Why We Hate You: The Passions of National Identity and Ethnic Violence

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Emotions have been running high in the last two years. We can date this current age of fear and anger, anxiety and rage, from the tragic events of September 11, 2001. A new level of violence and retaliation has been justified by the outrageous acts of mass terrorism against “us” by “them.” Commercial airliners were turned into missiles; suicide bombers became the chosen means of resistance by militant Palestinians in Israel, separatist Chechens in Russia, and opponents of the American occupation of Iraq. The sense of threat has heightened so much that the dropping of 5000 pound bombs in Afghanistan, firing from helicopter gun ships into crowded refugee camps in Palestine and the use of narcotic gas against one’s own citizens in Russia has become routine, acceptable, and hardly open to question. As we sit here today the government of the United States is attempting to pacify (“stabilize”) Iraq, which it invaded without a clear casus belli or the sanction of the United Nations after declaring it an imminent international menace. Governments, including our own, have assassinated those they consider threats to their security, and detain opponents indefinitely without indicting them.

There appears to be a loss of innocence since September 11th, a realization that the rest of the world is not as far away as we used to think, a greater appreciation of danger and threat from forces that we little understand, and an alarm at the degree of hostility, even hatred, that people in other parts of the globe feel toward Americans. The conservative commentator George Will has called it the end of America’s “holiday from history.”

The first and most palpable effect of 9/11 is this heightened fear and insecurity, powerful emotions that both motivate and justify certain kinds of actions, while at the same time clouding our reason. Governments, like people, are affected by such emotional states and sometimes cynically manipulate them to further their own ambitions and interests. The very language and meanings that have been given to the events of September 11th have determined our responses, made certain policies possible, and in other ways limited our options. The prevalent construction of the security environment in which the United States finds itself as a war against global terrorism elevates the sense of insecurity. Words like “vigilance” are routinely employed in our undeclared war. (This is a particular favorite of mine, since it was widely used in the 1930s in the
Soviet Union against those whom Stalin called “terrorists.”) Domestically, the need to feel secure has diminished our democracy in some ways and given new opportunities for the authoritarian impulses of certain officials. New military tribunals have been set up, and America once again has its own concentration camps, this time in Guantanamo Bay, for people captured in war but not classified as prisoners of war. Perhaps the most frightening sign of the hysteria that can be produced by fear was the recent debate in the United States over whether it is justified to use torture on prisoners who might have information that could prevent further terrorist attacks.

Strong feelings are involved in both the grievances that have led to terrorism and war, the killing of innocents and the taking of revenge, but also in the identification of foes and the misunderstanding that allows people to make others aliens, non-humans to be eliminated. Emotions arise from and contribute to perceptions of the world that may, in fact, be incomprehensible. Emotion, then, is even more visibly an integral part of politics than usual and needs to be taken seriously.

In the academy, however, we tend to shy away from emotion—understandably perhaps. We are about reason, rational calculation, and cognition—while emotion or passion is too amorphous, too vague, too subject to, well, emotions—to be an appropriate topic for investigation. In so far as emotion is researched, it is the prerogative of psychologists, while for many of the rest of us in social science, at least in recent decades, rationality and an objective sense of interest seem to be enough to explain human motivation and action. Few historians, political scientists, anthropologists, or sociologists have waded into the dark waters of affect, though this has clearly been changing recently. A number of scholars have gone back to the classics to investigate what had always been of concern to the great political theorists, i.e., the passions; and others have begun to look at emotions as they affect collective action, contentious politics, social movements, ethnicity and nationalism. And we see the beginnings of a history of the emotions as well.1

Certainly a partial explanation for the academic flight from emotion comes from dissatisfaction, even embarrassment, with the way emotions have been used to explain social protest in
the past. Earlier thinking by social scientists about emotions and collective behavior conceived of mass activity as irrational. Certainly the most influential thinker of that era about mass psychology was the nineteenth-century French sociologist Gustave Le Bon (1841–1931), who saw individuals as mad, subject to demagogues, and susceptible to violence when brought together in a crowd. The crowd became a mob, *un âme collective*, that subsumed the individual, simplified and guided thoughts and actions, and made actors capable of murder and other crimes, or, conversely, self-sacrifice inconceivable to the individual alone. Le Bon, however, was later tainted with the brush of racism, and he also deployed the irrationality of the masses as a powerful argument against democracy. In his explanation, changes in emotions, rather than in thought (as in Weber) or social life (as in Marx), were the key to historical transformations. But for Le Bon non-rational was equated with irrational, as if emotion and reason always operated at cross-purposes.

A hundred years later the prominent scholar of collective behavior, Neil Smelser, claimed that the student protests of the 1960s were best understood as an Oedipal rebellion of sons against their fathers. Protestors were seen as social deviants who undermined social order. But in time social historians, like Georges Rudé and Eric J. Hobsbawm, reconceived of the “mob” as a “crowd” and proposed that one could study the crowd as a reasonable actor with clear motivations. Other social scientists of the resource mobilization school, sympathetic to the protestors, sharply separated emotions from rationality, and largely ignored the former. Ironically, both social historians and social movement theory contributed to the disappearance of emotions as an appropriate subject of study.

In this paper I argue something that should be obvious, though not always for political scientists: Emotions are key to human motivation. Indeed, we would not be human without them. They are the stimulus to action; they are fundamental to self-identification, to thinking about who “we” are and who the “other” is; they are involved in the social bonds that make groups, even whole societies, or nations, possible. And they are, therefore, powerful tools to explain why people do what they do politically. My focus will be on national identity, and I will attempt to
show how a consideration of emotions contributes to the existing causal theories of ethnic violence.4

Let me begin with a discussion of two concepts that have for some time now intrigued, even agitated, scholars: identity and the nation.

Since that banner year, 1983, when the three canonical texts rethinking the category “nation” appeared (I have in mind Anderson, Gellner, and Hobsbawm and Ranger), historians and theorists of nationalism have demonstrated that the signifier “nation,” like those of class and race, acquired its own style of imagination, becoming increasingly over time about deep, essential differences between nations and fixed, continuous cores within them—whether such distinctions or harmonies existed or not.5 Certain “objective” criteria of nation—language most importantly—provided the clear markers of boundaries, inclusion and exclusion. Even though the first modern nations, France and the new “Creole” states in South and North America, imagined themselves as innovations in human history, within a few decades the nation was nearly universally reconstructed as ancient and primordial, continuous and ascending, moving inexorably toward self-consciousness and statehood. As Etienne Balibar describes the self-description of nationalism, “The illusion is twofold. It consists in believing that the generations which succeed one another over centuries on a reasonably stable territory, under a reasonably univocal designation, have handed down to each other an invariant substance. And it consists in believing that the process of development from which we select aspects retrospectively, so as to see ourselves as the culmination of that process, was the only one possible, that is, it represented a destiny.”6

Since the mid-nineteenth century national identity construction has most powerfully been about a single unitary identity, not a multiplicity of self-understandings, embedded in a long history and attached to a specific territory. The power of that identity lay within a broad transnational discourse of the nation, which justified both territorial possession and statehood to those with prior and exclusive claims based on language, culture, or race. As a new form of political legitimation, the nation brought culture together with a strong political claim to self-rule that ultimately found its sanction in a story about the past. The practice of finding deep ancestors
and long genealogies certainly goes back to earlier forms of political legitimation, at least to the Bible if not even earlier, in the story of kings, sons gaining power by virtue of the connection to fathers.

In a world of competitors for territory and political power, such genealogical or primordial assertions were a practical, even necessary, solution to the difficulty of establishing prior or exclusive claims to a piece of the world’s real estate. Frank recognition of the actual fabrication of the past or the constructed nature of national homogeneity would have undermined the purported wholeness and unity of the body of people now empowered. Since pre-national ethnic and religious communities did not map neatly with modern nations, and nations themselves are inherently unstable categories, primordialism and essentialism do the hard work of reifying the nation. Identities might in fact be fluid, but in the real world of politics the players act as if they are immutable, both for strategic reasons and emotional satisfaction. Like the idea of family, the nation provides clear boundaries for a community within which social goods can be properly distributed.

In social science the very process of constituting a political community in the form of a nation has been seen as a necessity for democratic politics. Democracies in particular require a clearly defined, bounded population that then has the right to be represented. Nation is a convenient and powerful form of identification that speaks precisely to these conditions. “Democratic discourse,” writes Margaret Canovan, “requires not only trust and common sympathies but the capacity to act as a collective people, to undertake commitments and to acquire obligations.” While nationalism (because of its affiliations with revolution and the Left) was suspect in the minds of many Western policymakers during the first great decolonization after World War II, political analysts were even more troubled by tribalism and social fragmentation than they were with efforts of nationalists to construct new, coherent communities on the model of Western nations. Political integration of localities or tribes into coherent nations was part of the project of modernization, the prerequisite to democratization, lauded by its theorists.
The nation had an even greater power than other forms of identity, a power that ultimately cannot be explained by narrow calculations of rational self-interest. National identity became an act of subscription to a continuous community with a past and a future, a shared destiny. Yael Tamir, the theorist of liberal nationalism, claims that national membership, “unlike membership in a gender, class, or region, thus enables an individual to find a place not only in the world in which he or she lives, but also in an uninterrupted chain of being. Nationhood promotes fraternity both among fellow members and across generations. It endows human action with meaning that endures over time, thus carrying a promise of immortality.” When they work, nations must feel like a community with powerful subjective identifications of individuals with the whole. While nations to some extent depend on free individual choice, as Margaret Canovan notes, “that choice is nevertheless experienced as a destiny transcending individuality; it turns political institutions into a kind of extended family inheritance, although the kinship ties in question are highly metaphorical.” Nation works most powerfully precisely when people are unaware that they have made contingent choices and feel that they are acting in accord with a natural order. Calculation is suppressed and feelings are heightened. “What nationalists create is in some sense a religion,” writes Stuart Kaufman. “For the nationalist, the nation is a god—a jealous god—to whom one pays homage, venerating its temples (monuments), relics (battle flags), and theology (including a mythical history); and receiving in return a sort of immortality as a participant in what is conceived as an eternal nation.”

