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The Nature of Mass Communist Beliefs in Postcommunist Russian Political Space

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Abstract: The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a democratizing regime in Russia during the 1990s raise several questions about the contours of Russian mass politics: Do Russians have structured beliefs that motivate political behavior? Does ideology guide Russian mass political beliefs? How has seventy years of Communist Party rule affected Russian political attitudes? This paper explores these questions through an analysis of public opinion from the 1995-1996 and 1999-2000 Russian National Election Studies.

Using covariance structure modeling on a series of attitudinal questions, this analysis finds evidence of the Leninist legacy in the beliefs exhibited by Russians in the 1990s. In order to operationalize the belief system carried over from Leninism, I create an index of attitudinal indicators reflecting the attitudes Russians hold relating to the shared experience of life under communism. I look at the possible determinants of this belief system and test the extent to which it influences Russian voting behavior. As predicted, the attachment to these values is greater among older, poorer, less educated, and rural segments of the Russian population. In the mid-1990s this belief system appears to have had a greater direct effect on vote choice than did any socioeconomic indicators. While the direct impact of the persistence of communist values on vote choice had declined by 2000, it continued to display indirect effects on vote choice for the Communist Party candidate.

MASS POLITICS IN POSTCOMMUNIST RUSSIA: AN INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Communist Party political rule in 1991 led to dramatic changes in political systems across the former Soviet region. In an area once distinguished for its uniformity of single-party politics, regimes varying from robust democracies to reconstituted dictatorships have taken root. Although Russia's postcommunist political history has not been characterized by a smooth transition to democracy, it would be misguided to assume that the mass political mind in Russia shares a uniform taste in favor of authoritarian political and economic relations—despite popular rhetoric to this end. In fact, there is little empirical basis for making strong assumptions about the underlying contours of the political predispositions of the Russian public and the impact of Communist Party rule on shaping opinions about political, economic, and social organization. What is the impact of the "Leninist legacy" on Russian political attitudes? Do Russians have structured beliefs that motivate political behavior? Is there any ideology guiding Russian mass political beliefs?

Using data from the 1995-1996 and 1999-2000 Russian National Election Studies, I argue that an attachment to values inculcated through the communist experience constitute a structured belief system that persists in the Russian mass public. This belief system is an inheritance of Russia's communist past and continued to play a motivating role in mass political behavior throughout the first postcommunist decade. Moreover, attachment to these values has had a greater effect on vote choice than do standard socioeconomic indicators.

This paper will proceed in two parts. First, I will offer an approach for conceptualizing ideological and cultural legacies in post-Soviet Russia and situate the role of mass politics in the framework of "Leninist legacies." This will be followed by an analysis of the structure of Russian political attitudes in 1995-1996 and 1999-2000. The second half of the paper will apply the results obtained from the first section in a basic vote choice model for the 1999 and 2000 Russian presidential elections in order to demonstrate the relationship between belief systems and political behavior.

PART I: RUSSIAN POLITICAL SPACE AFTER COMMUNISM

Identifying Ideological and Cultural Legacies

Much of the scholarship on postcommunist transitions over the past fifteen years has been framed in terms of the intersection of two primary dimensions: enduring legacies inherited from Leninist structures and the more proximate politics of decisions or outcomes experienced in the early years of transition. If this enormous body of work could be summarized in one broad conclusion, it would be that Leninism imparted both negative and positive inheritances on the societies and states emerging from Communist Party rule in the 1980s-1990s, and that these legacies shaped both the context in which early decisions were made, as well as the likelihood that particular institutional choices would be successful in ushering in democracy and capitalism.

Although a consensus has emerged among scholars of political transitions that the role of mass political attitudes at the time of regime change is largely insignificant when compared to the role played by political elites (Di Palma 1990; Przeworski 1991), the impact of mass attitudes on regime consolidation once a political transition is complete has not been fully scrutinized. For regimes that are attempting to build effective democratic institutions, mass political attitudes and behaviors might indeed play a significant role in influencing the character of the new institutions. Democracies rely on mass participation and voluntary compliance for claiming and exercising political authority. Moreover, at a theoretical level, the effectiveness of a democracy is in part dependent on how well it represents societal interests.

It is within this context that mass politics—and thus the legacies that are embedded within them—gain significance. It seems reasonable to expect that individuals socialized under a different regime than the one in which they are currently living are influenced by the legacies of living under the previous system. Life experienced under a particular political order may shape both the demands and expectations citizens have for their political system. For example, a strong attachment to the ideology or beliefs of the previous regime could impede the development of political legitimacy in the new regime. Likewise, a legacy of state paternalism could raise

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expectations for performance for a new regime. As we consider the variety of transition outcomes across the postcommunist region—from healthy democracies to hybrid regimes to dictatorships—the incorporation of mass beliefs into democratization models could prove instructive.

In order to analyze the impact of legacies on mass politics, it is first necessary to outline a conceptual framework that can be measured empirically. A useful starting point can be found in a 1997 essay in which Stephen Hanson disaggregates the concept of the "Leninist legacy" first introduced by Ken Jowitt (1992) into four components: the ideological legacy, the political legacy, the socioeconomic legacy, and the cultural legacy. Most empirical work on communist-era inheritances has demonstrated the effects of political and socioeconomic legacies on postcommunist institutional outcomes (Crawford and Lijphart 1997; Ekiert and Hanson 2003; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Kolodko 2000). Scholarship demonstrating the effects of an ideological and cultural legacy empirically, however, has been less frequent and has primarily emphasized consequences for political parties and associationalism (Grzymala-Busse 2002; Howard 2003), rather than on mass politics as a whole.

Hanson distinguished between the ideological and cultural legacies as follows: "Ideology, in my use of the term, refers to a formalized and codified definition of the 'proper' membership and boundaries of a polity...Culture, by contrast, refers here to the informal norms and daily life practices of social groups in a given region" (238). Hanson argued that the ideological legacy was the first element of the Leninist inheritance to fall away in postcommunist polities due to the ideological vacuum that resulted from forced uniformity around socialism. Cultural legacies, he posited, were likely to have a stronger impact since the norms and practices of culture "tend over time to become valued for their own sake and therefore to endure long after the institutions which produced them disappear" (238).

With regard to politics at the mass level, I would argue against a sharp distinction between ideological and cultural legacies. On the mass level, ideology is less likely to be associated with the political philosophy that shapes elite rhetoric and is more likely to overlap in

substantial ways with the institutions and practices through which politics is experienced (Converse 1964). Rather than establishing a firm boundary between ideology and culture at the mass level, a productive approach is to employ the concept of the "belief system"—defined by Philip Converse as "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence" (Converse 1964, 207). A useful attribute of the belief system concept for the study of postcommunist mass politics is the separation of interdependent ideas and attitudes from abstract theoretical constructs. Approaching mass political attitudes from the framework of "belief systems" allows us to consider the possibility that individuals may have mutually supporting ideas without consciously connecting these beliefs to a greater philosophical abstraction such as Marxism or liberalism.

The significant growth in reliable surveys conducted in the postcommunist region since the late 1980s provides scholars with an opportunity to look more closely at the contours of the political attitudes held by Russians during this period. It is now possible to look beyond basic responses to specific issue questions to see whether patterns emerge among respondents. Can we find evidence of mass belief systems in Russian attitudes? If so, identifying them will be the first step in understanding the impact of ideological and cultural legacies on mass politics.

Mass Beliefs: Dimensions and Domains

The study of political attitudes, predispositions, and ideology in democratic polities has contributed substantially to our understanding of the contours of political space in liberal democracies. Perhaps the most substantial finding has been the near universal existence of the left-right continuum for ideological organization, which is present in all advanced democracies. The left-right continuum persists in spite of differences in regime subtype (parliamentary vs. presidential) and regardless of the number of political parties in a system. Although political space in advanced democracies can be multidimensional, the left-right continuum appears to serve as an adequate tool for summarizing most debates.

