As we break for the summer, we can look back with satisfaction on the 2000–2001 academic year and take pride in the many activities sponsored by ISEEES (lectures, seminars, bag lunches, working groups, and conferences). We are particularly pleased that the year witnessed the establishment of our new Caucasus and Central Asia Program (CCAsP), as well as the launching of a new endowed lecture series, the Peter N. Kujachich Annual Lecture on Serbian and Montenegrin Studies. The inaugural lecture, entitled “The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic,” was presented by Professor Veljko Vujacic of Oberlin College, who will be remembered from his graduate student days at UCB where he was member of the Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies and completed his graduate training in the Department of Sociology. We expect to make the lecture an annual event that will bring outstanding scholars to campus to present their research on this critical and still very unsettled region.

The second semester of our seminar series for graduate students and faculty, New Directions in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, has been exceptionally stimulating and informative. Designed to showcase the ideas, projects, and written work of our colleagues, the spring seminar included presentations by visiting faculty, Stephan Astourian (History), Katerina Clark (Slavic), and Oleg Kharkhordin (Political Science), as well as Berkeley faculty, Andrew Janos (Political Science), John Connelly (History), and Gerard Roland (Economics). We are grateful to the Carnegie Corporation for its continuing support of this seminar and to the Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies for organizing the seminar events.

ISEEES’s calendar of events was exceptionally busy this past semester. We have sponsored or cosponsored five conferences, beginning with the Soyuz conference on February 16–17. This stimulating conference, “From the Internationale to the Transnational: Repositioning Post-Socialist Cultures,” brought together an international group of students and scholars of anthropology and sociology to discuss ongoing field research in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

On March 9, ISEEES hosted the Twenty-fifth Annual Berkeley-Stanford Conference, which draws colleagues from the Center for Russian and East European Studies (CREES) at Stanford and from ISEEES. This year’s topic, “Memories, Generations, and Life Histories in the Making of Post-Communism,” proved to be an excellent vehicle for exploring new perspectives and original research on developments in our region.

Another conference followed on April 21–22, “Central Asia Palimpsest: (Re) Emerging Identities and New Global Imprints.” Organized by Sanjyot Mehendale, the coordinator of our new Caucasus and Central Asia Program (CCAsP), this conference examined the ways in which Central Asia’s long-submerged local identities are being affected by transnational
and globalizing pressures. The conference was made possible by a grant from the Ford Foundation through UC Berkeley’s Institute of International Studies, with support from the Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, the Department of Near Eastern Studies, and the Central Asia/Silk Road Working Group.

A week later, on April 28–29, the Center for Slavic and East European Studies (our Title VI National Resource Center) held the annual outreach conference for teachers and other members of the community. This year’s conference was organized around a “virtual tour” of the former Soviet Union ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, with presentations on many different successor states and regions including Russia, the Baltics, Central Asia, Siberia, Ukraine, and the Caucasus. It was particularly timely to have Masha Lipman, until recently the deputy editor of the Russian weekly *Itogi*, as one of the conference participants. She focused her talk on the press and society in Russia today.

ISEEES ended the academic year with cosponsorship of a conference entitled “Russians in Hollywood/Hollywood on Russia” that took place at Stanford and UC Berkeley on May 11–12. The conference presented silent films and early talkies films from the 1920s and 1930s depicting the revolutions and Russian imperial splendor, together with commentaries by leading film specialists from the Bay Area and elsewhere. ISEEES cosponsored the conference with Stanford’s CREES, the Berkeley and Stanford Departments of Slavic Languages and Literatures, and the Stanford Art Department.

We want to extend our thanks to all the members of our community who have helped make the 2000–2001 academic year such a success! Special appreciation goes to the staff at ISEEES, executive directors Barbara Voytek and Ned Walker, and to Sanjyot Mehendale for launching CCAsP. Thanks also to graduate students, faculty, and Associates of the Slavic Center (ASC). The vitality and creativity of ISEEES depend on your continued participation.

Have a wonderful summer!

Victoria E. Bonnell
Director, Institute of Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies
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BPS Working Paper Series

The Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies (BPS) added two titles to its working paper series during Spring 2001. Funding for the publication of these working papers comes from a grant by the Carnegie Corporation of New York to BPS.


These titles are available to download in PDF format from the BPS publications Web page at http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~bsp/publications.html. A complete list of working paper titles can be found on that page as well. For more information on this series, contact BPS directly at bsp@socrates.berkeley.edu or (510) 643-6737.

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ISEEES director, Victoria Bonnell, with Professor Jenik Radon, Stanford Schools of Law and Business, at our Teachers Outreach Conference in April.
In his *Remembrance of Things Past*, Marcel Proust describes how, as a young man, he would wildly alternate among disparate self-definitions. Being with people who loved him or appreciated him, such as his grandmother, or the writer Bergotte, he would be filled with grandiose notions of his moral stature and his talents. Being with stern figures of authority, or with people who gave him reasons to believe that they thought little of him, his self-esteem would be crushed; he would feel small and wretched. And so, an encounter with a certain aristocrat and his father’s friend, who advised young Marcel to give up on his dreams of being a writer, left Proust shattered. He writes that he became “acutely conscious again of [his] own intellectual nullity.” His mind, he writes, was “like a fluid which is without dimensions save those of the vessel that is provided with it.” With some people, his mind would “expand to fill the vast capacity of genius.” Other people’s offhand comment or unfavorable look would suddenly “contain and enclose my mind within the straitened mediocrity.”

The majority of characters in Proust’s great novel are like the young narrator. They, too, basically depend on their social environment for their self-definition. Being with people of high status or people who respect them, they have lots of self-respect; being with people of low status or being treated disrespectfully, especially by persons of low status, they lose a grip on who they are. But these adults, unlike young Marcel, have gotten used to certain, more or less constant flows of respect coming from certain predictable sources, and to indifference and loathing coming from other quarters; and so, their self-definition has stabilized. They know their place. They can predict who will treat them in what way. And this knowledge gives them an anchor to their lives.

Now, during the course of the book, an interesting thing happens to the narrator. He alone of all the characters in the novel begins to change in the sense that at some point, he no longer depends on social structure to know who he is or to maintain his self-worth. Social structure recedes into the background. Instead, his self-definition and self-worth are increasingly based on internalized standards and on his interpretation of his (past and present) consistency with these standards. Now, how does he know what his unique standards are? How does he know that they are not random or fake? He knows them primarily thanks to memory of his past choices and actions and of the turning points in his life. This memory, constantly nourished and cultivated, constantly reawakened, allows him to retain a core of identity amidst changing life circumstances. This memory of where he comes from (so to speak) gives him a grip on himself: an idea of where he is going. As he puts it in one of the later volumes of the book, “My past is projected before me that shadow of itself which we call our future.”