It would seem self-evident that national identity, even more than other identities, is seldom purely about what is coolly calculated or convenient. Group or personal identities may be strategic starting points from which people act, but they are also emotionally generated. Identities are most often a complex combination of reason and affect, learning and experience from a variety of sources. Subjectively experienced, internalized early in life, they are a starting point for people’s strategic choices. People may act rationally to realize their preferences, but those preferences are intimately tied to the identities that people have constructed or that have been constituted for them. National identities are saturated with emotions that have been created
through teaching, repetition, and daily reproduction until they become common sense. The very rhetoric of nationalism reveals its affective base. Armenians speak constantly of betrayal, either by traitors within (like my ancient namesake Vasak Siuni who “betrayed” the martyr Vartan Mamikonian in 451 C. E.!), by foreign powers, or by their own treacherous imperial overlords. Their history is replete with invasions and massacres, with near disappearances, culminating in the Genocide of the early twentieth century. Yet they have survived! These tropes—betrayal, treachery, threats from others, and survival—are embedded in familiar emotions—anxiety, fear, insecurity, and pride. Even in the case of Kazakhstan, a nation that had not had an identity as a nation before the twentieth century—despite the efforts of the current government to construct a sense of a nation—nation-makers are constructing a history that is ancient, continuous, and primordial. Emotions are certainly involved here. The constructivist policy of the government must deal with the anxieties of cultural loss under the onslaughts of seventy years of Soviet power, the need for national pride to unite people around an ideological substitute for the discarded faith in a socialist future, and the insecurity of a formerly colonized people coexisting with their recent colonizers who make up almost half the population of the republic. For Tamir the need for the nation involves a perception of shared fate that becomes an answer to the neurosis, alienation, and meaninglessness of modern times. Here again is emotion. The dread of personal oblivion, the need for redemption, salvation, eternity, are all answered in the nation.13

What Are the Emotions?

Emotions are so basic to human beings and behavior that they have defied precise definition.14 Emotions are animal and human reactions to given stimuli that have somatic, cognitive effects and which have both neurological and culturally constructed aspects to them. In the words of Antonio Damasio, “the essence of emotion [is] the collection of changes in body state that are induced in myriad organs by nerve cell terminals, under the control of a dedicated brain system, which is responding to the content of thoughts relative to a particular entity or event.”15 But emotions only begin with the nervous system and the brain; they include, in ordinary language,
the perception of the changes that are taking place, the emotional response, or what Damasio separates out as “feeling.”\textsuperscript{16} Emotions, then, are things felt, feelings, though not all feelings are emotions—for example, tiredness or pain. Psychologists have appreciated their complexity, which involves “widespread activations of thought materials—variously called ‘appraisals,’ ‘cognitions,’ or ‘judgments’—some of which may only be automatic, habitual, semiconscious, or imperfectly glimpsed, and some of which spill over into facial signals, laughter, blushing, ANS [autonomic nervous system] or endocrine-system arousal, tone of voice, gesture, posture, and so on.”\textsuperscript{17}

Emotions can be either diffuse, like rage or anxiety, or goal-directed, like the emotion behind revenge. As Jan Elster notes, “Emotions, like desires and beliefs, are intentional: they are \textit{about} something. They differ in this respect from other visceral feelings, such as pain, drowsiness, nausea, and vertigo.”\textsuperscript{18} He goes on,

Emotions tend to be associated with specific action tendencies. Guilt induces tendencies to make repairs, to confess, or to punish oneself. The action tendency of shame is to disappear or to hide oneself, and in extreme cases to commit suicide. The action tendency of envy is to destroy the envied object or its possessor. Anger induces a tendency to harm the person who harms one. The action tendency of hatred is to make the object of the emotion disappear from the face of the earth.\textsuperscript{19}

The connection between emotion and action, whether fully conscious or deliberate, provides an important link in connecting structural environment to human action. Whereas structural explanations, like falling wage rates leading to protests, once seemed an adequate explanation, rationalist social scientists have become more specific about the microfoundations that connect structure with action—e.g., the claim that human beings seek to maximize their individual well-being in all circumstances and therefore can be reasonably expected to protest loss of income. Less reductionist explanations focus on the cultural and historical context in which choices are made—e.g., under what circumstances would falling wages lead to protest (moral economy, sense of appropriate compensation, etc.)? Many of these explanations, in fact, simply assume the emotional connection that arises in a particular context (a sense of justice or injustice, resentment at being exploited). Emotions add an important dimension to purely
structural or rationalist explanations that assume behavior is always based on coolly calculated self-interest.

In an important development for historians and social scientists, much recent psychological research on emotions has broken down the strict dichotomy between reason and emotion, cognition and affect. Summing up those findings, Deborah Gould writes, “Feelings should be seen as one way that humans arrive at understanding and knowledge; they are a necessary ingredient in, rather than a barrier to, all thought processes.” This idea goes back to David Hume and William James, both of whom saw reason and passion as linked to one another, and to George Simmel, who saw rationality as an “emotion of distance, remoteness, and indifference to excitement and pleasure,” a “blasé feeling” that arose in capitalism to control emotions that might be dangerous to market relations. Perhaps the best known psychologist making this point is Antonio Damasio. In his *Descartes’ Error* (1994) and *The Feeling of What Happens* (1999) he demonstrated that rather than emotions being obstacles to rational decision-making, they are in fact preconditions for reasonable choices. In his work with brain-damaged patients who had lost their ability to experience emotions, Damasio showed that they were unable to make decisions. He concluded that

there appears to be a collection of systems in the human brain consistently dedicated to the goal-oriented thinking process we call reasoning, and to the response selection we call decision-making, with a special emphasis on the personal and social domain. This same collection of systems is also involved in emotion and feeling, and is partly dedicated to processing body signals. Damage to [certain sectors of the brain, most particularly the anterior cingulated cortex] not only produces impairment in movement, emotion, and attentiveness, but also causes a virtual suspension of the animation of action and of thought process such that reason is no longer viable.

Similarly, psychologist Nico Frijda argues,

With cognitive judgments, there is no reason, other than an affective one, to prefer any goal whatsoever over some other. Cognitive reasoning may argue that a particular event could lead to a loss of money or health or life, but so what? What is wrong with death, other than it is disliked?

Human beings, it seems, are “reluctant decision-maker[s].” Making choices, deciding among preferences, is difficult and stressful. It requires dealing with complexity and overcoming
the fear of making the wrong decision. Here, where cost-benefit calculations fail, emotions step in and push a person to choose or prioritize his or her preferences.

Following the work of Alice Isen and Gregory Diamond, many researchers have concluded that rather than simple automatic responses, emotions are in part learned; indeed, in a sense they are “overlearned cognitive habits.” While emotions may feel automatic and even uncontrollable, they are in fact alterable, at least to some degree (just like habits). “[I]nvoluntary (automatic) in the short run in the same sense that such cognitive habits are, [they] may similarly be learned and unlearned over a longer time frame.”

Even as powerful an emotional state as depression is increasingly seen as a cognitive disorder subject to cognitive therapies. “All emotions presuppose cognitions, write Ron Aminzade and Doug McAdam but some emotions may highlight cognitions about ‘what is’ while others may emphasize moral aspirations and norms about ‘what should be’ or stress the counterfactual dimension of ‘what could be.’ Whereas hope, regret, and relief emphasize what could be or could have been, sympathy and anger highlight what should be…. Some emotions, such as hope, are directed toward the future while others, such as regret or relief, are oriented toward the past.”

Much of our emotional repertoire is an evolutionary inheritance, based on the pleasure and pain signals that promote survival of the organism, but much of it is instilled in childhood, through socialization and life experience. Whereas a fright response to a large animal charging toward you is fairly automatic, feeling shame at spilling food at a dinner party or disgust at the behavior of a boor has much to do with learning and cultural norms. When we say some emotions are sometimes constructed, what we mean is that there is cognitive work involved in the gestation of these emotions, in their intensity, duration, and the actions associated with them. Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta argue that “Some emotions are more constructed than others, involving more cognitive processing,” and that “The Emotions relevant to politics…fall toward the constructed, cognitive end.”

Standing as they do between biology and culture, linked to the body and society, emotions taunt both the neurobiologist and the historian. Only in part hardwired and in large part
connected to cultures, emotions are also gendered, racialized, and often specific to certain groups and classes. A key question for historians is the elucidation of specific emotional regimes or emotional cultures, or what Gould calls “emotional common sense,” that is the repertoire of emotions that can be employed without much conscious calculation or reflection. As Elster puts it, “Although culture may modulate and shape emotions and cravings, that very statement presupposes that there exist precultural or transcultural tendencies to be modified and shaped in the first place.” Many emotions are connected intimately to society or culture—those that Elster calls “social emotions,” like shame, contempt, hatred, guilt, anger (at someone else’s behavior), pridefulness, liking (triggered by a belief in someone else’s character), pride, admiration, envy, indignation, sympathy, pity, malice, and gloating. Others too have social connections: joy, grief, despair, disappointment, and the aesthetic emotions, wonder, awe. Elster argues that, “Emotions provide the main support of social norms.” “Not all cultures recognize or conceptualize the same emotions.” “When an emotion does belong to the conceptual repertoire of a culture, it can also become the target of prescriptive or proscriptive social norms, leading to either more or less frequent occurrences of the emotion than one would otherwise have observed.”

Emotions, then, give direction to our actions, stimulate us to act in various ways, help us form preferences and goals, and, most importantly, give meaning to our lives. Although strong emotions are to some degree malleable by individuals, they can also undermine cognition, choice, and rationality. Emotional biases can predetermine attitudes and actions that are inefficient or destructive. How well we do in dealing with emotions may have much to do with our genetic makeup, but it may have even more to do with the emotional culture in which we live. Richard A. Shweder uses the metaphor of a piano to illustrate the relationship of emotions and culture:

Human infants come into the world possessing a complex emotional keyboard; yet as they become Eskimo, Balinese, or Oriya only some keys get played. Do the other keys get stuck because they are hardly played at all?.....

While a differentiated emotional keyboard may be available to most four-year-olds around the world, the tunes that get played and the emotional scores that are avail-
able diverge considerably for adults. Some keys do not get struck at all; the emotional symphonies that do get played vary widely.36

Emotions are experienced and expressed according to certain cultural or narrative paradigms that are largely the stuff of common sense, habit, habitus (the taken for granted). Identity, interpretation, and perception all contribute to emotions, their expression, and the meanings they are given. However important and fundamental the work of psychologists might be, it is historians, anthropologists, political scientists, and sociologists who are best equipped to discover how circumstances, experience, and ideas affect affect. Colonial subjugation, for example, might at times be experienced as the rule of one’s betters or an unfortunate destiny and thereby lead to sullen, passive behavior, submission to authority. On the other hand, colonial rule might be experienced as unjust and remediable, a condition of humiliation that produces a feeling of shame but also of indignation. This in turn would lead to a desire for retribution and/or resistance. To understand why given situations are read in certain ways and, further, why people react emotionally in one way or another, requires historical, sociological, and ethnographic investigation sensitive to time and place.