It is not possible to make an analogous summation of the political space in many postcommunist regimes, in particular those that resulted from the collapse of the USSR. In contrast to several of the neighboring Leninist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe (with perhaps the exception of Romania), the penetration of Communist Party ideological and structural oversight in all areas of life was much more pervasive in the Soviet Union. While limited plurality in some areas of public life in Eastern Europe allowed societies to consider ideological alternatives to communism that ultimately provided ready alternatives upon the collapse of the Leninist regime, post-Soviet Russia greeted transition in a state of ideological vapidity (Hanson 1997). Moreover, the Communist Party's complete monopoly on power in all public arenas forced genuine political discourse into the narrow realm of the inner circle of the Soviet Politburo. For most of Soviet history, "correct" political positions were passed along to the masses to accept and internalize. Thus, while greater plurality in political opinion existed within the debates of political elites, this plurality was rarely made available for public consumption. As a result, political cleavages at the mass level were crude and ideological alternatives did not undergo meaningful public scrutiny.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, the space previously occupied by the narrow framing of anti-communism emerged containing a heterogeneous mix of positions on a broad range of political, economic, and social issues. An "anti-communist" position on the economy, for example, could encompass a broad spectrum of beliefs about the market, from support for a social-democratic welfare state to endorsement of laissez-faire liberalism. A substantial range existed within "pro-communist" debate as well, from a reconstituted centrally planned economy to a market system with state ownership of large industries. A brief look at Russian political activity throughout the 1990s suggests that Russia's multidimensional political space during the first postcommunist decade could not be easily summarized along a single dimension. In the first parliamentary elections in 1993, thirteen political parties or electoral blocs competed in the party list ballot for proportional representation.[1] In 1995, the number ballooned to forty-three, and in 1999 it dropped to twenty-six. In all three presidential contests, the winner has not belonged to a

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political party, but rather received support from a party designed for the primary purpose of endorsing the Kremlin.

Although much more chaotic than established democracies, the organization of politics in Russia's first postcommunist decade was not without some visible structure. Three political parties were elected via party list voting during all three parliamentary elections: the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), the liberal Yabloko party, and the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). A pro-presidential party was also elected to each parliament. Additionally, the leaders of the KPRF, Yabloko, and LDPR participated in both the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections. Nevertheless, in spite of the existence of some very basic elements of continuity among these institutions, Russia does not fit into a nice, neat binary left-right, liberal-conservative, or communist-democrat spectrum. The political space is infused with multidimensional, crosscutting conflicts over economic and political organization, state borders, political and social power, national interests and national identity. Although two political camps might share similar views regarding economic organization, they could be on completely opposite ends of an entirely different spectrum regarding executive powers, civil liberties, and the role of the state in individual affairs. For example, while both the pro-presidential centrist parties and the liberal Yabloko party have generally supported marketization of the Russian economy, Yabloko was opposed to the December 1993 Constitution that concentrated political power in the presidency, and consistently took anti-government positions on numerous aspects of state policy throughout the 1990s.

Bearing in mind the relative complexity elite-level and party politics exhibited within the heterogeneity and expansion of the previously "anti-communist" political space, one is left to speculate about the presence of analogous heterogeneity at the level of mass beliefs. In their ambitious 1999 analysis of party systems in Eastern Europe, Herbert Kitschelt et al. uncovered a high degree of social and ideological structuring on the mass level. The authors found that while the structure of political competition in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria could generally be summarized by a single dimension, the content of this dimension was not

uniform across cases. In some instances, positions on the economy were divisive, while in other cases social and cultural issues constituted the primary cleavages.

This finding raises important questions about whether such variation exists in Russia as well. Russian belief systems, rather than following a liberal-conservative continuum, could exhibit variation in positions with regard to the legacies of the communist past. In particular, since most Russian adults were socialized under the Soviet regime, it is logical to expect that their political opinions are not simply reactions to events in postcommunist politics, but may in fact be largely shaped by their social, economic, and political experience under communism. Attitudinal domains reflecting this lived experience might include the role of the state in both economic and social affairs, the prioritization of the rights of society and social guarantees above individual rights and liberties, and the degree of power accorded to political authority.

In operationalizing this legacy hypothesis, I will analyze attitudes in four potential domains where one might find an underlying structure of belief systems: (1) economic organization; (2) structure of the state and political community; (3) the relationship between state order and individual liberties; and (4) the concentration of political power. These four domains overlap with the primary areas constituting the predominant political discourse exhibited by political elites and party leaders in the 1990s as well.

Data: Russian National Election Studies 1995-1996, 1999-2000

The data employed in this analysis comes from the 1995-1996 and 1999-2000 Russian National Election Studies.[2] Both studies are three-stage panel surveys in which respondents were interviewed before the December State Duma (parliamentary) elections, after the State Duma elections, and after the springtime presidential elections. The 1995-1996 sample includes a total of 2,841 respondents in the first wave, 2,776 in the second wave, and 2,456 in the third wave. The sample size for 1999-2000 is 1,919 in the first wave, 1,842 in the second wave, and 1,748 in the third wave. Data from all three waves are included in this analysis.

Methodology: Covariance Structure Modeling

In order to analyze the underlying structure of Russian belief systems, this paper will employ two techniques in covariance structure modeling: principal components analysis and factor analysis. The choice of these techniques relies on the assumption that the correlations found among the observed variables are due to their common dependence on an underlying unobserved variable or variables. A total of twenty variables were selected from the 1995-1996 survey and twenty-five variables from the 1999-2000 study as indicators of the hypothesized domains of political beliefs described above.[3] In the interest of space, the full text of questions is not repeated below, but rather only brief summaries are included. Most indicators were organized in ordinal scales, but with properties that allowed them to be treated cautiously as continuous variables. Responses involved either placement on a 1-5 scale, a range of strength with agree or disagree statements, or clearly ordered categorization. Variables were coded 0-1 such that full disagreement with the statement or lowest possible placement on a scale corresponds to 0 and full disagreement or highest possible placement on a scale corresponds to 1.

(1) Economic organization:

a. What do you think about the privatization of state property in Russia?
b. What do you think about market reforms?
c. We must defend our industry against competition from foreign firms (agree/disagree);
d. It is normal when the owner of a prosperous enterprise, using the labor of his workers, becomes richer than many other people (agree/disagree);
e. All heavy industry must belong to the state and should not be given to private ownership (agree/disagree);
f. The state should set food prices (agree/disagree);
g. The government ought to guarantee a job to everyone who needs one (agree/disagree);
h. The state should limit the incomes of the rich (agree/disagree);
i. Private property in land should exist in our country (agree/disagree);
j. The capitalist system is not suitable for Russia (agree/disagree); (1995-1996 only)

(2) Structure of state and political community:

a. The Soviet Union should never have been dissolved (agree/disagree);
b. Should Russia seek out its own path of development or utilize the experience of the West?
c. Russia should strive for economic and political organization with the former Soviet Republics (agree/disagree); (1995-1996 only)
d. Russia and Belarus should unite in a single state (agree/disagree); (1999-2000 only)
e. Russia and Ukraine should unite in single state (agree/disagree); (1999-2000 only)
f. Ethnic Russians in Russia should have certain advantages over all other nationalities (agree/disagree); (1999-2000 only)
g. Are you proud to be a Russian citizen? (1999-2000 only)

(3) <u>State order and individual liberties</u>:

    a. Order should be introduced at all costs, even if citizens' rights are violated (five-point scale);
    b. The rights of the individual must be defended even if guilty people sometimes go free (agree/ disagree);
    c. In any society there will always be a need to forbid the public expression of dangerous ideas (agree/ disagree);
    d. It is better to live in a society with strict order than to give people so much freedom that they may destroy society (agree/disagree);
    e. How important to you are providing social guarantees to the people? (1999-2000 only)

(4) <u>Political power</u>:

    a. Some people believe that the President of Russia should have more powers than the Parliament. Others want the Parliament to have more powers. Five point scale on who should have much more power;
    b. Some people think that in Russia everything should be decided by the top organs of government in Moscow, that the center should be strongest. Others think that everything should be decided in the regions, that the regional authorities should be strongest. What do you think?
    c. Are there too few political parties, the right number, or too many? (1995-1996 only)
    d. What kind of political system would be most appropriate for Russia? (Continuum of Soviet system before perestroika to democracy of Western-type); (1999-2000 only)
    e. Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections is a good/bad way of having a political system; (1999-2000 only)
    f. Political parties are necessary to make our political system work (five-point scale); (1999-2000 only)

