Notes from the Chair

We are coming to the end of the 1998–1999 academic year at Berkeley. During these months we have witnessed dramatic and sometimes tragic developments in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, beginning with the financial and political crisis in Russia and concluding with the recent events in Kosovo. In an effort to explore these and other phenomena in our region, the Center for Slavic and East European Studies organized a variety of lectures, symposia, bag lunches, and seminars for the Berkeley campus and broader community. The spring semester has been particularly intense—the Slavic Center and the Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies convened four major conferences presenting multidisciplinary, comparative, and historical approaches to the contemporary problems of our part of the world.

The XXIII Annual Berkeley-Stanford Conference on March 12, 1999 took up the theme, “New Elites in Post-Communist Societies.” A distinguished group of colleagues from both campuses came together to discuss reconfigurations of elite groups since the collapse of Communism, with special attention to developments in society, the economy, culture, education, and politics. Approaching these issues from many different disciplinary perspectives, the speakers dealt with the composition, role, recruitment, circulation, and representation of elites. The highly informative talk by Professor Thomas Simons, former US Ambassador to Poland, will be reprinted in the fall issue of the Newsletter.

The topic of our Teachers’ Outreach Conference, “Coping with Crises: International Responses to Instability and Disorder in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union,” was particularly timely. Held on April 11–12, the conference gathered experts from Berkeley and elsewhere to consider the workings of international institutions and organizations (for example, United Nations, NATO, OSCE, the European Union, the IMF, and the World Bank) as they pertain to security issues and conflict resolution in our region. We believed that our conference would be relevant to current issues, but we could not have foreseen the concurrent unfolding of events in Kosovo. The conference served to highlight many important factors and perspectives. One recurring theme was the symbolism and function of historical analogies in the mobilization of both leaders and populations.

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On April 30, the Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies convened the annual Caucasus conference, devoted this year to “State Building and the Reconstruction of Shattered Societies.” Topics addressed included historical legacies and the role of outsiders in contributing to, or undermining, stability in the region; comparative economic performance and prospects for recovery; comparative leadership strategies; the cultural heritage of the peoples of the Caucasus and the relationship between tradition and “modernity” in the region; coping strategies for surviving the turmoil of the past ten years; and the relationship between weak states, paramilitary organizations, and political instability.
In mid-May, a group of scholars from the US, Western Europe, and Russia gathered for a working conference, “Russia on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century: Stability or Disorder?” Sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation, the conference brought to a culmination two years of research by distinguished scholars in the Russian field, including sociologists, political scientists, and economists. Over two days, we discussed thirteen papers (soon to be included in an edited volume) designed to assess Russia’s development in the 1990s and prospects for the country’s future.

On May 13, we benefited from a public lecture by the Ambassador of the Czech Republic to the United States, the Honorable Alexandr Vondra. Following the lecture, invited guests, students, faculty, staff, and Associates of the Slavic Center enjoyed his company at a reception at the Faculty Club. We were also joined by the Consul General of the Czech Republic, Ivana Hlavsova, the Honorary Consul General, Richard Pivnicka, and the University’s Vice Chancellor for Research, Joseph Cerny.

The summer is a welcome time for us at the Center, enabling us to take stock of the previous academic year and to prepare for the one ahead. Plans are already in place for our annual Colin Miller Memorial Lecture, to be held on November 9. Professor William Brumfield, a distinguished specialist on Russian art and architecture and a professor in the Slavic department at Tulane University, will be our guest lecturer.

We are now also exchanging goodbyes with our brilliant visiting scholars, speakers, and faculty, including Sergei Arutunov who was our NSEP visiting professor on the Caucasus and, together with his wife, Natasha Zhukovskaya, added so much to the community. Stephan Astourian, in Los Angeles during the summer, will be returning to Berkeley in the fall as the 1999–2000 William Saroyan Visiting Professor of Armenian Studies. Other visitors who enriched our program this year include Leila Aliyeva, Ford visiting scholar on the Caucasus; Josef Brada, professor at the Department of Economics and director of the College of Business International Programs at Arizona State; Vladimir Degoev, professor and chair of the Department of Russian History and Caucasian Studies at North Ossetian State University; Pauline Gianoplus, Mellon postdoctoral fellow for 1998–1999 with the Sawyer Seminar on Entrepreneurs, Entrepreneurialism, and Democracy in Communist and Post-Communist Societies; Issa Guliev and Firuza Ozdoeva who worked with Professor Johanna Nichols on her extensive Ingush-English dictionary project; Gayane Hagopian who taught Armenian language and culture in the Department of Near Eastern Studies this year; Serguei Miniaev, senior scientific researcher with the Institute of History of Material Culture at the Russian Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg; and our research associates, Alma Kunanbaeva and Izaly Zemtsovsky who shared their broad expertise by teaching courses on Kazakh language and culture, Central Asia, and giving lectures on a myriad of topics.

I want to take this opportunity to wish colleagues, graduate students, staff, friends, and Associates of the Slavic Center a restful vacation. Special thanks to Barbara Voytek and Ned Walker for their contribution to making the Center such a vibrant and innovative community.

Victoria Bonnell
Chair, Center for Slavic and East European Studies
Professor, Department of Sociology

Library News

The URL for the ISI Emerging Markets Web site listed on page 12 is not accessible to the UC Berkeley community. Those with a Berkeley IP address should go to the URL <http://~@~www.securities.com/> which allows access by IP recognition.

Faculty and Student News


AAAASS Convention Participants

The list of Berkeley participants in the AAASS 1998 Convention did not appear in its entirety. Allan Urbanic’s contribution was truncated, and Ilya Vinkovetsky was not mentioned. The following information should have been included on page 17:

Allan Joseph Urbanic, Slavic Collections Librarian, chaired the panel discussion entitled “New Models of Library Technical Processing and Their Impact on Slavic and East European Collections.” He also presented a paper entitled “CD–Roms From Eastern Europe” at the panel on “Sound and Lights in Research Libraries: The Academic Role of Non-Print Resources.”

Ilya Vinkovetsky, Ph.D. candidate in history, presented a paper entitled “Eurasianism of the 1920s and 1930s” at the panel on “The Founders of Eurasianism.”

Corrections to the Spring 1999 Issue

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Slavic Center Reports on Kosovo

Throughout the academic year, the Slavic Center hosted a series of lectures and round-table discussions dealing with the crisis in Kosovo in order to better inform the university community and the public about the background of the conflict, to provide analyses of the current situation, and to discuss the future prospects of the region:


April 8, 1999. “Kosovo: Background of a Tragedy,” lecture by Ellen Comisso, professor of political science, University of California, San Diego. Cosponsored by the Center for German and European Studies.


The transcripts of these events are summarized below by Anna Wertz, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History.

The Lesser Nationality

Anyone trying to understand the disintegration of Yugoslavia must begin with a theory of ethnic hatred. Are we merely witnessing the newest incarnation of centuries-old strife—or even just the latest example of human nature at its worst—or is this a new phenomenon created by opportunist who foment extreme nationalism as a means to political power in an era of instability?

This question becomes all the more complex when one looks at the question of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo who have the least in common with the other nationalities who make up the ethnic mix of Yugoslavia. As Veljko Vujacic pointed out in his November lecture on “The Roots of the Conflict,” it is not insignificant that the ethnic Albanians are not southern Slavs: they do not speak or for the most part understand a Slavic language and do not practice the Orthodox religion. These factors have helped other Yugoslavians to consider the ethnic Albanians outsiders, and their integration into a greater Yugoslavia has been, according to Vujacic, one of “the most intractable problems” facing the Yugoslav state from its inception. The failure of Albanian integration into Yugoslav society, Vujacic emphasized, is a fact; it is not a fiction “manipulated and invented by nationalists: it was a problem from the very foundation of the state.” And it is the failed “solution” to this problem that makes up the background of the recent strife over Kosovo.

Even before the foundation of Yugoslavia after World War I, Kosovo was an ethnically divided region where persecutor and persecuted exchanged roles many times over. During the Ottoman rule, Serbs and other Orthodox groups were in an inferior position. After the Period of Crisis in 1878, there were many instances of persecution of Serbs and Montenegrins, which were met with retributions by Serbia, which finally dominated after 1918. Despite the internationalist ideology of the Communists, this pattern of ethnic violence and “status reversal” continued into the post-World War II period. When Kosovo, part of an Italian-sponsored greater Albania, was reclaimed for Yugoslavia, Serb and Montenegrin colonists were persecuted and expelled.

The ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, however, were reluctant to join the Communists, who had great difficulty mobilizing the population when they began forming party cells in 1943 and 44. The Albanians were also dissatisfied with their new status as citizens of a Yugoslav state. “Even in Communist Yugoslavia, where other nationalities seemed more satisfied with the status they had gained (at least until the 1960s),” Vujacic explained, “the ‘Kosovo problem’ remained: how to integrate this population which is non-Slavic, which speaks the language poorly, which has a high demographic rate of growth in a common Yugoslav state.” The problem arose—and persisted—not simply because most ethnic Albanians chose not to integrate themselves, but also because the other ethnic groups did not want them to become a part of Yugoslav society. “Uniformly—and I stand by this statement—not only Serbs, but all Yugoslavs did not get along with Albanians, did not want to get along with them, segregated themselves from them, and spoke perjoratively of them. On the scale of ethnic status, the Albanians occupied the lowest step on the ladder.”

Vujacic witnessed this mutual distrust and lack of cooperation himself when he served in the Yugoslav army in the 1980s, but he does not base his conclusions solely on his own experience. Several studies have documented the history of the simultaneous rise of Albanian and Yugoslav nationalism in Kosovo. When the Communist Party began to organize in Kosovo after the war, it recruited adherents with the promise of the autonomy, if not outright independence, of Kosovo in the Bujane Declaration of 1943, which later served as the basis for Albanian claims for autonomy. When it became clear in 1944 that the promise of Kosovar autonomy would not be met, there were Albanian uprisings, uprisings that were bloodily suppressed. In the decades to follow, the Communist government treated the Albanian mi-
ority with suspicion and maintained a tight control over Kosovo. The security forces in the region were made up almost entirely of non-Albanian, that is to say, Serbian and Montenegrin cadres, who, on the eve of Yugoslavia’s new minority policy in 1966, held 90 percent of positions in the Ministry of the Interior and made up 70 percent of the ranks of the police. It is not surprising, then, that the movement for liberalization which began in the late 1960s was accompanied by Albanian demands for autonomy.

Likewise, the assertion of Serbian nationalist interests against those of ethnic Albanians which began in this period, Vujacic explained, “are not simply an invention of Milosevic.” When Albanians were given relative autonomy in the policing of their region, high-level Serbian officials expressed concern at the results of this confederalizing trend, fearing that it would fuel the irredentist demands of the Albanians and could lead to a secessionist movement. Despite these warnings, in 1968 Albanian protests for more autonomy led to constitutional amendments in 1971 and again in 1974 which made Kosovo an autonomous province within Serbia with the status of a near-republic. Albanian became the official language, and local cadres were promoted to the regional government. By the 1980s, the fulfillment of Albanian demands for autonomy could be seen, as they were by one Yugoslav economist, as an indication of Serbia’s promotion of minority rights and a sign of a spirit of brotherhood and unity within Yugoslavia.

But it is precisely this minority policy, Vujacic claimed, that led to the present crisis. First of all, the expansion of Albanian autonomy in the 1970s did not translate into economic improvement. In fact, Kosovo in the 1980s persisted as a Third-World country within Yugoslavia with a backward economy and a traditional, clan-structured society controlled by a corrupt, wealthy elite. At the same time, with a growth rate of 2.5 percent per year by the mid-1980s, ethnic Albanians became Europe’s fastest growing population. A Yugoslav “affirmative action” policy allowed a new, larger generation of ethnic Albanians a university education at Pristina University in their native language. When they sought employment, however, these graduates faced a regional economy drained by the abuse and incompetence of local Serbian and Albanian cadres and a greater Yugoslavia which neither spoke their language nor, for the most part, have any interest in hiring them. This policy, in other words, created an educated and frustrated constituency with a vested interest in the promotion of Albanian nationalism, exacerbating instead of pacifying Albanian-Yugoslav relations. This new generation of Albanians saw the actions of the Yugoslav government, which infringed on Albanian civil society and drained its economy, as an extension of Serbian chauvinism.