In a very suggestive article on the Irish Land War (1879–1882), sociologist Anne Kane analyzed thousands of documented speeches at mass meetings and found: “The most prevalent emotions are shame, fear, sorrow, humiliation, indignation, disgust, anger, hatred (of England and landlords), love (of Ireland and the land), pride, empowerment, enthusiasm, solidarity, vengefulness, and righteousness.”37 Here there are too many emotions to be sure, but Kane finds that there was a shift over time from emotions like shame, fear, sorrow and disgust as the movement grew to growing hatred, anger, and indignation, and that “these emotions, nurtured by narrative sharing and movement activity, blossomed into emotions of solidarity, enthusiasm, pride, love, and empowerment.”38 At first the Irish land movement was divided between moderates who hoped for a constitutional solution and radicals who thought of a constitution as simply British law that oppressed the Irish. When the British arrested the leaders of the movement, among them most prominently Charles Stewart Parnell, the resultant anger and indignation
brought both wings of the movement together in a furious opposition to the British. New metaphors, now of British tyranny and injustice and Irish unity and morality, made compromise less appealing—and it solved the collective action problem to boot.

**The History of Emotions**

Suffering may be key to survival; we must know and experience pain to want to avoid it. In the same way we learn to control emotions that in one condition are necessary but in another may be harmful. There is almost universal agreement that strategies can be developed to prevent certain emotions from occurring. One can learn to deal with anger, prevent it from breaking out in certain cases, as well as control its intensity and course. But this “emotional planning” requires some predictability over external events, for emotions are often set off by events outside a person’s control. Unstable situations increase the likelihood of emotional arousal and lessen the chances for controlling emotions. Revolutions, wars, times of uncertainty, moments of mass violence, ethnic conflict are all situations where careful calculation based on trustworthy information is difficult, if not impossible. But in such moments emotions may act as guides where rational calculation requires assistance.

If, indeed, emotions have only in part a biological base but also are affected by the way we think about emotions, how we experience and express ourselves culturally, then they also have a history and can change over time. Discourses and regimes of emotion can determine what we feel and how we express it. The dominant Western cultural discourse about emotions most often constructs them as those parts of our mental apparatus that are closest to animals, to instinct: primal, senseless, impulsive, biologically driven, sub-rational, involuntary, uncontrollable, feminine. Opposed to emotion discursively is rationality: a higher kind of thinking, disciplined, pragmatic, reflective, prudent, calculated, sensible, conscious, masculine. The two are thought of as different, separate, and rationality is preferable, our Apollonian side that must discipline and control our Dionysian nature. On the other hand, beginning in the eighteenth century with the rise of sentimentalism (one thinks here of the novels of Henry Richardson and Jean-Jacques
Rousseau), there was a reversal of valences. As William M. Reddy puts it, the essential doctrines of sentimentalism held:

(1) that superior virtue is linked to simplicity, openness, and lowly rank, because virtue is an outgrowth of natural sentiments that we all share and that wealth and refinement often corrupt; (2) that women are more likely to develop such virtue because of their greater sensitivity to natural feelings of benevolence, love, gratitude, and pity; (3) that men are more likely to be enslaved to their stronger passions; (4) that true beauty lies in virtuous innocence and sincerity; (5) that reading (especially novels) and writing are important instruments for the cultivation of sensitivity and virtue; and (6) that romantic attachment is the proper foundation of marriage. These ideas were in stark contrast to notions about virtue that had prevailed since ancient times. An age-old common sense taught that virtue was built on a rejection of passion in favor of reason; that men were more readily able to achieve it; that superior social rank and superior virtue more or less coincided; and that marriage ought to be arranged to preserve the coincidence of rank, rationality, and virtue.40

Reddy argues that the intense emotions of participants in the French Revolution of 1789 were expressed in the language of late sentimentalism. Revolutionaries both believed that their feelings were natural and therefore genuine but also doubted the sincerity of their emotions. In order to stir up the people for war, Brissot resorted to emotional language to “electrify souls.” “In the eyes of these sentimentalists, the political reality of 1791, after the return of the king, was still not Manichean enough. War would provide the ultimate, instructive melodramatic plot; war was the ultimate blurring of friction and reality into a didactic melodrama of patriotism.”41

Brissot, the moderate, was emotionally outbid by Marat and the “Mountain,” the Jacobins, who spoke of avenging the spilt blood of innocents, burning the monarch in his palace with all his lackeys, and making a weapon of despair and massacring one’s oppressors. The language of violence and hatred was closely linked to a language of love and loyalty: love for the fatherland, for liberty, for justice. It was presumed “that sincere natural feeling was intense and that those who were insincere were likely to betray themselves by a lack of intensity or by a misstep that people with true feelings never made.”42 If your own feelings are sincere and virtuous, then those who disagree with you must be insincere, and in the heat of combat must be killed.

After the fall of Robespierre, sentimentalism fell away in thinking about politics.
Interest came to be seen as the guiding principle of public action in civil society [in France in the period 1794–1814]. Honor, as a natural sense of rightness most developed in the male, was designated a motive especially for private behavior and for public service to the state (which often involved sacrifice of self-interest). What was called ‘sentiment’ was relegated to the sphere of the feminine, of the household; but emotion was also given special status in the arts as it was reconceptualized by Romantic thinkers in relation to the emerging competitive order. Sentiment was domesticated, privatized.

In the Romantic tradition emotion was given a positive valence—natural, pure, authentic—in contrast to the sober calculation of reason. But the Romantic concept of feeling acknowledged “(if reluctantly) the reign of self-interest over the realms of politics and public action.” The legacy of sentimentalism remained in Western thought: feelings were seen as natural, innate, and physiological in origin; sincerity was considered a moral virtue, hypocrisy an evil. But in much of subsequent Western thought emotions remained something to be “controlled,” even as one expresses them. Powerful ideas that go back at least as far as the ancient Greeks tell us that, though it is good to be “in touch with your feelings,” you are not supposed to “give into emotions” as they might get the best of you; you might “lose control.” Many of the great social theorists, like Weber, Freud, and Foucault, have noted that Western civilization has been a process of disciplining or repressing emotions.

It was precisely in the transitional moments of the late eighteenth-century revolutions and the early nineteenth-century social upheavals, at the very time of the Romantic revolt against Enlightenment rationalism, that the discourse of the nation emerged, and primordialized national identities were fixed on to specific peoples. With the explosive break of European colonies with their motherlands, beginning with the American Revolution, the idea of nations as new polities endowed with rights of self-governance entered the language of politics. Though prefaced by rhetorics of nation, popular sovereignty, and opposition to universal monarchy in England’s Glorious Revolution of 1688, the invocation of nation as a break with tradition and older forms of political legitimation took on a universal power with the revolution in France. At roughly the same time a notion of nation as a community of people with common culture, aspirations, and
political endowments emerged as a central subject in historical writing. By the early nineteenth century statesmen and intellectuals across Europe were learning to “speak national.” The concept of nation became common in political language, but its meaning remained varied, unstable, and highly contested. Its deployment depended on the ambitions of its authors. While Prussian bureaucratic reformers, like Stein and Hardenburg, deployed an “enlightened nationalism” (in Matt Levinger’s phrase) to bind the “nation” to the Hohenzollern monarchy and mobilize the populace against the French conqueror, Prussian aristocrats used the concept of the national to align a particularistic defense of corporate interests with the imagined body of the nation. At the same time certain middle-class activists used the language of the nation against the preservation of the traditional privileges of the social estates. At first there was ambivalence about whether the nation was Prussia or Germany, but in the post-Napoleonic era the idea of a German nation eliminated its rivals. When aristocrats, sensing danger from below, tried to “dis-invent” the nation, essentially abandoning the language of nationalism to Romantic writers, they effectively lost any hold over the discourse of the nation, which over time took on the notion of a cultural community with which sovereignty had to be shared or to which it had to be surrendered.

Certainly one of the most powerful and long-lasting formulations of nation, as a shared culture, was that elaborated in the two great universal histories of Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803)—Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit (Another Philosophy of the History of the Formation of Humanity) (Riga, 1774) and Ideen zur Philosophie des Geschichte der Menschheit (Ideas on the Philosophy of History of Humanity) (4 vols., Riga and Leipzig, 1784–1791). Though Herder contrasted the particularity of the nation and its Volkgeist or Kultur to the universalistic rationality of the French Enlightenment, he was at the same time a creature of the Enlightenment, explaining his own philosophy of history in naturalistic and scientific terms. Applying Liebnitz’s concept of development to peoples, Herder saw civilizations, like flowers, budding, blossoming, and fading. All human values and understandings were historical and national. Herder emphasized transformation and change through time
but always with a sense of an overall order. In the flow and seeming chaos of history, there were constancies, namely nations, dynamic and vital, changing but possessing a constancy of spirit. Herder celebrated diversity, but what to some might seem to be a dangerous relativism and an anarchy of values in his enthusiastic ethnographies is redeemed by the faith that all history, like all nature, reflects God and his divine plan. Though multiple in form, humankind for Herder is one.

Herder’s love of nations did not extend to the state. He despised government and power, the great absolutist monarchs of his time, and celebrated the cleansing force of the French Revolution. But even as Herder’s work appeared, the colossal political upheavals in France radically shifted the thinking of his countrymen about history and the nation. The universalist faith of the Enlightenment in general principles applicable everywhere was shaken by the turn toward the Terror and imperialism. “German educated opinion now agreed that all values and rights were of historical and national origin and that alien institutions could not be transplanted to German soil. Moreover, they saw in history, rather than in abstract rationality, the key to all truth and value.”