Results: A Single Dimension Solution

The first step in determining the model involved conducting principal components analyses on each of the two surveys. The goal of the principal components analyses was to reduce the large number of variables above into a smaller set of factors representing the maximum amount of both common and unique variance present in the data. In both instances, analysis of the eigenvalues and scree plots indicated that most of the common variance was explained by a single dimension,[4] although the level of this variance was rather low in both cases—22% in the 1995-1996 data and 20% in the 1999-2000. The low level of total variance explained suggests that there is actually relatively little unifying structure among the indicators listed above. Nevertheless, the presence of at least one component that explains about one-fifth of the variance in the analysis yields support for a one-dimensional factor analysis model. Using this information as a

Table 1: Pattern Matrices for Single-Dimension Factor Model

Indicators	Factor Pattern Coefficients (λ)	Communalities (h²)	Factor Pattern Coefficients (λ)	Communalities (h²)
	1995-1996		1999-2000	
Privatization	**.64**	.41	**.53**	.28
Market Reforms	**-.45**	.21	**-.55**	.31
Defend Industry	**.62**	.39	**.43**	.18
Owners Wealth	**-.52**	.27	-.39	.16
Heavy Industry	**.53**	.28	**.46**	.21
Food Prices	**.66**	.44	**.64**	.41
Guarantee Job	**.48**	.23	**.48**	.23
Limit Incomes of Rich	**.55**	.31	**.56**	.31
Privatization of Land	**-.43**	.19	-.25	.06
Capitalist System	**.49**	.24	-	-
USSR Dissolution	**.48**	.23	**.67**	.46
Example of West	.37	.13	**.45**	.20
Former Soviet State Integration	.13	.02	-	-
Russia-Belarus	-	-	**.54**	.29
Russia-Ukraine	-	-	**.56**	.32
Ethnic Russian Advantages	-	-	-.19	.04
Proud Russian Citizen	-	-	-.21	.05
Order-Rights	.17	.03	.19	.04
Rights of Individuals	.09	.00	.14	.02
Public Expression	.20	.04	.25	.06
Order-Freedom	.35	.12	**.45**	.20
Social Guarantees	-	-	.11	.01
Power of Presidency	-.15	.02	-.05	.00
Decisions in Moscow	.06	.00	-.07	.00
Number of Political Parties	.22	.05	-	-
Political System	-	-	**.56**	.32
Strong Leadership	-	-	.18	.03
Political Parties	-	-	-.21	.04
	N=954		N=912	

guide to determine the number of factors to be extracted, factor analysis was conducted on each survey. The model was estimated specifying a one-factor solution.

Table 1 provides the pattern matrices from the one-dimensional factor analysis models for each survey. Since only a single factor was extracted from each survey, the numbers in Table 1 can be roughly interpreted as correlations between the survey question and some underlying factor. By analyzing these correlations, we can assess whether or not a pattern exists among participants' answers. I will accept a threshold of .40 among the factor pattern coefficients as evidence of a meaningful correlation with the underlying factor.

The results presented in Table 1 show that a total of eleven of the twenty variables examined from the 1995-1996 data and thirteen variables from the 1999-2000 data have factor

pattern coefficients of .40 or higher in the factor analysis. Likewise, there is a considerable degree of resemblance between the analyses of the two time periods, with most variables that were included in both analyses exhibiting strong similarities with regards to size and direction of coefficients. Those variables that show greater change between the two periods—privatization of land, dissolution of the USSR, and the trade-off between order and freedom—can be explained in part by proximate events: agricultural land was largely privatized in the mid-late 1990s, reducing the salience of the topic, and greater discontent with democratization and lawlessness has contributed to an increase in public support for greater public order.

A general assessment of the factor pattern coefficients in Table 1 suggests that there is a strong intercorrelation of attitudes with regard to economic concerns. Individuals who tended to be against privatization were also opposed to market reforms and tended to support strong state involvement in the economy. Based on this observation, one might conclude that the underlying factor made manifest by these questions involves the hypothesized domain of economic organization. Yet, several indicators from the other hypothesized domains also have significant correlations to the underlying factor. From the hypothesized domain of state structure, the question about the dissolution of the Soviet Union is significant in both surveys, and the variables measuring Belarus-Russian unification, Ukraine-Russian unification, and following the example of the West show a high correlation with the factor in the 1999-2000 data. From the other two hypothesized dimensions, the importance of order over freedom and the preference for a political system like that of the Soviet Union also correspond to this factor solution for the 1999-2000 data.

A closer look at the direction of the factor pattern coefficients on specific questions suggests an interesting substantive interpretation of this factor. From the 1995-1996 data alone, we could conclude that the underlying dimension measures attitudes towards economic organization, arguing that the high correlation with the question about the dissolution of the Soviet Union is tapping into a reaction to the economic recession of the early 1990s. Yet, upon further consideration of questions from the 1999-2000 data that correlate with the underlying

factor, one is left to consider how unification of Russia and Belarus or Russia and Ukraine relate to a strictly economic interpretation of the factor. Rather, when including the positive correlations on questions that relate to the structure of the state, political community, and political power, it appears that the underlying dimension captured in this analysis is a system of attitudinal constraint with regards to an attachment for values and institutions carried over from the communist experience. Respondents who supported a greater role for economic central planning also tended to support other attitudes consistent with the tenets of communist values in general, and the specific policies of the previous communist regime in particular. They generally conceived of their political space as one that included the former Soviet republics of Belarus and Ukraine, supported the Soviet form of government, believed that that the Soviet Union should not have been dissolved, were against following the western example of development, and prioritized societal order over individual liberties. Likewise, individuals who supported a greater role for market forces in economic organization generally supported a political system closer to democracy, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, independence for Belarus and Ukraine, individual liberties, and a western development model.

Examination of the questions that did not correlate to the one factor solution lends further support to the substantive interpretation of a dimension organized around the lived communist experience. First, the two variables from the 1999-2000 data intended as indicators for structure of the state and political community that did not correspond to the factor—pride of Russian citizenship and belief that ethnic Russians should have additional advantages—were not part of previous Communist Party rhetoric or Marxist-Leninist ideology. Rather, they likely measure views of Russian nationalism, which might also be an aspect of one's perception of the political community, but are not necessarily components of a belief system structured around the legacy of communist values. Second, the questions measuring attitudes towards the power of federal political organs and the presidency have an almost zero correlation with the underlying factor and have communalities at near zero as well. This suggests that there is no perceptible relationship between attitudes towards these specific questions of division of political power and

other indicators in the model. To the extent that an underlying dimension about the division of political power exists, it does not appear to be connected to an underlying dimension that structures views about economic organization or individual rights. Likewise, views about individual rights and civil liberties do not appear to follow the communist values dimension. With the exception of a prioritization of societal order, attitudes towards freedom and individual rights are not part of this constraint system.

Thus, based on the information provided by these covariance structure models, Russian beliefs and opinions about a broad range of questions relating to the economy, the political community, and political order exhibit attitudinal constraint with regard to only one dimension— the inherited communist experience. If Russians did indeed have structured belief systems about these components that covaried independently of one another, then the models should have found evidence of more than one underlying component.

It is crucial to emphasize, however, that the pattern matrix derived from factor analysis is only as good as the data it is fed. The results of this analysis must be interpreted bearing in mind two possible mitigating issues. First, of the twenty-eight variables included in the analysis, nine were good measures of economic organization with a moderate to significant amount of correlation. Thus, a factor analysis in which these indicators loaded heavily on a factor dimension was not surprising.[5] In contrast, the remaining variables were perhaps poor indicators of possible underlying dimensions of political community, societal values, and political power. An analysis that included different data on attitudinal measures might produce an outcome with more dimensions.[6] Nevertheless, the similarity in results for two separate time periods suggests that these findings are not spurious or a consequence of method selection. A significant substantive conclusion can be drawn from this analysis: while it may be difficult to map the prominent domains of Russian political space as a whole, it is clear that a belief system structured around the institutional logic of the lived communist experience exists within a segment of the Russian voting-age population. This belief system can be interpreted as evidence of the persistence of Leninist ideological and cultural legacies in mass political attitudes.