In this period, Vujacic argued, the makeup of the Communist elite in Kosovo began to change, so that by 1978 two-thirds of the party organization was Albanian. And this new generation of Albanian members of the Kosov Communist leadership acquiesced to or shared the rising nationalist sentiment.

With the death of Tito in 1981, student demonstrations began in Kosovo with specific demands that quickly escalated to the demand for Albanian autonomy. These demonstrations were “the first sign that the multinational state was on the point of crisis,” and they ended with a death toll close to one thousand. From 1981 on, Kosovo was under some kind of military rule, and the proportion of Albanians relative to other Yugoslav nationalities persecuted for political crimes rose sharply: they accounted for 70 percent of prisoners with sentences longer than one year. This persecution only fueled the demand for autonomy.

Somewhat paradoxically, at the same time that Yugoslav authorities cracked down on Albanian political activists, Kosovo gained greater autonomy in a decentralizing Yugoslavia. In this period, Kosovo and Vojvodina became self-governing regions, and Serbia was not allowed to interfere in their right to home rule. At the same time, the outmigration of Serbs and Montenegro continued. The growing autonomy of an increasingly Albanian Kosovo led to the perception among Serbs that Kosovo was lost, lost to an irredentist and separatist enemy. “It became part of the official discourse,” Vujacic explained, “to say that the Albanians were striving to found an ethnically clean Kosovo. The term ‘ethnic cleansing’ was first used by Yugoslav officials in a negative sense to criticize ‘Albanian separatists.’”

Kosovo is Not Bosnia

For Vujacic, the crisis in Kosovo resulted from a flawed Communist nationality policy that fostered separatism where it intended to promote brotherhood. Ellen Comisso argued similarly that the relatively independent political status of Kosovo in a confederated Yugoslavia threatened Serbian interests. In a talk entitled “Background of a Tragedy,” she explained that as Kosovo became more solidly Albanian, through the outmigration—one might even say flight—of Serbs and the rising birth rate of Albanians, a relatively autonomous Kosovo became more and more of a menace to Serbians fearful of the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

Slobodan Milosevic’s solution to this fear, according to Comisso, was to try to create a strong, centralized Serbia to take over Yugoslavia. In the case of Kosovo, this meant that he removed the provincial leadership and replaced it with yes-men, and with the adoption of a new constitution in 1991, he revoked the region’s autonomous provincial status. His goal?—to make Kosovo Serbia again. But it is important to understand that this goal did not entail expelling Albanians from Kosovo, but rather bringing Serbs back by giving them jobs. To this end, Milosevic dismissed Albanians from posts at state enterprises and in government administration, closed universities and schools, and established, in effect, a Serbian colonial administration. The results were not quite what Milosevic had intended: the demographic proportions in Kosovo remained pretty much unchanged, while Albanian demands for autonomy grew.
The initial Albanian reaction to this policy, Comisso contended, was for the most part moderate. Urban intellectuals established a shadow government, which refused to recognize the legitimacy of the new Yugoslavia and practiced a policy of passive resistance. Since state positions were now reserved for Serbs, Albanians sought employment in a growing, liberalized private sector.

But not all Albanians participated in this combination of passive resistance tempered with a measure of accommodation to the new economic and political realities of Kosovo. If they had, Comisso explained, we would not now be so familiar with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The KLA began as a small group of extremists who wanted an armed uprising to throw off Serbian oppression. While Albanian moderates drew their numbers from urban areas, the KLA had largely rural support (a pattern, Comisso argued, that one sees repeated in the demographic breakdown of Serbian nationalists: Milosevic gets his support largely from rural areas.) The KLA had little support and little hope of achieving its objectives until 1997 when half a million arms went out in Albania and ended up largely in KLA arsenals. The KLA began with small operations aimed at Serbian policemen and Albanian “collaborators.” In 1998, with manpower and arms from Albania, the KLA attempted to take over a major town; in response, the Yugoslav army began systematic attacks on villages, particularly near the Albanian border, in an attempt to eliminate the KLA.

It is at this point that refugees began to leave Kosovo and NATO threatened Serbia with airstrikes. Yugoslavia agreed to withdraw forces and to have international monitors but withdrew the agreement as the KLA returned to demilitarized areas. At this point, the KLA had a new objective: to draw NATO into the situation. In drawing the West into the conflict, the KLA, Comisso said, was only adhering to “a Balkan tradition” of seeking outside help for revenge against one’s enemies.

But while the situation in Kosovo shares similarities with past Balkan conflicts, it is a mistake, according to Comisso, not to recognize its uniqueness. A key failure of the West, she argued, has been to assume that Kosovo was another Bosnia. “Kosovo is not Bosnia. But the United States has tried to apply the same strategy for stopping multiethnic violence in both regions,” she explained.

In the 1970s, when she was writing her dissertation, Comisso traveled across Yugoslavia from Montenegro to Pec. Kosovo was different from every other region in two ways: it was by far the poorest region, and this poverty heightened long-standing ethnic tensions. Comisso stressed that this was not the case in Bosnia, where ethnic tensions, if they existed, were not nearly so palpable. Bosnia was a relatively integrated society: the violence of recent years has dismembered what were functioning multiethnic communities. In Kosovo, by contrast, Serbs and Albanians were already segregated communities which did not readily mix. In Bosnia, intermarriage, if not commonplace, was unremarkable; in Kosovo, it was virtually unheard of.

This difference in relations among Yugoslavian regions and nationalities, Comisso argued, is not just a historical fact belonging to a Yugoslavia that has disappeared in the last decade. Rather, the differences between Kosovo and Bosnia have consequences for the current crisis. Using the Bosnia model, the United States delegation at Rambouillet tried to impose a plan on the warring parties. But the political situation and the political forces at the table were vastly different. Milosevic’s relationship to Bosnia was not the same as his attitude toward Kosovo: the Kosovo issue is central to his legitimacy as a Serbian leader, and he could not give it up without jeopardizing his hold on power. Likewise, Milosevic was much more willing to negotiate with the moderate political leadership that represented Bosnia at the Dayton Accords, than with the leaders of the KLA, a group of armed extremists. According to Comisso, by allowing the KLA to become part of the Albanian delegation, eclipsing the more moderate Albanian leadership and refusing to hear the objections of the Serbs, NATO lost its claim to neutrality.

Even so, the United States failed to satisfy even the KLA who turned down the Rambouillet plan because it did not promise independence. When NATO responded by trying to better accommodate the KLA, this only further alienated the Serbian side. The Serbs had understood the situation at Rambouillet not as an attempt at compromise, but an attempt to enforce with NATO military power the demands of the KLA. The Serbs understood, and rightly so, that if the KLA signed on and they did not, NATO would bomb Serbia.

NATO of course did begin bombing Serbia, and in Comisso’s view, has done so with the most confused and contradictory intentions possible. The bombing of Serbia made the Rambouillet agreement a dead letter, yet the purported goal of the bombing was to get Milosevic to accept the Rambouillet agreement. The bombing was intended to weaken Milosevic’s power; it has cemented it. The bombing was supposed to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. It has not prevented the shooting of all males of fighting age in villages suspected of sympathy with the KLA, and it has led to another human rights catastrophe: the mass expulsion of a million people from Kosovo. It was the bombing, according to Comisso, that made the expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo a sensible policy for the Serbs to follow: it became costlier to allow the Albanians to stay in Kosovo under de facto Serbian rule than to drive them out. The bombing was supposed to prevent ethnic strife from escalating in the Balkans. Instead the blocking of traffic on the Danube and the outflow of refugees has destabilized the political situation in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania.

If there is no logic to the purported foreign-policy goals of the bombing, Comisso argued, we must look at the domestic situation in the NATO countries for an explanation. Is this an attempt to find a new role for NATO, which is now no longer a defensive alliance protecting the security of its members, but an aggressive defender of “democracy”? Certainly, Russia is concerned about this new role of NATO as an offensive alliance. It may be that Bill Clinton, Tony
Blair, and Gerhardt Schröder want to display their liberal credentials to their domestic constituencies. Their domestic agenda has only exacerbated a foreign crisis with disastrous results.

**Hidden Wars**

As Xavier Bougarel expressed it in the opening remarks of his discussion on May 4, 1999 (“Kosovo: One War Can Hide Another”), “If you make a decision, [about the war] you are not paying with your own life but with the lives of others.” For Bougarel, it is important to investigate precisely what drove those in power in Belgrade, Kosovo, and NATO to enter a state of war.

Bougarel began his talk by dismissing the idea that this war is part of an “ancient conflict,” as even Serbs and Albanians sometimes maintain. “The Albanians will explain that they are the descendants of the Illyrians and that they were here before the Slavs arrived in the eighth century, and the Serbs will refer to the well-known battle of Kosovo.”

In fact, according to Bougarel, the Kosovo region was not at the center of either Serbian or Albanian nationalism until recently. While Serbian nationalism may have a longer history, nationalist feelings among Kosovo Serbs awakened only at the turn of this century. Likewise, Albanian nationalism as such appeared first in the south of Albania and was very late to arrive in Kosovo or in Macedonia. Even as late as World War II, Albanians had a Muslim, or Ottoman identity. Albanian nationalism crystallized only after the war, a result of the economic, cultural, and political transformations imposed by the Communist regime, which created a new class of professional elites who organized the first awakening of Albanian identity in Kosovo. The leaders of the KLA, for example, were students in Kosovo in the sixties and seventies who organized the student demonstrations. Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo, is also representative of this new Albanian elite: he was president of the Union of Writers of Kosovo before the end of Communist Yugoslavia.

According to Bougarel, rather than look for ancient conflict, we should seek more recent roots to the Kosovo crisis. Nationalist feelings on the part of Serbs and Albanians only came into open conflict in the last ten years. In this period, the Serbians tried first to suppress autonomy for the province and deny political rights and cultural freedom to the Albanians. At the beginning of the nineties, the Serbian parliament adopted a new law aiming to transform the demographic balance in Kosovo by silently expelling the Albanians from Kosovo—or encouraging their emigration to Western Europe—and resettling Serbians and Montenegrins in the region. At the same time, Albanian nationalists tried to make Kosovo a republic within Yugoslavia, and later fought for a completely independent Kosovo. In 1991, a gathering of all Albanian parties of former Yugoslavia decided that if Yugoslavia were to disappear, they would unify with Albania.

According to Bougarel, in reality, these two nationalist projects, the Serbian and the Albanian, were attempts to create a greater Serbia and a greater Albania. But it is not these plans in themselves that led to the war so much as internal contradictions and internal crises within the nationalist movements that gave rise to them. The war, Bougarel argued, is a crisis that hides the collapse of these nationalist projects.

In the case of Albania, the strategy of non-violent resistance chosen by Ibrahim Rugova and the Democratic League of Kosovo was a failure. The league could not bring international attention to the Kosovo problem and was not able to protect Albanian society from Serbian repression. The league expected Serbia to weaken, eventually allowing Albanian independence at a low price. While Serbia did indeed experience a very deep crisis, its military and police apparatus did not, and it was able to retain a hold on Kosovo at the expense of the Albanians.

The Serbs did not succeed, however, in changing the ethnic structure of Kosovo: very few Serbs wanted to settle in Kosovo. “Even the refugees of Krajina, Croatia, or other regions of Bosnia didn’t want to settle in Kosovo.” The policy of encouraging outmigration of Albanians was more successful: a significant group of Albanians from Kosovo emigrated to Western countries. But the result of this emigration was not so much the weakening of the Albanian community in Kosovo as the creation of a strong and wealthy Albanian émigré population able to finance the political and military efforts of its ethnic community. Thus Milosevic’s attempt to encourage Albanian outmigration only buttressed the Albanian nationalist movement. Likewise the repressive politics of the Milosevic regime eroded any Albanian allegiance to the Yugoslav state. “When you speak with Albanians who were in school in the sixties or seventies they have a sentimental link to Yugoslavia,” Bougarel explained. “Tito and Yugoslavia gave them school, gave them new housing, gave them social promotion. And when you speak with young Albanians, what has the Yugoslav state given them? What has Serbia given them? Only the war.”

By the end of the 1990s then, both the Serbian and the Albanian leaderships had failed to reach their objectives concerning Kosovo and were in crisis. The appearance of the KLA, a sign of the radicalization of Albanian nationalism, deepened internal conflict within the Albanian community, creating a struggle for legitimacy between it and the Democratic League of Kosovo. The international community, however, did not detect such disarray in the Kosovar and Serbian communities. It saw only a conflict between two essentially stable groups, Albanians and Serbs, where in reality there was a rapidly changing situation.