For Herder personally the shift from admiration to suspicion of French rationalism came much earlier, after a trip to Nantes in the summer of 1769, when he experienced (as Isaiah Berlin tells it) “a mixture of envy, humiliation, admiration, resentment and defiant pride which backward peoples feel towards advanced ones, members of one social class towards those who belong to a higher rung in the hierarchy.” For Herder feeling (Gefühl) was the means to thought and understanding. Through language feeling apprehended reality with an immediacy that the senses could not achieve. Humans and the world were united in feeling, which then could be expressed through words, but every signification initially involved an emotional attitude toward the world. For Herder, then, poetry and music were not simply beautiful representations of the world but a means to understanding it through a “logic of emotion.” “A poet,” he went on to say, “is the creator of the nation around him: he gives them a world to see and has their souls in his hand to lead them to that world.”
I focus on this moment of origin because it appears to me to be greatly overdetermined by both a revived interest in emotions and the actual experience of a cascade of related emotions by individuals and groups. Scholars have long noted the intimate connection between emotion and nineteenth-century nationalism, born as it was in the age of Romanticism. Even as historians and theorists turned their attention to the sociological settings that made the nation and nationalism possible—the breakdown of older cultural systems and identities, greater social mobility and social communication, the development of print capitalism, the practices of absolutist bureaucracies—consistently embedded in their narratives we find the emotions of love, pride, fear, and resentment. Borrowing from Nietzsche, Liah Greenfeld employs the term *ressentiment* as the central theme in her mammoth study of five nationalisms. *Ressentiment* is the “psychological state resulting from suppressed feelings of envy and hatred (existential envy) and the impossibility of satisfying these feelings.”51 Grounded in the fundamental comparability of subject and object and at the same time an experience of their actual inequality, *ressentiment* “fostered particularistic pride and xenophobia, providing emotional nourishment for the nascent national sentiment and sustaining it whenever it faltered.”52 Originating with a structural transformation that shook traditional identities, the move to the national was highly contingent, but once available the nation-form became the vehicle to overcome the early modern and modern psychosocial crisis of identity.

In the canonical work to which all studies of nationalism afterwards had to refer, Benedict Anderson is critical of “progressive, cosmopolitan intellectuals (particularly in Europe?),” who “insist on the near-pathological character of nationalism, its roots in fear and hatred of the Other, and its affinities with racism,” but forget “that nations inspire love, and often profoundly self-sacrificing love.”53 Even for the most rationalist of the early nationalists, Fichte, the revival of the German nation would result in a “love that is truly love, and not a mere transitory lust.”54 The early German nationalist Ernst Moritz Arndt (1769–1860) defined the German nation as a community bound together by love: “From the North Sea to the Carpathians, from the Baltic to the Alps, from the Vistula to the Schelde, one belief, one love, one spirit, and one
passion must again bring together the whole German Volk in brotherly union.” Love of the fatherland was the highest form of religion, a passion superior to that of the love of “fathers and mothers, wives and children.”55

Against the universality of Enlightenment rationalism the romantic nationalists emphasized difference and feeling. In his last book the late Ernest Gellner pointed out that these “two negations were, of course intimately linked to each other: where reason is universal in its prescriptions (what it deems valid is valid for all and at all times and in all places), emotions are linked to specific communities, to ‘cultures,’ which are, precisely, associations engendered and sustained by shared sentiment, shared by the members and not shared by outsiders, by non-members…. Rationality cannot, simply cannot, define the membership of exclusive clubs; feelings can.”56 Inclusion, of course, implied exclusion, and the nation was also defined by who could never be an authentic member.

Historians have long looked at emotions in history, though not very reflexively or conceptually. Only very recently, however, have they thought seriously about a history of emotions.57 The comparative study of emotional cultures or regimes has been principally the contribution of anthropologists, but how emotional cultures or communities are formed, how they change (not develop!), how stable, satisfying, or dysfunctional they are, are all questions appropriate for the contextual, empirically grounded, and hopefully theoretically informed work of historians. Among the problems historians might investigate are the influence of elite models of emotional expression on other classes; the different emotional languages of different historical periods and societies; and whether emotionality in some parts of the world is derived from other parts of the globe—perhaps another import from the metropole. While a grand narrative of emotions may be elusive, or even impossible, discussion of particular styles or (in a harder sense) regimes of emotion would be a major contribution.
THEORIES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT

The scholarly literature on ethnic and nationalist conflict has long ago abandoned the view that ethnic wars are the result of “ancient tribal hatreds”—though like the monster in slasher movies, just when you think that view is dead and buried, it springs up once more. Rather than resorting to explanation from primordialism, students of nationalism have turned to a number of other approaches. Theories of ethnic conflict have ranged from the resilient primordialist narratives of deep cleavages between peoples based on ancient antipathies to rationalist accounts of the instrumental employment of ethnicized rhetoric by elites to mobilize masses for murder. Some scholars have emphasized how democracy correlates highly with ethnic and civil peace, while others have challenged any domestic “democratic peace” argument and demonstrated that the very process of democratization is fraught with violence, both intrastate and interstate. Students of international relations have shifted attention from interstate wars to intrastate conflict, which in the second half of the twentieth century has become the major source of violent deaths. And the most extreme form of ethnic violence, genocide, has been connected with war and revolution, radical state elites and modernity.

Recent writing on ethnic conflict, mass killing, and genocide can be divided into those that emphasize reason and those that emphasize emotion. At the rationalist end we can distinguish between those that emphasize the instrumental role of elite actors and those that emphasize structural factors.

Reversing an older image of ethnic violence as bubbling up from the masses, elite approaches have located initiative at the top but they fail to explain why ethnic appeals have such powerful resonance below. Quantitative research has shown that a few killers can cause enormous destruction. Thugs, sadists, fanatics, and opportunists can, with modern weaponry (or even with machetes), slaughter thousands with little more than acquiescence from the surrounding population. Genocide in particular is an event of mass killing, with massive numbers of victims but not necessarily massive numbers of killers. The thugs, set loose by the political elite, create a
climate of violence that radicalizes the population, renders political moderates less relevant, and convinces people of the need to support the more extremist leaders.

Warfare itself helps harden hostile group identities, “making it rational to fear the other group and see its members as dangerous threats.”63 This is not to say that thugs and ordinary people do not use the opportunities offered by state-permitted lawlessness to settle other accounts with neighbors, take revenge, or, more mundanely, simply grab what they can. In these theories the role of instrumentalist elites who use nationalism to shape politics, keep themselves in power, and eliminate potential rivals (this sometimes involves “ethnic outbidding”) is emphasized; here ethnicity is the means of mobilization and manipulation.64 But the question is always begged: why do ordinary people respond to this kind of elite manipulation; why is it ethnicity that can be mobilized; why is violence provoked and not more peaceful means of resolving conflict?

Among the approaches that emphasize the primacy of structure are those elaborated by international relations scholars who have borrowed the concept of the security dilemma from interstate conflict to talk about ethnic violence. Here the principal cause of ethnic conflict is that in conditions of “emergent anarchy,” when states can no longer guarantee safety, groups rationally mobilize in preemptive self-defense. This leads to a security dilemma as other groups mobilize against them. “Risk-aversion is enough to motivate murderous violence.”65 A succinct statement of such a structural approach is given by David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild:

…ethnic conflict is most commonly caused by collective fears of the future. As groups begin to fear for their physical safety, a series of dangerous and difficult-to-resolve strategic dilemmas arise that contain within them the potential for tremendous violence. As information failures, problems of credible commitment, and the security dilemma take hold, the state is weakened, groups become fearful, and conflict becomes likely. Ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs, operating within groups, reinforce these fears of physical insecurity and cultural domination and polarize society. Political memories, myths, and emotions also magnify these fears, driving groups further apart. Together, these between-group and within-group strategic interactions produce a toxic brew of distrust and suspicion that can explode into murderous violence, even the systematic slaughter of one people by another.66
It is difficult to disagree with Lake and Rothchild, given that they have included both internal and external factors, structural dynamics and psychological states. Indeed, as rationalist as the account is, they begin the explanation with one set of emotions (collective fears) and mention that others come into play to magnify the initiating fears.

In general the rigor and parsimony of rational choice approaches that assume that human behavior begins with rational motivation at the level of the individual have been extremely useful in clarifying the logics that often lie hidden in explanations of ethnic conflict. But for all their economy and elegance, they have not been very successful in explaining the power of collective identities, particularly those of ethnicity, nationality, and nation. Yet ethnic conflict is ultimately about collective action, collective action that is often at odds with the interests of its perpetrators. Why, we still must ask, are people ready to kill and be killed for collective identities and attachments? But here we might ask, why do people feel insecure? Why do they fear what they fear? Is this simply an objective structural condition, or must it be mediated through specific emotions? Ironically, even in the most rationalistic explanations hidden emotions are at work.

We might begin our discussion of emotional approaches with the most ubiquitous and long-lived, the irresistible fallback position of primordialism. In this understanding people acquire certain identifications at birth or in the family, and ethnic/national loyalty arises from some deep, perhaps biological, drive, e.g., kinship, territoriality, liking people like oneself, and fearing or hating those who are different. Like other psychological approaches, primordialism is deeply essentialist and fails to explain why conflict between groups is so rare; why it occurs when it does and where it does and not at other times in other places? Presumably permanent and indelible differences ought to lead to the same results over time and space. How does primordialism explain the variation in ethnic conflict?

Most academic writing on ethnic conflict in the last decades has moved away from primordialism toward constructivism, the notion that identities and differences are primarily made in history, that they are in large part products of human action and choice rather than dictates of nature. But, as I hope to show, even in most constructivist writing, there are elements
of naturalism and essentialism that are impossible to avoid. I shall examine two recent works—
by Stuart Kaufman and Roger D. Petersen—on ethnic conflict to illustrate how approaches that
take emotions seriously add to strictly rationalist explanations while avoiding the pitfalls of
primordialism.

