, these forms of conventional political work through associations operate through various kinds of struggles, differences in opinion and approach, and at times also misunderstandings about the nature of political activism being undertaken. JBT Societies, veterans, and antifascists often become pulled into much larger battles over proper interpretations of the Yugoslav and WWII wars, specific national grievances, interests of nationalist and “antinationalist” parties, and many other routine political debates. In this section, in wide brush strokes, I sketch out the most significant fault lines produced by these struggles. I focus on two local chapters of Josip Broz Tito Societies, but I also mention in passing other antifascist and veterans’ associations that do related work. Additionally, I discuss several different celebrations, anniversaries and holidays, including the celebration of Day of Youth in Kumrovec but also anniversaries of WWII battles, and other manifestations marking essential dates from the socialist history.

These and other gatherings of Yugonostalgics, organized by the regional networks of the above-mentioned associations, at first glance appear to embody a consistent political vision that derives its inspiration from the region’s socialist history. After all, official descriptions in promotional materials, mission statements of the organizing

groups, and the omnipresence of political speeches, flags, and other political memorabilia at these events seem to suggest a coherent project whose political nature stays easily recognizable to most current and former residents of the region. Undoubtedly, common political themes at these official gatherings exist, as adjectives such as antifascist, antinationalist, and much less frequently, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist, recur routinely at their every corner. But as I discovered during my field research, the use of such terms does not automatically guarantee consensus when it comes to their meaning or purported relevance. Simply put, different groups prioritize different issues: veterans associations and unions of antifascists tend to emphasize WWII people's liberation struggle and antifascism. Members of the Sarajevo chapter of JBT Societies remain particularly committed to the Yugoslav version of socialist multinationalism—"Brotherhood and Unity"—and emphasize the need for fostering normative antinationalism in postwar Bosnia. By contrast, affiliates of the Banja Luka chapter, especially the younger ones, look very interested in anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist projects and even take up global issues and struggles, vocalizing for example their solidarity with Venezuela and Cuba.

Moreover, although Tito Memorial Societies usually register as citizens associations (NGOs), different chapters throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina possess significant ties to existent or emergent Leftist parties. The most prominent supporter of the League of JBT Societies in Bosnia Herzegovina is the Social Democratic Party (SDP), which in 2010 won the controversial electoral victory in the Bosniak-Croat Federation. The current Sarajevo chapter president, Goran Behmen, is not only a member of SDP but is also the son of the city's mayor and one of the most prominent senior figures in this party. Many of the young members of that chapter belong to the municipal Youth Forums of SDP, and some of them have or will make the transition into the actual political party. Such a close connection between the two groups is not surprising, since the SDP prides itself as being the official inheritor of the League of Communists of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (as the Communist Party was known). However, critics have pointed out that the SDP tends to act opportunistically in relation to its communist past, emphasizing those origins in contexts where it can benefit from the connection (such as, for example, postwar privatization of the Party's real estate) or channeling nostalgic sentiments for rallying political support for its own programs.¹⁹ Consequently, its leadership tends to symbolically reinforce its tie to the most domesticated, benign, and friendly aspects of the successful Yugoslav past but has ignored its less glorious aspects and never made an effort to address the injustices made in the name of communism.

Other smaller socialist and social democratic parties operating throughout the country also show their support for various initiatives of the Society, and take part in a number of commemorative events, such as visits to socialist sites

and monuments. In 2008, Banja Luka based members of the JBT Society founded their own party, symbolically named League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose platform relies on a vision of a moderate, democratic, and internationalist communism.²⁰ So far, the party has not had electoral success, but its members remain optimistic. Meanwhile, in contrast to the situation in Sarajevo, the relationship between the dominant social democratic party in Republika Srpska, the League of Independent Social Democrats (Savez Nezavisnih Socijaldemokrata - SNSD), headed by the current leader of Bosnian Serbs Milorad Dodik, and the Banja Luka chapter of the JBT Society, appear decidedly less harmonious. The SNSD apparently hijacked from Banja Luka Titoists the organization of the annual commemorative gathering in the National Park Kozara, a site of a major 1942 battle. Although the site is a symbol of multinational Partisan resistance in Bosanska Krajina, the SNSD turned the event into an opportunity to spread further the same nationalist rhetoric for which its leader, Milorad Dodik, has become infamous. In his 2010 speech at Kozara, Dodik linked the Partisan struggles against fascist occupiers and the contemporary struggles of Bosnian Serbs to gain recognition and autonomy from foreign interference, more specifically the International Community (specifically its agencies such as the OSCE and the Office of the High Representatives) which has been "guiding" postwar reconstruction and reforms. Such a parallel indexed the troubled relationship between international overseeing institutions in Bosnia and nationalist leaders from Republika Srpska in a way that places all the blame for political failings on the foreigners. Moreover, during the same event, Dodik repeated a well-rehearsed line about his commitment to preservation of Republika Srpska as a "logical outcome of our fight for freedom and independence,"²¹ fully aware of the fact such phrases angered many Bosniaks who saw the RS as an outcome of war and ethnic cleansing. While he and the other speakers kept referencing their commitment to the ideals of antifascism, none of them seemed particularly interested in reflecting upon their own nationalism.

Indeed, nationalist sentiments, claims, and assumptions enter the space of Yugonostalgic commemoration and the narratives of many affiliates of Tito Memorial Societies across present-day Bosnia in various ways. Although the leadership of the Banja Luka chapter describes a good working relationship with their colleagues from Sarajevo, the relationship between WWII veterans and antifascist associations in the Federation and Republika Srpska remains fraught with tensions and disagreements. Two separate leagues of veterans associations exist in Bosnia today: SUBNOR BiH and SUBNOR RS. They emerged out of the postwar divisions and the divergent interpretations of the 1992-1995 Bosnian war but occasionally also promote different narratives about WWII. Given their unspoken link with political parties, these two organizations sometimes become instrumentalized in various disagreements between

the SNSD and political parties in the Muslim Croat Federation. As a result of this, for several years now, the two SUBNORs celebrate the anniversary of the Battle of Sutjeska, another major moment of Yugoslav antifascist resistance, on different days. The president of the Sarajevo based SUBNOR, Jure Galić, has stated that the problem arose out of the fact that the veterans associations in Republika Srpska remain under the influence of the RS government, which has reinterpreted WWII battles as a moment in a long history of (exclusively) Serb resistance and fight for freedom.²² However, Galić interjected, this history belongs to all national groups in Bosnia, who fought alongside each other against fascism. By contrast, officials in the RS government, such as the Serb member of the Bosnian-Herzegovina Presidency, Nebojša Radmanović, have complained that others are trying to minimize the contribution of Serb people to the WWII fight and continue to manipulate the history of antifascism for their own political purposes.²³

Meanwhile, these conflicts over legitimacy and (re)interpretations of WWII persist even outside of the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Other SUBNOR organizations in the new post-Yugoslav states have voiced concerns that certain fractions within Serbia and Montenegro are trying to rehabilitate Royalist forces and personages such as Draža Mihajlović, claiming they were also antifascists and deserve the same recognition as the Partisans. Yet not everyone among the veterans in Serbia or Montenegro agrees to such rehabilitation; some, in fact have been very vocal in their opposition to such steps, claiming them to be an effect of residual loyalties of some groups to the Milošević nationalist regime.²⁴

Hence, it would be misleading to suggest that attitudes towards WWII and the Yugoslav socialist past map exactly onto the national(istic) imaginaries and new territories produced out of the dissolution of the common state. The JBT Societies and the SUBNOR leagues that exist across former Yugoslavia do collaborate and meet on various occasions. In many ways, their respect for and valuation of the People's Liberation Struggle (NOB), values of antifascism, and the figure and accomplishments of Marshal Tito, remains pretty universal. However, situated regional and national grievances do determine how different people at different sites talk about and make use of their nostalgia for Tito's Yugoslavia. In my experience, particular groups and delegations also tend to underline those aspects of socialist Yugoslavism that are the most interesting to them and with which their new national or regional units most identify in the present moment. In other words, the variations echo and make use of the dominant narratives and political discussions in separated if not completely isolated new national spaces.

For example, when the different republic delegations were invited to address the audiences at the 2008 celebration of the 65th anniversary of AVNOJ in the House of Culture in Jajce, their speeches differed in, to this observer, predictable

ways. The Slovenes and Croatians, coming from socialist republics that first stepped out of the federation in 1991, underlined the doctrine of national self-determination, which was guaranteed to various republics and peoples at the time of Yugoslavia's founding. The Serbian delegation mostly lamented the passing of a strong and globally significant state. By contrast, the delegation from the Muslim-Croat part of Bosnia used the opportunity to warn the general public about the ongoing reemergence of nationalist rhetoric and fascist politics, urgently reminding everyone of the deteriorating political situation in its own divided country. At the same time, the delegation from Republika Srpska eschewed sensitive political topics and instead had its choir perform several revolutionary songs.²⁵ The Macedonian delegation did not even get to deliver a speech, because they, having the longest return journey, had to head back before the end of the program!

In addition to these differences, which are perhaps not so much a reflection of nationalist tendencies, as they are of divergent post-Yugoslav trajectories on which various populations have embarked, other rivalries can be observed. For example, various chapters of the JBT society within Bosnia proper compete for recognition and leadership. The Bihać JBT chapter's efforts to put into work the League of Antifascists of Southeastern Europe²⁶ have encountered insufficient support and some resistance from Sarajevo, where the overarching JBT organization is located. By contrast the Bihać Titoists have received strong support from their affiliates in Banja Luka and Jajce, gaining allies across ethnic and entity lines. These forms of solidarity should not come as a surprise, because the residents of these particular towns share an important regional identity cemented in the strong antifascist history of the northwestern part of Bosnia, better known as Bosanska Krajina. During last year's festival "Day(s) of Balkan Love," the organizers emphasized this shared regional pride and identity as a source of strength and comradeship. At the entrance to the picnic grounds in Bosanska Otoka, the visitors could read a large announcement board, entitled "Bosanska Krajina, the Cradle of Antifascism," which traced the contributions of the region's residents to the resistance and the founding of the new Yugoslav state. Among other things, the list emphasized the multinational character of antifascist resistance, the fact the most important historical gatherings, congresses, and battles took place there, and that its towns and villages gave the Partisans so much manpower and many heroes.²⁷

In other words, the concert of organizations, events, and practices, which appear to be a part of a static, homogenizing, and past oriented politics, form a complex constellation of ongoing and emergent struggles for legitimacy, recognition, and leadership. Such struggles are not frozen in time; they depend on and must be situated in the present context, where they respond to changing political currents, various vested interests but also transformations in public opinion ushered in by the postsocialist "transition."

They interact with and become shaped by budding political aspirations of the affiliated (or antagonistic) progressive and pseudo-progressive parties but also by revisionist nationalist narratives and regional rivalries, whose annales are longer than the record of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. In this way, official practices of Yugonostalgia bring together multiple and overlapping histories of socialism and interpretations of the WWII struggle while at the same time seeking to imagine new future oriented projects.

Bread and games: celebrating Tito as a form of politics by other means

In the previous section, I argued that groups such as Tito Memorial Societies and WWII veterans associations practice a form of nostalgic longing that has a definite, if not uncomplicated, political character and ambition. I also suggested that their political aspirations remain firmly rooted in the present moment and the ongoing struggles across ideological, national, and regional divides. My next task lies with exploring the relationship of these political visions and the highly visible, colorful commemorative gatherings that these groups, and the regional networks to which they belong, organize every year. Great examples of such manifestations are the Day of Youth celebrations in the Croatian village of Kumrovec, and Socialist Yugoslavia's birthday observed in the Bosnian town of Jajce on and around the 29th of November.²⁸ What happens at these events to make them relevant for the political present in which Yugoslavia no longer exists and Marshal Tito has long been dead? What kinds of political acts are such celebrations?



Jajce, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Visitors from all over former Yugoslavia dance together at the 65th anniversary of the founding of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, November 29, 2008. Photo: Larisa Kurtović

As I already suggested, the fact that many of the social-democratic political parties and activist groups from the region help put together and attend these meetings certainly adds to the seeming transparency of their political character. But anyone attending any one of these manifestations would quickly realize that a single gathering is in fact a series of events, some of which are quite mundane and are not necessarily about conveying an ideology or realizing a political program. Taking part in these festivities and the carnival-like expressions of Yugonostalgia are people who come for all sorts of different reasons and, prioritize varied aspects of the Yugoslav experience. Among the visitors, there are those who long for the lost sense of security

socialist Yugoslavia provided, WWII veterans, politically disillusioned middle age visitors, curious young people, children of "mixed marriages" and "Partisan families," and senior citizens looking to have some fun.