The war has brought unity where there was none. One of the few results of the Rambouillet negotiations was the creation of at least the appearance of unity among the Albanians, whose disparate factions all signed the agreement. Likewise, the air strikes have unified Serbs in continued on page 8
Web Sites on Kosovo and the Balkans

ON THE BALKANS

“Crisis in the Balkans: Historical Background and Current Developments in the Former Yugoslavia”
Center for Slavic and East European Studies, UC Berkeley
(conference on April 19–21, 1996)
http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~csees/outreach/balkans.html

Historical Maps of the Balkans
The Perry Castaneda Library Map Collection, the University of Texas at Austin
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCL/Map_collection/historical/history_balkans.html

ALBANIAN SITES  (Note: “Kosova” is the Albanian spelling.)
Kosova Press
http://kosovapress.com/
Kosova Info.com
http://www.kosovainfo.com/

SERBIAN GOVERNMENT SITES
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Official Web Site
http://www.gov.yu/
Kosovo and Metohija site
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
http://www.gov.yu/kosovo/
Serbian Ministry of Information

OTHER OFFICIAL SITES
NATO site
http://www.nato.int/
Kosovo site
US State Department
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/kosovo_hp.html

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOs)
6/30/98 news release on Kosovo
Amnesty International
The Institute for War & Peace Reporting
http://www.iwpr.net/
Current news will be on the front page; see also the “Balkan Crisis Reports” and “Yugoslav Media Monitoring” links.

Kosova page, with links
Institute for Global Communications
http://www.igc.org/igc/pn/hg/kosova.html

TEACHING UNITS
Kosovo: A Bitter Struggle in a Land of Strife
New York Times on the Web, Learning Network

Teaching unit on Kosovo
East European, Russian and Eurasian National Resource Center, Columbia University
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/sipa/REGIONAL/ECE/teachers.html
Contains a very complete list of links on Kosovo

NEWS SOURCES
Balkans Special Report
The Washington Post.com

In-depth: Kosovo in Crisis
CBC NEWS ONLINE

International News Summary
ABCNews.com
http://abcnnews.go.com/sections/world/index.html
Choose “raw news” link from the box on the top right side. These are raw news wire feeds from Reuters and AP.

Introduction to the Kosovo Conflict
Central Europe Online
http://www.centraleurope.com/ceo/special/kosovow/intro.html

Kosovo Front Page
MSNBC.com

NATO Air Strikes Fact Files
BBC Online Network
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/nato_interact/ns_interact.html

Special Report: A Beginner’s Guide to the Balkans
ABCNews.com
http://abcnnews.go.com/sections/world/balkans/index.html

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Kosovo Report, continued from page 6

opposition to NATO. “Many Serbs in Serbia didn’t identify with the war in Croatia or the war in Bosnia or even with the war in Kosovo,” said Bougarel. “When I was in Belgrade in January 1999, many people didn’t care about the war in Kosovo; no one was willing to die for Kosovo. But these air strikes have awakened other feelings, for example, the feeling of Yugoslav patriotism.”

“We have a situation now where we have in reality two wars,” Bougarel went on to explain. “We have a war of NATO against Serbia or Yugoslavia on one side and we have on the other side a war of Serbia or the Serbian community against the Albanians. Each of these two wars is hiding the other one.” The campaign against the KLA in Kosovo has been less a war and more a program of systematic ethnic cleansing. “If you see ruins in Kosovo,” Bougarel said, “you can see they are not ruins from fighting but ruins from ethnic cleansing. You have no shots in the walls and no shell holes, but the houses are burnt from inside.” For the most part the Serbian people do not care about the war in Kosovo or about the massive ethnic cleansing. They consider that ethnic cleansing is a just reward for the Albanians for bringing NATO into the conflict. According to Bougarel, the NATO bombing “gave [Milosevic] a good pretext for organizing a massive ethnic cleansing.”

This is also a hidden war in the sense that the supposed nationalist objectives of the Serbian and Albanian leadership masked their real intention: keeping power through the war. This was true of the case in Bosnia; it is also true in Serbia and Kosovo. Likewise, the war has helped the KLA to get money from the Diaspora and to strip the Democratic League of Kosovo of its legitimacy. NATO, which has proclaimed itself to be on a humanitarian mission, is in fact seeking to secure a new role for itself. This quest for legitimacy is something that NATO shares with Milosevic: “if you look at the Europe as a whole,” Bougarel argued, “these are the only two actors who have survived the Cold War. And, in a sense, both need this war in order to survive the disappearance of Communism in Europe.”

Prospero Seeing Caliban

On the twenty-seventh day of the bombing, the Slavic Center sponsored a panel discussion directed at understanding more deeply the intentions, true and stated, of NATO in this Balkan conflict. Like Bougarel and Comisso, the panelists—Eugene Hammel, Steven Weber, and Andrew Janos—expressed skepticism at NATO’s official explanations for entering the conflict and looked to historical patterns and world politics for a more suitable explanation.

Hammel’s intention, as he expressed it, was “to peel back the moralistic and humanitarian fig leaf that the Clinton administration and NATO have used to cover what I think are their real motivations in mounting this war.” According to Hammel, NATO was less interested in saving the Albanians—it had ignored similar humanitarian crises in the region; the expulsions in Krajina and Bosnia, for example. Instead, Hammel argued, “the United States came to believe that Slobodan Milosevic as the dictator of a rogue state with the largest army in the region was simply too dangerous to be left alone and had to be brought to heel.” Their intent was “to destroy his military machine with as little collateral damage as possible.”

In a sense, Hammel argued, this policy toward Serbia was a replay of the international reaction to the fear of Serbian expansionism before World War I. In the Balkan wars of 1910–12, Serbia had doubled its territory and gained access to the Adriatic, which was soon taken away by Italian and Austrian intervention. In 1914, of course, it was a Serbian terrorist assassination of Archduke Ferdinand that set off the chain reaction beginning the First World War. Serbian nationalist aims were further thwarted during the Communist period. Serbian nationalism was the greatest threat that the Tito regime faced, and Tito succeeded in holding Yugoslavia together as long as he suppressed as much as possible expressions of ethnicity in Yugoslavia. Milosevic’s solution to this problem has been ethnic cleansing.

Hammel then turned to the possible repercussions of the war, which was continuing at a cost of a billion dollars per month. (“At that price,” he noted, “we could have bought Kosovo.”) Hammel pointed to the possibility of conflict between Turkey and Greece and expressed concern at the surge of nationalist rhetoric in Russian domestic politics as a result of its international isolation. “As in 1919,” he argued, “we have a cordon sanitaire around Russia.”

Rather than taking a historical approach, Weber analyzed the NATO war against Serbia as an example of “coercive diplomacy.” “Wars often start from miscalculations,” he argued, “and this was no exception.” Like Comisso, Weber maintained that NATO’s miscalculation stemmed from assuming that Rambouillet was a replay of the Dayton Accords, that Kosovo was another Bosnia. NATO believed that the threat of force worked then and it would work again. NATO, therefore, was not expecting a long conflict and the more the conflict dragged on, the more disadvantageous its position. As Weber explained, “the idea behind coercive diplomacy is that you ratchet up the cost to the adversary. But bombing is more effective at the start of the war; it becomes less useful as the war drags on,” as the target list moves on to less crucial sites.

In Weber’s view, Serbia also miscalculated Russia’s role in the international conflict, believing that there would be substantial pressure on NATO not to alienate the Russians by going to war against Serbia. But sympathy for the Albanian refugees kept domestic constituencies in the NATO countries behind the war.

For Andrew Janos, the conflict in Kosovo represented not merely a war of miscalculation but of mistaken ideology. The NATO bombing resulted, first of all, from a “serious dereliction of duty and poor judgement.” Borrowing an
We have been busy with outreach this spring, putting on two public conferences and planning for the annual summer institute that is presented through the Office of Resources for International and Area Studies (ORIAS).

Our annual outreach conference, held over the weekend of April 10–11, was entitled “Coping with Crises: International Responses to Instability and Disorder in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union.” When we chose this topic last fall, we knew there would be plenty of issues to cover, but little did we know that the Balkans would once again explode into conflict, making our topic even more timely. “It is hard to take it seriously that we are there to save Albanian lives,” he said.

For Janos, the real goal of the war seems to be more ideological than practical, as evidenced by President Clinton’s speech of April 16. According to Janos, there Clinton sounded a “messianic, millennarian” note. For Clinton, the war was an attempt to save multiculturalism, to end tribalism and hatred of the other in Europe. “He wants to change human nature by this war,” Janos said, and has presented the public with a “Dostoevskian Dilemma.” Dostoevsky asked, “Would you kill and innocent child to save humanity?” The American public has been asked to save humanity by bombing Serbia.

In his attitude toward Milosevic, Janos went on to explain, Clinton “is like Prospero seeing Caliban,” the civilized man of multiculturalism facing a nationalist savage. Likewise, NATO represents for Milosevic a harbinger of enforced universalism. In this time of shifting world order, Janos remarked, “we do not have the new idiom, a common denominator of what is acceptable, and it may never come to pass.”
Annual Outreach Conference

Coping with Crises
International Responses to Instability and Disorder
In Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union
April 10–11, 1999

Josef Brada, professor of economics, Arizona State University, “The IMF and the World Bank…Selling Ideology or Selling Good Sense to Transition Economies?”

Ellen Comisso, professor of political science, UC San Diego, “The Crisis in Kosovo: Myths and Alternatives”

Elizabeth Cousens, director of research, International Peace Academy, “Organizing International Assistance in Peace-Building: the Case of Bosnia”

P. Terrence Hopmann, professor of political science, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, “The Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) and Europe’s Role in Conflict Management in Eurasia”

Wade Jacoby, visiting scholar, Department of Political Science, UC Berkeley, “Creating Stability through Disruption? The EU in Eastern Europe”

Andrew C. Janos, professor of political science, UC Berkeley, “Between Empire and Commonwealth: Society and Security in East Central Europe”

Michael Nacht, dean of the Goldman School of Public Policy, UC Berkeley, “International Responses to Instability in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union: What Washington Thinks”

Annual Caucasus Conference

Statebuilding and the Reconstruction of Shattered Societies
April 30, 1999


Sergei Arutiunov, visiting professor, Department of Anthropology, UC Berkeley, and chair of the Department of Caucasus Studies, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Moscow, “Tradition and Prosperity in the Caucasus: Are They in Conflict?”

Stephan Astourian, William Saroyan Visiting Professor in Armenian Studies, UC Berkeley, “Transcaucasian Nationalisms: Some Comments”

Vladimir Degoev, visiting scholar, Department of History, UC Berkeley, and professor of history, North Ossetian State University, Russia, “The Challenge of the Caucasus to Russian Statehood: The Legacy of History”


Stephanie Platz, Alex Manoogian Assistant Professor of Modern Armenian History, University of Michigan, “Society, Nation, State: Ethnographic Perspectives on Transcaucasia”

CSEES Newsletter / 10
The two greatest success stories of the renewal of Eastern Europe since 1989 have been Poland and Czechoslovakia. A key factor in their political and economic achievements has been the rekindling of relations with Germany. Political parties across the spectrum in both Eastern European countries have recognized Germany as the link to their economic and political reintegration into a larger Europe. German-Czech and German-Polish relations have not been this good since 1918.

These friendly relations were not foreordained, however. At the end of the Cold War, in fact, they seemed highly unlikely. The memory of the interwar period and World War II threatened to hinder a close relationship with Germany, especially since many disputes left over from these earlier periods had never been truly settled in the intervening years. The establishment of free political systems in Eastern Europe meant that long-suppressed popular resentments and a resurgent nationalism could get in the way of political cooperation. After 1989, one issue in particular made the possibility of a German-Polish and German-Czech rapprochement highly unlikely: all three countries had to come to terms with the expulsion of millions of Germans from Polish and Czech territory after the war.

The German Minority and Historical Memory

The German minority figures prominently in historical memory in Poland and the Czech Republic. Before the First World War, the German minority was seen by Czech and Polish nationalists as an oppressive foreign element that had forced the autochthonous peoples into helot-like servitude. When these East Central European nations finally achieved statehood with the Versailles Treaty, many Germans (not necessarily former citizens of the Reich) who were left stranded in the successor states turned to Germany for assistance. After 1933, Nazi Germany often alternated its policy towards Germans abroad, switching from total neglect of the minority issue to harping on the abysmal treatment of Germans living outside the Reich. Whatever the truth to these allegations, the German regime only made the situation worse for these Auslandsdeutsche. German rule had been so harsh during the Second World War (much more so in Poland than in Czechoslovakia) that the postwar governments felt justified in expelling their German populations. Most Czechs and Poles felt these expulsions were just retribution, and the Communist governments, desperate for maintaining any modicum of legitimacy, claimed credit for them.