In his book *Modern Hatreds* Stuart Kaufman reverses the primordialist account of ancient
hatreds and argues that whatever the sources of the ethnic myths essential for ethnic conflict they
must be renewed in each generation. These “modern hatreds” both give rise to mass activity and
may be used by elites to mobilize populations. Kaufman holds that the necessary conditions for
ethnic war include myths justifying ethnic hostility; ethnic fears for survival; and opportunities
to mobilize and fight. “Ethnic wars occur when the politics of ethnic symbolism goes to ex-
tremes, provoking hostile actions and leading to a security dilemma.”68 “The symbolic politics
theory holds that if the three preconditions—hostile myths, ethnic fears, and opportunity—are
present, ethnic war results if they lead to rising mass hostility, chauvinist mobilization by leaders
making extreme symbolic appeals, and a security dilemma between groups…. If any of the three
processes are absent, however—if hostility rises but politics avoid extremist appeals, or if the
population resists such appeals, or if the sides’ demands do not cause a security dilemma—war
can be avoided.”69

While his account is basically a moderately constructivist one, Kaufman refers back to
some essential human characteristics and the structures of human interaction:

“Cultural tendencies toward collective group self-defense, while not in the genes, are
evolutionarily favored. Groups that can count on their fellow members’ loyalty are
more likely to survive than strict egoists.”70 Ethnic identification is based on the
“myth-symbolic complex”—“the combination of myths, memories, values, and
symbols that defines not only who is a member of the group but what it means to be
a member.”71 It is to these existing myths and symbols that ethnic leaders must refer
in order to persuade and mobilize their constituents around identities that mimic
family, kinship, and home, i.e., homeland, motherland, fatherland, nation, shared
history and territory. The power of ethnic identity is overdetermined, for ethnicity
may combine self-respect (identity) and self-interest (material goods) with group
survival, defense of territory and country, the propagation of the faith, and the
achievement of immortality.
At bottom Kaufman’s theory leads to emotions, though they are not his central focus. Whatever the truth or reality of historical injustices, the mythic reconstruction of past experiences and their symbolization are what motivate people to action. The symbol is given its meaning and its power by myths. Choosing among symbols is determined by emotions, and people will choose the emotionally most potent symbol. “From this point of view, then, political choice is mostly emotional expression, politics is mostly about manipulating people’s emotions, and symbols provide the tool for such manipulation.” And ethnicity is particularly emotionally laden.

Much more directly focused on emotions is the work of Roger D. Petersen, who elaborates four narratives centered on a key emotion (fear, hatred, rage, and resentment—with the last one proving to be the most compelling explanation for ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe, his region of study). For Petersen “emotions are mechanisms—recognizable individual-level causal forces—that work to change the level of saliency of desires.” He begins with a set of standard rationalist assumptions—“that almost all individuals strongly and commonly desire a few basic things: safety, wealth, and status or self-esteem”—but goes on to include emotions in his explanation. “Emotions alert the individual to heighten the pursuit of one basic desire above others to meet the demands of changing conditions…. Metaphorically, an emotion acts like a ‘switch’—it creates compulsions to meet one environmental demand above all others.” Emotions do many things: they reify groups, essentialize identities, frame outlooks and motivate actions, coordinate motivations, and “effectively point a legion of individuals in one particular direction.” Because they can be experienced by many people in the same way, they provide a source of common understanding of one’s own group and the other. “Emotion can substitute for leadership.”

Petersen contends that emotions are often instrumental; they drive an individual to pursue a clear goal. Fear prepares an individual to seek safety; hatred to act to right a historic wrong; resentment to deal with status or self-esteem discrepancies. Only rage, of his four emotions, is without a clear aim; it often leads the individual to self-destruction. Fear leads the individual or group to target the source of the greatest threat, while hatred targets the group that has been most
frequently attacked in the past. Resentment targets “the group perceived as farthest up the ethnic status hierarchy that can be most surely subordinated through violence.”

**Political Emotions in Ethnic Conflict: Anger, Hate, Fear, and Resentment**

While any observer of the nightly news would agree that emotions are involved in politics, the standard view is that emotions play a negative, distorting, or even destructive role in the political arena. Yet emotionality can also provide positive goods to the political, as George E. Marcus and Michael B. Mackuen have shown in their study of anxiety and enthusiasm in American presidential campaigns. Emotion, they demonstrate, is “a catalyst for political learning.” A sense of threat, for example, “motivates citizens to learn about politics.” At the same time various emotions enhance, rather than diminish, political attentiveness, and instead of disrupting political reasoning they contribute to the quality of democratic life. After careful statistical analysis, they conclude that “when politics makes people anxious, people sharpen their eyes and pay careful attention; when politics drums up enthusiasm, people immerse themselves in the symbolic festival.” People’s “minds” can be changed when disturbed by certain emotional signals. Anxiety disrupts habitual dispositions, and in heightening attention or participation emotion actually “enhances the ability of voters to perform their citizenly duties.”

Political emotions should be distinguished one from another. Elster, following Aristotle, provides a most useful definition of anger and hatred:

In anger, my hostility is directed towards another’s action and can be extinguished by getting even—an action that reestablishes the equilibrium. In hatred, my hostility is directed toward another person or a category of individuals who are seen as intrinsically and irremediably bad. For the world to be made whole, they have to disappear.

Borrowing a distinction made by Nico Frijda, Elster goes on to claim that hatred is to anger what shame is to guilt. The first term in each pair is about the evaluation of an object, while the second is an evaluation of an event. “Hatred says that ‘he is bad,’ anger that ‘he did something bad to me.’ Analogously, shame reflects the idea ‘I am bad,’ guilt that ‘I did something.’”
Compared with anger, hatred is more compatible with rational calculation. The greatest act of hatred in history, the Holocaust, was carried out in a methodical and systematic way. Although hatred is painful, it does not cloud the mind as anger or fear do. . . . Although the angry man may indeed be willing to take risks that a calculating hater would avoid, his lack of instrumental rationality detracts from his chances of success.  

In ordinary speech the word “hatred” is often used to mean nothing more than intense anger, but it is useful to distinguish between anger directed against something that someone has done to you and more generalized hatred directed against someone who is intrinsically bad. It is dangerous when anger turns into hatred. It is one thing for Palestinians to have feared Zionist settlers in the 1920s and 1930s, to anticipate that they may take their land in the future. But after they have been displaced from 78% of Palestine, forbidden to return, herded into refugee camps, periodically attacked, and forced to live under Israeli occupation, it may be that hatred drives them to want the Jews and Israel to disappear. On the other side, the most militant Zionists, some of them in the Sharon government, no longer simply fear the Palestinians. They hate them and are prepared to make them disappear (expressed euphemistically as “transfer”), but at the same time the government presents its actual policies as based on fear and anger at the human bombs sent by militant Palestinians against Israeli civilians.

The official American reaction to September 11th, I would argue, has in general been based on anger and fear rather than hatred. It is not all Muslims, or some essential Islam, that must be eliminated. Rather, action must be taken against those who attacked and (it is believed) continue to threaten the United States. It is what they have done, and might do, rather than what they essentially are, that motivates the feelings and actions of American officials—at least in overt expression and official rhetoric. This is about fear and anger rather than hatred, though often the line between these three emotions evaporates. The sense of American insecurity that has led to the invasion of two Muslim states and repeated states of alarm at home is based on the projection of a quite different mentality on those on the other side. Policymakers attribute quite a different mentality to the enemy; they are constructed as fundamentally hating us for what we are, no matter what we do.
Fear lies at the base of many explanations of ethnic conflict and mass killing. Lake and Rothchild more specifically speak of “fear of what the future might bring,” echoing how a Serbian peace activist, Vesna Pesic, explained the cause of the horrors in former Yugoslavia: “fear of the future, living through the past.” Fear of the future might involve fear of cultural assimilation or physical annihilation. As Milan Kundera once said, “A small nation can disappear, and knows it.” The complex emotion of resentment may be related to fear. Though status reversal or social humiliation—the perception that an undeserved individual or group has become superior to you or your group—may be based on a desire for self-esteem, closely connected is the fear of losing status, of becoming vulnerable, of being dominated. Ultimately it may be difficult to disentangle what exactly is at work here: a sense of injustice, the intolerability of being humiliated, or the fear of being put at risk. Humiliation or insult can create a fantasy of setting the wrong right, a scenario of revenge.

Based on the psychological, historical, and social scientific works referred to above, it is possible at this point to summarize what we know about emotions and ethnic conflict. Emotions are involved in preference formation, in choice among preferences, in moving people to action, in forming allegiances and affiliations. Beginning with the simplest psychological assumption—that animals (as Ivan Pavlov demonstrated a century ago) make associations between stimuli that frequently occur together—we can say that human beings organize objects along lines of similarity. Similarity is a primary basis for categorization, and humans from an early age categorize others on the basis of somatic and social characteristics.

Categorization is a means of organizing and understanding a complex world, of rendering it simpler and more manageable. But which characteristics people select as distinguishing one person or group from another varies and is somewhat arbitrary. The salient characteristics might be somatic or cultural, but even the most physical, like skin color, are highly inflected by culture. People certainly make judgments on the basis of observable and cultural factors and regard them as signs of difference and character. Indeed, the idea of race is the melding of physical with normative characteristics, the imposition of specific meanings on particular somatic elements.
There are, further, benefits that derive from group membership which give people incentives to attribute, fix, and reify characteristics to their own group and others. The more endangered a group is, the greater the threat felt from another, the stronger may be the incentive to fix differences and act on the basis of them. But for groups to operate as groups taking some kind of action, emotions must be mobilized. This is not to say that emotions are sufficient for collective action, but they are necessary. When combined with other factors, such as institutionalized organizations, charismatic leaders, various social factors), emotions make a major contribution. Rational choice theorists have long puzzled over the so-called “free-rider problem,” i.e., the rationalist notion that individuals will not join a movement if they calculate that they will benefit from its success whether they participate or not. But emotions generated through grievances and social movements—fears and hopes about the future—can overcome these rational calculations and lead people to join the movement, risk their lives, and otherwise do things that in cooler moments they might leave to others.

Finally, emotions are important not only in the emergence of social movements but in sustaining them. In looking for the causes of ethnic violence, emotions provide a key independent variable. Threats, which can come in different shapes—threats to one’s family or friends, to one’s own life, to the ordinary, the quotidian, the way things normally are, to social status, to personal and group interests—lead to fear, hatred, or resentment, which in turn can motivate people to act. But emotions are also a dependent variable to be explained. It is also important to understand where emotions come from, what generates specific emotions that lead to violence.

The story that Aminzade and McAdam tell about the role of emotion in the emergence of contention begins with an “injustice frame,” a perception of injustice that triggers anger, which is then joined to hope that action will lead to a better situation. Social change, structural change, cultural inclusion all may give rise to opportunities for such anger and hope, e.g., Gorbachev’s reforms, the call for reform, the appeal to popular participation in perestroika, the Soviets’ reluctance to use state violence. Certain transforming events can demonstrate that action can lead to change, e.g., the storming of the Bastille, the February strikes in Petrograd in 1917, the visit of
Ariel Sharon to the Dome of the Rock. Further: “hope can be manufactured and fear overcome through small, but tangible, victories that gradually demonstrate the power of collective action at the local level.” Here leaders play an important role—their emotional intelligence, their ability to frame grievances effectively, mobilize emotional energies, to touch the lived emotional experiences of other people. What would charismatic leadership mean except extra-rational, emotionally inspirational leadership! I would add to this model the importance of reinforcement and legitimation of the given emotional responses, both in existing discourses and by influential or hegemonic others.