In order to better understand how this belief system relates to Russian political behavior, the results of these factor analyses were used to create two indices. The variables in Table 1 with a factor pattern coefficient of .40 or higher were added together to create a Likert scale ranging from 0-1 in which each indicator was given equal weight. The variables for market reforms, owners' wealth, and privatization of land were reversed so that all variables were scaled in the same direction. As a result, a higher score on the index indicates greater attachment to the lived communist experience. Substantively, a person with a score of 0 on the index would hold positions on the economy strongly in favor of marketization, be against the reconstitution of the Soviet political community, and favor the Western developmental model. In contrast, a person with a score of 1 would hold the strongest possible position about state involvement in the economy, be against the dissolution of the USSR, and disagree with the adoption of Western approaches. Individuals with divided views on these points (for example, someone favoring a strong role for the state in the economy but against the Soviet conception of statehood) would fall somewhere between the 0-1 range. In practice, the mean score for 1995-1996 was .67, with a lower bound of .11 and an upper bound of 1. Thus, no individual in the full survey held views that were fully against the institutions or practices inherited from the communist era. The mean score increased in 1999-2000 to .72 with an empirical range of .31-.98. Thus, attitudes demonstrating a more favorable regard to the lived communist experience actually rose in the late 1990s.

Before applying these indices to the vote choice model presented in Part II of the paper, it is first useful to consider possible determinants of the communist legacy dimension. An ordinary least squares regression was estimated with each index as the dependent variable and several socioeconomic indicators as the independent variables (see Table 2).

Table 2: Socioeconomic Determinants of Communist Dimension

Variable	1995-1996		1999-2000	
	Slope coefficient (b)	(standard error)	Slope coefficient (b)	(standard error)
Age	**.17*****	.01	**.11*****	.01
Ethnic Russian	**.02****	.01	**-.02***	.01
Russian Orthodox	(-.00)	.00	(-.01)	.01
Female	**.03*****	.01	**.02*****	.01
Education	--	--	**-.10*****	.01
Illiterate	(-.02)	.01	--	--
Higher Education	**-.08*****	.01	--	--
Income	**-.06*****	.01	(-.01)	.01
Regional Capital	**-.06*****	.01	**-.04*****	.01
Wage Arrears	--	--	(.01)	.01
Unemployed	(.00)	.01	(.01)	.01
Union	**.01***	.01	**.01***	.01
CPSU Member	**.02***	.01	**.03*****	.01
Intercept	**.60*****	.01	**.75*****	.01
Adjusted R²	.26		.22	
	N=2,841		N=1,919	

For explanation of the variables and their coding, see Appendix 1. Descriptive statistics are available in Appendix 2.
(p > .1), ***p ≤ .001, ** p ≤ .01, *p ≤ .05
1995-1996 Dependent variable: mean (.67); standard deviation (.16); empirical range (.11, 1)
1999-2000 Dependent variable: mean (.72); standard deviation (.12); empirical range (.31, .98)

Several of the findings in Table 2 are particularly interesting. As expected, the greater one's age, the more likely the individual will have a higher score on the communist legacy index. Similarly, belonging to a union and previous membership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) both correspond to greater support for the persistence of pro-communist attitudes. Likewise, the greater one's education level, the less likely s/he will exhibit an attachment to beliefs organized around communist institutional logic. Additionally, residence in a regional capital and higher income also negatively correlate with a position favoring the continuation of communist-era institutions and values. These are all socioeconomic characteristics that are typically associated with citizens who endorse the Communist Party of the Russian Federation in elections, which lends further support to the interpretation that the underlying dimension uncovered here is a belief system structured around an attachment to the values and institutional logic of life under communism.

PART II: A PRELIMINARY VOTE CHOICE MODEL

Having identified and analyzed an underlying belief system related to the persistence of communist mass values in Part I, the second part of this paper will apply this observed

characteristic to a simple voting model of the 1996 and 2000 Russian presidential elections. The goal of this analysis is not to undertake a comprehensive evaluation of the determinants of Russian vote choice, but rather to understand the particular effect of the observed belief system on voting behavior.[7] Part II will begin with a brief review of the specific features and candidates in the two elections. This will be followed by an explanation of the methodology for the basic vote choice model and interpretation of the results.

Setting the Stage: 1996 and 2000 Russian Presidential Elections

Since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Russian voters have had the opportunity to make eight trips to the national election polls, voting in four parliamentary and three presidential elections. The 1996 Russian presidential election marked the first direct election for the Russian presidency since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The election occurred in two rounds. The first round, held on June 16, 1996 included a field of ten candidates. President Boris Yeltsin came in first (35.8%), followed by leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) Gennady Zyuganov (32.5%), General Aleksandr Lebed (14.7%), Grigory Yavlinsky of Yabloko (7.4%), and Vladimir Zhirinovsky of LDPR (5.8%), with the remaining candidates mustering less than 2% each. In the second round held on July 3, 1996, Yeltsin won 54.4% of the vote and Zyuganov took 40.7%.

On March 26, 2000, Russians voted in the first round of presidential elections, which—in accordance with the Russian Constitution—had been set ahead of schedule following President Boris Yeltsin's surprising resignation on New Year's Eve in 1999. Yeltsin's early departure from the Russian presidency at the end of 1999 curtailed preparations for the presidential campaign, giving a clear edge to Acting President Vladimir Putin. In spite of the rushed campaign period, a total of eleven candidates competed in the March ballot. Three candidates, Gennady Zyuganov (KPRF), Grigory Yavlinsky (Yabloko), and Vladimir Zhirinovsky (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia—LDPR), all leaders of their respective political parties and members of the State Duma,

had previously run for president in 1996 and had considerable recognition among the Russian general public. Nevertheless, Putin easily won the election in the first round, receiving 53.4% of the vote. Zyuganov came in second with 29.5%, followed by Yavlinsky with 5.9%. Zhirinovsky came in fifth place with 2.7% of the vote, edged out of fourth place by the popular governor of the Kemerovo region Aman Tuleev, who received 3.0%. The remaining candidates took less than 2% each.

*Vote Choice Model: Direct and Indirect Determinants*

For the purpose of evaluating the impact of the communist values dimension on Russian political behavior, I have elaborated a simple vote choice model. Multinomial logistic regression is used for the first round of the 1996 election and for the 2000 election, while binary logistic regression is employed for the second round of the 1996 election.[8] For the first round of the 1996 and 2000 elections, vote choice for Communist Party candidate Gennady Zyuganov is the base category. In the second round of the 1996 election, Zyuganov is coded as zero, and the winner, Boris Yeltsin, is coded as 1.

The vote choice model estimated for 1996 includes twenty independent variables and a six-category dependent variable. The sample used for estimation is the 2,078 respondents who voted in the presidential election. The dependent variable includes categories of vote choice for Yeltsin (n=700), Zyuganov (n=639), Lebed (n=346), Yavlinsky (n=174), Zhirinovsky (n=74), and a category for all votes cast for the other five candidates and against all candidates (n=145).[9] The dependent variable for the second round includes two categories: vote choice for Yeltsin (n=1,038) and Zyuganov (n=768).[10] The 2000 model includes twenty-eight independent variables and a five-category dependent variable comprising the 1,501 respondents who voted. The dependent variable includes categories of vote choice for Putin (n=881), Zyuganov (n=409), Yavlinsky (n=86), Zhirinovsky (n=21), and a category for votes for any of the other seven candidates or against all candidates (n=104).[11]

The independent variables are based on four stages in vote choice adapted from the bloc recursive voting model introduced by Warren Miller and Merrill Shanks in *The New American Voter* (1996). Miller and Shanks propose a multi-stage approach for analyzing voting behavior based on the belief that the causal ordering of individual-level vote choice occurs at different stages of time based on the proximity to the actual vote. They argue, for example, that socioeconomic indicators are generally fixed at a much earlier stage than an individual's issue preferences or evaluation of candidates. As such, these indicators are likely to affect vote choice at multiple stages. First, these indicators influence political predispositions, which will then affect issue preferences and evaluation of incumbents. In this manner, socioeconomic indicators are having an indirect effect on vote choice that is mediated through these other variables.