It strikes me that the two sets of characters—on the one hand, the young Proust and pretty much everybody else; on the other hand, the mature Proust—epitomize two fundamentally opposed types of personal identity that have been known and studied for a long time, although under different names. On the one hand, we have a type of identity that appears in all kinds of cultures in all epochs. We can call it corporate or group-based, because the carrier or such an identity is nobody outside a structure of a group of which he is a member. We can call it status-based or traditional. We can call it relational because it is conferred by others or by the person’s location within a network of social relations. The carrier of such an identity continually needs the presence of others to know who he is. These “others” may be the members of a stable group or may change over time, yet their identity-conferring function remains unchanged. I will call this type of identity place-based.

On the other hand, we have a type of identity in which the subject thinks of himself as his own maker, as his telos. We can call it individualist. We can call it, after David Riesman, inner-directed. We can call it modern. Here, the continuity of personality is supplied not by the group location but by the memory of past choices. The carrier of such an identity understands his life as an unfolding story in which he has control over events to the degree that he can exert free will and thus, can transcend the circumstances of his birth and social environment. As Charles Taylor puts it,
the “individualist self is the identity of a person for whom
the question ‘who am I’ has subjective value and meaning.”
Such a person “is a being who has a sense of self, has a
notion of the future and the past, can hold values, make
choices, in short, can adopt life-plans.” I call this type of
identity time-based.

Why is this distinction between place- and time-based
identities important, and what relevance does it have for the
post-Communist world? First, there is a well established
connection, uncovered first by Alexis de Tocqueville,
between the individualist identity and civil society, the
individualist identity and the capacity to associate, and
finally, between the individual and democracy.

Second, until now, time-based identities and the
cultures which employ them have been an exception
throughout the world. Only contemporary American social
science is guilty of the assumption that individualist
identities are widespread in the 21st century, that they are
universally available, or that they are randomly mixed
throughout the world with other types of identities. Yet, as
the string of thinkers from Nietzsche to Geertz have kept
insisting, the concept of time-based identity is historically
and culturally contingent. It is a product of distinct social
and cultural relations. It is a relatively new discovery and
hardly a widespread phenomenon. To feel, to think, and to
speak as the (unique) individual is possible only at a certain
time and a certain place, namely in the modern West. That
does not mean that all Westerners have a well-developed
identity of that sort, or that place-based identities do not
matter in the Western societies. Rather, what it means is
that in the West, and there alone, a modal personality has
two bases of identity available: place-based and time-based.
Other cultures have only the former.

In my research I have attempted to assess the degree to
which the time-based identity is a familiar idea in the post-
Communist world. I chose Poland for my research, because
Poland is widely considered as one of the most culturally
westernized countries of the former Soviet bloc. So, I
reasoned, if such identity is widespread, it should be
widespread there. Within Poland, I focused on big cities,
for it is widely accepted that the urban populations have
more contact with this mode of consciousness than rural or
small-time population. Finally, I zeroed in on elite mem-
bers—the leaders of opinion and politicians. I reasoned that
if such identity is widespread, it should be widespread
there, among the cream of local political society. My two
cities of choice were: Wroclaw in Western Poland and
Lodz in Central Poland. I interviewed some fifty top
members of local political elites in both cities.

How can one come up with empirical, reliable indica-
tors of time-based identity? In grappling with this question,
I availed myself of the results of a recent work by Michael
Mascuch from the Berkeley rhetoric department. Mascuch
distinguishes between a generic life history and a peculiar
form of life history, namely a unified totalizing narrative. In
a unified narrative, characteristic for the modern novel, life
is presented as a succession of turning points, where one
event causally will lead to another and where external
experiences result in learning or internal change.

As Mascuch suggests, in societies where identity based
on place is the cultural norm, people can produce all kinds
of life histories. But the features of a narrative will be
missing from their accounts. A tradition of producing such
narratives will be weak, because a person with a place-based
identity does not need to know the turning points of his past
life in order to know who he is.

By contrast, in societies where time-based identity is
the norm, the life histories will typically take the form of
narratives. People will see their lives in such terms and will
be able to produce such a narrative “on demand,” because
such narratives are vitally orienting to them.

This gave me a clue. I conducted open-ended inter-
views, asking such broad questions as how one became a
public person, political successes and failures, as well as
how one acquired his present ideological views and
affiliations. Then I analyzed such spontaneously produced
bits of life histories.

If an account had the following, and recurrent, three-
prong structure, it was the signal that a person is familiar
with time-based identity: situation-transformation-
situation. Put somewhat differently, these three elements
are: 1) the old way of thinking; 2) a new situation which
threatened that old way of thinking; and 3) the resulting
discovery or a new insight. This is the structure of a
classical novel plot. On the contrary, if the account stayed
at the level of external events, and there was no causality
from environment to internal change, I took it as the sign of
weakly developed individualist identity.

This research revealed astonishing differences.
Overall, barring individual exceptions, time-based identity
is familiar to Wroclaw leaders but not to Lodz leaders.
Lodz leaders’ identity is predominantly place-based.
Consider the example of two party activists, one from
Wroclaw and one from Lodz. Both are self-professed
conservatives. The question was about the circumstances of acquiring political views.

The Wroclaw person begins by saying that for a long time he had great difficulty with ideological self-definition. He was never an ideological anti-Communist. What bothered him in the seventies was “totalitarianism,” the stifling of diverse opinions, and not Communism per se. Apart from that, for many years he did not know who he was. The turning point for him came in 1989 when he joined an organization called the Democratic Center. As he says, “Even though it lasted for only three months, it was, to me, the first truly political experience in the sense that it went beyond the horizon of anti-Communism and that it forced me to formulate my own ideas. Really, during these three months I learned more than during all the preceding years.” This is a genuine narrative, because it specifies: 1) an old internal state; 2) a situation which challenged that state; and finally, 3) a new internal state resulting from the encounter. This is how the Wroclaw politicians routinely talk about their lives.

When asked the same question, his Lodz counterpart has no narrative to tell. He talks about values he was brought up with in his family: patriotic, democratic, and Christian values. These values, he says, determined his political choices since his early youth, such as his decision not to join the Communist Party. They led him, later, to join Solidarity and finally to co-found the Christian-National Union. On the latter decision he says, “When I realized I could not avoid partisan involvement, I had not the slightest problem finding my place in the spectrum. ... It was obvious to me it had to be a Christian party.” There is no mention of change, except for a change in external circumstances.