**Resentment and Anxiety: The Armenian Genocide, 1915**

Explanations for the mass deportations and murder of its Armenian subjects by the Ottoman Empire have ranged from essentialist readings of the differences between Muslims and Christians to the instrumentalist nationalist policies of the Young Turk leaders. While recognizing that distinctions between religious communities, the ambitions of nationalist modernizers, as well as the international rivalries of Great Powers all played a role in the tragic events of 1915, I want to heighten the role of emotions in explaining mass killing, not only on the part of direct perpetrators of the bloodshed but in the minds of the elites who initiated the whole deadly process. I suggest here that group identities, the reversal of traditional hierarchies, and a sharp sense of endangerment and resentment led Turkish officials and ordinary people to turn on the Armenians at a particularly difficult moment in the First World War.

From the time of the formation of the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth century Armenians in Anatolia were a subject people who had to accommodate to a ruling elite that was Turkish and Islamic. Even as Armenians, most notably in urban centers, succeeded in society, grew wealthy, and even entered state service, they understood that they had to adapt to the expectations of the ruling Ottoman elite in order to advance. The Armenian Church, itself institutionally tied into the Ottoman system of governance, usually preached acceptance of the fate befallen the Armenians, deference toward their rulers and social betters, both Muslim and Armenian, and opposed rebel-
lion of any kind. Yet even as they legitimized the system in which their people lived, Armenian clerics remained aware of the special burdens the people bore.

Though there had been greater access to positions of power and influence for non-Muslims before the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520–1566), in the following centuries religion marked a key boundary between privilege and disadvantage. Non-Muslims lived in a system based on hierarchy and discrimination, eventually codified in the so-called millet system in which each religious community had a degree of self-rule as long as they were loyal to the Ottoman authorities. As I have written elsewhere,

Armenians and Turks coexisted in an unequal relationship, one of subordination and superordination, with the Muslims on top and the non-Muslims below. The sheer power and confidence of the ruling Muslims worked for centuries to maintain in the Armenians a pattern of personal and social behavior manifested in submissiveness, passivity, deference to authority, and the need to act in calculatedly devious and disguised ways. It was this deferential behavior that earned the Armenians the title “loyal millet” in an age when the Greeks and Slavs of the empire were striving to emancipate themselves through revolutionary action. The Armenians in contrast worked within the Ottoman system and accepted the burdens of Muslim administration without much protest until the second half of the nineteenth century.90

Among Armenians the turn from a primary identification with an ethnoreligious community to an ethnonational identity was gradual and prolonged. The genesis of Armenian nationalism occurred in the diaspora, in far-removed places like Madras, where the first Armenian newspaper was published at the end of the eighteenth century, and Venice, where the Catholic Mekhitarist fathers revived the medieval histories of the Armenians and commissioned new ones. The new images of community generated in Europe and by diaspora activists fit well with the new forms and institutions of Armenian life emerging in Ottoman cities, particularly Istanbul. As capitalist production and exchange penetrated the empire, different millets (and even segments within millets) benefited (and suffered) unevenly from new economic opportunities. In the late eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century urban Armenians profited enormously from their association with the Porte. The amiras and sarafs, the wealthy money-lenders and bankers who financed the tax-farming system, along with the less affluent esnafs, the craftsmen and artisans
of the towns, accumulated wealth with which they subsidized schools, hospitals, and philanthropic organizations.\textsuperscript{91} Though highly placed, the amiras were always vulnerable to the arbitrary power of the sultan, and when reforming officials progressively eliminated the tax-farming system, the wealthy sarafs suffered financially.

When social tensions between the rich and the not-so-rich tore at the Armenian community and threatened the peace of the Ottoman capital, the sultan responded to the pleas of leading Armenians and reluctantly granted a “constitution” to regulate the Armenian millet. Community identity and self-sufficiency solidified, as well-to-do Armenians settled in Galata and other discrete sections, adopted European styles, established close ties with and even came under the formal protection of foreign states. They published the first newspapers in the empire, sent their children abroad for specialized and higher education, and grew visibly distant from the demographically and politically dominant Muslims. Armenians ran the imperial mint; an Armenian was chief architect to the sultan; and Armenians ran the Foreign Correspondence Office of the government. But for all their success and visibility, Ottoman Armenians were also the victims of unequal treatment and “other doubts and suspicions that emerged increasingly as faith in the viability of the Ottomanist synthesis of nationalities—a synthesis to which the official commitment to egalitarianism was directly linked—began to erode.”\textsuperscript{92}

Increasingly Turkish authorities interpreted any manifestation of cultural revival or resistance, however individual or local, as an act of national rebellion. The government restricted the powers of the Armenian National Assembly, accepting only \textit{takrirs} (petitions) dealing with churches and monasteries. The state prohibited all forms of national expression, banning the word \textit{Haiastan} (Armenia in Armenian) in print and forbidding the sale and possession of pictures of the last Armenian king, Levon V, who had lost his throne five centuries earlier. Instead of seeing them as the “loyal millet,” Turkish officials and intellectuals began to look upon Armenians as unruly, subversive, alien elements who consorted with foreign powers. The conservative Muslim clergy, long alienated by the Frenchified reformist bureaucrats among the Turks, were offended by the behavior and wealth of the most visible Armenians, those merchants who lived
in the capital, particularly those in Europeanized districts of the capital, like Galata, who affected Western manners or even took foreign citizenship. A highly placed Ottoman observer noted the resentment of religious Muslims toward the effects of the state-initiated modernizing project known as the Tanzimat:

Many among the people of Islam began complaining thus: “Today we lost our sacred national rights [hukuk-î mukaddese-i milliyyemizi] which were earned with our ancestors’ blood. The Muslim community [millet-i islamiyye], while it used to be the ruling religious community [millet-i hâkime], has [now] been deprived of such a sacred right. For the people of Islam, this is a day to weep and mourn.”

While Armenian clerics taught submission and deference and often allied with state authorities to persecute those modernizing intellectuals who attempted to bring Western enlightenment to young Armenians, Abdul Hamid II brought the reform period of the Tanzimat to an end and eliminated moderate and liberal alternatives within the system. The sultan created a system of personal, autocratic rule and centralized power within the palace. Both Christians and Turks who opposed the “bloody sultan” saw the restoration of the 1876 constitution as a principal political goal. By the 1880s a significant minority of Armenians, many of them from Russian Transcaucasia, conceived of revolution as the only means to protect and promote the Armenians. A new idea of the Armenian nation as secular, cultural, and based on language as well as shared history challenged the older clerical understanding of Armenians as an ethnoreligious community centered on faith and membership in the Armenian Apostolic Church. Faced by what they saw as the imminent danger of national disintegration, Armenian radicals turned toward “self-defense,” the formation of revolutionary political parties, and political actions that would encourage Western or Russian intervention into Ottoman affairs. For the young nationalists revolution was the “logical conclusion” of the impossibility of significant reforms coming from the state.

In 1894 Armenian refusal to pay taxes to Kurdish lords led to clashes between Kurds and Armenians in Sassun, the intervention of state troops, and the killing of hundreds of Armenians. Abdul Hamid decided to deal with the Armenian Question “not by reform but by blood.” This violence would later be read by Armenians as the first stage of a series of massacres that would
culminate in the genocide of 1915. But unlike the genocide, these massacres in eastern Anatolia in 1894–1896, which were largely carried out by Kurdish tribes and local lords, were part of an effort by the state to restore the old equilibrium in interethnic relations, in which the subject peoples accepted with little overt questioning the dominance of the Ottoman Muslim elite. That equilibrium, however, had already been upset by the sultan’s own policies of centralization and bureaucratization, as well as his strategic alliance with Muslim Kurds against Christian Armenians. This pan-Islamic policy, which was institutionalized in the formation of irregular “Hamidiye” units of armed Kurds, helped to undermine the customary system of imperial rule as much as did the emerging re-envisioning of nationality borrowed from the West.96

In his later memoirs Abdul Hamid sketched his private feelings about the Armenians, gendering them as womanly and cowardly.

Although it is impossible to deny that the Armenians dwelling in our eastern provinces are a great many times well founded in their complaints, it is fitting to say also that they exaggerate. Armenians look as if they are crying for a pain they don’t feel at all. Hiding behind the great powers, they are a nation [millet] who raise an outcry for the smallest of causes and are cowardly and coy like a woman. Just to the contrary, Kurds are strong and quarrelsome.... In those regions [buralarda] the Kurds have always been considered as the gentlemen and the Armenians the male servants [suak, also boy, youth].

In a memorandum to the British, the sultan defended his actions as necessary for maintaining order:

His Imperial Majesty treated the Armenians with justice and moderation, and, as long as they behaved properly, all toleration would be shown to them, but he had given orders that when they took to revolt or to brigandage the authorities were to deal with them as they dealt with the authorities.97

The Sultan’s language would be repeated by other officials and would echo in the justifications of the Young Turks and the apologist historians who would later attempt to reconceive state-initiated massacres as “necessary,” figments of Armenian imagination, or a Muslim-Christian civil war. Yet the continuity in the rhetoric about these events should not obscure the difference between Abdul Hamid’s essentially conservative and restorationist policy toward unruly subjects and the Young Turks’ far more revolutionary attempt to remove a major irritant.
Social differentiation among millets and the resultant tensions existed throughout the
nineteenth century, but the frames in which they were given meaning changed. The inferior
status of Muslims in the industrial and commercial world generated resentments toward Arme-
nians and foreigners. Ottoman westernizers recognized that the Muslims were the least prepared
of the millets to adopt western ways and would require the state to assist their progress. To
religious Muslims the visibility of better-off Armenians in the capital and towns appeared as an
intolerable reversal of the traditional Muslim-\textit{dhimmi} hierarchy that, in turn, increased resent-
ments toward Christians. Turkish patriots constructed Armenians as disloyal subjects suspi-
ciously sympathetic to Europeans. Whatever resentments the poor peasant population of eastern
Anatolia may have felt toward the people in towns—the places where they received low prices
for their produce, where they felt their social inferiority most acutely, where they were alien to
and unwanted by the better-dressed people—were easily transferred to the Armenians.\(^9\) In a
particularly toxic mix, religion, anxiety about class status, xenophobia, and general insecurity
about the impersonal transformations of modern life combined to create resentments and hostili-
ties toward the Armenians.\(^9\)

Yet ethnic differences, hostilities, and even conflict need not have become genocidal.
That would require a major strategic decision by elites in power. Though Abdul Hamid used
violence to keep his Armenian subjects in line, he did not consider the use of mass deportation to
change the demographic composition of Anatolia. He remained a traditional imperial monarch
prepared to use coercion when persuasion failed to maintain the unity as well as the multiplicity
and diversity of his empire. More fundamental ideological shifts took place before the images of
Armenians as subversive and alien appeared absolutely incompatible with the empire as it was
being reconceived.