Journeying with members and sympathizers of Tito societies from Bosnia, I discovered that while most people who go to these meetings do in fact hold dear Yugoslav (socialist) values, their motivations for making these at times long and uncomfortable trips are not exclusively political. These meetings are social occasions, and their communal aspect is not to be underestimated. Old-timers go as much out of sentimental affect as from the desire to travel, socialize, and have a good time. Many of these meetings turn into picnics, feasts, and occasions to drink and be merry. Individual buses frequently bring along foods to eat and share with the comrades who await them at the agreed upon destination. Organizers of large manifestations, such as the Day of Youth, provide a range of gastronomic specialties, including "Partisan bean stews," barbecues, goulash, and even "Partisan beer." Such large-scale preparations present first and foremost a matter of fulfilling social expectations because visitors from other parts keep track of how well their hosts "welcomed" them. Sometimes visiting delegations bring gifts to their hosts, but such provisions also have their own politics. In the context of the November celebrations in Jajce, the Slovenian delegation has for the past few years been bringing various items, including cured meats and alcohol, to share with attendees of the modestly prepared festivities in this small and war-ravaged Bosnian town. While some residents of Jajce appreciate such a gesture, others see it as a patronizing act by the economically much better positioned Slovenians who appear to think they are providing charity. Familiar problems of socialist era redistribution, therefore, make themselves visible even when it comes to foods and provisions at an event celebrating the memory of Yugoslavia.

Despite these occasional spoken and unspoken conflicts, consummation of food and alcohol forms the central aspect of the day's activities. Sometimes travelers on the buses start drinking from the very moment of departure, sharing bottles of plum brandy and home brewed liquors (*iz domaće proizvodnje*). A crucial aspect of these journeys are the music and singing, whether alongside the "partisan songs" cassette tapes that someone always brings along or the Society's choir members that may be accompanying the bus to its destination. The music repertoire includes various revolutionary songs, regional folk melodies with patriotic undertones, and the unofficial anthem of the Society, "Comrade Tito, We Swear to You." The Yugoslav national anthem, "Hey, Slavs," and the Serbo-Croatian version of the Internationale, "Rise Up You Earthly Slaves," are sometimes sung on buses but are more frequently performed preceding the political speeches once the programs of the manifestations have already begun. Depending on the mood and the occasion, the day will be marked by spontaneous or

official performances of many other popular patriotic odes. After the food and drinks have been consumed, depending on the size of the event, various groups break into song and dance, particularly the revolutionary collective folk dance, *Kozaračko kolo*, which can sometimes involve up to a hundred dancers.

The young people who join the older visitors at these events have their own unique reasons for coming along. Many belong to youth wings of socialist or social democratic parties or to various contemporary antifascist, anarchist, or anti-capitalist organizations in the post-Yugoslav states. They aim to reconnect to the heritage of a time which most of them lived only as children or did not experience first hand at all. Just like for the older generations, part of the attraction originates in the possibility of having a really good time. On the buses I have traveled with from Bosnia, there tended to be a great number of single young men, most of who are secretly drawn in by the promise of a fleeting romance with a likeminded girl from some other part of former Yugoslavia. Such hopes draw on the cultural representations of the forms of sociality that developed during the socialist era *work actions* (Omladinske radne akcije-ORA), where youth worker brigades from all parts of Yugoslavia came together to build railways and roads. The concomitant possibilities for having fun, drinking, forging friendships, and finding love across republic (and ethnic) borders presented a major incentive to volunteer for such large scale building projects. Many of the youth I encountered and talked with during these manifestations professed a positive, even romanticized, view of such work actions. What is more, some, including Dušan Malešević whom I interviewed and spent time with in Banja Luka, are actually organizing small scale versions of such work actions in their home towns.²⁹

In addition to visitors who come with the intent of socializing, there are those who bring along various items to sell, including different sorts of souvenirs with the image of Tito and other Yugoslav socialist symbols, such as T-Shirts, caps, key chains, pens, pins, and so on. Even Tito Society chapters and other organizations sometimes sell these items as a way to raise funds for their work. Commercialization of symbols of socialist Yugoslavia presents the single most visible aspect of the Yugo nostalgia phenomenon, which quickly drew the attention of academics and the wider public.³⁰ Some of these articles are mass produced (with printed images of relevant symbols) while others are made by the people who sell them, including carved flasks, honey brandies, and various other perishables.³¹ A few vendors sell antiquated goods, such as WWII uniforms, ceremonial pins, or socialist era books and pamphlets. At larger events, such as the one in Kumrovec, someone usually sets up one or more stands with old and new literature, where the visitors can also obtain the latest editions of newspapers or monographs published by various chapters of Tito Societies across former Yugoslavia. These forms of targeted commercial activity are sometimes paired up with the sale

of purely mass produced goods, mostly cheap plastic items one could find at any post-socialist open-air market.



Kumrovec, Croatia: At the celebration of Day of Youth, a man sells antiquated copies of books about Tito and Socialist Yugoslavia, May 23, 2009. Photo: Larisa Kurtović

These profit-making activities certainly contribute to the fair-like atmosphere that often marks such Yugo nostalgic events. In addition to the buzzing sounds of the nostalgia markets, there are also plenty of colorful sights, including visitors dressed up as Yugoslav pioneers, or even more attention grabbing, young women playing the part of the "young partisan girl." Aging WWII veterans arrive in their ceremonial army uniforms, with full military honors. In Jajce, I encountered in person one of the several recognizable Tito impersonators, the Slovenian actor, Ivo Godnič. Dressed in a replica of the Marshal's white uniform, he arrived in a limousine, much to the delight of the gathered crowds, who then addressed him with various praises and requests or simply wanted to take a picture with him.³² The majority of visitors actually wear some sort of an article that professes their belonging to the gathered collective, be it a red neck scarf, a red shirt, or one of the clever shirts with a political message, such as "the machinist was better" (*Bravar je bio bolji*), referencing both the counterintuitive misbalance between Tito's modest formal education and his political accomplishments and the gap in achievements between the former Yugoslav leadership and their post-socialist political successors. Sometimes, these shirts comment not on the past but propose a wishful image of the future. I encountered one such shirt in Jajce in 2008 which sent a message to the nationalists and the new political and economic elites: "Your time is almost done" (*Vaše vrijeme ističe*).

Despite the optimism contained in this message, each one of these celebrations has its somber moments or tragic undertones that help remind those in attendance of the fact that the past is irrevocably lost. During each of the meetings I attended, I encountered teary-eyed participants who wore on their faces the traces of struggles caused by the violence of the 1990s and the race to survive the disorienting and dispossessing effects of the new era of market capitalism.³³ Hence, it seems important to pose the question: do the

commercial aspects, the fair-like atmosphere of these events, and the presence of costumes, music, and dance erode the purported political character and the seriousness of the organizers' intentions? Does the sensual and material quality of these meetings and the emphasis on pleasures of being a Yugoslav subject turn these events into media spectacles or a peculiar sort of a farce? How can we think about the various kinds of affective performances and responses of the participants?



Kumrovec, Croatia: a local vendor sells various brandies bearing the name and image of Marshal Tito, May 23, 2009.

Photo: Larisa Kurtović

Some of the critical observers of Yugonostalgic gatherings dismiss them as populist celebrations, whose political character and value are dubious at best. Because of the celebratory aspect of these meetings, with an emphasis on food and drinking, critics have placed them under the rubric with the pejorative title: “bread and games.” The Latin saying out of which the phrase was derived—*panem et circenses*—refers to the ways in which the powers that be use shallow and trivial incentives, such as populist entertainment and gluttonous feasts, to politically demobilize the populations under their rule. In late socialism, this phrase became in Yugoslavia a part of the critical arsenal for capturing the seeming lack of popular dissent, allegedly enabled by shallow pleasures of the good life, filled with consumption and celebration that marked the decade of 1980s.³⁴ The use of this phrase has continued in the postwar period as well.

My own interpretation of such sensorial, affective, and celebratory aspects of these organized commemorative practices moves in a different direction. First of all, the omnipresence of music, dancing, and other creative entertainment (however misguided it can sometimes be), reminds one of the customary festivities that were a part of the partisan resistance during WWII. The leadership of the Yugoslav army maintained high morale by supporting different forms of artistic production and cultural life, even during some of the most difficult periods of the war. As such, creative participatory entertainment presents a genre of social experience that does not necessarily lead to quenching of political aspirations but may as well help fuel commitments to certain kinds of political visions. Secondly, these ordinary practices and everyday pleasures, such as

consumption of certain kinds of foods and music, are in and of themselves productive of particular kinds of persons and inter-group solidarities. They helped create generations of people who identified with Yugoslavia not because they were fully convinced by socialist ideology but because they shared a common cultural experience. Political projects, including creation of nation-states, rely precisely on such colonization of everyday life and mundane practices through which strangers come to see themselves and each other as members of a community. What is at stake in such post-Yugoslav gatherings, like the ones I have described here, is a reenactment of a bodily memory and a reproduction of a certain social relationship. In fact, enacted at these meetings is a way of relating socially to others, on which socialist Yugoslavism was founded. In rehearsing these encounters, contemporary Yugonostalgics keep alive not only the memory of a less uncertain and more pleasurable past, but they also help perpetuate the practices and forms of life which the long gone country enabled and relied on through the nearly five decades of its existence. The organizers of events in Kumrovec, Jajce, and Bosanska Otoka recognize and make use of this. Hence, these manifestations call into being a sense of political being and action that is rooted not in ideology, but in sociality, a practiced social relationship.

A Tale of two Buses and two Milans: some thoughts on the slippery politics of Yugonostalgia

What kinds of social relationships emerge in the course of remembering socialist Yugoslavia and its charismatic leader, Marshal Tito? And how might those forms of relatedness help shed light on political potentials and limits of this phenomenon and its “official” practice? In this last ethnographic section, I narrate my encounters with two members of the JBT Society chapters from Sarajevo and Banja Luka, both named Milan, who accompanied me during my bus journeys to two out-of-town manifestations, and with other Yugonostalgics I met on my ways. The first story concerns a bus trip with the Sarajevan Titoists who traveled to Kumrovec in late May of 2009, and the other describes a much shorter journey with members of the Banja Luka chapter to the emerging festival of Yugonostalgia, “Days of Balkan Love” in Bosanska Otoka, undertaken in early August 2010. Although not my first visit to a (post)socialist memorial or my first manifestation of this sort, my journey to Kumrovec was the first time I signed up to accompany one of the JBT chapters to this kind of a celebration. On this bus, I met for the first time my interlocutor Milan,³⁵ an older gentleman with a sparkling short-sleeved white shirt and pressed gray trousers (an outfit that captured a different sense of time and history). A widowed retiree, whose children found refuge from war in the West, where they formed their families and built new lives, Milan had a lot of time on his hands that needed to be filled. After our meeting on the bus, I would encounter him at various cultural events in Sarajevo, including exhibits and lectures, which he always followed with great interest. Milan was too young to be a veteran of the WWII, but he

had been a member of the Communist Party and admitted to have lost the social status he enjoyed during socialism. Nevertheless, he carried himself with great dignity and was interested in my project, occasionally contacting me to give me ideas about materials I should collect. Although we had a very long conversation during our 14-hour long trip to Kumrovec and back, he never told me, and I never asked, about his ethnic background. This uncertainty resulted not only out of social mores, which made asking such question on my behalf rude, but also from the tacit and shared assumption that in this context such a piece of information ought not to have mattered.

Traveling alongside us, on a bus whose windows were covered by images of Marshal Tito, were various other members of the society, including a group of young men that I had grown to know in the course of my two-year-long fieldwork. Anes, who was hardly 18 at the time, and Jadranko, a college student in his early twenties, frequented such manifestations and often dressed as Yugoslav pioneers, even though they were clearly too old to play such a role. Anes, especially, has become a minor TV celebrity because he showed up at almost every relevant occasion and has already become recognizable as one of the youngest members of the Society. The rest of the people (including the Croatian border guard who was on duty that morning) were fascinated by his youth and often asked him questions about why he participated in such events if he did not have any memory of Yugoslavia. Anes would always have a ready answer which emphasized the fact his parents raised him in the spirit of Tito, whose leadership was unparalleled. Yet one could not ignore the fact that both Anes and Jadranko were members of the SDP Youth Forum and planned to become members of the party. They were also involved with other activist organizations in Sarajevo, often supporting a myriad of emergent initiatives for political change, though their politics and rhetoric by no means reflected some kind of a hard-line support for a communist revolution. Instead, in a more general manner, they professed adherence to the values of antinationalism and repeated familiar phrases about “better times” and the need for reform.