For the new Communist states, the expulsions represented not only recompense for the atrocities of the war, but also for a long history of German domination in the region. When Poland was partitioned in the eighteenth century, the western portion of the Polish state was incorporated into Prussia, making anti-Germanism a hallmark of Polish aristocratic nationalism. Anti-German sentiment and nationalism in the Polish population first spread beyond the intelligentsia and aristocracy during Bismarck’s failed anti-Catholic campaign, the Kulturkampf, in the 1870s and 1880s.

After achieving independence in 1918, the Polish state inherited a large German minority which created great difficulties between Poland and both Weimar and Nazi Germany. At the end of the Second World War, Stalin gave Poland substantial parts of Germany in order to ensure bitter animosity between the two countries and to reinforce Poland’s dependency on the U.S.S.R. Germany ended up surrendering one-fourth of its pre-World War II territory, and well over five million people were expelled from these “recovered lands.”

In the postwar period, anti-German sentiment among Poles remained strong due to wartime atrocities. Ostpolitik helped relieve international tensions, but the public’s suspicion of Germany remained, no doubt enhanced by the Communist regime. The government continued to exploit these popular prejudices in order to maintain its hold on power. In 1970, the Polish government informed the troops who were sent to squash the Baltic strikes that they would be confronting Germans. Needless to say, many of these soldiers were surprised when they encountered fellow Poles.1 To a large extent, Stalin’s scheme worked brilliantly, and the siege mentality of the Poles persisted. The Cold War left German-Polish problems festering.2

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Because of the legacy of the partitions of Poland and the threat of the nation’s disappearance yet again during World War II, the Poles, perhaps more than most nations, remain highly sensitive about their nation-state’s borders. Maintaining territorial integrity, especially vis-à-vis Germany and Russia, is a sacred national mission. In the postwar period, the issue of territory, more than the expulsions themselves, became the greatest source of political antagonism between Poland and West Germany. Although East Germany recognized the Oder-Neisse border in 1950, West Germany did not give any formal recognition until the 1970 accord, which specified the border as only running between the German Democratic Republic and Poland. (A new agreement recognizing the Federal Republic-Polish border was finally signed on November 14, 1990). Despite this conciliatory move, the signals remained mixed, for the West German Supreme Court insisted in 1973 and 1976 that the lands ceded to Poland were still legally German. Poland, for its part, considered West Germany a revisionistic state, and the Polish government continued to tell its citizens that they must be prepared at all times to face German aggression.

Of course, the suspicions ran deepest when the issue turned to the German minority in Poland. The minority numbering over one million in interwar Poland and made up 3.5 percent of the population. Polish historians during and after the war have consistently blamed this “fifth column” for Poland’s quick defeat in Germany’s September Campaign. Any remaining trust between Poles and the German minority had been broken by the end of the war, when the postwar Polish government used the allegations of treasonous conduct to support the expulsion and the expropriation of the German minority.

For most of the postwar period, however, many Poles believed that a German minority no longer existed. In order to thwart Germany’s claims that the Polish government was denying ethnic Germans the right to emigrate, the Polish government simply insisted that there were no Germans left in Poland. Polish leaders certainly did not want to encourage mass emigration, especially to those who might suddenly “rediscover” their German identity. Because these ethnic Germans remained in the western regions, mostly in industrial Silesia, the Polish government also feared that acknowledging their presence would encourage German annexationist claims based on the nationality principle. This situation led to an extraordinary twisting of statistics. For example, a 1971 government survey established the ridiculously low figure of only thirty-five hundred Germans still living in Poland. Thus when the German minority again became an issue in the post-1989 period, it caught most Poles unaware.

As in Poland, Czech nationalism has been defined in part as anti-German. Within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Czechs traditionally occupied the lower rungs of the social ladder and the greater economic and social success of the Germans dates back in Czech historical memory to the Austrian victory at White Mountain in 1620 (which was not necessarily a “German” victory). Like the Poles, the Czechs also blame the German minority for having been a fifth column during the interwar period. In particular, Czech historians blame the German minority in the Sudetenland for instigating the tensions between Czechoslovakia and Germany that led to the abdication at Munich in September 1938. After the war, the Czech government insisted that the continued presence of the German minority and the sustainability of Czech democracy were inherently incompatible. President Benes, perhaps looking to divert attention from his own inability to stand up for Czechoslovakia during the Munich conference, issued the decrees to expel the Germans in summer 1945 (the expulsions had already begun unofficially in the spring of that year). The Potsdam Conference in August 1945 gave international sanction to these “transfers.” In addition, in May 1946 Benes proclaimed an amnesty law that ended in the murder of many Sudeten Germans. In the end, the Czechs expelled over three million ethnic Germans from the Sudetenland and elsewhere, showing more thoroughness than the Poles in their “ethnic cleansing.” While a steady effort was made to remove all traces of the German influence in the Sudetenland, silence over the issue dominated for the next two decades.

While Poland and Czechoslovakia continued in a campaign of silence and denial, West Germany was also reluctant to bring up the question of postwar atrocities against Germans, especially in light of the Third Reich’s own wartime record. The Wirtschaftswunder (“Economic Miracle”) provided rapid integration of the expellees, thus helping to place the issues of recrimination, restitution, and compensation on the backburner. On the issue of territorial loss, German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik of the 1970s also seemed to finally recognize the postwar situation and borders. East Germany’s insistence on socialist brotherhood and its legacy as an anti-fascist state allowed it to avoid such questions altogether.

All states involved used geopolitical reasoning as the ultimate argument in this sensitive topic: the Eastern European countries used it to justify the expulsions, and the German states used it to press the expellees to accept their situation. It seemed that with time, the German expellee issue would find a simple and quiet solution: the expellees would simply dwindle away with the years.

With unification in 1990, however, many of the surviving expellees in Germany found new hope in correcting past injustices. This situation was helped by Poland and Czechoslovakia’s own attempts to find a just solution to the Communist legacy. Yet the very scope and vigor in finding such solutions in turn helped to shape the different outcomes that these two states faced in their relations with Germany.
Despite the expulsions and emigration in the postwar period, roughly 532,000 people who consider themselves Germans now reside in Poland. Some estimates place the number of ethnic Germans closer to one million. However, because of the Communist government’s continued insistence that there were very few ethnic Germans left within Polish borders, the German minority’s political reemergence in 1989 was a shock for most Poles and created an attitude of deep suspicion and even nationalist backlash, resulting in the harassment of many Polish-Germans by their neighbors and local authorities.10

Many ethnic Germans responded to the growing resentment against them through a political activism made possible with the demise of Communism. The League of Expellees (Bund der Vertriebenen) played an extremely important role in this stirring of discontent in the first few years after reunification. With 2.2 million members, they had lobbied German Chancellor Helmut Kohl not to recognize the Oder-Neisse border and pressed for restitution for the expellees.11 When some of the Germans in Poland began espousing the League’s rhetoric, this seeming disloyalty of the minority made the historically uneasy relationship between the Poles and Germans even more difficult. Relations between the German minority and the Polish government became increasingly tense in 1990 and threatened to sour even more.

Given the well-known Polish fears of any revision of the borders, German leaders in 1989 and 1990 had hardly been tactful in this sensitive matter. Many exploited the territorial issue to gain right-wing support. One month before the fall of the Berlin Wall, Theodor Waigel of the Christian Socialist Union, the Bavarian sister-party of the conservative ruling Christian Democratic Union, asserted that the German Reich’s 1937 borders were still legally extant. Waigel timed this statement right before the fiftieth anniversary of Hitler’s invasion of Poland, and this incident did little in the way of showing support for the fledgling Solidarity government.12

The issue of borders became even more highly politicized after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Although the idea of unification increasingly became more real, Helmut Kohl refused to recognize the Oder-Neisse line, claiming that he had no right to speak on behalf of a yet-to-be-unified Germany. This stance induced strong criticism from Poland and elsewhere, including the French foreign minister and the American media,13 and the voices of doubt concerning the desirability of German reunification grew.14 Indeed, Kohl’s blustering had pushed Polish opinion closer to the Russians than anything the Polish Communists had been able to do in four decades of official cooperation with the Soviet Union.15 In 1990 Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki even considered letting Soviet troops stay in Poland in order to act as a counterweight to Germany, while Lech Wałęsa openly (and unwisely) advocated the use of nuclear weapons against a possibly rogue Germany.16

With a rather inauspicious start after 1989, a start which exposed the festering territorial issue of over forty years, one would expect a more troubled Polish-German relationship today. Nevertheless, despite the initial wavering, subsequent action by Germany to finalize the border question decisively by November 1990 has effectively quelled interstate tensions, producing a very cooperative and cordial relationship since then. On June 17, 1991, a Treaty of “Good Neighborness and Friendly Relations” was signed, an agreement in which Germany promised it would represent Polish interests in the European Union.17 With this political reconciliation, room was opened for spiritual healing between the two states. While visiting the Polish capital on the fiftieth anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising, Roman Herzog asked for forgiveness of German crimes.18 The German government invited Foreign Minister Władysław Bartoszewski to address a special joint session of the Bundesrat and Bundestag in 1995 to commemorate the end of the Second World War. Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski underscored the new importance and improvement of German-Polish relations by making Bonn and Berlin the destinations of his first official state visit.19

Rather than worrying about maintaining its borders, Poland has now become more concerned with making them more permeable, advocating more access to Germany for its products and workers. Currently, some five hundred thousand Poles are employed by German businesses in Poland.20 In the trans-border “gray sphere” trade alone, the estimated total amounts to some six billion dollars a year.21 In a recent survey, most Poles expressed their preference for Germany as Poland’s primary economic partner (and the United States as the preferred political partner). Importantly, the survey also indicated that Germany was the second-most preferred military partner.22

Elizabeth Pond compares the new relationship between Germany and Poland as a reconciliation on par with that of the German-French rapprochement in the 1960s.23 A new national narrative, one of reconciliation, has now shaped historical memory to view the 1970s as a pivotal period, as a thawing of icy German-Polish relations. The present official program of friendly cooperation has allowed a redefinition of the past and has projected good relations further back in history. Although this “presentism” may have flaws as a form of historical inquiry, it has nonetheless helped to improve the interstate atmosphere and to establish a more trusting relationship between state and minority in Poland. The Polish government truly appreciates the efforts of the Federal Republic’s embassy to moderate German minority demands.24 In reciprocity, Warsaw has looked the other way while the German embassy continues to give out passports to ethnic Germans (by 1994 about 170,000 passports were handed out).25 German groups have been given considerable opportunity to cultivate their nationality. They have been able to organize politically as an ethnic party since 1991, and in 1993 they were exempted from the

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Jewish Higher Education and Empire in Fin-de-Siècle Russia

Ben Nathans

On February 19, 1999, Ben Nathans, assistant professor of history at the University of Pennsylvania, spoke on “Higher Education and Empire in Fin-de-Siècle Russia: Jews and the Imperial University.” His lecture was cosponsored by the Slavic Center and the Department of History at U.C. Berkeley. His lecture is summarized below by Deborah Yalen, Ph.D. candidate in history at U.C. Berkeley.

The impact of the “Great Reform” era on Imperial Russia’s Jewish population—the empire’s largest non-Slavic and non-Orthodox ethnic minority and the world’s largest Jewish population at the time—has been subject to ongoing historiographical debate. Concurrent with the major reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the Crimean War defeat, the tsarist state implemented a series of limited measures directed specifically at its Jewish population, whose right of residence had until then been limited to the Pale of Settlement (consisting primarily of territories acquired by the Russian state during the Polish Partitions of the late-eighteenth century and several provinces of southwestern Russia). In addition to abolishing the notorious cantonist system of the Nicholaevan era, whereby Jewish boys were conscripted for twenty-five years of military service, the reforms implemented during Alexander II’s rule provided greater geographical, social, and professional mobility to select groups of Jews, particularly wealthy merchants (1859), university students (1861), and certified artisans and medical personnel (1865).