Here is another example of how Lodz elite members fail to see their lives in terms of a unified narrative. Asked how he became a public person, a Lodz person explains that he was among the organizers of the August 1980 strike. He says that for the first few weeks after the strike he thought that his political involvement would be short-lived, that it would end in a month or two. Later, this proved to be an illusion. A month passed, then another. Problems mounted. No sooner did one conflict with the authorities end than another had already begun. He says he had no time to sit back and rethink his career plans. He had no choice but to plunge deeper and deeper in the union affairs. The scope of his responsibilities grew. October came, then November, and there was still plenty of work to do. Eventually—he does not know exactly when and how—he began to treat his union work like a regular job. His story ends here. Again, external events do not translate here into internal change and learning.

Other more extensive research, which I don’t have time to describe here, has led me to a more general conclusion about the status of the individualist identity in the post-Communist world. I believe that the cities of Western Poland like Wroclaw, Gdansk, and Szczecin are truly exceptional not only for Poland but for the entire post-Communist world in general. The urban areas of Western Poland are the only contiguous area in Eastern Europe where the individualist identity is widespread. Elsewhere, this type of self-identity is missing. There are only islands of it, for instance, in the artistic circles. Despite all the socioeconomic changes that Communism had brought about—modernization, urbanization, the spread of education, and the destruction of traditional peasant society, the basic form of identity available to society members is place-based and not time-based.

This leads one to a fascinating question: what does it take to create a modern individual? What did it take to create individualism in Western Poland? But this is a topic for another talk.

References

2 Ibid., p. 539.
Exiles at Home and Abroad: The Bulgarian Intelligentsia in Emigration

Maria Stoilkova

Maria Stoilkova is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Anthropology. She presented the following paper at the 2001 Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities. Currently, she is continuing her dissertation research among the Bulgarian community in New York.

While America has witnessed a technology explosion, the way we think of migration has irreversibly changed. It suffices to bring to mind the stories of thousands of “Third World” engineers to the Silicon Valley and their quick path to social prestige and financial success in the technology boom as reminders that we can no longer think of migration in terms of the earlier categories of “deprivation,” “adaptation,” or “the invasion of the poor.” Migration scholars, instead, have made us contemplate the relationship between the predicaments of the emerging “global capitalism” and the changing nature of the state, society, and culture. The increased internalization of economy no longer necessitates an internally homogenous national labor force but increasingly relies on dislocating and re-embedding particular groups of people. The emergence of highly trained personnel necessary for managing the global economy—a group of professionals and technicians that is increasingly mobile—has prompted Manuel Castells to speak about “an emerging global cosmopolitan class.” While, on a global scale, the effects of these social developments may be seen as beneficial to strengthening the world political and economic integration, at the level of those particular countries who have been capitalizing on providing for the education of highly-trained professionals, these effects are often perceived as devastating.

The topic of my paper was inspired by the increased concern of the Bulgarian public with issues regarding the large-scale migration of young professionals from Bulgaria following the collapse of Communism and by the heightened awareness of many young Bulgarians in the US who have come to recognize the commonality of their diasporic experience. Some 800,000 educated Bulgarians have left their country in just a few short years, following the break up of the socialist regime—precisely at a time that seemed to offer a space for re-imagining the future of Bulgaria as a new era of democratic development, providing unforeseen opportunities for personal, intellectual, political, and economic prosperity. This outflow of the best-educated younger generation of the country has been described as the most severe “brain drain” in modern Bulgarian history and this in a country that lacks any significant experience dealing with emigration.

Moreover, Bulgaria today faces a devastating demographic crisis, whereby within the last ten years the population of the state has diminished by almost two million (out of 9 million at the end of 1989). This demographic drop has often been explained as related to the overall decrease of the economically active population and the steady rise of the index in unemployment, combined with a high mortality rate and the lowest birthrate in Europe. Surprisingly however, and until recently, there has been little attempt to generate public concern and explicitly relate the causes of this demographic crisis to the unprecedented outflow of young people from the country. In an emotionally charged attempt to attract these people back to Bulgaria, the Bulgarian government recently flew in 300 young and “successful Bulgarians living abroad” on the expense of the state budget to meet for a conference and negotiate conditions under which this cohort may resume their loyalties to the Bulgarian nation. Most of these young Bulgarians today are practicing privileged international professions or continuing their academic careers in the United States. I believe that the logic behind the exodus of young members of the Bulgarian intelligentsia can be placed within the broader context of shifting relationships between postsocialist countries and transnational capitalism.

The central question of this paper is how we can make sense of the fact that a whole generation of educated and rather privileged people have chosen to leave Bulgaria precisely when it seems to offer them heightened possibilities? It strikes us as almost natural to think of migration from Eastern Europe or Russia as being provoked purely by brute factors of unemployment, impoverishment, and the general failure of postsocialist regimes to establish tolerable living conditions for their populations. With this presentation, however, I would like to reach beyond simply economic or political explanations and look at how status, prestige, and a sense of self-fulfillment, as well as larger patterns of social stratification inherited from socialism, may be just as central a set of factors as the former. The conclusions drawn in this study are part of my ongoing
research for my Ph.D. dissertation in anthropology and are based on extensive interviews with members of the Bulgarian community (mostly in the San Francisco Bay Area), with officials from relevant ministries in Bulgaria and the Bulgarian Consulate in Washington, DC, with representatives of various Bulgarian associations in the US, and analyses of media reports, books, and surveys. My research draws as well on two bodies of theoretical literature: the study of international migration and the study of transnationalism and globalization.

Recent research within these fields has challenged two of our most stable perceptions of world migration: the image that it is usually the poorest section of a society that migrates and the notion that migration is above all a voluntary act. Saskia Sassen, among others, has argued that long-scale migration flows are embedded in specific systems that can be economic, political, and ethnic, but also cultural and ideological. In this sense, she argues, the influence of the aggressive campaign during the Cold War to depict the West as a place where economic well-being is the norm and well-paying jobs are easy to get, is a decisive factor inducing people of the so-called Eastern bloc to move westward. In addition, anthropologists deeply invested in phenomena of the social imaginary have paid attention to the relationship between transnational migration and the proliferation of new identities and cultural flows in the globalizing world. Yet, as Aihwa Ong argues, the production of these new identities promoted by modern forms of travel are entrenched in structures of various order—national and transnational—and are part of larger political-economic regimes in control of “the flow of people, things, and ideas” and therefore they should not be studied independently of these structures.

I suggest that three factors are central to explaining the recent emigration of educated Bulgarians: 1) the radical incompatibility of the intelligentsia’s cultural and moral values with those required for economic success in the contemporary conditions of “wild capitalism”; 2) their alienation from the official life of the state following the decline in the status and work perspectives of the intelligentsia’s last socialist descendants; and 3) this generation’s admiration for perceived values of western civilization.

My ethnographic evidence shows that the bulk of people who migrate westward and specifically to the US belong to a generation that came of age in the mid-1980s and received their education from Bulgarian universities in the last years of socialism. In other words, one can argue that the emigration “crisis” in Bulgaria today is a result of generation-specific disadvantages brought about by the new economic realities in Bulgaria, following the dissolution of the socialist state. This insight prompted me to look further at the particular characteristics of social stratification during socialism and the role the educated classes have played in that society as patterns essential for understanding this recent migration phenomenon.