Figure 1 outlines the four stages of vote choice model employed in this analysis.[12]

Figure 1: Diagram of Vote Choice Stages

| **Stage 1:** Socioeconomic Characteristics |
| **Stage 2:** Perceptions of Current Conditions |
| **Stage 3:** Political Predispositions and Partisanship |
| **Stage 4:** Candidate Evaluations |
| **Vote Choice** |

The first stage includes socioeconomic characteristics that have exhibited statistical significance in other models of Russian voting behavior. The second stage involves a basic index of perceptions of current conditions. While Miller and Shanks include analysis of current conditions at a stage closer to the vote choice, as Tim Colton has argued, perceptions of a society's predicament should enter into the determination of electoral preferences at an earlier stage in a polity undergoing transition than in an established democracy (Colton 2000, 25). The third stage aims to look at political predispositions, ideology, and partisanship. This stage is operationalized by the communist legacy index created in Part I as well as several dummy variables for the primary ideological party "families" in Russian politics. The fourth stage includes different measures of candidate evaluations. For 1996 there is a question about approval of Yeltsin as president and two questions about "feeling thermometer" scores for Yeltsin and Zhirinovsky.[13] Measures for 2000 include: a question about approval of Yeltsin as president, a question about approval of Putin as prime minister, a like/dislike scale of the candidates, and simple indices of perceptions of candidates' qualities. Further description of all variables, their coding, and their descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2.

As Figure 1 seeks to demonstrate, I hypothesize that the variables in each of the respective stages have both a direct effect on vote choice, as well as a possible indirect effect that is mediated through subsequent stages of the model. Therefore, for the purposes of understanding the impact of the communist legacy on vote choice, it is constructive to consider its significance at Stages 3 and 4.

Analysis of Vote Choice Results: Communist Legacies and Candidate Characteristics

Since coefficients obtained from logistic regression are of little substantive interest on their own, Tables 3-5 provide the first differences in predicted probabilities for several statistically significant variables (p $\leq$.05) in three vote choice models that include variables from all four stages of vote choice.[14] Therefore, only the direct effects of each variable on vote choice are fully captured.

Table 3: Predicted Probabilities for Determinants of 1996 First Round Vote Choice
(Coefficients are first differences in predicted probabilities arising from a change from the minimum to the maximum of each variable)

Variables	Yeltsin	Zyuganov[†]	Lebed	Yavlinsky	Zhirinovsky
Socioeconomic					
Age	-.01	.21	-.12	-.02	--
Russian Orthodox	--	--	--	.01	--
Income	.06	-.09	.06	.01	--
Regional Capital	.11	-.12	.01	.00	--
Union	-.06	.06	--	--	--
Political Predispositions					
Communist Index	**-.46**	**.51**	**.04**	**-.05**	**-.02**
Socialist	-.23	.36	-.06	-.02	-.02
Centrist	.12	-.07	--	--	--
Liberal	.11	-.11	--	.03	--
Nationalist	--	--	.11	--	--
Candidate Evaluations					
Yeltsin Approval	.33	-.23	--	--	--
Yeltsin Thermometer	.28	-.11	--	--	--
Zhirinovsky Thermometer	-.13	.14	-.13	-.03	.17
Constant					
McFadden's R^2	.15				
Count R^2	.49				

[†] Predicted probabilities for Zyuganov use Yeltsin as the base. N=2,078

While there is much of substantive interest in this table, the predicted probability of the index of attachment to the communist experience is of primary relevance to the present analysis. The first round of the 1996 election suggests that the hypothesized belief system played an important role in vote choice between Yeltsin and Zyuganov. Voters with a maximum score on this factor were 51 percentage points more likely to vote for Zyuganov and 46 percentage points less likely to vote for Yeltsin. No other factor in any of the decision stages exhibits as substantial a difference in predicting vote choice. *Ceteris paribus,* moving from the minimum to the maximum on the index of communist values had a greater impact on voting for Zyuganov than did a similar move on any socioeconomic characteristic or with regard to candidate evaluations.

Yet, in practice, it is unlikely that such a change from the absolute minimum to the absolute maximum is representative of any individuals in this dataset. An alternate measure for considering the impact of the communist legacy index on vote choice is to evaluate movement along the index from one half a standard deviation below the mean value to one half a standard

deviation above the mean value while holding all other variables constant at their means. Using this measure we see a decrease of 10 percentage points in the probability of voting for Yeltsin and an increase of 12 percentage points in the probability of voting for Zyuganov. If we take this same measure and apply it to age, the difference in predicted probability that results from moving from the 31-40 age range to the 51-60 age range is zero in vote choice for Yeltsin and is only 6 percentage points for Zyuganov. Therefore, even the observation of more modest change in the communist legacy index appears to have a greater impact on predicted probability of vote choice than any socioeconomic characteristic except for urbanization, which is at a comparable level.

The impact of the communist values index on the other vote choices appears dwarfed in comparison to the Yeltsin-Zyuganov pairing, though it is not insignificant. Aside from the Zhirinovsky feeling thermometer score, the communist values index is the only variable found to be statistically significant across all five categories of the dependent variable. While it is negatively correlated with both Yavlinsky and Zhirinovsky, curiously those citizens with a higher score on the index were slightly more likely to vote for Lebed instead of the Communist Party candidate Zyuganov.

The second round of the 1996 election, in which Yeltsin and Zyuganov participated in a runoff, displayed similar results. While age, income, urbanization, and union membership were the only socioeconomic characteristics to display statistical significance, their overall impact on predicting vote choice is dwarfed by the communist values index. An individual with the highest score on the communist legacy index is 60 percentage points less likely to vote for Yeltsin than someone with no attachment to these values. This stands in stark contrast to the effect of socialist partisanship: a member of a socialist party was only 37 points less likely to vote for Yeltsin. If we evaluate change in predicted probabilities of the more modest difference of one half a standard deviation below the mean to one half a standard deviation above the mean, we see that voters making this change were 14 percentage points less likely to vote for Yeltsin. An analogous movement in age had less of an effect: moving from the 31-40 age range to the 51-60 age range

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reduced the likelihood of voting for Yeltsin by 5 percentage points. Thus, even if we are to look at changes that are more moderate than moving from the minimum to the maximum of a variable, we see that one's attachment to communist-era values tends to result in a greater probability of influencing one's vote choice than a similar degree of change on other variables that exist on a continuum.

Table 4: Predicted Probabilities for Determinants of 1996 Second Round Vote Choice
(Coefficients are first differences calculated from logistic regression; Vote for Zyuganov=0 and Vote for Yeltsin=1)

Variable	First Difference
Socioeconomic	
Age	-.15
Income	.11
Regional Capital	.18
Union	-.06
Political Predispositions	
Communist Index	**-.60**
Socialist Partisan	-.37
Centrist Partisan	.13
Liberal Partisan	.14
Candidate Evaluations	
Yeltsin Approval	.26
Yeltsin Thermometer	.25
Zhirinovsky Thermometer	-.19

N=1,806

Table 5: Predicted Probabilities for Determinants of 1999-2000 Presidential Vote
(Coefficients are first differences in predicted probabilities arising from a change from the minimum to the maximum of each variable)*

Variables	Putin	Zyuganov[†]
Socioeconomic		
Ethnic Russian	-.10	.08
Education	.13	-.16
Unemployed	.08	-.08
Current Conditions	.11	-.10
Political Predispositions		
Communist Index	**(.17)**	**(.12)**
Socialist Partisan	-.17	.19
Government Partisan	.16	-.13
Candidate Evaluations		
Yeltsin Approval	.18	-.15
Putin Approval	.41	-.36
Putin Scale	.45	-.25
Zyuganov Scale	-.56	.60
Yavlinsky Scale	--	--
Zyuganov Qualities	-.20	.17

[†] Statistical significance for Zyuganov uses Putin as the base. N=1,501
* Variables for current conditions and unemployment were statistically significant in the model estimated using five multiply imputed data sets. The predicted probabilities included here are calculated from the singly imputed data set.

In contrast to the results of the 1996 election, the communist legacy index is not among the statistically significant variables influencing vote choice for the top two finishers of the 2000 presidential election, Vladimir Putin and Gennady Zyuganov. It appears, rather, that candidate evaluations play a more significant role in determining vote choice in 2000. This could be the result of a variety of factors. First, it is very plausible that as Russia moves further away from its Soviet past, the strength of attachments to beliefs established through socialization under a communist regime decline as well. This is somewhat curious, however, considering that the mean level of the communist legacy index was actually higher in the 1999-2000 sample than among the 1995-1996 respondents. Second, perhaps the perceived ideological distance between Putin and Zyuganov in 2000 was not as significant as that between Yeltsin and Zyuganov in 1996. Having achieved a reputation as a Soviet-style technocrat reminiscent of Brezhnev, it is possible that those individuals with a strong attachment to the values and institutions of life under communism perceived Putin as a viable option for representing those values. If so, then it is logical that variables *other* than scoring on the communist index would determine a vote choice between Zyuganov and Putin. Lastly, as mentioned in Part I, the belief system organized around the persistence of communist-era values appears to be present within only a fraction of the Russian mass public—a fraction that is likely concentrated in an older population that is slowly undergoing cohort replacement.