The circumstances and impact of the 1861 decree on Jewish students and Russian university culture as a whole formed the subject of an illuminating presentation by UC Berkeley alumnus, Professor Ben Nathans, during a visit to the Center for Slavic and East European Studies on February 19, 1999. As Nathans demonstrated with archival documentation and references to contemporary memoir literature, the immediate result of the decree was a dramatic influx of Russian Jews into the empire’s institutions of higher education, accompanied by invigorated hopes within the Jewish community for attaining economic, social—and, eventually it was hoped, legal—parity with the empire’s Russian subjects. Yet by the late 1880s, the regime put an abrupt halt to this movement with the imposition of a numeros clausus on Jewish students in institutions of higher education. Why, Nathans asked, did the tsarist regime open up and then abruptly close its doors to secularized, educated Jews? In Nathans’ analysis, this tentative gesture towards the Jewish population illustrates both the ambivalent nature of the Great Reform era for Russia’s Jewish minority and the tsarist regime’s anxiety concerning Jewish contributions to the growth of a nascent civil society within the Russian empire.

The historical debate over the motivations of the tsarist regime for these actions tends to invite comparisons to the Western European experience of Jewish emancipation, whereby Jews were granted legal equality as full-fledged citizens of the nation. Yet, as Nathans has pointed out in his research, the civic emancipation of Western European Jews was predicated on the passing of the estate classifications, a process not yet experienced by the Russian empire, where the estate (sosloviiia) system and restrictions on civil rights for all subjects of the Russian empire persisted up until the end of the old regime. During his lecture, Nathans also noted that higher education in Russia was historically the result of state initiative and control, rather than the product of a medieval theological culture as in Western Europe. The goal of higher education as it was originally conceived by the tsarist state was to create a docile, meritocratic service class. The regime’s traditional privileging of higher education at the expense of primary or middle-level education was replicated in the 1861 decree, which addressed itself only to the most potentially “useful” members of the Jewish community. These significant differences in the Russian experience render the Western concept of “emancipation” in the context of educational reform problematic when applied to the impact of the Great Reforms on Russia’s Jewish minority.

Professor Nathans characterized the 1861 reform as selective and utilitarian rather than humanitarian in nature, motivated primarily by the state’s interest in harvesting the talents of the Jewish population’s best and brightest. Yet by and large the contemporary Jewish community believed that the university decree heralded more sweeping changes in Jewish legal and social status. While the decree did not mention “civic emancipation,” Russian Jews understood the reform to be a harbinger of something approximating Western-style emancipation—a reward, as it were, for the presumed contributions enlightened Jews would make to Russian society upon receiving a university education.
While civic emancipation remained but a theoretical hope, the new legislation provided new advantages to Russian Jews. The most tangible benefit was the geographic mobility afforded those who received a higher education.

According to Nathans, inhabitants of the Jewish Pale of Settlement saw their home as an enormous but crowded ghetto, despite the fact that it approximated the size of France and today supports a population many times that of the mid-nineteenth century. The prospect of relocation to the Russian interior, albeit only for a small percentage of Jews, was a feature of the 1861 decree that deeply resonated with the Jewish community. This hunger for geographical mobility, Nathans suggested, also reflected an overarching desire on the part of many Jews to attain a bourgeois economic and social status, an aspiration which he suggests was a major motivating factor behind the massive influx of Jews into institutions of higher education in the 1860s and 1870s.

An evolving attitude towards secular knowledge was another crucial component of the positive Jewish response to the 1861 reform. Eastern European religious authorities had sanctioned the study of non-Jewish subjects, but strictly for the sake of better understanding traditional Jewish texts. At the same time, the Kulturkampf waged by representatives of the East European Haskalah (Jewish Enlightenment) against traditional Judaism in the decades preceding the 1861 decree had slowly penetrated the popular consciousness and facilitated Russian Jewry’s receptivity to secular educational opportunities (particularly white-collar opportunities in the fields of law and medicine, which dominated the imperial university curriculum at the time). Nathans also noted that much of the voluminous memoir literature of the time draws on the metaphors of “awakening” and “reaching for the light” to suggest a transposition of the traditional Jewish reverence for religious textual study to the realm of secular knowledge, though he cautions that these autobiographical accounts cannot be relied on as historically accurate depictions of the concrete process of secularization.

Despite the Jewish community’s greater acceptance of the pursuit of secular knowledge, the 1861 decree did expose fault lines between direct beneficiaries of the reform and the mass of Jews left behind in the Pale. Whereas Talmudic scholars once constituted the cream of Jewish society, Jewish university students gradually assumed a new elitist identity linked with their geographic and social mobility, marking, in the words of the Russian-Jewish historian Iulii Gessen, the passage of a traditional Jewish “religious aristocracy” to a new “diploma aristocracy” in the post-1861 era. Nathans suggests that this resulted in a reconfiguration of educated Jews’ relationship to the Jewish masses that mirrored the Russian intelligentsia’s self-image vis-à-vis the peasantry: the traditional division between “coarse” and “refined” Jews (in Yiddish, proste and sheyne) was reconfigured in Russian categories as that between the Jewish intelligentsia and its own narod (nation), still confined to the Pale.

This privileging of a secular Jewish elite was reinforced by the establishment of a philanthropic organization known as the Society for the Spread of Enlightenment among the Jews (Obchestvo dlia rasprostraneniia prosvesheniia mezdu evreiam v russii), founded in 1863 by prominent representatives of St. Petersburg’s Jewish upper bourgeoisie under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior. The explicit mission for the Society in its early years was to provide scholarships for the most promising Jewish university students. This shift in the Jewish educational elite’s center of gravity from the traditional to the secular sphere was both consistent with the Russian state’s privileging of higher education and reflective of the cooperation between the state and the Jewish commercial and social elite in advancing the role of Jews within Russian society.

The university subculture that Jewish students entered in the 1860s and 1870s was one of considerable ethnic and religious diversity. According to Nathans, university students of all backgrounds cultivated a collective student identity transcending ethnic, religious, and class differences. The prospect of relocation to the Russian interior, albeit only for a small percentage of Jews, deeply resonated with the Jewish community.

This ethic of egalitarian collectivity among the Russian student intelligentsia was based on students’ idealized populist conception of the collective (mir) as it was thought to function in the life of the Russian masses. Within this worldview, the identity of “student” ostensibly transcended religious and national particularisms and found expression in the Russian language as the lingua franca of university culture. This mythology of the Russian university as a melting pot, Nathans noted, contrasted strikingly with the reputation of Central European universities at this time, where virulent anti-Semitism was openly accepted.

Consistent with the notion of the university as melting pot, Jewish university students tended to avoid identifying themselves with explicitly Jewish issues. Along with Jewish merchants, Jewish university students were the most likely of all Russian Jews in fin-de-siècle Russia to adopt Russian names in place of their given Yiddish or Hebrew names. As Jewish students became exposed to radical ideologies within the university subculture, they confronted the prospect of having to subsume their Jewish perspective within a broader, class-based political agenda.

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An official Harley-Davidson Bikers Bar in Bratislava privately initiated, funded, and run by young Slovak entrepreneurs

A mixture of Eastern and Western brands come together at the Harley-Davidson Bar in Bratislava

Signs of Change In Slovakia

A scene from Southwest Americana created in Bratislava
Jewish Higher Education, continued from page 15

In spite of Jewish students’ efforts to dampen their Jewish identity, the influx of Jews into the imperial university system eventually led to growing fears on the part of the regime that the system had been inundated with Jews to the detriment of Russian students. From the regime’s perspective, then, the utilitarian basis of its 1861 decree had brought unintended and unwelcomed results, and this sense only intensified in the politically tense and reactionary atmosphere that emerged in the wake of the assassination of Alexander II. By 1887, when one in seven university students in the Russian empire was Jewish, the conservative Russian press was arguing for the imposition of quotas on Jews in higher education based on the logic of proportionality, namely that the representation of minorities within higher education should not exceed their overall percentage within the larger population. Behind this rationale, Nathans suggested, there was a deep suspicion that Russia’s fledgling civil society was becoming dominated by Jews and other non-Russians.

The resulting *numerus clausus* on Jewish university students—what the contemporary Jewish press referred to as a “silent pogrom” in education—represented the most significant retreat from the tentative reforms initiated by the state in regard to its Jewish minority. What the Jewish Pale of Settlement had symbolized to Russian Jewry in terms of limiting geographic mobility, the new quotas now symbolized in limiting social and professional mobility. In essence, suggested Nathans, the quota violated the implicit *quid pro quo* between the state and the Jewish community: the provision of education and social mobility in exchange for the contributions of a Jewish elite in the professional and commercial spheres of society.

Yet in practice, the Jewish quota was imposed inconsistently, particularly under Minister of Education Ivan Delianav. In certain regions, particularly outside the main educational centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg, the number and proportion of Jews in higher education even increased, though Nathans cautions that in some instances the statistics may have simply reflected the consequences of massive university-wide expulsions of Russian students during times of political unrest. Later, the chaos of the 1905 revolution disrupted the enforcement of quotas altogether.

The uneven enforcement of the quotas was partly the result of strategies devised by Jewish students and their families for obtaining university admission against all odds. A handbook was published for Jewish parents to aid them in getting their children enrolled in institutions of higher education, and cash bribes—in the sardonic words of one memoirist, “the Magna Carta of the Jewish people”—constituted one effective method for overcoming the quota restrictions. Nathans also noted the enormous number of petitions that were submitted by Jews pleading for admission to the universities. The strain on Jewish families desperately trying to secure a secular education for their children also became a much-explored theme in the wryly humorous Yiddish literature of the day.

Ultimately, the Jewish quotas dealt a critical blow to the notion of the Russian imperial university as a melting pot and highlighted the Russian intelligentsia’s failure to address the reality of ethnic and religious chauvinism alongside class and political oppression. From the state’s perspective, the quotas also had the undesired consequence that Jewish students began flocking in the thousands to institutions of higher education in Western Europe, such that the number of Russian Jewish students studying in the West eventually exceeded the number of Jewish university students in Russia. Contrary to tsarist intentions, the Jewish quotas inadvertently enhanced Western influence on a significant portion of its university-educated Jewish intelligentsia.

Professor Nathans concluded with the observation that there is a tendency to think of the 1920s as the “golden age” of Jewish integration into Russian/Soviet institutions of higher education. However, this process in fact started much earlier as a result of the self-modernizing tendencies of the old regime. While the tsarist regime never promoted a formal policy of co-opting Jewish elites, its reforms were nonetheless motivated by utilitarian interests. The 1861 decree permitting selective Jewish access to institutions of higher education outside the Pale of Settlement, combined with bourgeois aspirations of Russian Jews for geographical, professional, and social mobility, facilitated the introduction of Jewish students into Russian university culture and set the stage for a distinctive Jewish presence in academia well before the Soviet period. While Jewish students attempted to integrate into the melting pot subculture of the universities, the eventual tsarist crackdown on Jewish admissions extinguished Russian Jewry’s faith in the benefits of a *quid pro quo* relationship with the tsarist state and contributed directly to the evolution of the “Jewish Question” as a central, if not the defining, debate in imperial nationality policy in fin-de-siècle Russia.
Remembering, continued from page 13

5 percent threshold mandated in the new electoral law. There is still some difficulty in establishing full minority schools, but the problems are perhaps more financial than ideological.

The German movement advocating compensation and restitution from Poland has been effectively squashed. The most significant factor for improved relations has been the quick burial of the past by both sides, thus avoiding over-politicization of the expulsion and question of compensation. Despite his initial waffling, Kohl eventually made clear to the expellee lobby that the price of unity was the permanence of the Oder-Neisse border. On the issue of restitution, the German government has neither taken up the case of expellees nor spoken out against it. Significantly, Warsaw understands the meaning of this non-committal stance and has not pressed for a clarification of the issue.

Because of the inability to play on the German-Polish issue, right-wing groups have been effectively marginalized. In 1993, no anti-European or anti-German nationalist parties were elected to the Sejm. In those elections, the only three parties espousing ethnic nationalism (Party X, the Self-Defense Farmers’ Union, and Polish National Community) together attained less than 6 percent of the vote. The only extreme nationalist party, the Polish National Community, received 14,989 votes, or 0.11 percent of the total. Skinheads remain a marginal phenomenon and do not number more than several hundred, due in large part to the tough policies of the government. When a German truck driver was fatally stabbed in Nowa Huta on October 2, 1992, six skinheads received harsh sentences of five-and-a-half years in prison. The minor who inflicted the fatal wound was sentenced to confinement in a juvenile detention center until his twenty-first birthday.