Statistics show that by the end of the socialist period, the stratum of professionals and intelligentsia, forming an identifiable socio-political unit together with people in administrative positions, constituted more than 40% of the population of Bulgaria. The breakup of the socialist system, however, brought a very new concept of social distinction based on wealth, which came to obliterate formerly dominant criteria for social differentiation drawn along the lines of education, profession, administrative status, and the character of work (e.g., intellectual vs. manual). Today the status of the so-called “mass intelligentsia” of socialism (teachers, doctors, journalists, academics, and engineers)—the social group which was expected to embody the category of the “middle class” after the fall of socialism—has radically dropped in prestige, concurrent with a drop in their standard of living. The postsocialist realities, which fostered significant structural redistribution of the administrative apparatus, left a large number of state-employed professionals and intellectuals literally on the street. It is precisely the educated group of the generation of the 1980s that has embodied in their personal lives the weight of the so-called “transitional period” in Bulgaria.

Let us concentrate for a moment on the above facts with a different set of metaphors. The postsocialist realities opened up a process in Bulgaria very similar to what Bourdieu has described in his work, Distinction, though in reference to France. Discussing the social costs of times that involved radical economic restructuring, he noticed that shifts in the labor market first and most dramatically affect the generation which enters the labor force at that particular moment. Furthermore, “(t)he structural de-skilling of a whole generation, who are bound to get less out of their qualification than the previous generation would have obtained, engenders a sort of collective disillusionment [...].”

If initially directed towards the educational system alone, which in the case of Bulgaria has indeed produced far too many specialists than the post-socialist labor
market possibly could make use of, this mixture of revolt and resentment in the hearts of deprived young people extends to all other institutions and specifically to the state. As one of my informants has expressed, this “anti-institutional cast of mind” of the generation in our focus—whose betrayed ambitions make them refuse to accept such fundamental tenets of the new (and in some senses previous) societal order as ‘career,’ ‘status,’ and in general what came to stand for ‘getting on’ in society—is a major stimulus to leave the country. Later he concluded, “It is insulting to live in a society where success is measured through speculations and deceptions married with physical abuse, where there are very few who live well, and where those that achieved their prosperity through legal operations and professionalism are even fewer.” 10 The expressed desire to leave Bulgaria is today among the most explicit, and probably least self-destructive, forms of refusal embodied by the Bulgarian youth. The increased mortality rate that I mentioned earlier clearly indexes some of the more destructive forms of refusal.

My second hypothesis argues that the cohort that is most likely—and, of course, most able—to embark on emigration belongs to the once privileged urban and highly educated class, commonly referred to as the “mass intelligentsia.” For the sake of being brief, I will simply refer here to these people as “intelligentsia,” however, recognizing the much more complex nature of social structure and identification under socialism. 11 Two factors of life during that period—belonging to the upper class of “intelligentsia,” or the “nomenklatura,” and residence in the capital of Sofia or another big city—were central in providing access to a prestigious status in society. My research so far clearly correlates these patterns with the social background of Bulgarian émigrés whom I have interviewed.

A few central characteristics of the cultural outlook of “intelligentsia” became very influential in framing the experience of young émigrés, whom I will call the “transitional generation” of Bulgaria. Although ideologically egalitarian, socialist societies were in fact rigidly stratified, and the class of “intelligentsia” was one of the most visible layers of the social body, publicly defining the hegemonic moral framework of the Bulgarian society. As George Faraday has put it, socialist intellectuals viewed themselves as the “leaders of the nation” and combined their real passion for arts and ideas with a strong tendency to treat education and cultivation as a measure of human worth in addition to a heightened sense of social responsibility towards their nation. 12 These “hard core” values were also used as grounds for differentiating and denigrating such groups as “the Party-elite,” “the bureaucrats,” “the provincials,” and “the peasants.”

Features of this attitude are manifest in the way Bulgarians in the diaspora construct their identities and communicate between each other, and I will discuss here two instances that demonstrate these relations. On the one hand, the new exilic consciousness of the diasporic Bulgarians resides in the tension between a sense of national belonging cultivated within the intelligentsia’s origin-centered essence of identity (as described above) and another based on the idea of displacement. These two aspects of their identity clash in an attempt to redefine their political loyalties: a Bulgarian self, who is not supposed to leave, a person who is supposed to modernize the nation, and who heroically bears the burden of the hard transition that his country undergoes; and another self, shaped by the emerging notion that “we are citizens of the world” and, therefore, we do not necessarily subscribe to a narrow, nationalistic identity. The dynamic of overcoming the frustrations of this identity crisis reappears in many interviews over and over again. “The fact that I don’t wake up in my bed in Plovdiv,” a Bulgarian émigré shares, “but in Washington does not mean that I don’t, so to say, dwell within the space of my native country. [ … ] I have made a choice to live abroad, that concerns purely and exclusively only my profession. Yet, this is difficult to explain to the Bulgarian public.”

On the other hand, ambitious educated Bulgarians in the States often feel very awkward in meeting their non-educated compatriots, who mostly enter the states through the “Green Card” lottery. This awkwardness is a result not only of the explicitly distinct lifestyle of cosmopolitan professionals, which strictly separates them from the “petty ambitions” of service laborers, but is also a reflection of surprise at encountering “so many different kinds of Bulgarians,” as another of my informants, a member of the recently established Bulgarian Wall Street Club, has noticed. Such cohabitation between ambitious professionals and manual laborers within the diaspora was almost impossible within socialist Bulgaria, except on a very superficial level, given the strict residence regulations, extreme contrasts of life in the capital and other parts of the country, and the prevailing ideology of egalitarianism which meant to represent all Bulgarians as equal. In a way, then, Bulgarians in the diaspora, perhaps for the first time, become more aware of the social inequalities inscribed and hidden in the socialist system they have exited.
Bulgarian historians have discussed another feature of life under late socialism that bears potential to support my explorations. During the last years of socialism, Bulgarian intellectuals gradually came to see themselves as “exiles within”: not necessarily being political dissidents, they were nevertheless alienated from the official ideology of the socialist state and, more importantly, saw themselves as cosmopolitan “westerners.” In addition, those whom I called the “transitional generation” of the 1980s grew up during a period when the socialist system became much more open to Western influences. As part of this process, Western popular culture, which mostly came through non-official channels, profoundly shaped the formation of the cohort that is at the center of my study. They tend to compare themselves to young people of similar educational and occupational status in the West, not to their parents or their grandparents. In the perception of this generation the “geographical West” was constructed to represent the goal of the pursuit of excellence and fulfillment, at once cultural and intellectual, professional and personal. Thus, the exodus of the young members of intelligentsia to the US paradoxically represents a form of spatial realization of this sentiment and seems to represent their search for the “true face” of European cosmopolitanism albeit in a different geo-political body.