In the second half of the nineteenth century Turkic intellectuals, both in the Ottoman and
Russian empires, stimulated interest in a new conception of a “Turkish” nation. Responding to
the works of European orientalists who discussed an original Turkic or Turanian race, men like
Ismail Gasprinskii in Crimea, Mirza Fethali Akhundov in Transcaucasia, and Huseynizade Ali
Bey from Baku, attempted to teach pride in being Turkish and in speaking a Turkic language. Identification with a supranational community of Turks distinguished the “race” or “nation” of the Turks from the multinational Ottoman state. Yet inherent in that identity with the Turkic was a confusion about the boundaries of the nation and the location and limits of the fatherland (vatan). Was the homeland of the Turks Anatolia or the somewhat mystical Turan of Central Asia?

The Turkish revolutionary elite at the turn of the century, including those who emerged from the Young Turk committees to lead the Kemalist movement, grew out of an intellectual milieu that exalted science, rejected religion, and borrowed freely from Western sociology. Influenced by the ideas of Charles Darwin, Claude Bernard, Ludwig Buchner, even the phrenology of Gustave Le Bon (who “proved” that intellectuals have larger craniums by doing research in Parisian millinery shops), “the Young Turk ideology was originally ‘scientific,’ materialist, social Darwinist, elitist, and vehemently antireligious; it did not favor representative government.” Neither liberals nor constitutionalists, the Young Turks were étatists who saw themselves as continuing the work of the Tanzimat reformers—Mustafa Reshid Pasha, Mustafa Fazil Pasha, Midhat Pasha—and the work of the Young Ottomans. Earlier, Ottoman westernizers had hoped to secure western technology without succumbing to western culture, somehow to preserve Islam but make the empire technologically and militarily competitive with the West. Reform had always come from above, from westernizing statesmen and bureaucrats, a response to a sense that the empire had to change or collapse. The Young Turks shared those values, but steadily added new elements of nationalism to their imperial étatism.

Many of the Turanists argued for a purified Ottoman Turkish language, freed of Arabic and Persian words, that would serve as the language of this Turkic nation and also serve as the official language for the non-Turkic peoples of the empire, those that made up the Ottoman millet. The Young Turk government passed resolutions reaffirming Turkish as the official language of the empire, requiring all state correspondence to be carried on in Turkish, and establishing Turkish as the language for teaching in elementary and higher education, with local lan-
guages to be taught in secondary schools. Not surprisingly, the Young Turk promotion of Turkish was seen by non-Turks as a deliberate program of Turkification. Not only Greeks and Armenians, but Arabs as well, resisted some of the modernizing programs of the CUP that at one and the same time attempted to universalize rules and obligations for all peoples of the empire and threatened to undermine the traditional privileges and autonomies enjoyed under the millet system.

The prevalence of a nationalist template among Armenian and Turkish leaders at the end of the Ottoman period reinforced and essentialized differences between the peoples of the empire. To a considerable degree religious distinctions were transmuted by both the Armenians and the Turks into national and racial differences, far more indelible and immutable than religion. At the same time economic competition in a hard economic environment and struggles among Turks, Kurds, and Armenians over the limited resource of land intensified interethnic tensions. Stereotypes on both sides had long existed, but changes in relative status, particularly the perceived reversal of the Muslim-dhimmi hierarchy, created the kinds of fear and anxiety about the future that political entrepreneurs could exploit. Ultimately, however, the launching of genocidal violence in 1915 came, not from the transmutation of identities and the accompanying stereotypes, not from the accumulating tensions, but from the initiative of the state.

The Young Turk leaders’ suspicions about Armenians as subversives intensified with the initial defeats of the Ottomans in the Sarikamish campaign of the winter of 1914. In the context of imminent collapse of the empire in 1915, with the Russians threatening in the east and the Australians and British landing at Gallipoli, the Young Turk government decided to demobilize Armenian soldiers, attack the villages around Van and then the city itself, arrest Armenian intellectuals and parliamentarians in Istanbul (April 24, 1915), and order the deportations of their Armenian subjects. The state removed all legal restraints on violence toward Armenians, indeed encouraged theft and murder, punished those who protected the Armenians, and created a cycle of violence that grew from the local to the whole of eastern and central Anatolia.
It was in this context of desperation and defeat that, beginning in the first months of 1915, the Ottoman authorities demobilized Armenian soldiers from the Ottoman Army, at first organizing them into work brigades and then forcing them to dig their own graves before being shot. As rumors spread of Turkish violence against Armenian villagers, Armenians in Van organized to protect themselves in April. Their activity was painted as a revolutionary uprising, and fighting broke out in the streets. The advancing Russians took the city, but those Armenians who lived behind Turkish lines now became the targets of a massive campaign to remove them from the region. To prevent any further organized resistance by the Armenians, the Ottoman government rounded up the leading Armenian intellectuals, political leaders, and even members of the Ottoman parliament in Istanbul and exiled them from the capital on April 24, the date that later would be commemorated as Genocide Day. Most of them perished at the hands of the authorities.

The argument often employed by Turkish leaders to Western and German diplomats who protested against the treatment of the Armenians was that the precarious condition of the empire and the requirements to defend the state justified the repression of “rebellion.” In a telling interview with the American ambassador, Henry Morgenthau, Talaat conveyed the complex of reasons that influenced the decision to eliminate Anatolian Armenians. “I have asked you to come to-day,” began Talaat, “so that I can explain our position on the whole Armenian subject. We base our objections to the Armenians on three distinct grounds. In the first place, they have enriched themselves at the expense of the Turks. In the second place, they are determined to domineer over us and to establish a separate state. In the third place, they have openly encouraged our enemies.” In his own terms the Grand Vizier spoke of the status reversal of Armenians and Turks (“they have enriched themselves at the expense of the Turks” and “are determined to domineer over us”). He also alluded to the government’s fear of Armenian separatism and the breakup of the empire, and the collaboration of Armenians with the Russians.

In his posthumously published memoirs Talaat revealed the thinking of the authorities at the moment of decision and how the deportations escalated into mass killing that involved
ordinary civilians. Though he attempts to apologize for unintended excesses, he tells more about the motivations for mass killing than more recent apologists have.

The Porte, acting under the same obligation, and wishing to secure the safety of its army and its citizens, took energetic measures to check these uprisings. The deportation of the Armenians was one of these preventive measures.

I admit also that the deportation was not carried out lawfully everywhere. In some places unlawful acts were committed. The already existing hatred among the Armenians and Mohammedans, intensified by the barbarous activities of the former, had created many tragic consequences. Some of the officials abused their authority, and in many places people took preventive measures into their own hands and innocent people were molested. I confess it. I confess, also, that the duty of the Government was to prevent these abuses and atrocities, or at least to hunt down and punish their perpetrators severely. In many places, where the property and goods of the deported people were looted, and the Armenians molested, we did arrest those who were responsible and punished them according to the law. I confess, however, that we ought to have acted more sternly, opened up a general investigation for the purpose of finding out all the promoters and looters and punished them severely....

The Turkish elements here referred to were shortsighted, fanatical, and yet sincere in their belief. The public encouraged them, and they had the general approval behind them. They were numerous and strong....

Their open and immediate punishment would have aroused great discontent among the people, who favored their acts. An endeavor to arrest and to punish all those promoters would have created anarchy in Anatolia at a time when we greatly needed unity. It would have been dangerous to divide the nation into two camps, when we needed strength to fight outside enemies.105

The murder of Armenians was not motivated primarily by religious fanaticism, though distinctions based on religion played a role. Religion, even as it progressively mutated into an ethnic distinction, remained a principal marker of difference. While most victims of the massacres were condemned to deportation or worse because of their ethnoreligious identification, there were many cases in which people were saved from death or deportation when they converted to Islam.106 The identity of Armenians for the Turks was not as indelibly fixed as the identity of Jews would be in the racist imagination of the Nazis. Still, the collective stereotypes of Armenians as grasping and mercenary, subversive and disloyal, turned them into a alien and unsympathetic category that then could be eliminated.
The Turks who turned on the Armenians believed that a great injustice had been done to them. They had been humiliated by the Armenians, reduced in their self-esteem, made vulnerable by those who should have been subordinate to them. By all rights Turks and Muslims should have dominated society, the state, and the economy in a Turkish empire, but the Armenians had betrayed their benevolent Ottoman masters and undermined the stability of the state and the safety of its people by joining forces with the Russians and Europeans. Untrustworthy, deceptive, treacherous, the Armenians were an existential threat to the empire and to Islam. Fear and anger metastasized into resentment and hatred. The Armenians had to be eliminated or they would destroy all that the Young Turks valued.

CONCLUSIONS

Fear, anger, hatred, and resentment remain powerful motivators in the politics of the present. Far too often historians and other social scientists use explanations that emphasize emotions without specifying either that they are about emotions, which emotions are at play, and what the action tendency of those emotions is likely to be. Recognition of the power of emotions does not imply that rational calculation is not also involved. Rather, it suggests that the complex ways in which reason is affected by emotion, and how emotions are often “rationalized,” made reasonable, must be carefully explored.