Polish attitudes towards Germany are marked by pragmatism and trust. A testament to the strength of this new relationship is the fact that the latest potential point of German-Polish conflict did not erupt into interstate quarrelling. This potentially divisive issue that ended as a non-event was the effort of the Silesian minority in Poland to gain official recognition and autonomy.

The Silesian Autonomy Movement

Although brewing for decades, the issue of a separate Silesian nationality came to the fore in the summer of 1997, when the Wojewodship of Katowice registered the People’s Union of Silesian Nationality (Zwiżesz Ludności Narodowości Śląskiej). This decision effectively recognized “Silesian” nationality as separate from Polish nationality. The registration caused a rather intense but brief commotion in the media, the headlines being dominated soon thereafter by the floods that summer.

The movement for autonomy remains small, numbering only a few thousand supporters. Nevertheless, the knee-jerk reaction of many Poles was to suspect that the autonomy movement had German backing and served as a cover for German influence. This attitude was due to the contested history of the region and the ambiguity of national identity in Silesia, which had broad political autonomy in interwar Poland. Classified “objectively” by language as “Poles” by the interwar and postwar Polish governments, many Silesians have traditionally considered themselves to be simply “Silesian” or, more disturbingly for the Polish government, “German.” Such Silesians had been ostracized by national-minded Poles during the 1920s and 1930s for their apparent opportunism and lack of national feeling. Likewise, these Silesians were often contemptuously called “Wasserpolacken” (“watered-down Poles”) by Germans.

During the war, many Polish-speaking Silesians quickly became “German” through the German National List (Deutsche Volksliste). Thousands entered the Waffen-SS and the Wehrmacht, and many Silesian graveyards attest to their share of service for Hitler’s Reich. Today, 90 percent of all Germans in Poland reside in Upper Silesia, and they still make up a majority in many districts. Silesia and German nationality remain strongly linked in the consciousness of Poles and ethnic Germans alike.

Even today, many of these Silesians remain ambiguous about their identity and still switch nationalities according to economic circumstances. There had been growing concern on the part of the Polish government about the rise in people claiming German nationality. The Polish Foreign Minister in 1995 warned that an untenable situation was created by so many Poles choosing to become Germans.

Nevertheless, unlike past feuds with Germany over Silesia, this time no dire warnings of German intervention came into the mainstream Polish media. The current Silesian cultural autonomy problem has not been conflated with the political separatist movement of the early 1920s, when Germans living in Silesia tried to break away completely from the Polish state. Although some may seriously believe that the Silesian separatists are working to join with Germany, it is a minority opinion. In the main, Poles have remained trusting enough of “their own” Silesians.

Poland is discovering that it is really a “republic of many nationalities” (rzeczpospolita wielu narodów). The debate over Silesian identity shows that multiculturalism is not generally perceived to be a threat to the integrity of the state. The desire to conform to Western styles of government, which tend to give considerable rights to minorities, has also made reaction to Silesian nationality milder. It is simply seen as “Western” to have ethnic minorities, and a heterogeneity that exemplifies tolerance is seen by many Poles as an attractive asset within the new Europe. For others, this multiculturalism serves the Polish national project: in order to ensure that Poles living abroad (especially in Lithuania) are treated fairly, Poland itself must first set an example. Furthermore, a pluralistic society holds a certain nostalgic appeal, for Poles are reminded of the traditions of the Polish Commonwealth in the golden age of Polish history. The very many books that have recently
come out on ethnic groups that live or have lived in Poland (such as Jews, Germans, Mennonites, Ukrainians, and Tartars) attest to this growing nostalgia. Hence, multiculturalism for the Poles represents a fusion of past national traditions and its future as a Western state. Poland’s liberal minority policy has allowed the German government to avoid playing the ethnic card. The Silesian episode, rather than creating German-Polish antagonism, reveals how Poland has been able to overcome the over-politicization of such threats with firm guarantees and good cooperation.

Today, the worries over Germany among the Poles remain confined to the economic sphere and are not in the political realm. In a 1995 survey, only 32 percent of Poles felt that Poland’s independence was at risk. Of these people, only 9 percent believed that Germany was a threat to Poland’s independence, while 32 percent perceived Russia as a greater threat. Germany is not considered an enemy. Revanchism is no longer the issue it was in the 1930s, and the fear of German militarism, long cultivated by the Communists, has virtually vanished. The quick resolution of the border question with Germany and a reassessment of Poland’s multicultural history have led to a real break with the nationalistic interwar experience.

The Czech Case: Reconciliation or Restitution?

From the vantage point of 1989, the chances of a Czech reconciliation with Germany were perhaps better than those for a Germano-Polish rapprochement. For one thing, the scale of crimes committed in Poland during World War II had been incomparably greater. Secondly, the number of Germans remaining in the Czech Republic was significantly smaller; hence the intractable minority problem of the interwar period was not likely to reoccur. From the territorial point of view, the Czech situation also differed from Poland in 1989–90 in that no sizable group in Germany claimed the Sudetenland as an integral part of Germany, as was the case with Silesia. From a historical perspective, “Germany” never included the Sudetenland—except for a brief episode from 1938–45, which only made any claims on the territory even more suspect.

Moreover, unlike in Poland where the minority issue was virtually unknown to the public under Communism, the question had gained public attention as early as the 1970s, when anti-Communist political dissidents had raised the issue of the German deportations. Writers such as Václav Havel and Jiří Dienstbier explored the expulsions in terms of civil and human rights. They saw clearly that the Sudeten Germans had been denied the very same rights which the Germans had been denied any kind of official compensation, moral or otherwise.43  By 1992–93, the Sudeten Germans had become thoroughly frustrated because they had been denied any kind of official compensation, moral or otherwise.44  Domestic politics in the Czech Republic
eventually irritated and galvanized the Sudeten Germans, and soon the festering Sudeten problem became one of the Czech Republic’s biggest and most insurmountable foreign-political problems.

By insisting that his privatization-via-restitution scheme had a moral basis, Václav Klaus made the process all the more difficult. It became necessary to justify compensating the Church and the Jewish victims of expropriation while ignoring the claims of the Sudeten Germans. The federal German government did not intend to support the Sudeten German’s property claims, but the Czech domestic situation antagonized the powerful Sudeten German lobby, which forced German politicians to take a stand. Kohl would have preferred a quiet resolution to the whole issue. But when faced with a decision, the German government chose to support the Sudeten Germans against the Czech government.

The unresolved issue of restitution quickly complicated relations between Germany and the emerging Czech state. Because of the economic and political help offered by Germany in the first years of the post-Communist period, Czech leaders and the Czech people had initially viewed Germany as a valuable ally. In 1991, the two countries began to negotiate a friendship treaty. The negotiations, however, exposed the contradictions in the Czech policy on the Sudeten question. The Czech government claimed to want reconciliation while simultaneously failing to appease the Sudeten Germans with restitution or indemnification. Because the wrangling in 1991 over the restitution issue in the Friendship Treaty lasted so long, the issue became overly exaggerated in the 1992 Czech election campaigns, thus making foreign policy towards Germany a highly politicized affair. The treaty was eventually passed in 1992 only because it did not address the Sudeten German question.

By 1992, the Sudeten German issue was moved to the top of the German agenda with the Czech Republic. Several politicians such as the CSU leader Edmund Stoiber were in no rush to resolve the issue, since they profited politically from the tense relations. Kohl likewise insisted on some gesture on the part of the Czechs. When none was forthcoming, he decided to block compensation payments to some twelve thousand Czech survivors of the Holocaust until the Czech government proved more amenable. Thus, Kohl played a dangerous game by linking (and equating) the Holocaust to the German expulsions. Indeed, even Germany, the most powerful advocate for an expansion of the European Union, seemed to waver in its commitment to see the Czech Republic enter into the organization.

The Czech government, in turn, further highlighted its insensitivity towards the expelled Germans when it refused even to negotiate with the Sudeten Germans. Thus, while the Czech authorities argued for moral righteousness for the victims of Communism, they also emphasized the practical necessity of the victimization of the Sudeten Germans, thereby denying that that moral criteria applied to their own treatment of the expellees. Some Czech officials resorted to using the only quasi-moral-legal argument they had, which was the popular notion of the Germans’ collective guilt. Along these lines, the Czech Constitutional Court ruled in March 1995 that the German claims for land restitution were not legally valid because of the Sudeten Germans’ share in the crimes of National Socialism. This argument is made even more specious by the fact that the Czech legal system does not officially recognize the existence of collective guilt. Such acts of hypocrisy not only hindered German-Czech relations, but also aided the growth of right-wing attitudes among Sudeten Germans and their supporters and a reaction by Czech nationalists. By failing to take a strong moral stance, the Czech government left the restitution issue open for extremist groups to take up.

**Germany and the Bavarian Factor**

Unlike the Germans expelled from Poland, who scattered across western and (to a lesser extent) eastern Germany, most Sudeten Germans settled in Bavaria, right across the border from their former homeland: one out of every four Bavarians claims some Sudeten German heritage. As the most prosperous and the second most populous Bundesland, Bavaria plays a prominent role in federal German politics, thereby allowing the Sudeten German issue to be magnified many times its original size.

The primary organization of the Sudeten Germans is the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft (Sudeten German Heritage Union), which claims one hundred thousand members. While very effective at pressuring Bonn, the Heritage Union’s efforts have been less successful but more sensational in the Czech Republic, where the group has led campaigns to tie up the Czech courts with restitution cases. The Landsmannschaft has also encouraged the Sudeten Germans to send Czech residents letters accusing them of “illegally occupying” German homes. The group has tried to scuttle attempts at rapprochement between Prague and Bonn. In the case of the friendship treaty, it was the Heritage Union that forced the removal of the provision annulling all Sudeten German property claims.

The Czech government’s initial moral condemnation of the expulsions and the attempt to implement restitution for other victims of Communism spawned hope among the Sudeten Germans. The issues that the Sudeten Germans wanted to have resolved were first and foremost the return of property and/or indemnification. They certainly had much to gain by pressing for compensation. By 1981, the worth of their former property had reached 265 billion Deutsch Marks. Yet the Czech government was not willing to back up its moral regret with any material form of compensation. There were even signs of retracting from any moral obligations. Havel’s position now reflected regret for the excesses of the expulsions, but not for the expulsions themselves. On the issue of compensation, Havel emphasized, “We are not prepared to let new storms wreak havoc in the area of property rights, and thus to resurrect all the evil spirits of the past.”
The crushed hopes of the Sudeten Germans quickly turned to bitterness and political activity. What gave the expellee organization added momentum was the publicity over atrocities in Bosnia. The media outrage over “ethnic cleansing” made the issue of German expulsions seem all the more compelling. Here, historical memory was given an extra boost by current events that gave past experience new meaning and even a new vocabulary. The Sudeten Germans found help from other quarters as well. Alois Smock, the Austrian foreign minister, directly accused the Czechs of having instigated “ethnic cleansing” in 1945. The Czech foreign minister Zílenec countered that the true terror had begun with the Third Reich and that the Austrians had been an integral part of that horror. This continual search for original sin made any dialogue emotionally charged and counterproductive.

**Right-Wing Groups in the Czech Republic**

The politicization of the expulsion and compensation issues has fed the growth of right-wing groups in the Czech Republic. As in Poland, there exists considerable fear of the economic clout of Germans and the danger of dependency on Germany. In the Czech Republic, however, the Sudeten German issue played on these fears and allowed fire-eaters to win points on the domestic scene. Having initially been consigned to near extinction, the Czech right-wing exploited the weakness of the government’s resolve. The Right forced the other political parties to take up the Sudeten issue in the 1992 elections, thus contributing to its over-politicization.

Right-wing groups have prevented any reconciliation by harping on the theme of Munich 1938: the selling out of the Czech people to the Germans. Miroslav Sládek, head of the nationalist Republican Party, blamed the West in late 1992, on the eve of the breakup of the country, for the alleged misery of the Czechoslovak situation: “We won’t allow another Munich! Havel, Klaus, and Meciar have sold us to the Germans. The West is afraid of a united Czechoslovakia. Today we have the best chance ever of becoming the world’s fourth superpower after the United States, Russia, and China.” The sheer delusional nature of his statements notwithstanding, Sládek’s rhetoric shows how the battle-cry of Munich is used effectively to strike an emotional chord with the Czech public. Even third-party writers did not refrain from contributing to the apocalyptic visions of submitting to Sudeten German demands. One Soviet writer blamed the Czechs for caving in to Germany, warning that the Czechs were in danger of becoming a German “protectorate” once more. A writer for the *Atlantic Monthly* drew an analogy between the Sudeten German desire for restitution and the desire of Hitler to vanquish the Czech people, resettling them in the polar circle if necessary.