Instead of making a conclusion, I will quickly mention a set of issues that rest outside the scope of this presentation but which frame my future research. Obviously, the Bulgarian immigrant community in the US is by no chance a homogenous group. It seems to me that highly-trained Bulgarians from the same cohort whose professional trajectory was not so successful in the US may not relate to their home country and their host society in a similar way as the successful young professionals do, and thus this second group may carry a different kind of subjectivities from the type I have already discussed above. The same counts for the differences between professionals and manual laborers.

An essential element of the way in which foreigners adapt to their new lives in a diaspora is the character of the “place” itself. I tend to think that it is easier for Bulgarians, and other East Europeans as well, to accommodate and integrate here in the US than in Western Europe, where they are subjected to less advantageous controlling factors than in the States. The perceived “whiteness” of East Europeans, added to their high level of Western-style educational background and competency in legitimate “high-culture,” allows young and educated Bulgarians to be recognized in the highly stratified and racially charged American society as at least “middle class” individuals. Moreover, most East Europeans truly believe in the myth that the US is an achievement-based society, and this is another incentive for preferring to live in the US over Germany, France, or Austria.

References


2. The data has been taken from the Annual Review, 1999 of the Demographic Institute of the Bulgarian Academy of Science.


9. Ibid., p. 144.

10. Interview taken by the author on October 23, 2000, San Francisco.

11. For a comprehensive discussion on the role of the intelligentsia in Eastern Europe and Russia see the works of: Z. Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters: On Moder-

12 Faraday, The Revolt of the Filmmakers.


Central Eurasian Information Resource

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The CEIR Regional Image Database is being developed using multi-media management software. A selection of CEIR images, and more background information about the CEIR project, can be found at Web address listed below. Individuals interested in contributing original, quality images of notable geographic features, cityscapes, architecture, folkways, and lifestyles characteristic of locales within the former Soviet Union, are invited to write to slavinfo@u.washington.edu with a brief description of the item or collection. We will also be glad to hear from individuals planning to do some serious photography on their next trip to the region. A CEIR staff member will respond promptly to each inquiry.

When completed, the CEIR will provide geographic, statistical, image, bibliographic, and full-text information, together with curricular materials supporting the study of the regions of the Russian Federation and other former Soviet republics at a unique level of detail and in a wide range of subjects.

Contact: CEIR Regional Image Database, University of Washington Libraries, Slavic & East European Section, Box 352900, Seattle WA 98195; Tel: (206) 543-5588; Fax: (206) 685-8049; slavinfo@u.washington.edu; http://content-dev.lib.washington.edu/ceir/index.html.
The Balkans and the West After Milosevic

Edward W. Walker

Edward W. Walker is Executive Director of the Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies at ISEEES and a specialist on sovereignty issues in the former Soviet Union. The following is a summary of a speech he made to the Peninsula Chapter of the World Affairs Council of Northern California on March 22, 2001. Developments since that date are not incorporated in the talk.

For a few short months late last year, it appeared that a general peace settlement for the Balkans might finally be possible. The reasons for this optimism were several. First, and most obvious, was the extraordinary series of events that forced Slobodan Milosevic to step down as president of rump Yugoslavia. For years, it had been axiomatic for Western officials, who blamed Milosevic for precipitating the “wars of Yugoslav succession,” to argue that genuine political and economic stabilization in the Balkans would be impossible as long as Milosevic remained in power. With the Great Villain gone, it seemed that a genuine stabilization might finally be possible.

Even more encouraging was the way Milosevic left office. Who would have believed at the beginning of last year that he would have allowed a reasonably “free and fair” election to take place for the Yugoslav presidency, that he would lose that election, and that, when he tried to falsify the election results, there would be a generally peaceful popular uprising, that interior ministry or army troops would not been used to suppress the uprising, that the uprising would force Milosevic to step down, and that the man to replace Milosevic, Vojislav Kostunica, would lead a unified coalition of 18 opposition parties and would be a constitutional lawyer who seemed genuinely committed to electoral democracy? From the standpoint of European and American policy makers, not to speak of most Serbs, it seemed almost too good to be true.

There was good news from other parts of the Balkans as well. In Kosovo, Western governments were deeply relieved when moderates associated with Ibrahim Rugova’s Democratic League won municipal elections in October 2000, while more intolerant and militant nationalists associated with Hashim Thaci and other former commanders of the KLA performed poorly. The results seemed to suggest that a majority of Kosovo Albanians were tired of war and wanted political normalization with the Serbs and improved economic conditions more than they wanted revenge or the expulsions of more Serbs and other minorities from the province. In addition, the situation in and around Mitrovica, the town on the highway north to Serbia from Pristhtina where many Serbs were still resident, and where earlier in the year there had been a good deal of inter-communal violence between Serbs and Albanians, seemed to have stabilized. Moreover, officials in the UN administration that was in effect running the country—UNMIK, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo—indicated that they were pleasantly surprised by the industriousness of the Kosovo Albanians in restoring the local economy and rebuilding the region’s destroyed infrastructure. Finally, it appeared that the NATO peacekeeping force, KFOR, had security matters reasonably well in hand.

In Bosnia, meanwhile, as officials in the Clinton Administration constantly reminded the public, the Dayton Accords were (more or less) holding up. The NATO-led peacekeeping force, SFOR, had brought an end to the great bulk of the violence; Bosnian citizens were worrying less about personal security in going about their daily life; and huge amounts of economic aid were pouring in from international organizations and foreign governments. The fiction of a unified state made up of two equal entities—the Republika Srpska in the east and the Croat-Bosnian federation in the west—was holding up; the joint presidency and other joint institutions had survived and in some cases were even functioning reasonably effectively; and the repatriation of some refugees and internally displaced persons was continuing (albeit slowly). Then, shortly after Milosevic lost the presidential elections in Yugoslavia and Rugova’s party won the municipal elections in Kosovo, the leader of the Bosnian Muslims during the war, and its representative to the collective Bosnian presidency, Alija Izetbegovic, resigned. Izetbegovic did not have quite the same reputation for stirring up interethnic enmity as Milosevic or Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, but he was associated in the minds of many Serbs and Croats with the violence of civil war and was widely considered an advocate of the right of Muslims to dominate Bosnian politics. His resignation was therefore not regretted, to put it politely, by Western governments.