As mentioned above, Tables 3-5 show only the direct results of the communist legacy belief system. By evaluating vote choice as a series of stages, however, it is possible to consider the indirect effects as well as the direct effects of particular factors. In particular, one would expect that the belief system identified in Part I of this paper, which I have placed in Stage 3 of the vote choice model, might influence how individuals perceive candidates—both in terms of retrospective and prospective evaluations. Table 6 shows the predicted probabilities of the communist values index at Stage 3 of the vote choice models in which variables for candidate evaluations are excluded, displaying both first differences and the differences of moving from one half a standard deviation below the mean to one half standard deviation above:

Table 6: Indirect Effects of Communist Values Belief System

Election	Yeltsin	Zyuganov	Lebed	Yavlinsky	Zhirinovsky
1996 Round 1 (1st differences in predicted prob.)	-.55	.55	.05	-.04	.00
(+-stan. dev./2)	-.12	.13	.00	-.01	.00
1996 Round 2 (1st differences in predicted prob.)	-.66	--	--	--	--
(+-stan. dev./2)	-.16				
	Putin	Zyuganov	--	Yavlinsky	Zhirinovsky
1996 Round 2 (1st differences in predicted prob.)	-.07	.34		-.03	(.00)*
(+-stan. dev./2)	-.04	.07	--	-.00	(.07)

*The index variable was not statistically significant for the Zhirinovsky vote choice in 2000.

The results of the communist legacy index exhibit substantial indirect influence as well as direct effect on vote choice. The direct effects in 1996 appear to be particularly strong, with only a few percentage points from the indirect effects of the Stage 3 model being absorbed into Stage 4 variables. The difference between direct and indirect effects in 2000 is more pronounced. While the communist values index is a statistically insignificant variable in the full four-stage model, positing no direct effects on vote choice, it appears to have some indirect effects that are visible at Stage 3. As expected, those with a higher score on this index are less likely to vote for Putin and more likely to vote for Zyuganov. The significance of the effect for vote choice for Zyuganov is particularly strong. *Ceteris paribus*, an individual with a higher regard for the values and institutions of the communist experience was .07 percentage points more likely to vote for Zyuganov. The only other variable in Stage 3 that exhibited a stronger effect was belonging to a socialist or pro-government party. Therefore, it appears that while the direct effects of the belief system are muted in the final vote decision, positioning on this dimension likely affected candidate evaluations, which appear to have played the most substantial role in vote choice.

CONCLUSION: PRESENT, BUT WEAKENING LEGACY

To summarize the empirical results of this paper, in Part I principal components and factor analyses were conducted in search of underlying attitudinal domains in Russian political beliefs.

These covariance structure models provided a one-dimensional solution lending support to the existence of an attitudinal belief system structured along the values and institutional logic inherited from the communist experience. In order to operationalize this legacy, I constructed two indices from the indicators that exhibited a strong correlation to the underlying factor. Relationships between the indices and several socioeconomic indicators were analyzed through an ordinary least squares regression estimation, yielding support to the hypothesis that a belief system capturing the legacies of lived communism was present within particular segments of the population.

Part II of the analysis tested the communist legacy index in a simple vote choice model that examined the 1996 and 2000 Russian presidential elections. The results suggest that voters with a high score on the index were much more likely to vote for the Communist Party candidate, Gennady Zyuganov. For voters deciding among other alternatives, however, the communist legacy scale had little correlation with vote choice.[15]

On the surface, the impact of the communist legacy index on vote choice appears intuitive. Similarly, most theoretical suppositions about the importance of various Leninist legacies on postcommunist outcomes seem logical on a conceptual level. The greater challenge is demonstrating their effect empirically. In evaluating the models presented here, it is necessary to bear in mind that most hypotheses of the determinants of communist partisanship and support for communist candidates are based on socioeconomic indicators, such as level of education and urbanization, as well as negative responses to current conditions—not underlying political predispositions. The empirical results presented in both Part I and Part II suggest, rather, that attachment to values acquired through socialization under the Soviet system may in fact serve as a form of ideological constraint among a segment of Russian voters. This belief system is evidence of the persistence of Leninist ideological and cultural legacies in mass public opinion.

Furthermore, the voting behavior of individuals who exhibited this belief system in the 1990s appears to have been influenced more by these beliefs than by socioeconomic indicators. These results suggest that while socioeconomic indicators did have a direct effect on vote choice

for Zyuganov in 1996 and 2000, these indicators also had an indirect effect that was mediated through the communist legacy belief system. Likewise, even though the direct effects of this belief system diminished by the 2000 election—lending support to the assertion that the Leninist legacy on postcommunist attitudes is on the decline—attachment to communist era values continued to display substantial indirect effects at earlier stages in the vote choice decision.

In seeking to understand how Leninist ideological and cultural legacies have affected mass politics in Russia, this inquiry has found that the most visible form of structured beliefs in Russian political space appears to be an underlying dimension organized along an attachment to the values and institutional logic of the communist experience. This dimension, however, represents only part of the contour of Russian mass beliefs. It is clear that not all questions relating to state structure, political power, and individual rights and liberties fall along this communist values dimension. Other attitudes might align along different dimensions that were not uncovered in this analysis. Yet, it is worth emphasizing that those indicators that did not correspond with the communist values dimension did not appear to exhibit any patterns suggesting an alternate form of structured ideological constraint.

Additionally, while the communist legacy belief system is the only visible form of ideological constraint among the sample of the Russian voting-age population surveyed in the 1999-2000 RNES, it is not necessarily the universal belief system for all Russians. The dimension uncovered here explained less than 25% of the overall variance in responses to the questions included in the factor analysis. There is much variance in mass beliefs that is left unaccounted for. While some Russians appear to exhibit a belief system structured along the institutional logic of communism, for others this belief system does not appear to play an influential role. Thus, it seems logical that not all Russians structure their political beliefs along this domain. In fact, those that do exhibit this belief system are probably clustered within a specific demographic that also correlates with increasing age and rural communities, although this has yet to be empirically demonstrated.

The finding of a mass belief system in Russia that is representative of the legacies of having lived under communism has significant implications for our understanding of Russian mass politics and the democratization of postcommunist regimes. First, it raises several questions about the role of ideological and cultural legacies carried over from life under the previous regime on postcommunist politics. How do these artifacts, which continue to shape attitudes and opinions post regime change, affect a democratizing regime's ability to establish and maintain effective, representative institutions? While one would expect that the strength of this belief system would diminish over time as the era of lived communism fades into the deeper past—an expectation confirmed by the analysis of the 2000 presidential election presented here—does the persistence of this attachment in the early years after regime change present particular challenges? Given the importance that scholars have credited to "lock-in" effects in the early years of postcommunist institutional reforms (Fish 1999), it is worthwhile to consider whether attachments to this belief system in the early years might have shaped subsequent trajectories of both mass ideology and elite rhetoric.

Lastly, while it appears that the significance of the communism legacy belief system is declining in its significance as a predictor of vote choice, it is necessary to note that no other mass belief system appears to have developed to take its place. After almost a decade of more open political discussion and contested elections, the most visible structure in Russian mass politics continued to be framed in terms of the discourse propagated by the previous regime. Perhaps the antecedent regimes in postcommunist cases affect latter-day political beliefs and competition more deeply than previously thought. If so, Leninist legacies could have consequences for democratization and regime consolidation that extend beyond their impact on institutional and elite-level variables to include their influence on mass attitudes and behaviors as well.