Here, historical memory played an important part in defining the possible lines of action for the Czech govern-ment. The case is well illustrated by comparing the experiences of Poland and the Czech Republic. Poland had fought a lost but valiant battle against the Germans in 1939, while the Czechs had surrendered in 1938 without a shot fired. This disgrace in their national history has made Czech politicians more wary of compromising on “national interests.” That they might be perceived to be selling out to the Germans would be political suicide. The availability of such a ready-made label that would swiftly bring political ruin has made Czech politicians tow the nationalist line when it comes to dealing with Germany. In 1993, the situation became even more complicated after the breakup of Czechoslovakia, a project that had been a source of Czech national pride. To add another historical mishap in the form of “Munich” would have been unbearable. In short, the repeated accusations of Munich made it increasingly difficult to conduct diplomacy, which requires some compromise of national interests.

While the Poles were able to push the compensation issue to the backstage and thus marginalize nationalist groups, right-wing groups in the Czech Republic pulled off stunts like the Vik Affair, in which one million propaganda leaflets were distributed around the country claiming that a deal had been struck by the Czech government with Germany to give back property to the Sudeten Germans. These statements were taken very seriously by many Czechs, especially those living in the Sudeten region. The Republican Party’s secretary Jan Vik was charged with (but not convicted for) spreading “alarmist news.” Sládek’s party, however, got free publicity and even some credit for making the government look incompetent. The Republican Party came back from the brink to win close to 8 percent in the 1996 elections. They formed an alliance with the Social Democrats and Communists to reject any negotiations regarding a joint German-Czech declaration on the Sudeten issue, thereby forcing the government to take a more assertive stand against Germany.

**The Limits of Justice**

Ironically, the current Sudeten German problem which has caused the Czech government difficulties at home and abroad was spurred in part by the broader goal of coming to terms with the Communist past. Desiring a more thorough overhaul of their political system, Czech leaders took greater measures than the Poles in compensating the victims of Communism. Once the Czechs opened this Pandora’s box, however, they had difficulties establishing limits. The Czech leadership believed naively that the search for justice could be confined to the sphere of morality without touching material claims, and even more naively that moral justice could be limited to only one segment of the population. The Czech government position was left vulnerable to attack, and the Sudeten Germans, provoked into action, could not resist. The ensuing political struggle within the Czech and the German governments destroyed the possibil-
ity of reaching a gentlemen’s agreement of silence, as the Poles had done with the Germans.

The Czech struggle over restitution demonstrates the way in which historical memory can define the limits of what is possible in politics. By defining prejudices and preferences, the collective memory of a group or nation places limits on what can be labeled politically “pragmatic” and sets the psychological preconditions that can either inspire or prevent a more intensive search for alternatives when obstacles or difficulties are encountered. This memory can remain dormant for decades, but once it is fitted into a political program, it is infused with meaning and can evoke powerful images. Historical memory can be used by some to hinder attempts to deal with a problem reasonably, as the memory of “Munich” did in the Czech restitution issue. The Czech Republic openly tried to strike a bargain with Germany in which two moral wrongs would make a right; what they failed to recognize was that one person’s pain is hardly ever seen by another as equal to his own.

When a political program is not overcharged by an attempt to settle the past, historical memory can also serve the interests of reconciliation. In Poland, peace with the German minority was facilitated by the memory of Ostpolitik and of the pluralist traditions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Most importantly, the Polish government wisely knew not to press Germany for the clarification of outstanding issues. Perhaps Poland was helped in this silence by the very enormity of Germany’s wartime crimes on Polish soil, a heavy past which inhibited the activity of German groups seeking restitution. Nevertheless, the experiences of Poland and the Czech Republic underscore the fact that the duty to remember also entails the need to forget.

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3 Ibid., p. 543.
5 Elliot, p. 541.
6 I will use the term “ethnic Germans” because the literature uses this term to describe those Germans outside of Germany who nonetheless identified with Germany through subjective, historical, or cultural ties. Many of these Germans, however, would be closer “ethnically” to Slavic tribes (for example the Kashubians or the Masurians). Although they possessed German state citizenship, they did not consider themselves nor were they considered ethnically “German” when they had been under the Second Reich and under the Nazis (except in some propaganda pamphlets during the interwar period). Most of them were reclaimed to Polendom after the war. Ironically, these once non-ethnic/politically defined Germans and their descendants have been steadily claiming a German ethnicity even before 1989. Despite the mass expulsions, ethnic Germans have lived continuously in Poland since 1945. They were exempted from expulsion because they possessed skills which the Polish state needed, had strong Polish familial connections, or simply had lied and bribed their way into Polish nationality (often simply so they could keep their property). Zbigniew Kurcz, “Überlegungen zur Deutschen Minderheit,” Dialog [Nos. 3–4 (1997): 54–55], p. 54.
9 Jakub Karpinski, “In the New Europe, Poland is Better as a Partner than an Enemy,” Transition [(February 9, 1996): 12–14], p. 12.
10 Kurcz, p. 54. Kamusella, p. 15.
12 “Missed Opportunity,” The Economist [312, no. 7618 (September 2, 1989): 46].
17 Elliot, pp. 547–548.
18 Karpinski, “In the New Europe, Poland is Better as a Partner than an Enemy,” p. 13.
19 Ibid., p. 12.
21 Karpinski, “In the New Europe, Poland is Better as a Partner than an Enemy,” p. 13.
23 Pond, p. 11.
24 Ibid.
25 Kamusella, p. 17.
26 Ibid., p. 16.
27 Ibid., p. 17.
28 Pond, p. 11.
31 Ibid., p. 63.
Course on Georgian Language and Culture

Near Eastern Studies 298: Georgian Language and Culture
Fall 1999 / Tuesdays and Thursdays, 3:30–5:00 p.m.
Instructor: Dr. Shorena Kurtsikidze

This course is designed for students and postgraduates who are interested in studying the non-Indo-European languages of the Caucasus and the traditional cultures and contemporary life of this region.

The materials for the course will be the textbook, *Georgian Language for English Speakers*, and the documentaries about the history and cultural anthropology of Georgians and their neighbors (Abkhaz, Adigeians, Chechens, Ingushs, Kabardians, Balkarians, Circassians, Ossetians, Dagestanians, Azeris, Armenians, Kurds, etcetera).

Professor Kurtsikidze holds a doctorate in cultural anthropology from the Academy of Sciences of Georgia and a degree in simultaneous interpreting from the Institute of the Foreign Languages and Literatures. Her academic interests include ethnic and cross-cultural studies, and she has done extensive field work in the Caucasus and India.
All-California Conference In Russian History

The All-California Conference in Russian History was held on April 9–10, 1999 at the University of California, Los Angeles. There are plans to make this meeting an annual event. Nineteen historians participated, three Berkeley faculty and two former graduate students:

**Terence Emmons** (Ph.D. in history, 1966), professor of history at Stanford University, presented a paper on “Pavel Milukov and the Russian Sonderweg.”

**Martin Malia**, professor of history, presented a paper on “Comparative Revolutions from the Hussites to the Bolsheviks.”

**Lynn Mally** (Ph.D. in history, 1985), associate professor of history at UC Irvine, presented a paper entitled “The Soviet Union and Popular Front Culture.”


**Reginald Zelnik**, professor of history, presented a paper entitled “What was a ‘Strike’? The Evolution of a Concept.”

Association for the Study of Nationalities Convention

The Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN) held its annual convention on April 15–17, 1999 at Columbia University. Following are the contributions made by current Berkeley scholars and some former Berkeley graduate students:


**Oleg Kharkhordin** (Ph.D. in political science, 1996) chaired the panel entitled “Melting Pot or Salad Bowl: Post-Soviet Ethnic Identities in a Big City.” Oleg is currently an associate professor with the Faculty of Political Sciences at the European University in St. Petersburg.

**Harsha Ram**, assistant professor of Slavic languages and literatures, presented a paper, “Prisoners of the Caucasus: Cultural Myths and Media Representations of the Chechen Conflict,” at the panel entitled “Images of Chechnya in the Media.”

**Veljko Vujacic** (Ph.D. in sociology, 1995) served as a discussant on the panel entitled “Melting Pot or Salad Bowl: Post-Soviet Ethnic Identities in a Big City” and participated in the special roundtable entitled “The Rebellion in Kosovo and the Bombing of Serbia II.” Veljko is currently an assistant professor of sociology at Oberlin College.

**Edward Walker**, executive director of BPS, served as a discussant on the panel entitled “Re-identifications in the Caucasus” and presented a paper, “Theories in Practice: Predicting Stability/Instability in Dagestan,” at the panel entitled “History, Democracy, and Stability in Dagestan.”


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Our 1998–99 Outstanding Graduate Student Instructors

- **Katherine Elkins**, Ph.D. candidate in comparative literature
- **Gregory Graff**, Ph.D. candidate in agricultural and resource economics
- **Anne Hruska**, Ph.D. candidate in Slavic languages and literatures
- **Darya Kavitskaya**, Ph.D. candidate in linguistics
- **Konstantine Klouchkine**, Ph.D. candidate in Slavic languages and literatures
- **Marie Alice L’Heureux**, Ph.D. candidate in architecture
- **Jarrod Tanny**, Ph.D. candidate in history
Laura Adams, Ph.D. candidate in sociology, has been appointed visiting assistant professor in the Department of Sociology at Hamilton College in Clinton, New York.

Evgenii Bershtein (Ph.D. in Slavic languages and literatures, 1998) will begin a tenure-track position as assistant professor at Reed College this fall.

Peter Blitstein, Ph.D. candidate in political science, has an article in press in Cahiers du monde russe, "Researching Nationality Policy in the Archives" [40, nos. 1–2 (1999)]. Peter will be serving as assistant professor of history at William Paterson University in New Jersey effective January 2000.

Victoria E. Bonnell, professor of sociology and chair of the Slavic Center, co-edited a volume with Lynn Hunt, Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999).

Robin S. Brooks, Ph.D. candidate in political science, presented a paper entitled “The American Dream Deferred: Escalation of the (non-)Intervention in Yugoslav Conflicts” at the annual conference of the Interdisciplinary Society for the Study of Social Imagery, which was held in Colorado Springs, Colorado in March. Robin will spend next academic year conducting dissertation research in Bulgaria on a Fulbright Fellowship.

Robin S. Brooks and Matthew Brunwasser, M.J. candidate at the Graduate School of Journalism, co-authored an article, “Nationalism and Reform in Macedonia, which is forthcoming in the International Journal of Albanian Studies.

Michael Burawoy, professor of sociology, co-edited the volume Uncertain Transition: Ethnographies of Change in the Post-Socialist World (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999) with Katherine Verdery. The volume is the product of a conference, Ethnographies of Transition, which was held in 1996 and was cosponsored by the Slavic Center.

Winson Chu, Ph.D. candidate in history, received a grant from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for a year at the Freie Universitaet in Berlin, from where he will be travelling extensively throughout Germany and Poland to visit archives. His research project is entitled “Regional Variations among German Nationalist Organizations in Interwar Poland, 1920–1939.”

Anne Clunan, Ph.D. candidate in political science, has been awarded a renewal of her IIS/MacArthur Multilateralism Dissertation Fellowship for AY 1999–00. Anne’s article, “Constructing Concepts of Identity: Prospects and Pitfalls of a Sociological Approach to World Politics,” will be included in the forthcoming volume Beyond Boundaries? Disciplines, Paradigms, and Theoretical Integration in International Studies, which will be published by SUNY Press. The volume is edited by two Berkeley Ph.D.s, Rudra Sil (political science, 1996) and Eileen Doherty (political science, 1994).

Keith Darden, Ph.D. candidate in political science, received a 1998–99 IGCC/MacArthur Fellowship in Regional Relations on European Regional Integration for his dissertation project, “Creation of New Forms of Regional Order in the Former Soviet Union.”

Adrienne Edgar, Ph.D. candidate in history, has been awarded a tenure-track position as assistant professor of history at the University of South Carolina. She will begin at the University of South Carolina in fall 2000, after she spends AY 1999–00 as a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian Studies.

David Engerman (Ph.D. in history, 1998) has been made assistant professor of history at Brandeis University.