I presumed most of the people on the bus traveling to Kumrovec had similar orientations if not political aspirations. But as I discovered during a coffee break in a road café we stopped by after we crossed the Croatian border, some of the Society’s members were looking for other political visions beyond the SDP. One man in his late 30s showed others his brand new membership card for another opposition party, People’s Party Work for Betterment, which (despite having been founded by Croat businessmen from Herzegovina), had multinational membership and a reform program. “This is the future,” the man proclaimed while the others looked at him skeptically.

When we finally arrived to Kumrovec, the group dissipated, wandering around into different corners of the complex, visiting Tito’s house of birth, looking at but

rarely buying souvenirs, and finally settling in to hear the official welcome of the League of JBT Societies in Croatia. Somewhere along the way, we went in line to take a photograph with the flower covered famous statue of Tito, made by Croatian sculptor Antun Augustinčić, which grabbed the attention of all visitors. In 2004, the statue’s head was blown off by unknown perpetrators but later repaired. The visitors touched it, stroked it, and talked to it as if it was sacred.³⁶ Some of them cried, including my companion Milan, whose eyes welled up with tears, which he promptly wiped with a cotton handkerchief. But the sadness turned out to be transient, as everyone’s tears could quickly transform into laughter, thanks in part to copious amounts of alcohol, the demand for which made the waiters in nearby restaurants run around frantically, like “headless flies.” Soon, different inebriated groups began singing socialist songs, followed by the formation of an ever-expanding Kozaračko kolo.



*Kumrovec, Croatia: Visitors leave flowers and take photographs in front of the famous statue of Marshal Tito in front of his house of birth, created in 1948 by Croatian sculptor Antun Augustinčić.
Photo: Larisa Kurtović*

I wandered around this tremendously large event in search of interesting sights and people to whom I could talk. I tried to pose some questions to two “pioneer” girls in their mid thirties from Serbia, but my request for an interview scared them off. The two pseudo pioneers in their late forties from Zagorje were much more forthcoming. They admitted feeling nervous about coming to the gathering because for a long time social pressures in their part of Croatia had made traveling to Kumrovec for the Day of Youth contentious and politically risky. During the heyday of Croatian nationalism in the 1990s, the village of Kumrovec could not even be found on the map of the newly independent Croatian state. Curators worked hard to reimagine the site not only as the birthplace of Tito but as a much less controversial open air ethnographic museum showcasing the traditions of Zagorje. Yet on that day, these two *Zagorci* were fully equipped with blue hats and red scarves, which made them look sincere but slightly ridiculous given their age and perturbing, round bellies. They inquired with me about the situation in Bosnia, and from their questions, I realized that despite the geographic proximity and the fact they once shared a country with my companions (and me), they knew or understood very little about contemporary political realities. For even though the past was seemingly shared, the present and the future were quickly increasing the gaps created by the war.

No one among my interlocutors that day advocated or acknowledged the possibility of there ever being another Yugoslavia. Moreover, none of them had a plan or a political program for war stricken and economically troubled Bosnia. When I asked my co-travelers on the bus about the reasons why they wanted to come to such an event, everyone described it as an opportunity to socialize and meet other people (*druženje*). That I expected more from their responses testified to my own slanted and limited view of what these celebrations ought to represent and do. I returned to Sarajevo with a couple of new books, several new contacts, and an unresolved disappointment about what this journey was supposed to accomplish.

Many months later, on a fickle Saturday morning of August 7, 2010, I found myself in front of the office of the Josip Broz Tito Society in Banja Luka, waiting to board the bus that the organization had commissioned for the trip. We were to journey westward, in the direction of the small town of Bosanska Otoka, and find our way to a river island where our Bihać hosts were throwing their party, aptly called “Days of Balkan Love.” The younger members of the Society, including my main contact, had already departed in a private car several hours before, in order to drop off supplies and help with the organizers with logistics. Aside from the Chapter’s president, whom I interviewed a few weeks earlier, and the secretary, with whom I conversed only briefly, I did not know anyone else. It was my first journey with the Banja Luka Titoists, yet despite the unknown faces, the sights and the routine were absolutely familiar: the shouting and crossing names off the lists, the occasional sight of socialist iconography, the red scarves and shirts thoughtfully chosen for the occasion, and the frantic accounting of all the things that needed to be brought along on the bus.

As I was among the last to board, I ended up sitting in the right corner seat of the very last row of the bus. Next to me sat a gregarious, energetic man in his late 60s, also named Milan, who was only too happy to strike up a conversation. Before we departed, I learned that Milan joined the Society because he was looking for a good way to spend his time and socialize with his peers and also take part in the regular field trips organized by the Society. Milan was born in Drvar but moved to Banja Luka just on the eve of the devastating earthquake that hit the city in 1969, the memory of which was still vivid in his mind. He spent most of his working life in the local Secretariat of Internal Affairs, the one governmental agency in socialist Yugoslavia that seemed in charge of everything that mattered, from issuing IDs and residence permits to spying on suspicious activities. “Supovci,” as they were often colloquially described, were men with a certain aura of authority and entitlement, rumored to be tough and ideological hard-liners. But in fact, many of the people employed at these municipal secretariats did routine jobs as bureaucrats, pushing small cogs of much larger machinery.

After retiring, Milan also got divorced (at his age, people do not try as hard to stand one another, he said), and his children were busy trying to make ends meet. His daughter emigrated in the war, and his son had his own family to take care of in Banja Luka. He was living in a small apartment, filling his time by volunteering as a sports referee and taking field trips with his own local community government (*mjesna zajednica*) and the Josip Broz Tito society. He was curious about why I was traveling to the gathering and was markedly confused when I told him I was in fact from Sarajevo but was spending time in Banja Luka doing research. He was glad to talk to me in the context of my research, but I could sense he was puzzled about one thing in particular: was I or was I not, Serb? As the day unraveled it became clear to me he had decided I was, regardless of the fact I told him directly that I was not. Throughout our journey though the picturesque Krajina landscape, he mapped out for me the ethnic geography of lands we passed: these here to the left were Serb villages, these others to the right, Croat, and further yet, Muslim. I was struck by the ease with which he described these spaces in terms of ethnic belonging, until it dawned on me that to him such logics seemed perfectly natural and unproblematic. This perhaps reflected more his age and world view rather than gave a clear indication of his politics — which, as it would turn out, was as full of paradoxes as the day that lay ahead. Half-way through the journey, he told me his brother had been married to a Muslim woman but that his marriage had since dissolved. To make the situation even stranger, his former sister in law was sitting a few rows down with another female friend, who Milan said was also Muslim. Milan and his brother’s former wife never said a word to each other, although Milan hinted to me that the whole situation was difficult and complicated.

Outside of the circle of our conversation, passengers on the bus were busy chatting away among themselves, sharing the latest news and showing each other photographs from previous travels with the Society. Soon after departure, someone gave the driver one of the cassette tapes with songs about Tito, and everyone joined in the song. The group of men in the back to which I was the most proximate brought out a bottle of homemade brandy and started passing it around. The pungent smell of alcohol filled the air while the noises became more expressive. After some two hours of driving and one short stop along the way, we arrived in front of the small river island with a medium size restaurant complex where our Bihać hosts were waiting for us. There we encountered at the entrance a large red flag of the Communist Party and a smaller Venezuelan flag signifying support for Chavez’s second wave socialism. Two young guys from Bihać sold Partizan beer for 1 convertible mark while another older gentleman from the Banja Luka JBT Society sought to raise funds for the organization through the sale of caps and T-shirts with Tito’s image. Although this manifestation was clearly much smaller than the one in Kumrovec, all the essential elements were there. New

busses of invited Titoist groups from all across former Yugoslavia, as far as Montenegro and Istria, continued to arrive, increasing the number of flags anchored and displayed to at once symbolize the unity and fragmentation left behind by the 1990s. Friends and acquaintances hugged each other, exchanging greetings and compliments. At some point, the organizers gave a welcoming speech, which was followed by a rather extraordinary show by a singer and belly dancer hired for the occasion, who in the pauses between her renditions of “Comrade Tito, We Swear to You” performed her own “orientalist” choreographies. As her neon green costume decorated with fake silver coins flew and shook, the crowd went wild with excitement.



Bosanska Otoka, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Signs at the entrance to the one day festival "Days of Balkan Love" include the red flag of League of Communists of Yugoslavia (with a parole, Workers of the World, Unite!), and a contemporary poster "Let's Defeat Imperialism." Photo: Larisa Kurtović

As I went around exploring my ethnographic terrain, I noticed among the visitors a woman with a hijab, the veil worn by Muslims to indicate religious piety. Around her neck hung the red polyester scarf of the Bihać JBT Society, which the other hosts were also spotting. I was immediately drawn to her readiness to combine symbols of religious piety and longing for socialism. She joined the other dancers, staying particularly close to another woman who had arrived on one of the buses from Croatian Istria. Eventually, when I got to talk to her, I learned that Fadila was in her early fifties and that Broz was her hero ever since she was a little child. She continued to believe in the values he promoted even though she became intensely religious and “covered” with a veil in the late 1980s. Sensing my puzzlement over her ability to reconcile what seemed to be contradictory orientations, she told me that as a person she was interested in all things good. And Tito, she said, was good. Next to her stood Ivanka who introduced herself to me loudly using a pejorative term “officiruša,” reserved for wives of high ranking officers of the Yugoslav National Army. Immediately after that, she described herself using the much more dramatic and violent phrase “Chetnik whore.” Ivanka, a Croat, explained that she married a Serb officer with whom she had “three wonderful children and a wonderful life” but that in the early 1990s her radicalizing surroundings in Croatia ostracized her for having “betrayed

the nation.” “But I don’t care,” she exclaimed, “because I know what is important in life.” She then proceeded to explain that everything would be fine with friends such as Fadila and her comrades that had gathered on that day on a small river island on the bank of river Una. As Fadila and Ivanka danced away their Kozaračko kolo, it occurred to me that no single thesis statement about Yugonostalgia would ever be able to adequately capture the complexities of post-Yugoslav memories and attachments that play out in these settings.



Bosanska Otoka, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Women dance "Partizansko kolo", wearing red scarves and more rarely, blue pioneer hats. Photo: Larisa Kurtović

It would be difficult to say that sites such as these are locations of a kind of hope for the future, though they definitely have some potential. During the day, I met the wide-eyed 18 year old Miloš from Banja Luka, who had come along to the party with other youngsters from the JBT Society. At some point, he told me whisperingly: “You know, this is my first time in Bosnia.” I laughed and asked him whether or not he was born in Banja Luka. He quickly clarified his statement and said he meant Federation. To my next question about whether or not it was any different, he responded “no” and then quickly said “I like it.” I thought and continue to think about this encounter which laid bare both the limits and potentialities of such events and the concomitant forms of sociality and belonging that they enable. His factually inaccurate mapping, which placed his hometown outside of Bosnia, in fact revealed another type of geopolitical imagination found among a significant number of residents of Republika Srpska, according to which Bosnia-Herzegovina begins where the Dayton imposed entity line ends. His mistake illuminated the existence of a normalized discursive frame, a way of understanding and talking about the world, which casts doubt on whether any type of inter-national unity in Bosnia can be made possible again. Yet the fact he was there among the Titoists from all across Bosnia and former Yugoslavia left open the possibility that he would pave his own path, form his own opinions, and be able to imagine a different way of talking and living that is not completely determined by nationalist logic.

On the way back to Banja Luka, in the early evening hours, our bus driver decided to make another stop in the small town of Omarska, near Prijedor, which in 1992 became infamous as the site of a Serb concentration camp

for local Muslims and Croats. We stopped by the Motel and Restaurant “Evropa,” whose quaint setting and name completed the mosaic of contradictions I encountered that day. After we boarded the bus, I went back to my seat next to Milan, who had been drinking and was clearly tired. Earlier that day, during the performance of one revolutionary song, I saw him crying. He told me his parents were partisans from Drvar,³⁷ who were proud to had taken part in the resistance and proud of the country that arose out of that victory. Just on the outskirts of Banja Luka, the bus stopped and his former sister in law and her friend got off to continue on foot. As they left, he called them “bulas,” a colloquial and in that context pejorative term for veiled Muslim women. He then turned to me and said: “Never again will I live with them. Never!” At that point, it was not clear to me whether Milan never caught on to the fact that I was one of “them,” or whether he decided, according to some other logic, that I was not. What was clear was that Milan’s attitude towards the shared Yugoslav past and the values that were constitutive of it remained fraught with paradoxes, ambivalences, and uncertainties. I never found out the reason for his anger, since I could not bring myself to challenge him and ask why did he cry earlier that day in light of the moment I just witnessed. Soon after, we said our goodbyes.