The news from Croatia was even better. Franjo Tudjman, who was almost as reviled in Western capitals as Milosevic, had died in December 1999, and his party was subsequently roundly defeated in parliamentary elections. The new president, Stipe Mesic, and his new prime minister, Ivica Racan, were making all the right noises about democracy, minority rights, economic reform, and eventual accession to the European Union, so the hope was that
Croatia would soon be following the path of Slovenia, the first former Yugoslav republic to really make the “turn to Europe.”

The result of all this, then, was first and foremost relief at the long-awaited ouster of Milosevic (perhaps only the ouster of Saddam would have pleased Washington more). The mood at the time is nicely captured by an article written by Carl Bildt, the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy to the Balkans, that appeared in the January/February issue of Foreign Affairs entitled, “A Second Chance in the Balkans.” “The recent changes in Belgrade and Zagreb,” Bildt asserted, “bring with them a second historic opportunity to advance toward genuine peace and prosperity in the Balkans.” The first historic opportunity was at Dayton, when Bildt argued that Milosevic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic had “failed to grasp the opportunities” presented by Dayton for achieving a lasting peace in the Balkans.

For the soon-to-be-elected Bush team, the developments in the Balkans in October-November seemed particularly auspicious. Above all, it appeared that a new Bush administration would indeed be able to withdraw, if not all, at least many, even most, American troops from Bosnia and Kosovo, thereby living up to his campaign rhetoric about the need to limit the use of the American military in peacekeeping operations abroad.

The hope, then, was that a general peace settlement would finally stabilize this chronically unstable region, a settlement that, from a Western perspective, would ideally look something like this:

1. First, acceptance and formal recognition by all Balkan states of the borders inherited from the Yugoslav period.
2. Second, agreement on the permanency of Bosnia as a unified state made up, at least for now, of two separate entities, Republika Srpska and the Croat-Bosnian Federation.
3. Third, the preservation of Yugoslavia as a confederation of three equal parts—Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro, each of which would have “substantial autonomy,” in the language of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 that ended NATO’s bombing campaign of Serbia.
4. Fourth, a commitment by all Balkan governments to preserve democracy, respect individual liberties, and afford minorities the institutional protections needed to preserve their languages and culture.
5. Fifth, agreement that all refugees and “internally displaced persons” (IDPs) had a right to return to their homes, and concrete measures to ensure the repatriation actually took place.

Part and parcel of such a settlement would be a commitment to a deepening of market reforms by all governments in the region; a commitment by the United States and the European Union to provide additional economic aid for the region; financial support from the IMF and World Bank; greater access to Western markets; and a commitment to support the gradual incorporation of the Balkan states into the European Union through separate “stabilization and association agreements,” and likewise a commitment by each Balkan state to adopt the acquis communautaire—that is, the vast collection of laws the EU has required prospective members to adopt before they can be accepted into the community. With accession to the EU, the difference between autonomy and independence for Kosovo, Montenegro, and Republika Srpska, or the design of the Serb-Croat-Muslim “entity” of Bosnia, would diminish, even vanish. As Bildt put it in his Foreign Affairs article, the Balkan states faced a fundamental choice: integration with EU or disintegration and more violence. The assumption was that the governments of the region would recognize that the only “rational” option was the former.

Today, some three months later, the mood is very different. Once again, there is a real risk of another intercommunal war, this time in Macedonia. More generally, there is a sober-minded realization that a speedy “turn to Europe” for much of the region is very unlikely for the foreseeable future.

Why the mood change? In Serbia, Kostunica’s administration has been reluctant to cooperate with the UN’s International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague, as the Chief Justice of the Tribunal, Carla Del Ponte, has made clear on a number of occasions. A number of Milosevic’s cronies have been arrested, including his former secret police chief, Rade Markovic. It also appears that Milosevic will be arrested soon, albeit for corruption and involvement in the murder or attempted murder of a number of political opponents rather than for war crimes. Belgrade has also made clear that it is very reluctant, at least for the time being, to turn Milosevic over to the Hague Tribunal for prosecution. The reason is that both the Serbian elite and society see the Tribunal as an instrument for persecuting Serbs, who are being disproportionately targeted by the Court.

Indeed, the Serbian people are far from reconciled to what they see as a loss of traditional territory in the wake of the Yugoslav breakup. They are particularly resentful of the loss of Kosovo, and they believe that the difficulties that NATO and UNMIK are having in stabilizing the province vindicates their conviction that the Kosovo Albanians are a lawless, aggressive, and violent people who make for impossible neighbors. NATO bombing has also reinforced the Serbian perception of themselves as a victimized people. There are virtually no voices within the republic suggesting that the NATO bombing was prompted by a conviction that Milosevic had ordered the Yugoslav military to deal with the KLA by driving the Albanians out of Kosovo. Recently, Kostunica declared March 24, the anniversary of the beginning of the NATO bombing cam-
paign, a national holiday, the “Day of Remembrance,” and he described the bombing as an “evil” while refusing to say a word about Albanian victims of the crisis.

It is also very clear that the Serbian economy is not going to rebound very quickly, and that the cost of reconstruction will be enormous. Economic recovery is going to be hampered by “donor fatigue” in the international community, while the Bush Administration seems, at best, dubious about the benefits of foreign aid. And the international community is already being called upon to help with reconstruction in Bosnia and Kosovo. Serbia also has a huge number of displaced persons to deal with—some 700,000—the largest number in Europe outside the former Soviet Union.

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Finally, it is clear that Kostunica faces an enormous political challenge. He needs to consolidate his political position and somehow deal with Milosevic and his cronies; he has to weed Milosevic supporters out of the government, particularly the military; he has to deal with pressure from the War Crimes Tribunal to turn over Milosevic and other Serbs indicted for war crimes; he has to respond to the unrest in the Presevo Valley, which I will discuss in a moment, as well as the deepening insurrection in Macedonia; he has to deal with the likely attempt by Montenegro to secede from Yugoslavia this summer or fall—which by the way would make the federal government of Yugoslavia redundant, a particular problem for Kostunica given that he is president not of Serbia but of Yugoslavia; and finally, he has to deal with Kosovo, Washington, the EU, and Russia, and all of this against a background of a catastrophic economic situation.

The optimism about Bosnia also seems premature. The country remains deeply divided despite a huge flow of Western aid. It is running a huge trade deficit; domestic and direct foreign investment are virtually non-existent; the “federal” government has a substantial and growing budget deficit; unemployment is very high; and Bosnia’s public institutions suffer from endemic corruption. The elections held at the end of last year were characterized by a good deal of exclusivist, nationalist rhetoric, and politicians from all communities continue to make clear their displeasure with Dayton, which has led the UN High Representative, Jacques Klein, to fire numerous officials, including the Croat representative to the collective presidency. In short, it appears that the international community can’t put Humpty Dumpty together again—that is, Bosnia is not going to become the truly multiethnic state it once was, with mixed and reasonably well-integrated ethnic communities. Accordingly, the withdrawal of the NATO-led peace keeping force would almost certainly lead to immediate chaos and violence.