In an age such as ours in which governments raise the level of public anxiety by changing the color of security alerts, at a moment when the threat of terrorism has become a palpable (though in my opinion, largely manufactured) fear, it is even more urgent that we think through the role of emotions in politics. After all, terrorism is about producing fear; that’s what terrorists do—they use a psychological weapon to reach their political goals. If the public is afraid, or reacts from fear, thus aiding the terrorists in their struggle against it, it is probable that subsequent actions taken out of fear, anger, hatred, or a sense of retribution or revenge, while providing temporary solace, will lead not to greater security but to inappropriate and counterproductive activities. It is certainly questionable whether decisions made two years ago, when the level of
excitement and anxiety in the United States was very high, have reduced the sense of insecurity or made the country safer than it was before 9/11. By turning toward war a people invite a descent into the most uncontrollable of emotions, those associated with hatred of the other and intolerance of difference, sacrifice and heroism, killing and death.
NOTES


2 “Emotions were banished from the study of social movements, to a very large extent, in reaction against a tradition of collective behavior analysis that ran from le Bon through Turner and Killian and Neil Smelser. This older tradition approached collective behavior mainly from the outside, as something that irrational others engaged in.” [Craig Calhoun, “Putting Emotions in Their Place,” in Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta (eds.), *Passionate Politics*, p. 48]

3 “Thus, in order to legitimate protest movements, with which they were largely sympathetic, they ignored emotions and implicitly accepted the assumptions of rational choice theory, embracing the false dichotomy of emotions and rationality.” [Aminzade and McAdam, “Emotions and Contentious Politics,” p. 21]

4 This effort is in line with the work of other social scientists who are turning toward emotions. Note, for example, the political scientists George E. Marcus and Michael B. Mackuen, who write, “To move forward, we need to extend the information-processing model beyond the contemporary restriction to cognition. Thus, we turn to matters of emotion…” [“Anxiety, Enthusiasm, and the Vote: The Emotional Underpinnings of Learning and Involvement During Presidential Campaigns,” *American Political Science Review* LXXXVII, 3 (September 1993), p. 673]


14 See, for example, William Reddy’s definition, which requires a careful reading of the early part of his book: “An emotion is a range of loosely connected thought material, formulated in varying codes, that has goal-relevant valence and intensity…that may constitute a ‘schema’ (or a set of loosely connected schemas or fragments of schemas)’ this range of thoughts tends to be activated together … but, when activated, exceeds attention’s capacity to translate it into action or into talk in a short time horizon.” (Reddy, *Navigation of Feeling*, p. 94)

15 Damasio, *Descartes’ Error*, p. 139.

16 Damasio writes, “In general, I use emotion for a collection of changes occurring in both brain and body, usually prompted by particular mental content. Feeling is the perception of those changes.” (Ibid., p. 270)


19 Ibid., pp. 38–39.


22 For Damasio body, brain, and emotions are all linked; emotions begin in the body and quickly affect the mind, which exists in the brain/body. He told an interviewer for the *Financial Times*, “Emotion is the primary process that starts the chain and prepares your body in act in a particular way. Emotion is public in the sense that it produces observable changes in the body.” He distinguishes emotion from feeling, which is private and internal. Elster disagrees with Damasio’s idea that emotions are indispensable for rational decision-making because they help individuals make up their mind among choices. [Strong Feelings, p. 159]

23 Ibid., pp. 70, 71.


29 Ibid., p. 21.


32 Elster, *Strong Feelings*, p. 11.

33 Ibid., p. 98.

34 There are those, of course, who disagree. Elster, for example, believes that “there is no doubt that common sense has got it right: emotions are involuntarily undergone rather than consciously chosen, events rather than actions.” Some emotions, like fear, are set off by perceptions rather than cognition, and the resultant behavior is automatic rather than willful. Fear triggers “action without choice,” behavior that is intentional but not guided by consequences. Panicky flight might lead you away from the lion but toward an unseen cliff. But even he agrees that while “the emotion arises independently in the mind, its further course can be subject to choice.” “When an emotion is not under the control of choice, it may be an obstacle to (minimal or rational) choice.” Elster’s position here is close to that of Reddy, who says he is attacking constructionism but in fact is attacking a “strong version” that claims that every aspect of emotional behavior is constructed. (Elster, *Strong Feelings*, p. 150, 155, 153)


38 Ibid., pp. 256–257.


41 Ibid., pp. 138–139.
42 Ibid., p. 141.
43 Ibid., p. 145.
44 Ibid., p. 147.


46 “To participate effectively in legitimate political discourse, one needed to claim to speak on behalf of the national interest rather than for the egotistical interests of one’s own estate.” [Matt Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism: The Transformation of Prussian Political Culture, 1806–1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 94]

47 “Every nation is one people, having its own national form, as well as its own language: the climate, it is true stamps on each its mark, or spreads over it a slight veil, but not sufficient to destroy the original national character.” [Ideen translated as Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man by T. O. Churchill (2 vols., London, 1800–1803), p. 166.] Nature (or God) created the plurality of languages and cultures, or, as Isaiah Berlin puts it, “A nation is made what it is by ‘climate,’ education, relations with its neighbours, and other changeable and empirical factors, and not by an impalpable inner essence or an unalterable factor such as race or colour.” [Isaiah Berlin, Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History of Ideas (New York: Viking Press, 1976), p. 163] Larry Wolfe further elaborates: “For Herder a people’s identity lay in its folklore, its ancient customs, the historical archive by which it might be studied and identified. Herder’s anthropological approach was aimed not at forming the identities of peoples [as Rousseau had proposed], but at recognizing them and locating them on ‘the map of mankind.’” [Wolfe, Inventing Eastern Europe, p. 311]

48 Iggers, The German Conception of History, p. 41.


52 Ibid., p. 16.


54 Cited in Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism, p. 97.

55 Ibid., p. 114.

56 Gellner goes on: “Nations, unlike the brotherhood of man favoured by the Enlightenment, are exclusive cubs. They are based on sentiment, partly because this links them to the vitality, the colour of life, which
is precisely the point at which the Romantics were most at odds with the Enlightenment.” [Ernest Gellner, *Nationalism* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), pp. 67–68]

57 This point was made by Barbara H. Rosenwein, a pioneer in the history of emotions in medieval studies, at a workshop on emotions organized at the University of Chicago by Sheila Fitzpatrick, November 24, 2003.


62 Reviewing six case studies by other authors that examine ethnic violence from Northern Ireland, India, Sudan, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and the Balkans, Fearon and Laitin make this point graphically: “Indeed, based on these studies, one might conjecture that a necessary condition for sustained ‘ethnic violence’ is the availability of thugs (in most cases young men who are ill-educated, unemployed or underemployed, and from small towns) who can be mobilized by nationalist ideologues, who themselves, university educated would shy away from killing their neighbors with machetes.” [James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” *International Organization*, LIV, 4 (Autumn 2000) (pp. 845–877), p. 869]

63 Ibid., p. 871.

64 See, for example, the work of Bogdan Denich, V. P. Gagnon,

66 Lake and Rothchild (eds.), *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict*, p. 4.


69 Ibid., p. 34.

70 Ibid., p. 24.

71 Ibid., p. 25. Kaufman is indebted here to Anthony Smith’s definition and analysis of ethnicity, and to Crawford Young and Donald Horowitz for their notion of symbolic politics.

72 Ibid., p. 28.


74 Ibid.

75 Ibid., pp. 3, 4.

76 Ibid., p. 4.

77 Ibid., p. 19.

78 Ibid., p. 25.

79 Marcus and Mackuen, “Anxiety, Enthusiasm, and the Vote,” p. 672.

80 Ibid., pp. 680–681.

81 Ibid., p. 681.


84 Ibid., pp. 66, 67.

85 On attribution error, see T. F. Pettigrew, “The Ultimate Attribution Error: Extending Allport’s Cognitive Analysis of Prejudice,” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* (1979), 5, pp. 461–476. Pettigrew suggests that the “ultimate attribution error” is the propensity of a group to see its own positive behavior as stemming from internal causes and its negative behavior as caused externally, while believing that its opponents negative behavior stems from within and its positive behavior is enforced from outside.


88 “[T]he mobilization of emotions are a necessary and exceedingly important component of any significant instance of collective action.” But “the mobilization of heightened emotion is necessary, but not sufficient, for an episode of contention.” In other words, “the mobilization of strong emotions do not ‘cause’ movements or revolutions, but… otherwise favorable environmental circumstances (for example the presence of established organizations, expanding political opportunities, population pressures, and so on) will not produce a movement in the absence of heightened emotions.” [Aminzade and McAdam, “Emotions and Contentious Politics,” pp. 14–15, 17]

89 Ibid., pp. 33–34


94 “Logical conclusion” comes from Libaridian.

95 The words are those of the sultan as conveyed by Grand Vizier Said Pasha when he fled to the British Embassy in December 1895. Quoted in Astourian, “Testing World-Systems Theory, Cilicia (1830s–1890s),” p. 606.


99 . For a particularly telling reading of Turkish attitudes toward the giaour (unbeliever) and Armenians, see Stephan Astourian’s analysis of Turkish proverbs in Astourian, “Testing World-Systems Theory, Cilicia (1830s–1890s),” pp. 409–431.

100 On the development of the separate nationalisms of the peoples of the Ottoman Empire, see Fatma Muge Gocek, “Decline of the Ottoman Empire and the Emergence of Greek, Armenian, Turkish and Arab Nationalisms,” unpublished paper.

101 Ibid., p. 32.
According to Sukru Hanioglu, the historian of its early years, “The Young Turk movement was unquestionably a link in the chain of the Ottoman modernization movement as well as representing the modernist wing of the Ottoman bureaucracy.” [Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, p. 17]

Hasan Kayali argues that the Young Turks “subscribed to the supranational ideal of Ottomanism” rather than to “a Turkish nationalist cultural or political program.” (p. 14) “The Young Turks did not turn to Turkish nationalism but rather to Islamism as the ideological underpinning that would safeguard the unity and continuity of what was left of the empire. Islam became the pillar of the supranational ideology of Ottomanism, with religion imparting a new sense of homogeneity and solidarity.” (p. 15) Therefore, the perception of Turkification on the part of non-Turks, he claims, was incorrect. My own understanding is that rather than primarily dedicated to a pan-Islamic policy, as Kayali argues, the Young Turks adopted different orientations toward different constituencies and that there was no overriding consensus, let alone unanimity, among the Young Turks on ideology. He seems closer to the mark when he writes, “The Young Turks envisaged the creation of a civic-territorial, indeed revolutionary-democratic, Ottoman political community by promoting an identification with the state and country through the sultan and instituting representative government. Though they remained committed to the monarchy within the constitutional framework, they conceived of an Ottoman state and society akin to the French example in which religion and ethnicity would be supplanted by ‘state-based patriotism’.” (p. 9) [Hasan Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1997)]

The difficulty of assessing the weight of nationalism and Ottomanism among the Young Turks is reflected in the work of Nyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964). Writing about the period just before World War I, Berkes argues, “When, later rival parties became harbingers of anti-Ottoman nationalism, Turkish nationalism gained some influence in the Society, but never replaced Ottomanism.” (p. 329) Much of his book is concerned about three competing schools of thought among the Young Turks from 1908 to 1918: the Westernist, the Islamist, and the Turkist.