If there is anything to be learned from these ethnographic vignettes I have described above, it is that gatherings of Yugonostalgics are as much about forward oriented hope situated in alternative forms of belonging as they are about an ongoing struggle to define a new political language and articulate political positions that correspond to the realities of the postwar moment. Practices of collective nostalgia enable certain forms of mobility and contestation but also reveal the painful impasses created by the remapping of the borders these busses cross in order to bring people together. Manifestations like the ones I presented and analyzed here remain at once sites of shared values, friendship, and laughter but also of political contestation and strategic misunderstandings that enable their repetition and perpetuation. As such, they are a promising terrain for exploration of practices, rhetoric, and paradoxes of ex-Yugoslav postsocialism but also places where it is possible to openly long with others for a state and a way of life which has not existed for twenty years. It remains to be seen whether such events will continue to be organized after all of those who remember the times past are gone

In place of conclusion: Happy Lands (need no nostalgia)

The 2009 documentary film *Happy Land* (Sretna Zemlja) chronicles the journeys of two buses making their way to two very different sites of commemoration of two very different moments in Yugoslav socialist past. The multigenerational passengers of the first bus are members of the Josip Broz Tito Society from the Croatian city of Rijeka journeying to the village of Kumrovec to one of the annual Day of Youth manifestations which I have been describing

in this essay. The second bus carries members and sympathizers of the “losing side”—the surviving soldiers of the Ustaša forces and their “progeny”—to the village of Bleiburg on the Austro-Slovenian border, where in May 1945 thousands of fleeing fascist collaborators and civilians who accompanied them were slaughtered by advancing and by then victorious Yugoslav partisans. The sites, and the captivating quests to reach them, illuminate the full extent of the more widely held anxieties about these places and the proper ways of remembering WWII and Yugoslav socialism in the now independent state of Croatia.

The film’s director, the outstanding Croatian filmmaker Goran Dević, weaves together the narratives of the passengers on two “opposing” sides of these politics of remembrance, drawing parallels not so much between their ideology or ethical content but between the forms they take and the disappointments they produce.³⁸ When asked about his editing choices at the 2009 Sarajevo Film Festival, Dević claimed that in staging parallel narration (which, considering the brutality of the Ustaša regime, to many in the audience seemed inappropriate), he sought to highlight that the people on both buses journeyed in order to retrieve something that could not be found. In so saying, Dević unwittingly named nostalgia, or perhaps more appropriately melancholia—the permanent state of unrenunciable loss—as the subject of his film.

In this article, I mimicked Dević’s narrative form in order to tell my own tale of two similarly journeying buses, their passengers and the people and places they met on the way. However, I did so in order to think through some of the contradictions and ambivalences involved in preserving the memory of socialist Yugoslavia in postwar Bosnia, the successor state whose past, present, and future remain perhaps most burdened by its uneasy legacies of promises, and failures. But unlike Dević, who focuses solely on loss, I proposed we consider how such forms of commemoration reflect ambivalent, sometimes even self-contradicting, intentions while bringing into being forms of meeting and exchange that are firmly situated in the present and may even affect the making of new futures. I argued that the phenomenon we may call by a single name—Yugonostalgia—forms a constellation of different processes, ideologies, positions, practices, and instantiations of politics that are neither progressive nor reactionary (though they can sometimes be both), neither nationalist nor antinationalist (though they can be that too), neither capitalist nor anti-capitalist, and so on.

Perhaps the only certainty of Yugonostalgia is that it inevitably brings into foreground the tragic nature of Yugoslav dissolution, along with a sense of profound ambivalence about what such a shared sentiment may mean for the future. This is why Yugonostalgia can only be studied for the effects it produces, in the context where its contradictory pulls play out.

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THE END OF A VIOLENT ERA: THE ROLE OF FORCE IN RUSSIAN BUSINESS CONFLICTS

Jordan Gans-Morse

Jordan Gans-Morse is a Ph.D. candidate in the Travers Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing chaos of the early 1990s produced extreme lawlessness. In rapid fashion a society with massive industrial assets plunged into an institutional vacuum. Courts, law enforcement bodies, and state regulatory agencies capable of enforcing the rules of the game for a modern market economy had to be created from scratch or rebuilt from the remnants of socialist institutions. In the absence of effective state institutions, firms turned to alternative forms of protecting property and enforcing contracts. Mafia rackets and private security agencies provided physical protection, collected debts, and adjudicated disputes among firms. When large sums of money were at stake, contract killings became a prominent means of acquiring or protecting assets. In short, outright force or the threat of physical coercion became common tools for protecting property and ensuring adherence to business agreements.

Today, two decades after the fall of the Iron Curtain, high profile cases of property rights abuses continue to dominate journalistic accounts of Russia, as well as many policy and academic studies. But this narrow focus is misleading. It offers a skewed and unrepresentative portrayal of modern-day Russian business practices. In part, this is because such accounts often concentrate on a handful of tycoons and the extent to which these “oligarchs,” as they are frequently called, hinder or promote the development of the rule of law.

By contrast, my ongoing research focuses on ordinary Russian firms’ everyday practices as they seek to resolve property rights and contract disputes. Throughout 2009, I conducted 90 in-depth interviews with Russian businesspeople, lawyers, and private security agencies. In the summer of 2010, I then carried out a survey of 301 firms across eight Russian cities: Moscow, St. Petersburg, Nizhniy Novgorod, Kazan, Samara, Ekaterinburg, Rostov-on-Don, and Novosibirsk.¹ Contrary to popular opinion, my research reveals a dramatic decline in the use of private coercion to protect property rights.

Private Force in the 1990s

Russian firms’ reliance on organized crime had its roots in the criminal subculture that emerged out of the Soviet labor camps. From the Brezhnev period onward, informal entrepreneurs filled the economic niches created by the inefficiencies of the Soviet command economy. Given that private economic activity was illegal, these early *kommer-santy* required sources of protection and arbitration outside of the state. The *vory v zakony*, or “thieves professing the code,” who emerged from the labor camps were well-suited

for this role. They had developed a complex informal hierarchy for governance of the underworld and honed skills, such as counterfeiting official documents, essential for moving goods in the Soviet period.²

The initial legalization of private economic activity with the 1987 Law on Individual Labor Activity and the 1988 Law on Cooperatives created new fodder for criminal rackets. The rapid emergence of smalltime entrepreneurs and open-air markets led to ideal conditions for extortion. In addition to the criminals who earned their underworld laurels in the Soviet penal system, racketeers and thugs, known as *bandity*, emerged from three sources with a comparative advantage in the application of violence: groups of sportsmen, especially boxers, wrestlers, and martial arts specialists; criminal gangs based on ethnic networks from the Northern Caucasus; and veterans returning from the war in Afghanistan.

Although *bandity* initially made a living through extortion of kiosks at open-air markets, their relations with Russia’s emerging capitalists rapidly evolved. As markets became crowded with competing criminal protection rackets, gangs began to offer protection from other *bandity* in exchange for a percentage of entrepreneurs’ profits, a service known as providing a “roof” (*krysha*). Soon markets were divided into spheres of influence, with sellers displaying insignia to warn would-be extorters that they were under the protection of a given criminal leader. The privatization of state-owned enterprises repeated this process on a larger scale. Suddenly, thousands of shops were in private hands and in need of *kryshas*. By 1994, the majority of Soviet firms had been privatized in a rapid giveaway of industrial assets. Many of these enterprises proved to be valuable targets for criminal groups, and simultaneously in desperate need of protection services.

The services for which firms relied on criminal protection rackets continued to evolve. *Bandity* became involved in the enforcement of contracts, collection of debt, and intelligence gathering on prospective business partners. In the absence of an effective court system, they began to play an adjudicative role. The *krysha* of one firm would meet with the *krysha* of another to negotiate on behalf of their respective clients, or, if need be, to resolve the dispute by force. For longstanding or complex disputes, *bandity* would turn to criminal leaders, known as *avtoritety*, and to *vory v zakone*, who served as arbiters in what became a system of “shadow justice.”³ Finally, realizing that true profits were not in protection schemes or extortion rackets but in business itself, criminals began to request shares

as a form of payment and to acquire shares in privatized companies, taking an active ownership and managerial role.⁴

Alarming estimates of the influence of organized crime on the Russian economy soon became widespread. A Ministry of Interior (MVD) report released in 1994 claimed that up to three-fourths of Russian businesses paid protection money, with the banking sector particularly under the sway of organized crime groups. The Russian Academy of Sciences (RAN) reported in 1995 that criminal groups held 55 percent of capital and 80 percent of voting shares in private enterprises.⁵ These studies became the basis for dire assessments of organized crime in Russia by Western analysts, although the imprecise distinction among protection, control, and ownership of enterprise assets in these reports complicates assessment of their validity.⁶ Regardless, the reality of harsh violence during this period was undeniable, including extensive contract killings, car bombs, and all out gang wars on the streets of cities such as Moscow, Ekaterinburg, and Kazan. Shocking tales emerged. Reputedly, the FBI traced connections of a well-known *vor* directly to the Kremlin,⁷ while the journalist Seymour Hersh reported that criminal rackets even controlled access to the passport line at the US embassy.⁸


Along with criminal protection rackets, private security agencies played a major role in property rights protection in the early 1990s. These agencies emerged in the aftermath of the collapse of the mammoth Soviet security structures, in particular during the reorganization of the KGB, which created a supply of highly-trained unemployed security specialists. In 1992 the government passed the Law on Private Detective and Protection Activity and issued a concomitant government decree, legalizing the formation of private security structures, a process that was already de facto underway. Private protection enterprises (*chastnoe okhrannoe predpriyatie*), known widely by their Russian acronym as ChOPs, soon became a major facet of the Russian business world.

In and of itself, the emergence of a large private security sector was unremarkable. Other countries have private security agencies, including the United States and Britain. But the key difference was that “in Russia, the activity of private protection agencies extended beyond mere physical or informational security and into the sphere of business transactions and civil property relations.”⁹ ChOPs offered a long list of services: debt collection, physical protection, collection of data on lawsuits, market research, information on future business partners, protection of trademarks and commercial secrets, and investigations of future or current employees. The private security sector grew rapidly. By 1993, there were already approximately 5,000 registered private security agencies. This number doubled by the end of the decade, doubled again by 2005, and today is estimated at around 30,000 agencies.¹⁰

The Decline of Private Force

Despite the growing number of private security agencies, the role of private force in the Russian business world has declined dramatically. Evidence that economic conflicts are less likely to be settled by violence appears in the statistics on annual murders of businesspeople, as seen for Russia’s Central Federal District in Figure 1. The numbers remain high by Western standards and indicate that Russia is still a rugged place to do business, but they also show a significant positive trend compared to Russia’s recent bloody past. Meanwhile, most experts concur that reliance on contract killings declined after the early to mid 1990s.¹¹ Contract killings persist to this day, but observant analysts have recognized that an increasing number of targets are outside the sphere of property disputes. While businessmen, bankers, and bureaucrats with control over valuable licenses or permits are still prevalent among the victims, a rising proportion of contract killing targets are journalists and human rights activists.¹²

Figure 1
Annual Murders of Businesspeople in
Central Federal District of RF, 1997-2005¹³



Businesspeople themselves corroborate this decline in physical violence. A survey conducted by Radaev of 221 enterprise managers across 21 Russian regions in 1997 unveiled that even by the mid-1990s the use of violence was declining.¹⁴ Less than 15 percent of respondents considered violence a serious problem. While approximately 40 percent of respondents reported personally experiencing violent extortion or threats of physical coercion, businesspeople seemed to be sensing a turning point: Only 14 percent said the risk of threats and extortions was getting worse, whereas 30 percent said it was getting better.¹⁵ Indeed, my survey of 301 firms from eight Russian cities, conducted in June and

July of 2010, validates these optimistic prognoses: Less than five percent of respondents said they or their employees personally had been subjected to threats or physical coercion.

Survey evidence paints a similar picture with respect to the disappearance of criminal protection rackets. Frye and Zhuravskaya found in a 1996 survey of 230 small retail shops in Moscow, Ulyanovsk, and Smolensk that over 40 percent of respondents reported having contact with a criminal group in the last six months; a survey of shops conducted in the same three cities two years later found the respective figure to be less than 25 percent.¹⁶ Surveys conducted by the Russian business association OPORA in 2004 and 2005 across 80 of Russia's 89 regions found that well under ten percent of small businesses during these years reported frequent contact (although between 30 and 40 percent reported some "irregular" contact).¹⁷ By contrast, my 2010 survey found that only 8 of 105 small businesses in the sample (and 11 out of 301 firms in the overall sample) reported contact with mafia protection rackets at any point in the last three years.