APPENDIX 1: INDEX OF VARIABLES

Socioeconomic Characteristics
Age: Recoded in decades: 18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, 70 and up;
Ethnic Russian: Dummy variable, 1=identifies as ethnic Russian, 0=identifies as other nationality;
Russian Orthodox: Dummy variable, 1=identifies with Russian Orthodox religious affiliation, 0=identifies with other religious affiliation or no religious affiliation;
Female: Dummy variable, 1=female, 0=male;
Illit: Dummy variable, 1=highest level of education is four years of elementary school or less, 0=having completed more than four years of elementary school (1995-1996 only);
Higher Education: Dummy variable, 1=having completed university-level education, 0=not having a university education (1995-1996 only);
Education: Six point index coded 0-1, 0=without education, illiterate, .2=elementary education, .4=incomplete secondary education, .6=secondary education, .8=specialized secondary education or incomplete higher education, 1=higher education or graduate degree (1999-2000);
Income: Total family monthly income in rubles, divided into five groups that approximate quintiles of the sample. For 1995-1996, 0=0-250,000, .25=251,000-450,000, .50=451,000-750,000, .75=751,000-975,000, 1= >976,000); For 1999-2000, 0=0-2,500, .25=2,501-5,000, .50=5,100-7,500, .75=7,501-10,000, 1= >10,000.[16]
Regional Capital: Dummy variable, 1=resides in a provincial capital city, 0=lives elsewhere;
Wage Arrears: Dummy variable, 1=has experienced wage arrears since May 1999 (1999-2000 only);
Unemployed: Dummy variable: 1) For 1995-1996, 1=was forced to take involuntary unpaid leave in past twelve months; 2) For 1999-2000, 1=has been unemployed at some point in last twelve months;
Union: Dummy variable, 1=union member;
CPSU Member: Dummy variable, 1=was previously a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union;

Current Conditions and Political Predispositions
Current Conditions: Index comprised of average score to three questions about the state of the Russian economy, whether or not the national economy has improved in the past twelve months, and how the family situation of the individual has changed in the past twelve months. Variable is coded 0-1 with 0 representing the greatest dissatisfaction with current conditions (perceives worsening of national and personal economic circumstances) and 1 representing greatest satisfaction (perceives improvement of national and personal economic circumstances);
Socialist Partisan: Dummy variable, 1) For 1995-1996, 1=identification with the Communist Party of Russian Federation, Communists for the Soviet Union, Agrarian Party of Russia, Power to the People, 0=identification with another political party family or no partisanship; 2) For 1999-2000, 1=member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), Agrarian Party, Stalinist bloc, Pensioners Party, smaller communist and patriotic splinter parties, or any iteration of "Communist," 0=member of another political party family or no partisanship;
Government Partisan: Dummy variable, 1=identification with Yedinstvo, Our Home is Russia, or any iteration of "Putin's party" or "Shoigu's party," 0= member of another political party family or no partisanship (1999-2000 only);

Centrist Partisan: Dummy variable: 1) For 1995-1996, 1=identification with Women of Russia, Employees' Self-Management Party, Union of Labor, Ecological Party of Russia (KEDR), Rybkin Bloc, My Fatherland, Transformation of the Fatherland, For the Motherland, Stable Russia, Inter-ethnic Union; 0=identification with another political party or no partisan identification; 2) For 1999-2000, 1=identification with Fatherland-All Russia, Women of Russian, Women in Defense of the Motherland, Nikolaev/Fedorov bloc, KEDR, any iteration of "Luzhkov's party" or "Primakov's party," 0=identification with another political party or no partisan identification;

Liberal Partisan: Dummy variable: 1) For 1995-1996, 1=identification with Yabloko, Russia's Democratic Choice, Forward Russia, Pamfilova-Gurov-Lysenko Bloc, Common Cause, Beer Lovers' Party, Party of Russian Unity and Accord, Social Democrats, Party of Economic Freedom, Bloc of Independents, Federal-Democratic Movement, Eighty-nine Regions Bloc, 0=identification with another political party or no partisan identification; 2) For 1999-2000 1=identification with Yabloko, the Union of Right Forces (SPS), the Green Party, or any identification of partisanship with the party of a liberal leader, 0=member of another political party family or no partisanship;

Nationalist Partisan: Dummy variable: 1) For 1995-1996, 1=identification with the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Congress of Russian Communities, Derzhava, Govorukhin Bloc, National-Republican Party, Russian All-People's Movement; 0=identification with another political party or no partisan identification; 2) For 1999-2000, 1=identification with the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), the Zhirinovsky Bloc, SPAS, Russian National Unity, smaller nationalist parties, or any iteration of "Zhirinovsky's party," 0=member of another political party family or no partisanship;

Candidate Evaluation
1995-1996
Yeltsin Approval: Approval of Yeltsin's performance as president, 0=fully disapprove, 1=fully approve;
Yeltsin and Zhirinovsky Feeling Thermometers: Rating respondent feeling to candidate on scale of 0-100, recoded to 0-1;
1999-2000
Putin Approval: Approval of Putin's performance as prime minister, 0=fully disapprove, 1=fully approve;
Putin, Zyuganov, Yavlinsky, and Zhirinovsky Scales: Measures like/dislike of candidate on a 0=10 scale, 0=strongly dislike, 10=strongly like;
Putin, Zyuganov, Yavlinsky, and Zhirinovsky Qualities: Index comprised of average score to three questions in agreement/disagreement about a candidate's intelligence, leadership ability, and honesty and trustworthiness. Respondents answered in a range from "yes, probably yes, probably no, no." Variable is coded 0-1.

Missing data on socioeconomic characteristics was minimal and thus was recoded to the mean group (The one exception is the variable for having been sent on forced employment leave in the 1995-1996 dataset. Multiple imputation was employed to replace missing values on this variable). Missing data on several attitudinal variables was replaced by using multiple imputation. Variables with data missing from 15% or more of the respondents were excluded from the analysis. The 1999-2000 model was also estimated with missing data recoded to mean and median values. The substantive results of both models are essentially the same.

APPENDIX 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Descriptive Statistics: 1995-1996 Variables

Variables	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Age	47.77	16.55	19	94
Income	879,581	1,223,117	0	3.80e+07
Current Conditions Index	.22	.17	0	.92
Communist Index	.67	.16	.11	1
Yeltsin Approval	.28	.24	0	1
Yeltsin Thermometer	2.55	2.74	0	10
Zhirinovsky Thermometer	1.95	2.93	0	10
Dichotomous Variables	*Percentage Positive*			
Ethnic Russian	86.10			
Russian Orthodox	76.17			
Female	59.66			
Illiterate	4.19			
Higher Education	16.75			
Regional Capital	40.94			
Unemployed	8.87			
Union	38.12			
CPSU Member	13.20			
Socialist	12.43			
Centrist	5.88			
Liberal	5.28			
Nationalist	4.68			

Descriptive Statistics: 1999-2000 Variables

Variables	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Age	49.30	17.28	18	99
Income	1,745	2,711	0	50,000
Current Conditions Index	.33	.16	0	.75
Communist Index	.72	.12	.31	.98
Yeltsin Approval	.30	.22	0	1
Putin Approval	.70	.20	0	1
Putin Scale	.73	.27	0	1
Zyuganov Scale	.46	.37	0	1
Yavlinsky Scale	.42	.29	0	1
Zhirinovsky Scale	.23	.27	0	1
Putin Qualities	.83	.19	0	1
Zyuganov Qualities	.66	.28	0	1
Yavlinsky Qualities	.58	.27	0	1
Zhirinovsky Qualities	.43	.29	0	1
Dichotomous Variables	*Percentage Positive*	*Modal Group*		
Ethnic Russian	84.58			
Russian Orthodox	79.21			
Female	64.00			
Education		Specialized Secondary/ Incomplete higher (36.27%)		
Regional Capital	42.57			
Wage Arrears	33.46			
Unemployed	18.45			
Union	31.21			
CPSU Member	12.98			
Socialist Partisan	18.86			
Government Partisan	5.68			
Centrist Partisan	6.83			
Liberal Partisan	8.55			
Nationalist Partisan	3.28			

APPENDIX 3: NOTES ON COVARIANCE STRUCTURE MODELS

Due to the complex calculations involved in covariance structure modeling, statistical software for conducting principal components and factor analyses do not support the use of multiply imputed datasets. Therefore, the principal components analyses and factor analyses were conducted with listwise deletion of missing variables. The principal components and factor analyses were repeated on data sets created from single imputation on all attitudinal variables, and while the coefficients exhibited some minor fluctuation, the overall pattern is consistent with the results presented here.

Principal Components Analysis
1995-1996
The principal components analysis yielded six components with an eigenvalue > 1. The eigenvalue of the first component = 4.32 with communality of .22. The eigenvalue of the second component = 1.21 and added only .06 to the cumulative variance. The scree plot exhibited a strong drop-off after the first component.