In Montenegro, yet another crisis is brewing that may well come to a head this summer. The Montenegrin president, Milo Djukanovic, a one-time ally of Milosevic who broke with the Serbian leader in 1997 and has become a strong advocate of Montenegro's independence, has called for parliamentary elections on April 22. If parties that support his call for independence win, as they are expected to, he plans to hold a referendum on independence, and if that is approved, to declare full independence. If Montenegro does declare independence, the international community is going to face a major political dilemma (and a legal conundrum) that will inevitably effect the status of Kosovo as well. And who knows how Belgrade, or for that matter the Yugoslav military or Serbs and Serbian supporters within Montenegro, will react to a declaration of Montenegrin independence.

So what of Kosovo? By all accounts, the Kosovo Albanians have absolutely no confidence in the possibility of reconciliation with the Serbs, and the fall of Milosevic has done little, if anything, to change that. As David Rohde, a journalist who won a Pulitzer Prize for his coverage of the Balkans for the Christian Science Monitor and New York Times, wrote recently: “The province remains widely corrupt, lawless, intolerant of both ethnic and political minorities, and a source of instability. The [UN-NATO] mission in Kosovo is proving even more daunting than the one in nearby Bosnia.”

Of the 200,000 or so Serbs who lived in Kosovo before the war, at least 125,000 have left. Most of those remaining are dug in in the north, notably in the divided city of Mitrovica, where there have been episodic incidents of violence and terrorist acts, including a bus bombing last year that killed eleven Serbs, and another bombing last month that killed seven and injured many more. The Serbs in the north would clearly like to see the province partitioned, assuming that Yugoslav sovereignty can’t be restored, while many, and probably most, Albanians would like see all remaining Serbs driven back into Serbia. At the same time, the ability of KFOR to guarantee security within Kosovo is undermined by terrorist incidents like the bus attacks, as is the authority of UNMIK when its officials can’t find or prosecute the perpetrators.

There was, I should note, a scrap of good news this week – it was announced that five Albanians were arrested on charges of involvement in the recent bus attack. On the other hand, not only Thaci but Rugova, who is a moderate in the context of Kosovar politics, disappointed Western governments by failing to condemn the insurrection in Macedonia, a refusal that doubtless reflects the extent of Kosovo Albanian support for the National Liberation Army.

The issue that received the most international attention in recent weeks before the fighting in Macedonia was the matter of the so-called Ground Safety Zone, a three-mile
wide, 50-mile long area along the Kosovo-Serbian border where, according to the agreement that ended the NATO bombing campaign, only lightly armed Yugoslav police have been allowed. Most critical is the area along Kosovo’s eastern border with Serbia, in the so-called Presevo Valley, which is some 80 percent Albanian and where some 70,000 Albanians live. An Albanian guerilla force, which calls itself the Army for the Liberation of Presevo, Medvedja, and Bujanovic, and which reportedly has some 1,000 active fighters at its disposal, has been using the Ground Safety Zone as a safe haven for attacking Yugoslav police and troops, with the long-term aim of at least preventing Yugoslavia from exercising sovereignty in the region, and ideally of bringing about the unification of the region with Kosovo.

Finally, we come to Macedonia, the most dramatic case of political deterioration since last year. Reports of the emergence of an organization calling itself the “National Liberation Army” (which has the same initials as the Kosovo Liberation Army in Albanian, UCK, and wears very similar uniforms and emblems) in northern Macedonia along the border with Kosovo appeared in January, when it took responsibility for an attack on a Macedonian police station. Clashes with Macedonian police continued in February and then picked up dramatically this month. Some of the fighting was a mere 10–15 miles from Skopje, the Macedonian capital, although most is now centered around Macedonia’s second largest city, Tetovo, which has had a majority Albanian population.

Apparently, the NLA had been organizing itself for some time within Macedonia, and may even have a presence in Skopje. Initial reports were that it had some 300–500 men, some of whom at least were from Kosovo. The NLA has certainly been receiving significant logistical support and reinforcements from Kosovo. On the other hand, Western and Macedonian journalists report that it has very broad popular support from the Albanian population where it is active, if not from the majority of Macedonia’s Albanians. So the claims made by both Macedonian and Western officials that the fighting is limited to a small group of “terrorist” troublemakers, or else that it is simply an incursion into Macedonia by KLA fighters from Kosovo and lacks indigenous support, seem implausible. The number of NLA fighters has reportedly grown significantly in the past two weeks, and may now be as high as 2,000, most of whom it appears are from Macedonia, not Kosovo or Albania.

There is thus a real risk that the fighting will spread, despite the recent cease-fire. Already, the two ethnic communities in the area of the fighting are fleeing in different directions. The level of distrust and fear in both communities has spiked, as one would expect, with many on both sides saying that they now believe that it is impossible for Albanian and Slavic Macedonians to live together, despite the efforts of the Macedonian government to show some restraint.

What, then, are the implications of all this for the Bush Administration? Most importantly, hopes for a speedy stabilization of the region are a chimera. The new administration is facing its first foreign policy crisis in Macedonia, and it is very likely that four years from now, at the end of President Bush’s first term in office, the Balkans will remain a zone of instability and international concern.

With respect to Serbia, the two key issues at the moment are (1) how hard to press Kostunica on cooperation with the Hague Tribunal; and (2) whether to allow Yugoslav troops back into the Ground Safety Zone.

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With regard to the former, the Administration has to decide whether to insist that Belgrade hand over Milosevic, and if so, when. The Serbs are facing a deadline of March 1, at which point the Bush Administration has to declare that Belgrade is cooperating with the Hague Tribunal before Washington can proceed with the disbursement of some $100 million in aid and, more importantly, before the US will give the IMF and World Bank the green light to help Serbia. Belgrade has taken a number of steps to accommodate Washington, including amnesty for most Kosovo Albanians who had been jailed for political reasons, as well as for some 30,000 Yugoslav army draft dodgers and deserters. Earlier, Kostunica pardoned Flora Brovina, the best known Albanian political prisoner, along with a Serbian journalist accused of spying. And as noted earlier, Belgrade has arrested a number of Milosevic cronies. The Yugoslav prime minister, Zoran Djindic, flew to DC this week to argue Belgrade’s case in Washington, and it looks as if the Administration will go ahead and rule that Belgrade has gone far enough to warrant continued aid.

The second pressing issue is whether to allow the Yugoslav Army back into the Ground Safety Zone in accordance with a plan presented by Nebojsa Covic, the Serbian deputy prime minister. Under the terms of the plan, Belgrade would reintroduce troops into the area, thereby restoring a measure of de facto sovereignty. At the same time, however, it would guarantee greater Albanian representation in local police and administrative bodies, and it would provide for democratic elections to municipal assemblies that were previously dominated by Serbs. Western journalists would be invited into the region to report on the treatment of Albanians, and EU observers would monitor a cease-fire.