Most telling in terms of the evolution of property defense strategies, firms in the late 1990s were beginning to indicate a clear preference for strategies other than reliance on criminal protection rackets. Radaev's 1997 survey found that in response to threats and extortion, only 15 percent of respondents would turn to criminal groups, while about the same number who would turn to the police. The largest category of respondents, 34 percent, said they would rely on themselves to deal with the threat.¹⁸ OPORA's 2004 survey similarly found that only 14 percent of small firms reported they would turn to a *krysha* for help should they face a violation of their rights.¹⁹

The extent to which criminal *kryshas* have become a thing of the past is perhaps best summarized by the co-founder of a prominent Moscow private security agency, himself a former Ministry of Internal Affairs agent specializing in fighting organized crime. In the early 1990s, he explained, the majority of his firm's work involved helping clients deal with *bandity*. By 1995, a noticeable shift was occurring: "... criminal groups were disappearing to such an extent that they were becoming simply something exotic. If a client came to us and said that some *bandity* from the street had tried to extort him, well, this was for us something exciting. [It gave us a] sort of nostalgia for the old days."²⁰ The challenges his security firm faces have continued to evolve, and he noted that today it is even more rare to encounter criminal protection rackets.

The shift away from private force is also apparent in the private security sector. In the 1990s, the line between ChOPs and criminal groups was often been blurry. At times, private security agencies used criminal methods to collect debts and, in some cases, directly extorted businesspeople. In other cases, criminals themselves formed ChOPs in order to legally carry weapons. Some estimates claim that around

15 percent of ChOPs in the late 1990s had criminal ties. Moreover, businesspeople at times turned to ChOPs with explicit demands for illegal activities, including physical attacks and kidnapping.²¹ The fact that for many years a numerous ChOPs, accounting for as many as 150,000 employees, remained unregistered and out of the gaze of the state facilitated the persistence of questionable practices.²²

Yet even if firms' shift from criminal protection rackets to ChOPs did not initially entail the complete elimination of criminal elements from the market for private security, it brought about significant changes. ChOPs were willing to apply force but were more likely than *bandity* to do so only as a last resort. They focused more on conflict prevention and in place of violence often applied pressure to a client's competitors by gathering compromising materials, known in Russian as *kompromat*, which could be used for blackmail. They worked on the basis of formal contracts and usually paid taxes to the state. They had to legally register with the MVD and could have their license revoked if they violated laws and regulations. They encouraged clients to understand and abide by the laws, and they organized business associations to screen out criminal enterprises masquerading as legitimate security agencies.²³


As private security agencies brought legitimacy to the market for protection, they simultaneously became more specialized as providers of physical security and less frequently a substitute for state institutions. Today, the word ChOP narrowly refers to security guards, whereas the term *krysha* has a clear connotation of criminal connections.²⁴ Experts estimate that provision of basic physical security accounts for 70 percent of the private security sector's revenues, the rest consisting of information security, legal services, and installment of security systems (cameras, alarms, etc.). Although there has been recognition that profit margins for providing detective services, such as investigating credit histories and locating debtors, are quite high, these services account for a negligible fraction of ChOPs' work.²⁵

Meanwhile, the security concerns of Russian businesspeople have evolved dramatically. Today, the concept of "economic security" (*ekonomicheskaya bezopasnost*) entails a wide range of threats, including information security, such as computer virus attacks by competitors; espionage by employees with ties to other companies; raids that use complicated legal schemes to acquire assets; and unwarranted inspections (*naezdy*) by government regulators, some of which are instigated by competitors. To address these sophisticated threats, firms specializing in economic security rely far more on lawyers, accountants, IT specialists, and former law officials than on application of violence and force.

Survey research indicates that this trend toward specialization was already beginning by the late 1990s. A 1997 survey by Hendley et al. of 328 industrial firms from six regions found that even though half of the

respondents utilized the protective services of a security agency, less than three percent of respondents relied on these firms to prevent or resolve problems with suppliers or for evaluating the credit-worthiness of customers. They concluded: “These results suggest that security agencies have the more prosaic mandate of protecting money or property, rather than the task of enforcing contracts through intimidation of trading partners.”²⁶ In a 2001 survey of 304 open joint-stock companies in Moscow, Tomsk, and Nizhnyi Novgorod, Yakovlev et al. reported that only five percent of respondents whose legal rights had been violated turned to ChOPs to help resolve the problem.²⁷ Likewise, in the 2010 survey I conducted, less than 10 percent of respondents reported using the services of a private security agency for any reason in the last three years. On the other hand, 33 percent of firms, and approximately 45 percent of firms with over 100 employees, reported using their own internal private security service at some point in the last three years to resolve a security issue. But as seen in Figure 2, the reasons that firms turn to private force reflect a very different type of threat than the property disputes of the 1990s.

Figure 2
Firms Use of Private Security (past 3 years)
Of firms using private security, % using in response to the following problems²⁸



Primarily, firms use private security for dealing with internal problems pertaining to employees and the security of information technology systems. For example, of the 100 firms in the survey sample that report using an internal security service in the last three years, 52 percent used this service for issues related to IT security, while 73 percent used the service to run employee background checks. Such issues as debt collection, contract violations, and property disputes represent a significantly smaller share of the services for which firms turn to private force.

In summary, the era of overt private violence and coercion as a widespread tool of mainstream businesspeople has come to an end. Entrepreneurs today rely on *bandity* for protection, adjudication, and contract enforcement services almost exclusively in remote and underdeveloped regions.²⁹ Organized crime today remains a significant problem in

illegal sectors, or, in the words of Elena Panfilova, the director of the anti-corruption organization Transparency International’s Moscow office, in the sectors “where it belongs.”³⁰ Violence and organized crime are no longer part and parcel of everyday business transactions in Russia.

New Threats

While the use of outright force may have subsided, this does not imply that all is calm in the Russian business world. The nature of threats and challenges, however, has changed. If the 1990s were a period of lawlessness during which the state was too weak to protect honest businesspeople from criminals and unscrupulous competitors, then the threat in recent years often has been the state itself. Indeed, the comparison of bureaucrats to *bandity* has not been lost on businesspeople. In the words of a consultant to small businesses in Moscow: “Who cares about criminals? Inspectors can close you in a matter of seconds. This is in itself a kind of mafia system.”³¹ Or as a small businessman pointed out, “The *bandity* who were here 15 years ago wore a sign that said ‘*Bandit*’. It was easy to distinguish between *bandity* and non-*bandity*.... Today in Moscow alone, there are over 50 organizations that have the direct right to inspect and block the work of an enterprise.”³² Surveys indicate that unwarranted and unannounced inspections remain one of the most pressing problems for Russian businesspeople, despite several rounds of legislation designed to reign in bureaucrats and regulators.³³

Another issue of significant concern for Russian businesspeople pertains to illegal corporate raiding (*reiderstvo*). Raiding blossomed in the late 1990s and, although it has subsided in recent years, remains a problem.³⁴ While the term is taken from the American usage, it involves far more than buying up a company’s shares in order to change management. Prior to a 2002 reform to the Law on Bankruptcy, one common scheme was to buy up a company’s debt, then force bankruptcy on the company, use a corrupt judge to appoint a trustee loyal to the raiders, and then get a judgment allowing the seizure of the firm’s assets. Other schemes involve forgery of internal corporate documents or the creation of a second set of documents by paying corrupt government officials. These documents are then used to acquire a majority of voting stock or to create a friendly board of directors. A third tactic relies on civil suits filed with corrupt judges, who then issue a judgment allowing acquisition of assets as a form of compensation. In other cases, raiders pay law enforcement or tax officials to initiate criminal cases against target companies, reducing the market value of the firm they wish to buy or forcing a recalcitrant owner to concede to selling her assets.³⁵ Many of these schemes involve corrupt bureaucrats or judges, and there are a growing number of instances in which bureaucrats or law enforcement officials themselves have been the instigators of raids.

Despite the risks raiding poses to Russian firms, it differs significantly from the outright violence and coercion

of the 1990s. As Thomas Firestone, a U.S. Department of Justice Lawyer and resident legal advisor at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, explains: "... 'reiderstvo' is not just simple thuggery. In contrast to more primitive criminals, Russian 'reideri' rely on court orders, resolutions of shareholders and boards of directors, lawsuits, bankruptcy proceedings, and other ostensibly 'legal' means as a cover for their criminal activity."³⁶ In other words, the struggle over property rights has moved from the streets and into the courtrooms of the judiciary and offices of the bureaucracy. Whether this is a step toward the rule of law or a development that will leave institutions mired in corruption remains to be seen.

Endnotes

- 1 Approximately 34 percent of the sample consisted of firms with less than 100 employees; 42 percent of respondent firms had between 100 and 500 employees; and 22 percent of respondent firms had more than 500 employees.
- 2 This section draws on Stephen Handelman, "The Russian 'Mafiya,'" *Foreign Affairs* 73, no.2 (1994): 83-96; Nikolai Modestov, *Moskva Banditskaya* (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 1996); Petr Skoblikov *Imushchestvennye spory i kriminal v sovremennoj Rossii*, (Moscow: Publishing House DELO, 2001); Federico Varese, *The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Vadim Volkov, *Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 2002).
- 3 The term is from Skoblikov, *Imushchestvennye spory*.
- 4 Timothy Frye, "Private Protection in Russia and Poland," *American Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 3 (2002): 578; Volkov, *Violent Entrepreneurs*, ch. 3-4.
- 5 William H. Webster, *Russian Organized Crime: Global Organized Crime Project* (The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), 2-3.
- 6 Volkov, *Violent Entrepreneurs*, 97-98.
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- 8 Seymour M. Hersh, "The Wild East," *The Atlantic Monthly* (June 1994).
- 9 Volkov, *Violent Entrepreneurs*, 141.
- 10 Data up until 1999 from Volkov, *Violent Entrepreneurs*, 138. Data for the years after 1999 are from Aleksei Borodkin, "Razoruzhennaya okhrana," *Dengi* (November 24, 2008); Aleksei Khodorych, "Poslednii dovod zashchityi," *Dengi* (April 17, 2002); Elena Lashkina, "Chopnutie: Chastnie okhrannye predpriyatiya postavili pod kontrol," *Rossiiskaya gazeta* (November 9, 2007); and press releases at www.mvd.ru/news.
- 11 Contract killings in general are tough to measure, and different sources report drastically varying statistics, not least of all because in the early 2000s the MVD began reporting only the number of solved cases rather than the number of registered contract killings. See "Plan po ubiistvam," *Vlast*, (December 1, 2008).
- 12 "Bureaucrats Are Mostly the Victims of Contract Killing in Russia," *Kommersant*. 2008 (December 1, 2008); Vidya Ram, "Why You Should Still Be Worried About Russia," *Forbes* (March 12, 2009); Elena Skvortsova, "Gromkie zakaznye ubiistva," *Agenstvo federalnykh ressedovaniy* (July 14, 2000).
- 13 Data are from N.S. Matveeva, "Kriminologicheskii analiz sostoyaniya zashchishchennosti predprinimatelei ot tyazhkogo nasiliya v Tsentral'nom Federal'nom okruge," in *Kriminal'naya ekonomika i organizovannaya prestupnost*, ed. A.I. Dolgova (Moscow: The Russian Criminological Association and the Nizhgorod Academy of the MVD, 2007), 86. Matveeva notes that while these statistics refer to overall murders of businesspeople, her analysis of the data indicates that all but approximately five percent of these deaths were related to the victims' business activities.
- 14 Vadim Radaev, "The Role of Violence in Russian Business Relations," *Problems of Economic Transition* 41, no. 12 (1999): 34-61.
- 15 Radaev, "The Role of Violence," 36-40.
- 16 Timothy Frye and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, "Rackets, Regulation, and the Rule of Law," *The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 16, no. 2 (2000): 478-502; Frye, "Private Protection in Russia and Poland."
- 17 OPORA, *Usloviya i faktory razvitiya malogo predprinimatel'stva v regionakh Rossii* (2005): 91; OPORA, *Usloviya i faktory razvitiya malogo predprinimatel'stva v regionakh Rossii* (2006): 52.
- 18 Radaev, "The Role of Violence," 42-43.
- 19 OPORA, *Usloviya i faktory* (2005), 70-71.
- 20 Author interview, 18 September 2009, Moscow.
- 21 Volkov, *Violent Entrepreneurs*, 143; Yurii Shebaldin, "Na grani fola," *Ogonyok* 43 (October 2007).
- 22 Khodorych, "Poslednii dovod zashchityi."
- 23 Mikhail Pravotorov, "Proshchaj, 'krysha'!", *Profil* (October 4, 2006); Volkov, *Violent Entrepreneurs*, 142-143, 147, 151-152.
- 24 This statement was corroborated without exception in interviews with businesspeople and security specialists. In a typical response regarding the functions of ChOPs, one small businessperson in Moscow explained: "ChOPs? Those are just the guys that stand outside and guard the door" (author interview, 10 February 2009, Moscow).
- 25 Author interview with Aleksandr Ivanchenko, Executive Director of the Russian Security Industry Association, 8 June 2009, Moscow; Khodorych, "Poslednii dovod zashchityi."
- 26 Kathryn Hendley, Peter Murrell, and Randi Ryterman, "Law, relationships and private enforcement: Transactional strategies of Russian Enterprises," *Europe-Asia* 52, no. 4 (2000): 643.
- 27 A.A. Yakovlev, V.V. Golikova, T.G. Dolgopyatova, B.V. Kuznetsov, and Y.V. Simachev, *Spros na pravo v sfere korporativnogo upravleniya: ekonomicheskie aspekty* (Moscow: Higher School of Economics, 2004): 71.
- 28 Of the 301 firms in the survey, only 27 report using a private security agency while 100 report using an internal security service in the last three years.