1999-2000
The principal components analysis yielded eight components with an eigenvalue > 1. The eigenvalue of the first component = 4.94 with communality of .20. The next component had an eigenvalue = 1.45, adding only .06 to the cumulative variance. The scree plot exhibited a strong drop-off after the first component.

Factor Analyses
The factor analyses presented here were generated from the use of maximum likelihood estimation. The model was also estimated using iterated principal factoring, yielding the same substantive result.

APPENDIX 4: NOTES ON VOTE CHOICE MODELS

The vote choice models were estimated three ways using different techniques for missing values: listwise deletion, a single imputation of chained equations, and multiple imputation of chained equations (in both instances the ICE function in Stata9 was employed). Minor differences were observed across the three models, none of which altered the substantive significance of the results. Since more than half of the sample was lost due to missing data, the models presented here employed multiply imputation for calculating missing data. Due to limitations in calculating postestimation commands with indices comprised of imputed data, the data reported in the paper come from the single imputation data.

1996 First Round Vote Choice
(Multinomial logit regression coefficients)

Variables	Yeltsin	Lebed	Yavlinsky	Zhirinovsky
Socioeconomic				
Age	-.73**	-1.31***	-1.40***	(-.66)
Ethnic Russian	(.24)	(.27)	(.31)	(.31)
Russian Orthodox	(.10)	(.31)	.51*	(.51)
Female	(.20)	(.01)	(-.05)	(-.18)
Illiterate	(.28)	(-.03)	(--)	(-.30)
Higher Education	(.28)	(.20)	(.35)	(-1.08)
Income	.49*	.59**	.60*	(-.09)
Regional Capital	.74***	.51**	.48*	(.17)
Unemployed	(-.06)	(.30)	(.18)	(-.17)
Union	-.38**	(-.21)	(-.19)	(-.08)
CPSU Member	(-.09)	(-.02)	(.19)	(-.49)
Current Conditions	(.54)	(-.35)	(.30)	(1.10)
Political Predispositions				
Communist Index	-4.28***	-2.50***	-4.83***	-3.95***
Socialist	-1.75***	-1.26***	-1.93***	-2.21**
Centrist	.57*	(-.03)	(-.58)	(.11)
Liberal	.72*	(.44)	1.21**	(1.01)
Nationalist	(.14)	.67*	(-.11)	(.32)
Candidate Evaluations				
Yeltsin Approval	1.77***	(.74)	(.79)	(.21)
Yeltsin Thermometer	.08*	(.00)	(-.03)	(-.09)
Zhirinovsky Thermometer	-.05*	-.06**	-.09**	.23***
McFadden's R²	.15			
Count R²	.49			

Vote for Zyuganov is the base category. N=2,078
(p > .1) *p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001

1996 Second Round Vote Choice

(Coefficients are from logistic regression; Vote for Zyuganov=0 and Vote for Yeltsin=1)

Variable	Coefficient
Socioeconomic	
Age	-.64*
Ethnic Russian	(-.25)
Russian Orthodox	(.06)
Female	(.19)
Illiterate	(-.18)
Higher Education	(-.02)
Income	.44*
Regional Capital	.76***
Unemployed	(.18)
Union	-.24*
CPSU Member	(-.14)
Current Conditions	(.67)
Political Predispositions	
Communist Index	-3.67***
Socialist Partisan	-1.56***
Centrist Partisan	.58*
Liberal Partisan	.63*
Nationalist Partisan	(-.10)
Candidate Evaluations	
Yeltsin Approval	1.18***
Yeltsin Thermometer	.07*
Zhirinovsky Thermometer	-.05*
McFadden's R^2	.25
Count R^2	.74

N=1,806

(p > .1) *p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001

1999-2000 Presidential Vote

(Multinomial logit regression coefficients)

Variables	Putin	Yavlinsky	Zhirinovsky
Socioeconomic			
Age	(.54)	(.75)	(-1.44)
Ethnic Russian	-.66**	(-.51)	(.86)
Russian Orthodox	(-.32)	-.79*	(-1.10)
Female	(.16)	(-.35)	(-.59)
Education	.92*	3.04***	(-2.17)
Income	(.01)	(.58)	(.42)
Regional Capital	(.03)	(.24)	(.37)
Wage Arrears	(-.20)	(-.27)	(.50)
Unemployed	.59**	(.70)	(1.10)
Union	(.16)	(-.10)	(-.06)
CPSU Member	(.01)	-1.38*	(.67)
Current Conditions	(.89)	(1.03)	(.43)
Political Predispositions			
Communist Index	(-.78)	-4.07**	(-.13)
Socialist Partisan	-1.03***	-2.74**	(-.21)
Government Partisan	1.34*	(-29.52)	(-29.07)
Centrist Partisan	(.18)	(.90)	(-29.32)
Liberal Partisan	(.12)	(.69)	(1.14)
Nationalist Partisan	(.36)	(-.33)	3.05***
Candidate Evaluations			
Yeltsin Approval	1.16**	(.32)	(.83)
Putin Approval	2.12***	(-.41)	(2.42)
Putin Scale	1.49***	(-.41)	(-1.44)
Zyuganov Scale	-2.56***	-3.23***	(-1.58)
Yavlinsky Scale	(.19)	3.07***	(-1.89)
Zhirinovsky Scale	(-.43)	(.12)	(2.17)
Putin Qualities	(.42)	(-.60)	(1.85)
Zyuganov Qualities	-1.35***	(-.41)	(-1.60)
Yavlinsky Qualities	(-.00)	2.39**	(.67)
Zhirinovsky Qualities	(.22)	(-.43)	(1.46)
McFadden's R²	.32		
Count R²	.73		

Vote for Zyuganov is the base category. N=1,501
(p > .1) *p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001

NOTES

[1] In 1993, 1995, 1999, and 2003 one-half of the 450-seat State Duma was elected through proportional representation and one-half through single-member districts. Starting in 2007 all seats will be elected through proportional representation.

[2] The 1995-1996 RNES is available in the data holdings of the Interuniversity Consortium for Social and Political Research (http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/). The raw data file of the 1999-2000 RNES was generously provided to me by Timothy Colton, the principle investigator of the study, which was financed by the National Science Foundation and the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research. To my knowledge, this data has yet to be publicly archived.

[3] While many questions were repeated in both surveys, several questions appear only in one survey. In some instances, insufficient response rates in one survey year necessitated removing the variable from consideration.

[4] For more detail, see Appendix 3.

[5] A principle components analysis and subsequent factor analysis of the economic indicators alone produced a similar result to the model explored in this paper.

[6] In developing the model presented in this paper, approximately forty different variables were examined. In some instances, principal components analysis suggest two or three dimension models, but upon estimating these factor solutions it was clear that the dimensions captured were related to the methodological structure of the question design or to the lack of variation in the responses and thus were not capturing an underlying substantive dimension.

[7] For comprehensive accounts of Russian vote choice in these elections, see Timothy J. Colton, *Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the New Russia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000) and Timothy J. Colton and Michael McFaul. *Popular Choice and Managed Democracy: The Russian Elections of 1999 and 2000* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.

[8] For more information on maximum likelihood estimation using binary and multinomial logit, see J. Scott Long, *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997).

[9] This category will not be discussed in the analysis of the results due to minimal substantive interest.

[10] The 135 respondents who voted against both candidates are excluded from the analysis.

[11] In test analyses of single independent variables on a six category dependent variable that included a category for fourth place finisher Aman Tuleev, no independent variables proved statistically significant. For this reason, Tuleev is included in the fifth category, which will not be analyzed here due to minimal substantive interest. Additionally, the small number of respondents voting for Zhirinovsky provides little variation on the dependent variable and thus limits the statistical power of the results for this category.

[12] For a similar application of the Miller and Shanks model to the Russian data, see also Colton (2000).

[13] Feeling thermometer scores were other candidates were excluded due to extensive missing data.

[14] Regression coefficients for the full models can be found in Appendix 4.

[15] This may be in part due to the limited validity of estimates obtained by multinomial logit. The assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives may not fully reflect the reality of the election scenario in which voters are selecting from a variety of candidates and not only the two pairings analyzed in each category of the dependent variable.

[16] The Russian ruble was deflated effective January 1998.

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