David Frick, professor of Slavic languages and literatures, has been awarded a 1999 Guggenheim Fellowship for “distinguished achievement in the past and exceptional promise for future accomplishment.”

Eric D. Gordy (Ph.D. in sociology, 1997) has a forthcoming book entitled The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives, which is scheduled for publication in July by Penn State University Press. Eric is an assistant professor of sociology at Clark University.

Galina Hale, Ph.D. candidate in economics, received a summer fellowship from BPS to conduct research in Russia.

Lise Morjé Howard, Ph.D. candidate in political science, received a 1998–99 fellowship from the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) for her dissertation project, “Organizational Learning and Forgetting: the United Nations and Civil War Termination.” Lise also received a summer fellowship from BPS to conduct research in Eastern Europe.

Marc Howard, Ph.D. candidate in political science, received a summer fellowship from BPS to conduct research in Eastern Europe.
Lisa Husmann (Ph.D. in geography, 1997) is teaching a summer course at Berkeley on the geography of Central Asia and China.

Oleg Kharkhordin (Ph.D. in political science, 1996) is the author of the recently published *The Collective and the Individual in Russia* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999). Oleg is an Academy Scholar at the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies at Harvard University and an associate professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences and Sociology at the European University at St. Petersburg.

Kristen Kopp, Ph.D. candidate in German, received a grant from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) to spend the next year in Berlin where she will conduct research for her dissertation, “Contesting Borders: German Post-Colonial Discourse and the Loss of Eastern Territories.” Kristen is researching the fin-de-siècle colonization of Poland by Germany and the subsequent loss of those territories after World War I.

Christine Kulke, Ph.D. candidate in history, received a research grant from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) to spend the next year in Berlin where she will conduct research for her project, “The Communities of L'viv / Lwow / L'vov / Lemberg, 1939–53.”

Alma Kunanbaeyva, visiting professor with the Department of Near Eastern Studies and IAS Teaching Programs, taught a course this spring for the Silkroad Foundation, which is based in Saratoga, California. Entitled “The Living Epos: Musical Narration and Story-telling in Central Asia,” the course focused on the epic songs and tales in Central Asian life, art, and culture.

Marie Alice L'Heureux, Ph.D. candidate in architecture, wrote an article entitled “Archival Research Update: Tallin and St. Petersburg” for IREX which was published in their on-line newsletter, *The Alumni Journal*.

Ann Marsh-Flores, Ph.D. candidate in Slavic Languages and Literatures, received a 1998–99 Instructional Development Fellowship from the Berkeley Language Center for her project “More than Song and Dance: Exploring a Music-Based First Year Language Curriculum.”

Arthur McKee (Ph.D. in history, 1997) has been appointed visiting lecturer in Russian history at American University in Washington, DC.

D’Ann Penner (Ph.D. in history, 1995) will spend AY 1999–00 as a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian Studies. She is currently an assistant professor at the University of Memphis.

Peter Schmelz, Ph.D. candidate in music, received a 1998–99 ACTR/ACCELS Graduate Fellowship in Advanced Russian Language and Area Studies for research in Moscow.


Ilya Segal, assistant professor of economics, was chosen to be a 1999 Alfred P. Sloan Fellow. The fellowship awards a two-year grant.

Sabine Stoll, Ph.D. candidate in Slavic Languages and Literatures, received a 1998–99 Instructional Development Fellowship from the Berkeley Language Center for her project, “Teaching Russian Aspect: A Case of Grammatical Harassment?”

Isabel Tirado (Ph.D. in history, 1985) has been appointed Dean of the College of Humanities and Social Sciences at William Paterson College in Wayne, New Jersey.

Lisa Walker, Ph.D. candidate in history, presented a paper, “Portraits of the New ‘Fathers and Sons’: Historical Commemoration and Local Civic Identity in Nizhnii Novgorod, 1889–1913,” at the UC Riverside History Graduate Student Conference on May 29.


Reginald Zelnik, professor of history, edited the recently published *Workers and Intelligentsia in Late Imperial Russia: Realities, Representations, Reflections* (Berkeley: IAS Publications, UC Berkeley, 1999). Four of the papers in the volume are by Berkeley Ph.D.s: Deborah Pearl (history, 1984), Mark Steinberg (history, 1987), Gerald Surh (history, 1979), and Eugene Anthony Swift (history, 1992).
Fellowships and Other Opportunities

**Slavic Center Travel Grants** provide limited travel support for faculty and Center-affiliated graduate students. Awards up to $300 are made to those presenting a paper at a meeting of a recognized scholarly organization. Awards are made on a first-come, first-served basis, and priority is given to those who did not receive Slavic Center funding in the past AY. To apply send request with budget. Contact: Barbara Voytek, CSEES, UC Berkeley, 361 Stephens Hall # 2304, Berkeley CA 94720-2304; bvoytek@socrates.berkeley.edu.

**Columbia University**

The **Council for European Studies Network Travel Subsidies for European Scholars** fund the domestic travel, up to $300, of European scholars who are temporarily in the US and who have been invited to lecture at a university or college which is an institutional member of the Council. Deadline: rolling. Contact: Council for European Studies, Columbia University, Box 44 Schermerhorn Hall, Room 1016-18 Schermerhorn Ext, New York NY 10027; Tel: 212-854-4172; Fax: 212-749-0397; ces@columbia.edu; http://www.columbia.edu/cu/ces/.

**Kosciuszko Foundation**

The **Metchie J. E. Budka Award** provides $1,000 for outstanding scholarly work in Polish literature (14th century to 1939), Polish history (962 to 1939), and Polish-US relations. Graduate students and postdocs in their first three years may apply, and an application is available on their website or by writing to their address. Deadline: 7/21/99. Contact: The Metchie J. E. Budka Award, The Kosciuszko Foundation, 15 E 65th St, New York NY 10021-6595; Tel: 212-734-2130; Fax: 212-628-4552; http://www.kosciuszkofoundation.org.

**National Research Council / Office for Central Europe and Eurasia**

The **COBASE Program Travel/Host Grants for American Scientists** provide $2,500-$2,750 for short-term project development and $3,300-$15,300 for long-term projects. Grants for individual American specialists who plan to establish new research partnerships with their colleagues from Central/Eastern Europe (CEE) and Newly Independent States (NIS). This program is designed primarily to prepare these new partnerships for competition in National Science Foundation programs. Deadline: 7/30/99 (long-term only); 8/16/99 (short-term). Contact: Office of International Affairs, National Research Council, 2101 Constitution Ave NW (FO 2060), Washington DC 20418; Tel: 202-334-3680; Fax: 202-334-2614; ocee@nas.edu; http://www4.nas.edu/oia/oiahome.nsf.

**Woodrow Wilson Center**

The **East European Studies Short-Term Grants** provide a stipend of $80 a day, up to one month, for graduate students and postdocs who are US citizens or permanent residents. The grants fund research in Washington, DC while residing there. No office space provided. Deadline: 9/1/99. Contact: East European Studies, Woodrow Wilson Center, One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington DC 20523; Tel: 202-691-4000; Fax: 202-691-4001; haynesai@wwics.si.edu; http://wwics.si.edu/.

The **Kennan Institute Short-Term Grants** provide a stipend of $80 a day, up to one month, and are available to scholars in need of library, archival, and other specialized resources of Washington, DC area for Russian or post-Soviet studies. Academic participants must possess a doctoral degree or be doctoral candidates who are near completion of their dissertations. Deadline: 9/1/99.

The **Kennan Institute Research Scholarships** provide $3,000 per month, for 4–9 months of research by graduate students in Washington, DC on Russian, post-Soviet, and East European studies. Deadline: 9/1/99.

Contact for Kennan Institute opportunities: Fellowships and Grants, Nancy Popson, Kennan Institute, 370 L’Enfant Promenade SW Ste 704, SI MRC 930, Washington DC 20024-2518; Tel: 202-287-3400; Fax: 202-287-3772; ngill@sivm.si.edu; http://wwics.si.edu/.
The Center acknowledges with sincere appreciation the following individuals who have contributed to the annual giving program, the Associates of the Slavic Center (or have been enrolled due to their particular generosity toward Cal to support some aspect of Slavic & East European Studies) between January 1 and May 31, 1999. Financial support from the Associates is vital to our program of research, training, and extra-curricular activities. We would like to thank all members of ASC for their generous assistance.

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Crisis in Russia (Round Table Discussion), sponsored by CSEES and BPS.

The Future of European Studies: Perspectives and Methods at the Millenium (Symposium). Sponsored by the Center for Western European Studies, IAS, the Townsend Center for the Humanities, the Center for German and European Studies, CSEES, the Department of History, the Department of Political Science, and the UC Berkeley Library.

The Genius of the (Other) System: The Rise and Fall of the Major Soviet Studios (Conference). Sponsored by the Film Studies Program, the Townsend Center for the Humanities, CSEES, the Department of Comparative Literature, the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures.

Imperial Borderlands: Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia, 1700-1917 (Culture, Identity, and History in the Caucasus and Central Asia Series), sponsored by BPS.

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State Building and the Reconstruction of Shattered Societies (Annual Caucasus Conference). Sponsored by BPS, with funding by the Ford Foundation, and by CSEES, with funding by the US Department of Education under Title VI.

1998–99 Public Lectures

Sergey Ambartsumian, former president of Yerevan State University and member of the Presidium of the National Academy of Sciences of Armenia. *Science, Education, and Politics in Armenia*  
Nina Antanovich, visiting scholar, Department of Political Science, CSU Fresno, and Department of Political Science, Belarusian State University, Minsk. *Belarus: A Divided Nation*  
Sergei Arutiunov, visiting professor of anthropology, UC Berkeley, and chair of the Department of Caucasian Studies, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Moscow. *Religious Institutions and Political Power in Buryatia, Siberia*  
Stephan Astourian, William Saroyan Visiting Professor of Armenian Studies, UC Berkeley. *From Ter Petrossian to Kocharian: Causes and Prospects of the Transition in Armenia*  
Xavier Bougarel, author of *Bosnie: anatomie d’un conflit*. *Kosovo: One War Can Hide Another*  
Josef C. Brada, professor of economics and director, College of Business International Programs, College of Business, Arizona State University. *The Persistence of Moderate Inflation in the Czech Republic and the Koruna Crisis of May 1997*  
Bulgari. Lecture and Bulgarian folk music performance  
Fedor Burlatsky, Chairman of the Scientific Council of Political Science of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences. *The Current Political and Economic Crisis in Russia*  
The Honorable Vojtech Cepl, justice of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic. *Transformation of Hearts and Minds in Eastern Europe*  
Israel Charny, executive director, Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. *Classifying Denials of the Holocaust, the Armenian Genocide, and Other Genocides*  
Levon Chookaszian, director of the
U.S. Ambassador and special advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Caspian Basin energy diplomacy. The Caspian Sea—Where Foreign Policy and Business Interests Intersect Eileen Murphy, Queen’s University, Belfast, Ireland.


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In recognition of the importance of recent events in the Balkans and the need to understand these events from a historical perspective, the Department of History (with support from the Slavic Center and from the College’s Social Science Division) has made tentative plans to host a visiting professor in the field of Balkan history during spring semester of the academic year 1999–2000. He is Roumen Daskalov, associate professor of history at the University of Sophia, Bulgaria, and the Central European University in Budapest. (In December 1998 an agreement was signed between the University of California Education Abroad Program and the CEU concerning academic exchanges between the two institutions.)

Although details were not yet firm at the time the Newsletter went to press, the current plan is for Dr. Daskalov to give a large undergraduate lecture course (History 100) on the history of Southeastern Europe, with emphasis on the Balkan region, and a graduate proseminar (History 280B) on the historical background to the more recent conflicts (4 units each).

Daskalov is the author of four books in Bulgarian, including *Between East and West. Dilemmas of Bulgarian National Identity*, and numerous articles and chapters in books in Bulgarian, English, and German. He has held the prestigious Humboldt Fellowship in Berlin, a Fulbright at the University of Maryland, an academic year appointment at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, a temporary fellowship at St. John’s Oxford, and the Jean Monnet Fellowship at the European Institute in Florence.

Students who are not history majors will be welcome in both courses, which are intended to service interested students of the entire campus. It is also anticipated that Dr. Daskalov will give some public lectures and participate in public forums. For further information, please contact Professor Zelnik at the Department of History or by e-mail <zelnik@socrates.berkeley.edu>.