29 Pravotorov, "Proshchaj, 'krysha'!"; Volkov, *Violent Entrepreneurs*, 152.

30 Author interview, 12 February 2009, Moscow.

31 Author interview, 3 June 2009.

32 Author interview, 26 March 2009.

33 See, for example, "Monitoring of the Administrative Barriers to Small Business Development in Russia," CEFIR, 2008.

Continued from page 13

Endnotes

1 This article draws on ethnographic research conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia between 2008 and 2010, that was made possible by two fellowships in particular. I am extremely grateful for the generous support of the SSRC International Dissertation Research Fellowship Program and the Peter N. Kujachich Endowment in Serbian and Montenegrin Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. The conclusions, opinions, and other statements in this essay belong to the author and are not necessarily those of the above-mentioned funding programs.

2 Throughout this text, I will sometimes also refer to these associations as JBT Societies and Tito Memorial Societies. I will occasionally refer to the members of these groups as "Titoists."

3 Among such projects are organizations Naša Jugoslavija (Our Yugoslavia) in Pula, Croatia, Generalni Konzulat SFRJ (General Consulate of SFRY) in Tivat, Montenegro, project Titoslavija in Sarajevo, and various virtual initiatives such as the now defunct Cyber Yugoslavia.

4 The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement brokered by the Clinton Administration preserved the unity of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state but divided its territory into two semi autonomous regions: the (Muslim-Croat) Federation, whose political center is Sarajevo, and Republika Srpska (RS), whose unofficial capital is Banja Luka. Although the agreement was supposed to be temporary, this administrative framework has survived for nearly 16 years. Ongoing conflicts over the stalled process of the reform of constitution (which may or may not include dissolution of the Dayton imposed administrative units) have led to the reemergence of nationalist rhetoric on all sides and have catapulted the entire country into its biggest political crisis since the end of the war.

5 See Tim Judah, "Yugoslavia Is Dead: Long Live the Yugosphere" (*European Institute of the LSE*, November 2009), accessible at: www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/Research/LSEE/PDF%20Files/Publications/Yugosphere.pdf. For my critique of Judah's analysis, see Larisa Kurtović, "Istorije (bh) budućnosti: Kako misliti postjugoslovenski postsocijalizam u Bosni i Hercegovini?" [Histories of Bosnian-Herzegovinian Futures, or How to Think Post-Yugoslav Postsocialism in Bosnia-Herzegovina], (*Puls demokratije*, 17 Aug 2010), accessible at: <http://pulsdemokratije.ba/index.php?id=1979&l=bs>

6 For powerful anthropological critiques of the totalitarian paradigm see Alexei Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever Until It Was No More* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), Dominic Boyer, *Spirit and the System: Media, Intellectuals, and the Dialectic in Modern German Culture*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), Bruce Grant, *In the Soviet House of*

34 Approximately 8 percent of the respondents in the survey I conducted reported being the victim of a raid.

35 Thomas Firestone, "Criminal Corporate Raiding in Russia," *The International Lawyer* 42, no. 4 (2008): 1207-1229; Vadim Volkov, "Hostile enterprise takeovers: Russia's economy in 1998-2002," *Review of Central and East European Law* 29, no. 4 (2004): 527-548.

36 Thomas Firestone, "Criminal Corporate Raiding in Russia," 1207.

Culture: a Century of Perestroikas (Princeton University Press, 1995), Martha Lampland, *The Object of Labor: Commodification in Socialist Hungary* (University of Chicago Press, 1995), and C. Humphrey, *Marx Went Away—But Karl Stayed Behind* (University of Michigan Press, 1998), among others.

7 For examples, see: G. W Creed, *Domesticating Revolution: From Socialist Reform to Ambivalent Transition in a Bulgarian Village* (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), Olga Shevchenko, *Crisis and the Everyday in Postsocialist Moscow* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), or the volume edited by Maria Todorova *Remembering Communism: Genres of Representation* (Social Science Research Council, 2010).

8 For some of the most recent examples, see S. Oushakine, *The Patriotism of Despair: Nation, War, and Loss in Russia* (Cornell University Press, 2009), Tanja Petrović, "Officers without an Army: Memories of Socialism and Everyday Strategies in Post-Socialist Slovenia," in *Remembering Utopia: The Culture of Everyday Life in Socialist Yugoslavia*, ed. B. Luthar and M. Pušnik (New Academia Publishing, LLC, 2010), 93-118., G. W Creed, *Masquerade and Postsocialism: Ritual and Cultural Dispossession in Bulgaria* (Indiana University Press, 2011).

9 See previously cited Alexei Yurchak 2005 and also "Post-Post-Communist Sincerity: Pioneers, Cosmonauts, and Other Soviet Heroes Born Today," in Thomas Lahusen and Peter H. Solomon, eds., *What Is Soviet Now?: Identities, Legacies, Memories* (LIT Verlag Berlin-Hamburg-Münster, 2008), previously cited Dominic Boyer 2005 along with his article "Ostalgie and the Politics of the Future in Eastern Germany," *Public Culture* 18, no. 2 (2006): 361-381., and the recent edited volume Maria Todorova and Zsuzsa Gille, *Post-communist Nostalgia* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010). For the Yugoslav case specifically, see B. Luthar and M. Pusnik, *Remembering Utopia: The Culture of Everyday Life in Socialist Yugoslavia* (New Academia Publishing, LLC, 2010).

10 For an argument of why studying postsocialism matters in this vein, see Katherine Verdery, *What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?* (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).

11 Daphne Berdahl, "'(N)Ostalgie' for the Present: Memory, Longing, and East German Things," *Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology* 64, no. 2 (1999): 192 – 211). Also, for a more general argument inspired by the fall of socialism, see S. Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia* (Basic Books, 2002).

12 See Boyer 2006.

13 Maya Nadkarni and Olga Shevchenko, "The Politics of Nostalgia: A Case for Comparative Analysis of Post-socialist Practices," *Ab Imperio* 2 (2004): 482-518.

14 Berdahl 2002, also the edited volume D. Berdahl, M. Bunzl, and M. Herzfeld, *On the Social Life of Postsocialism: Memory,*

Consumption, Germany (Indiana University Press, 2009) and Jonathan Bach, "The Taste Remains: Consumption, (N)ostalgia, and the Production of East Germany," *Public Culture* 14, no. 3 (2002): 545-556.

15 See M. Velikonja, *Titostalgija - študija nostalgije po Josipu Brozu* (Mirovni inštitut, 2008) and "Lost in Transition," *East European Politics & Societies* 23, no. 4 (2009): 535-551.

16 Nevena Škrbić Alempijević, *O Titu kao mitu: proslava Dana mladosti u Kumrovcu* (Zagreb: FF Press; Srednja Europa, 2006).

17 S. Jansen, *Antinacionalizam: etnografija otpora u Beogradu i Zagrebu* (Biblioteka XX vek, 2005), Monika Palmberger, "Nostalgia Matters: Nostalgia for Yugoslavia as Potential Vision for a Better Future," *Sociologija* 50, no. 4: 355-370; Jim Seroka, "Yugo-nostalgia, Pragmatism, and Reality: The Failure of Inter-Republic Cooperation among the Republics of the Former Socialist Yugoslavia during the 1990s," *International Journal Organization Theory and Behavior* 5, no. 1 (2002): 29 - 38; Zala Volčič, "Yugo-Nostalgia: Cultural Memory and Media in the Former Yugoslavia," *Critical Studies in Media Communication* 24, no. 1 (2007): 21 - 38.

18 Nevena Škrbić Alempijević 2006 and Mitja Velikonja 2008.

19 For perceptive criticism of this tendency, see Vuk Bačanić, "Da li je Tito bio član SDPa?" [Was Tito a member of SDP?] *Dani* 20 March 2009: 28.

20 For more information, see the official website presentation of the Savez Komunista Bosne i Hercegovine "O nama," 2011, SKBIH Predsjedništvo, 15 March 2011. http://skbih.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46&Itemid=27

21 Radio Televizija Republike Srpske, "Mrakovica, sjećanje na Kozarsku epopeju" [Mrakovica, remembering the epopee of Kozara], 4 July 2010. <http://www.rtrs.tv/vijesti/vijest.php?id=24044>

22 Interview published in Dženana Halimović, "Dvije proslave bitke na Sutjesci" [Two celebrations of the Battle of Sutjeska], *Radio Slobodna Evropa*, 21 June 2010, http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/bitka_na_sutjesci_obilježavanje/2078304.html

23 Statement published in "U bici na Sutjesci se kovala budućnost Evrope" [The Future of Europe was forged in the Battle of Sutjeska], *Glas Srpske*, 13 June, 2010. <http://www.glassrpske.com/vijest/2/novosti/40996/cir/U-bici-na-Sutjesci-se-kovala-buducnost-Evrope.html>

24 Edina Kamenica, "Savez boraca Srbije i danas odan Miloševiću" [The League of Veterans of Serbia even today loyal to Milošević] *Oslobođenje*, 7 April 2009. p 16; see also Esad Krcić, "Antifašisti upozoravaju na novo buđenje fašizma" [Antifascists warn about the new awakening of fascism], *Radio Slobodna Evropa*, 12 December, 2008. <http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/Content/Article/1359233.html>

25 To make the irony greater, the very setting of the 65th Anniversary of the Birth of Yugoslavia was an ethnically divided town, situated in one of Bosnia's so-called mixed cantons, where Bosnian Muslims and Croats coexist through a complex grid of national power-sharing and accommodation.

26 For more information see the official presentation of the Liga antifašista jugoistočne Evrope http://www.tito-bihac.org/Liga%20antifasista_aktivnosti.html (accessed 15 March 2011).

27 Author's notes from the field, 7 Aug 2010.

28 Since old socialist holidays have rarely remained a part of the official calendar in the newly separated states, the unspoken agreement among the organizers results in these commemorative meetings taking place on the weekend nearest to the symbolic date.

29 For a sample of media coverage of the 2009 action in Podgradci, near Bosanska Gradiška, see Dejan Šajinović, "Lopatom i uz pjesmu Titu - u bolju budućnost" [With a shovel and song dedicated to Tito—going towards a better future], *Deutsche Welle*, 15 October 2009. <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4786550,00.html>

30 The image and name of Marshal Tito have been used for various purposes; for example, in Sarajevo, a popular hang-out spot, ironically housed on the first floor of the Museum of the Revolution, is called Café Tito. This is where the remaining Day of Youth enthusiasts from Sarajevo who could not make it to Kumrovec, as well as youth in search of a good time, celebrate the evening of the 25th of May. Right across from the Museum is the infamous Marshal Tito military complex in front of which there is a life-sized statue of Marshal Tito, identical to the one in the village of Kumrovec. Each May 25th, around noon, delegations and individuals come to pay their respects to Tito, leaving meticulously arranged flower wreaths, red carnations, and messages for the past president. For a catalogue of different uses of Marshal Tito's image and various commercial appropriations of socialist Yugoslav symbols, see Mitja Velikonja, *Titostalgija - študija nostalgije po Josipu Brozu* [Titostalgia -a study of nostalgia for Josip Broz], (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Mirovni inštitut-Mediawatch, 2008).

31 The popularity of Tito as a brand and a marketing gimmick has given birth to an initiative on behalf of some members of the Broz family to copyright Tito's name, signature, and likeness, in order to protect his legacy from becoming a source of unwarranted profit or misuse.

32 Želimir Žilnik, the legendary Serbian Black Wave film director and chronicler of the 1968 Student Movement, made a 1993 work of documentary fiction by staging a walk by a Tito impersonator through the streets of Belgrade, encountering the city's residents in various states of trauma and denial of what was happening in by then defunct Yugoslavia. The film is entitled "Tito among the Serbs for the Second Time."

33 Such sentiments are perhaps the most apparent during gatherings commemorating Tito's death, when different delegations bring flower wreaths and give passionate speeches to the gathered audiences, reminding those present of the betrayal of values once held dear. In Sarajevo, this day is marked by visits to Tito's statue, located in front of the huge army complex which used to bear his name but has since the war been turned into a university campus.

34 The echoes of such interpretations could be located in the scholarly understandings of carnival as an event that temporarily suspends the rules, in order to help release accumulated social tensions. This related discussion, however, lies outside the scope of this exploratory paper.

35 In order to protect my informants about whom I write in this section, I have changed all of the names and some identifying markers. All the names in this part of the text are pseudonyms.

36 For more information on the practices surrounding the statue, see Marijana Belaj, "Tito Poslije Tita: Kip Josipa Broza kao žarište obrednog ponašanja" [Tito after Tito: The Statue of Josip Broz as a center of ritual behavior]. *O Titu Kao Mitu: Proslava dana Mladosti u Kumrovcu* (Zagreb: Srednja Evropa, 2006) 201-218.

37 Drvar is also a site of a major WWII battle, precipitated by a huge Nazi offensive aimed at destroying the Partisan troops

under the leadership of Tito. Today, Yugonostalgics gather in Drvar a few times a year to mark the anniversary of the battle and sometimes to also celebrate locally the Day of Youth.

38 Among the passengers on both buses are the aging witnesses of WWII violence, whose deeply felt traumas stand out against the playful, ambivalent, and sometimes downright disturbing words and actions of their young companions.

Campus Visitors

Tamir Chultemsuren is a visiting researcher with ISEES this spring. He is a lecturer at the Department of Sociology, National University of Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. He studies social movements and protest in post-communist countries (comparative research of Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia). His visit is sponsored by the Open Society Institute. During his time in Berkeley, he will work with Professor Vicki Bonnell.

Irina Dimitradze is a visiting scholar with ISEES during the Spring 2011 semester. She is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Ilia University, Tbilisi, Georgia. She will work on archaeology in Georgia with Professor Patrick Kirch, Anthropology.

Kim Jung Il is a visiting scholar with ISEES during the 2010-2011 academic year. He is Assistant Professor at the Department of Russian Language and Literature, Kyungpook National University, Korea. His visit is sponsored by his university. While in Berkeley, he will be doing research on the keywords of Russian culture from a comparative cultural viewpoint.

Danijela Ljepavic is a visiting student researcher with ISEES during the Spring 2011 semester. She is an instructor at the Study Program for French Language, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Montenegro, Niksic, Montenegro. Her visit is sponsored by the American Councils Junior Faculty Development Program. Her research topic is linguistics, especially interpretation of French idioms and collocations and comparative analysis between languages derived from Serbo-Croatian. While in Berkeley, she will work with Professor Mairi McLaughlin, Department of French.

Dominic Armour Martin is a visiting student researcher with ISEES during the Spring 2011 semester. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate in social anthropology at Kings College, at the University of Cambridge. During his time at Berkeley, he will research late socialism and its impact on religious movements, especially the Old Belief in the Russian Far East.

Park Jeong O joins us from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in South Korea, where he teaches Romanian language and literature. He is spending two sabbatical years at UC Berkeley, conducting research on contemporary Romanian culture and literature.

Svetlana Roberman is a visiting Fulbright post-doctoral scholar at ISEES during the 2011 calendar year. She holds a Ph.D. in social anthropology from Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Israel. Her research is on post-Soviet Jewish diaspora in Germany and Israel. She will work at Berkeley with Professor Yuri Slezkine, Department of History.

Gohar Shahnazaryan, Assistant Professor of Sociology at Yerevan State University, Armenia, returned to Berkeley and is a visiting scholar with ISEES this spring. Her visit is sponsored by the Open Society Institute, and she uses her time at Berkeley to develop new course materials.

Nazym Shedenova is a visiting scholar with ISEES during the Spring 2011 semester. She is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Philosophy and Politology, Al-Farabi Kazakh State National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan. Her visit is sponsored by the Open Society Institute. Her research deals with sociology of gender, economical sociology, and public policy. During her time with ISEES, she will work with Dr. Mary E. Kelsey at the Department of Sociology.

Zoran Skrobanovic is a visiting student researcher with ISEES this spring. He is a lecturer at the Department of Oriental Studies, Chinese Language and Literature, Faculty of Philology at the University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia. His visit is sponsored by the American Councils Junior Faculty Development Program. During his time at Berkeley, he will continue his research on modernism and on the influence of Chinese language and literature on Western modernist writers. He will work with Professor Andrew Jones.

Danijela Lugaric Vukas is a visiting scholar with ISEES during the Spring 2011 semester. She is a senior lecturer at the Department of East Slavic Languages and Literatures, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb, Croatia. Her visit is sponsored by the American Councils Junior Faculty Development Program. During her time in Berkeley, she will examine Soviet literature and popular culture. She will work with Professor Olga Matich.

Faculty and Student News

Monica Eppinger, Department of Anthropology, received her Ph.D. from UC Berkeley on December 17, 2010. Her dissertation is titled *Reforming the Nation: Law and Land in Post-Soviet Ukraine*. She received five academic job offers and began teaching at St. Louis University School of Law (with affiliation with the SLU program in anthropology).

Cameron Girvin, Ph.D. candidate, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, accepted funding from American Councils for their Southeast European Language Training Program, with which he will be doing advanced Serbian language study in Belgrade during the summer of 2011.

Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics, was awarded one of the 2011 Excellence Awards in Global Economic Affairs by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. The aim of the Excellence Award is to build a community of the brightest young researchers in the area of global economic affairs. These researchers are to be given intellectual, financial, and administrative support – based on the Kiel Institute's generous resources – to pursue focused programs of research in designated areas.

Tony Lin, Ph.D. candidate in the Department Slavic Languages and Literatures, presented a paper entitled "Negotiating Wyspiański's Wesele: Three Case Studies" at the Polish Studies Conference, hosted by the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. He also won the Outstanding GSI Award for 2009-2010.

Jessica Merrill, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, is currently doing research for her dissertation in Moscow and Prague, after receiving a Fulbright-Hays fellowship for that purpose. More specifically, she is researching and writing on the role of folkloristics in the development of Russian Formalist and Czech Structuralist Literary Theory.

Malgorzata Szajbel-Keck, Ph.D. candidate in the Department Slavic Languages and Literatures, presented a paper at the 5th Annual Slavic Linguistics Society Conference in Chicago (October 29-30, 2010). The paper was titled "Nouns with Aspect – The Curious Case of Polish Verbal Nouns." Her travel expenses were partially covered by an ISEES travel grant. She also received a Summer FLAS for 2010 to participate in the Russian and East European Summer Language Institute in Pittsburgh, where she studied Slovak.

Gergely Tóth, Lecturer in Hungarian and German, UC Berkeley, has been a member of the Lecturer Teaching Fellows Group this year, under the guidance of Steve Tollefson. He has also been working on a website which will include (at the current stand) about 3,000 photos, taken over the last ten years, of Hungarian neighborhoods (or, often, only of their remnants) in the United States, as one of his interests is immigration history and the detailed

documentation (photography, audio recordings of events, oral history interviews) of ethnic institutions. Dr. Tóth hopes to complete this project by summer 2011. He will give a presentation on this work at the annual conference of the American Hungarian Educators' Association in Cleveland in April 2011.

Barbara Voytek, Ph.D., former Executive Director of ISEES, has four articles in press, scheduled for publication this year: "In the Shadow of the Grand Narrative: Revisiting the Early Holocene of the Northern Adriatic" (to be published in the March 2011 issue of the *Journal of World Prehistory*); "Plus Ça Change, Plus C'est la Meme Chose: Change and Continuity in the Neolithic" (Istituto Studi Liguri, Italy); "A Retrospect on Yellow Flint" (to be published in an edited volume of papers from the colloquium on Balkan honey-colored flint, EAA 2009); and "The Balkan Neolithic: a Study in Sedentary Village Life" (volume in the memory of Eugene Comsa, Romanian Academy of Sciences 2011).

Cameron Wiggins, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, presented a paper entitled "Goncharov's Oblomov: Comedy on the Stage of the Novel" at AATSEEL in January 2011. She also published an article in the new volume *Petersburg/Petersburg: Novel and City, 1900-1921*, edited by Olga Matich and published by the University of Wisconsin Press. The article is entitled "The Enchanted Masquerade: Alexander Blok's The Puppet Show from the Stage to the Streets."

ASEES Convention, Fall 2010, Los Angeles.

The ASEES annual convention was held in November 2010 in Los Angeles, CA. The following ISEES affiliates made presentations:

Ronnelle Alexander, Professor in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, chaired the panel on *Bai Ganyo in English and in World Literature*.

Nina Renata Aron, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Anthropology, presented a paper titled "Fashioning Russia: The Production of a New Russian Other" at the panel on *Gender and Culture: New Directions in the Era of Globalization*.

Katya Balter, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, chaired the roundtable on *(Re)visions of Periphery in Soviet and Post-Soviet Film*, and participated in the roundtable *Spaced Out: Towards a Reinterpretation of Space as Cultural Malaise*.

David Ilmar Beecher, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History, participated in the roundtable on *The Friendship of Peoples (Druzhiba narodov): Soviet Policies, Popular Meanings, and Contemporary Legacies*.

Alexandre Beliaev, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Anthropology, presented a paper titled "Youth Likbez:

Knowledge and Pedagogy in the Near Abroad” at the panel on *Talking About Nationalism, Again*.

Daniel Aaron Brooks, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, chaired the roundtable *Spaced Out: Towards a Reinterpretation of Space as Cultural Malaise*.

Greg Allan Castillo, Associate Professor in the Department of Architecture, presented a paper titled “The Model East German Home as a Finishing School for Discontent” at the panel on *Lifestyle Under State Socialism in East Central Europe*.

John Connelly, Associate Professor in the Department of History, chaired the panel *From Mountaintops to Imagination: The Cultural History of Polish Getaways, 1956-1972*, and served as a discussant on the panel on ‘Polonizing’ *Contested Borderlands: Cultural and National Appropriations in Interwar Poland*.

Polina Dimcheva Dimova, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Comparative Literature, served as a discussant on the panel on *The Bulgarian Village and the Bulgarian City: Architecture, Mythology, and Ideology of the Living Space*, and participated in the roundtable on *Approaches to Music and Literature: Influences, Transpositions, Settings*.

Nicole Eaton, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History, chaired the roundtable on *‘The Bread of Affliction:’ Rationing and Survival During the Great Patriotic War - Leningrad and Beyond* and presented a paper titled “Sacred Revenge: Justifying Red Army Violence against German Civilians in East Prussia, Spring 1945” at the panel on *The Memory of World War II in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia*.

Mieka Erley, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, presented a paper titled “Reclaiming the Motherland: The Trope of ‘Melioratsiia’ in Soviet Prose of the 1920s and 1930s” at the panel on *Earth, Wind, and Fire: Art and the Natural World, 1860-1935*.

Christine Elaine Evans, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History, chaired the panel on *Spectatorship in Russian and Soviet Cinema* and presented a paper titled “*Not a Mirror but a Magnifying Glass: Soviet Television between the Cinematic Avant-garde and Current Digital Media*.”

M Steven Fish, Professor in the Department of Political Science, participated in the roundtable on *Russia in 2010: Assessing the Medvedev Presidency and Looking Forward to the 2011 Duma Elections*.

Victoria S. Frede, Assistant Professor in the Department of History, presented a paper titled “Friendship and ‘Courtoisie’: Vasilii Zhukovskii and the Sentimental Codes of the Alexandrine Court” at the panel on *Friendship, Networks, and Nepotism in Imperial, Soviet, and Post-Soviet Russia*.

David Frick, Professor in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, chaired the panel *A Noble Life: Elite Pursuits in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth* and presented a paper titled “‘In Flight from the Muscovite Foe’: Wilno Stories from a Time of War” at the panel on *Wars, Borders and Loyalties in Early Modern Eastern Europe*.

Cammeron Girvin, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, presented a paper titled “Building with Cement and Ink: Dimitrovgrad, the City of Youth” at the panel on *The Bulgarian Village and the Bulgarian City: Architecture, Mythology, and Ideology of the Living Space*.

Aglaya Glebova, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History of Art, presented a paper titled “Disfigured Landscapes, or Picturing Russian Nature” at the panel on *Imagining Peace, Engendering Strife: Russian Pastoral and its Discontents*.

Luba Golburt, Assistant Professor in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, presented a paper titled “‘Zemnykh bogov ia ne khvalil’: Patronage in the Romantic Age” at the panel on *Pushkin’s Muses Revisited: Inspiration, Memory, Reception*.

Olga Raevsky Hughes, Professor Emerita in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, participated in the roundtable *‘Between Two Stars’: Russian Postwar Emigration in America*.

Anastasia Ioanna Kayiatos, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, presented a paper titled “Silencing Race in Late-Soviet Russia” at the panel on *Racial and Ethnic Conflict is the Business of Capitalists: Imaging the Soviet Union as the Land of Multinational and Multiracial Peace*.

Mark Aaron Keck-Szajbel, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History, presented a paper titled “Hitchhiking in Communist Poland” at the panel *From Mountaintops to Imagination: The Cultural History of Polish Getaways, 1956-1972*.

Jody Laporte, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science, presented a paper titled “The Management of Political Opposition in Kazakhstan” at the panel on *Prospects for Change in Central Asia*.

Tony Hsiu Lin, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, participated in the roundtable *Approaches to Music and Literature: Influences, Transpositions, Settings*.

Danielle N. Lussier, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science, participated in the roundtable *The Mind of a Terrorist*, and presented a paper titled “The Opportunities and Constraints of Legacies: Society’s Inheritance in Post-Soviet Russia” at the panel on *Communist Legacies and Post-Communist Justice*.

Olga Matich, Professor in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, chaired the panel on *Lolita — Text, Phantasy, Screen*.

Hugh McLean, Professor Emeritus in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, was a discussant on the panel on *Tolstoy and the Ethical Truth(s) of Fiction*, and participated in the roundtable on *Teaching Tolstoy's "War and Peace"*.

Jessica E. Merrill, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, presented a paper titled "Two Varieties of One Genus: Roman Jakobson's Interwar Folkloristics and Poetics" at the panel on *Cross-disciplinary Exercises: Folklore, History, and Psychology in Literature*.

Anna Muza, Lecturer in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, chaired the panel, *V sei grznyi chas: Leonid Andreyev, Texts and Technics* and participated in the roundtable on *Secret Lives of the Early Soviet Stage: Authors, Performances, Institutions*.

Eric Naiman, Associate Professor in the Departments of Slavic Languages and Literatures and Comparative Literature, participated in the roundtable *Making War and Peace with Words: The Challenges of Russian Literary Translation* and presented a paper titled "Did She Have a Precursor: On Shirley Temple and Lolita's Older Sister" at the panel on *Lolita — Text, Phantasy, Screen*.

Irina Paperno, Professor in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, presented a paper titled "Tolstoy's Philosophy of Death, in Theory and Practice" at the panel on *November 7 (20) 1910: Tolstoy is Dead*.

Alexis Jean Peri, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History, presented a paper titled "Recounting and Revising the Siege: The Liubovskye Family Archive of the Leningrad Blockade, 1941-2006" at the panel on *The Memory of World War II in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia* and participated in the roundtable on *'The Bread of Affliction: ' Rationing and Survival During the Great Patriotic War - Leningrad and Beyond*.

William Quillen, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Music, participated in the roundtable on *Approaches to Music and Literature: Influences, Transpositions, Settings*.

Brandon Schechter, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History, participated in the roundtable on *The Bread of Affliction: ' Rationing and Survival During the Great Patriotic War - Leningrad and Beyond*.

Kathryn Schild, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, chaired the panel on *War and Empire*.

Erik R. Scott, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History, chaired the panel on *Friendship, Networks, and Nepotism in Imperial, Soviet, and Post-Soviet Russia* and presented a paper titled "Between the Caucasus and the

Kremlin: Georgian Political Networks Under Stalin" at the panel on *Revolution and Reconstruction at Center and Periphery*.

Katy Sosnak, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, chaired the panel on *Honoring the Classics? Graphic Novel Adaptations of Literary Masterpieces*, and presented a paper titled "Unmasking the Invisible: 'Japonisme' in Russian Literature" at the panel on *Literary Responses to the Russo-Japanese War: Art, Espionage and Imperialism*.

Lucas William Stratton, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, participated in the roundtable *Spaced Out: Towards a Reinterpretation of Space as Cultural Malaise*.

Alyson Louise Tapp, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, presented a paper titled "'First Snow' and Firstness in 'Evgenii Onegin': Elegy, Empathy, Narrative" at the panel on *Pushkin's Muses Revisited: Inspiration, Memory, Reception*.

Allan Joseph Urbanic, Librarian for Slavic and East European Collections, participated in the roundtable on *Pacific Rim Slavic Bibliographers and Their Collections*.

Daniel Viragh, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History, presented a paper titled "The Neolog Conception of History and Jewish Schools in Hungary in the Late 19th Century" at the panel on *Central European Jewish Identity in the 19th and Early 20th Centuries*.

Edward Walker, Executive Director, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, chaired the panel on *Talking About Nationalism, Again*.

Susanne Alice Wengle, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science, presented a paper titled "Oil Wars Redux? The Russian Oil Industry under President Medvedev" at the panel on *Resource Politics in Russia*.

Elizabeth Wenger, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History, presented a paper titled "Writing Peace: Canon Formation and Pacifism through Censorship in Poland and the GDR 1948-1956" at the panel on *Fighting the Cold War*. She also presented a paper titled "Searching for Jack London: (Post)Colonial Poland's Quest for Cultural Cache Through Canon Formation (1945-1956)" at the panel on *Colonial and Postcolonial Central and Eastern Europe*.

Cameron Wiggins, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, presented a paper titled "Drama v forme romana: Turgenev's 'Rudin' as a Hybrid Text" at the panel on *Generic Intersections in the Fiction of Ivan Turgenev*.

Alexei Yurchak, Associate Professor in the Department of Anthropology, participated in the roundtable *Dmitri A. Prigov (1940-2007): Challenges to Russian Culture*.

CRRC-UC Berkeley Field Project: Spring 2011

The Berkeley Program in Eurasian and East European Studies is pleased to report on its latest group of CRRC scholars who came to Berkeley from the Caucasus in April 2011 for a two-week stay. Their visit was sponsored by a generous grant by the Carnegie Foundation to ISEES. Our CRRC scholars for Spring 2011 were Rusiko Amirejibi-Mullen, Rahilya Geybullayeva, George Sanikidze, and Aghasi Tadevosyan.

Rusiko Amirejibi-Mullen (Javakhashvili Tbilisi State University)

Rusiko Amirejibi-Mullen is finishing her Ph.D. at Queen Mary University of London on the topic of Language Policy and National Identity in Georgia. Prior to beginning her Ph.D. in London, she worked as a professor in the Department of Kartvelian Languages at Javakhashvili Tbilisi State University for twenty years. She has written articles in comparative linguistics, lexicology, semantics, and social linguistics, has edited several academic books, and was one of the compilers and editors of *A Comprehensive Georgian-English Dictionary* (London: Garnett press, 2006). Her main research interests concern language and language policy in Georgia from the pre-modern period to the present, and the role of language and language policy in inter-ethnic relations and the Georgian nation-building process.

During the CRRC workshop she will develop a syllabus that on language policy in Georgia, tentatively entitled, “The Past and Future of Language Policy in Georgia.” The course will examine the history and practice of language policy in Georgia from an interdisciplinary perspective. Her hope is that the course will serve as a platform to identify where social science can meet policy-making, particularly as it relates to long-term national identity, language, and state-building.

Rahilya Geybullayeva (Baku Slavic University)

Rahilya Geybullayeva is Chair of the Journalism and Azerbaijani Literature Department, Baku Slavic University, Baku, Azerbaijan. Her main research interests relate to comparative literature, cultural history, national culture, and media studies. Geybullayeva is the author of several monographs and numerous articles, including “The Influence of a Dominant Factor on the Language of Azerbaijani National Literature,” “Masterpieces of Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity: Epos,” “The Book of Dedem Korkud,” and “About Stereotypes without Stereotypes.”

During the Berkeley workshop she will focus on developing a syllabus titled “History and Fiction: Epic and Historical Chronicle.” Her course will involve comparative analysis of post-Soviet Azerbaijani, Chinese, and Turkish texts in respect to representation of historical reality in literature.

George Sanikidze (Ilia Chavchavadze State University)

George Sanikidze is Director of the G. Tsereteli Institute of Oriental Studies and Professor at Ilia Chavchavadze State University, Georgia. He teaches courses on the Caucasus, Medieval and Modern East-West Relations, the History of Islamic Countries, and Methodology. He has been a visiting scholar at Paris-Sorbonne-III and Paris-Sorbonne-IV Universities, University of California, Berkeley (Fulbright), and the Universities of Hokkaido and Osaka, Japan. He is author of the forthcoming volume, *Islam in Georgia and Georgia's Interactions with the Islamic World* (Nova Science Publishers: New York).

While at Berkeley, he hopes to develop a graduate level seminar on “Orientalism and the Caucasus: Georgia Between East and West.” The course will be a novel attempt to bring the concepts and critiques of “Orientalism” to the Caucasus. It will explore Georgia’s geopolitical location at the crossroads of “East” and “West” as well as of Islam and Christianity. Focusing on ethnic and religious vectors of identity, Sanikidze will examine the sources and evolution of perceptions of and by peoples in the region. Of particular interest is the shift from ethnicity to religion as a basis of identity of the area’s Muslim population.

Aghasi Tadevosyan (Yerevan State University)

Aghasi Tadevosyan is Visiting Professor at Yerevan State University, where he teaches courses in the Department of Archeology and Ethnography. He is also a senior researcher at the Institute of Archeology and Ethnography at the National Academy of Sciences, Armenia. In addition to his academic work, Aghasi is involved in ongoing research and consultancy projects with NGOs such as the Open Society Institute, United Nations Development Program, and UNESCO. These projects have investigated methods of cultural preservation and poverty reduction in Armenia.

As a Carnegie Scholar at Berkeley, he will develop a course on the intersection of post-socialist transitions and everyday life, especially in the South Caucasus. The course will focus on the political, economic, cultural, and social processes associated with the transition, and the effect of these processes on everyday life. The course will address questions such as how have discourse, interactions, public spaces, and time allocation changed in the past 20 years of post-socialism.

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US Dept of Education **Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) Fellowships** for Academic Year and Summer intensive language training enable eligible graduate and undergraduate students who are US citizens or permanent residents to gain competence in the modern foreign languages critical to the national needs of the US and training in area and international studies. Academic Year languages include Armenian, Bulgarian, Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, Czech, Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, and Russian. **Deadline:** mid-January 2012, check website for specific date. For details, see <http://www.grad.berkeley.edu/financial/deadlines.shtml#graddiv>

ISEEEES/BPS Travel Grants provide limited travel support for ISEEEES/BPS-affiliated graduate students. Grants up to \$400 are awarded to students who are on the official program of a professional conference or workshop. **Deadline:** Applications accepted on a rolling basis. To apply, send a request with a budget to Dr. Edward W. Walker, BPS, UC Berkeley, 260 Stephens Hall #2304, Berkeley, CA 94720-2304; Tel: 510-643-6736; eww@berkeley.edu

The **Drago and Danica Kosovac Prize** is awarded for a senior or honors thesis in the social sciences or humanities that researches some aspect of Serbian culture or history. Cal undergraduate students are eligible to apply. The application includes submission of the thesis and two letters of recommendation. **Deadline:** Applications accepted on a rolling basis.

The **Peter N. Kujachich Endowment in Serbian and Montenegrin Studies** offers awards up to approximately \$5,000 to faculty, graduate or undergraduate student projects that focus on the experience of the Serbian and Montenegrin peoples. Applications should consist of a research or project proposal, budget, and letter of recommendation from department chair or faculty advisor. **Deadline:** Applications accepted on a rolling basis.

The **Hertelendy Fellowship in Hungarian Studies** offers awards to encourage and recognize the study of Hungary. This fellowship provides partial support (tuition, stipend, and/or travel and research-related expenses) to UC Berkeley graduate students working in Hungarian studies. UC Berkeley faculty, undergraduates, and visiting researchers may also apply for funding of research projects devoted to Hungarian studies. Research projects may include conference presentations and language study. An application consists of a letter of intent, research proposal, budget, and letter of recommendation from faculty advisor or department chair. **Deadline:** Applications accepted on a rolling basis.

Contact: Jeffrey Pennington, ISEEEES, UC Berkeley, 260 Stephens Hall #2304, Berkeley CA 94720-2304; Tel: 510-643-6736; jpennington@berkeley.edu