In late February, US Secretary of State Colin Powell announced that Washington would agree to the return of Yugoslav forces to part of the Ground Safety Zone.
However, it would not allow US or NATO troops to operate outside of Kosovo—that is, in either Serbia or Macedonia. There was reportedly a sharp disagreement between Britain and the US on this question, with the British advocating joint NATO-Yugoslav patrols in the Presevo Valley along with the Serbs, as well as NATO protection for EU monitors in the region. Not surprising, the US position prevailed, and Lord Robertson, the NATO Secretary General, announced “a phased and continued reduction of the ground safety zone.” It was later agreed that Yugoslav troops would initially be allowed into a small wedge of territory in the south of the Presevo Valley where the Serbian, Kosovo, and Macedonian borders intersect, a move that has since acquired greater urgency because of the need to cut off supplies and reinforcements from Presevo to the NLA in Macedonia. The reintroduction of Yugoslav forces into the region took place two weeks ago, and as yet it has not provoked an armed response from the Albanian guerillas.7

So what of Kosovo? Lord Robinson, in response to the fighting in Macedonia, has issued a call for the dispatching of additional NATO troops to KFOR in order to allow it to deal simultaneously with Mitrovica and close the border with the Presevo Valley and Macedonia. It is thus unlikely that the US troop commitment to KFOR will be scaled back, at least for the time being. KFOR and UNMIK have to protect Serb minorities in the north; keep the remnants of the formally disbanded KLA under control; oversee law enforcement, the judicial system, and the preservation of democracy; help develop an indigenous police force; try to limit the supply of arms and men to the insurgencies in Presevo and Macedonia; and deal with links between former KLA commanders, now politicians, and the post-KLA militias, as well as organized crime (particularly smuggling) and corruption in general. And they have to do all this without alienating the local Albanian population and becoming a target of attacks by Albanian militants. To date, the latter, including the NLA in Albania, apparently continue to think of NATO as their ally, but that could change very quickly. And finally, of course, they have to help with economic reconstruction in this impoverished territory.

Finally, there is Macedonia, the most acute immediate problem. It is now very unlikely that the insurgency will be put down by force by the Macedonian government. Tensions between Albanians and Macedonian Slavs were already serious before the recent fighting, despite concerted efforts by the Macedonian government to adopt moderate policies and include Albanian parties in Macedonia’s last two governments. Too many people have fled their homes, and the language on both sides has become too heated, for Macedonian Slavs and Albanians to live together in peace in Tetovo or even Skopje. The best one can hope for is that the current cease-fire will hold, and that some kind of precarious agreement will be worked out whereby Skopje exercises some kind of nominal sovereignty in the contested areas. Even that, however, seems quite unlikely. More probable is a prolonged and violent Albanian resistance struggle.

For Washington, the choices in Macedonia are limited. It is politically impossible for the Bush Administration—even if it wanted to, which of course it does not—to send another peacekeeping force to the Balkans, a reluctance that is shared by our European allies. Nor is the West likely to agree to a big increase in aid to Macedonia, both because of doubts that it would be put to good use as well as because of existing commitments elsewhere in the Balkans. Apparently, the Western strategy is to provide military and financial aid to Macedonia in the hope that it will be able to defeat the insurgency by military means. And at the same time, Western officials will try to isolate the rebels by helping to cut off supply lines to Kosovo, the Presevo Valley, and hopefully even Albania. They also hope to confront the Albanians with a unified international front condemning their use of force and unequivocal opposition to any change in international borders. The West was accordingly very pleased when the Albanian government made a clear statement of support for the Macedonian government, but as I suggested earlier, they’ve been disappointed by the reaction from Rugova, and they are trying to pressure him to take a clearer stance by suggesting that a failure to do so will jeopardize international support for Kosovo’s autonomy.

There are four scenarios for the long-term future of the Balkans: rapid stabilization, a general settlement, more political chaos, or uneven stabilization.

What of the long-term future? Let me give you four scenarios and tell you how likely I think each is. The first scenario is the most optimistic, but as I already suggested, I consider it very unlikely. It is the vision of a rapid political and economic stabilization of the region through a general peace settlement based on existing borders, a genuine commitment to Europe by Balkan governments and peoples, and step-by-step integration into the EU.

The second scenario, which I also consider unlikely but is what many people in the region want, is a general settlement based on territorial swaps or the emergence of new independent states, whether it be independent Kosovo, Montenegro, Republika Srpska, or separate Bosnian Croat or Muslim states. In general, the hope is that border changes will better reflect ethnic distribution as well as normative beliefs about traditional homelands. The reason this is extremely unlikely is that it would be extraordinarily difficult to get an agreement on any such border changes, particularly given the fact that the international community is so instinctively wary of changes in the borders of legally recognized states, even negotiated changes.

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Outreach Programs

Our 27th Annual Teachers Outreach Conference, “The Former Soviet Union Ten Years After the Collapse,” was held on Saturday and Sunday, April 28–29, 2001 on the Berkeley campus. This year’s attendance was up from last year, and the lively discussion sessions along with the feedback we received on conference evaluations have shown this conference was a great success. The Teachers Outreach Conference is funded in part by a Title VI grant from the US Department of Education to the Center for Slavic and East European Studies within ISEEES.

Ten years ago the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was still in existence; it covered a territory of nearly one-sixth of the earth’s land surface; and it was the world’s largest country, covering eleven time zones. The USSR broke apart rather suddenly and unexpectedly into fifteen successor states. After being introduced by conference organizer, Victoria Bonnell, director of ISEEES, Edward Walker, executive director of the Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies within ISEEES, introduced the conference topic. He recalled what the West thought would happen in the former Soviet Union after its collapse and noted our pessimism for its prospects for rapid recovery and normalization. We feared that the dissolution of the Soviet Union would lead to a crisis similar to that which befell former Yugoslavia, marked by inter-ethnic or inter-state war—worse yet a Yugoslav-type conflict with nuclear capabilities. We feared the rise of authoritarianism, nuclear proliferation, and general chaos. Walker then compared our expectations for the former Soviet Union against the reality of a decade, mentioning the considerable variation in the trajectories and in the experiences of the Soviet successor states and the types of factors which led to those differing outcomes. Things have not turned out as badly as we pessimistically feared, although there are certainly many more changes and improvements to come as the successor states make their post-Soviet journey.

Next, Masha Lipman made a presentation entitled “Russian Press and Society Under Putin.” Until earlier that month, Lipman was Deputy-Editor-in-Chief of Itogi, a Russian weekly magazine. The timeliness of our conference became very clear as Lipman described in detail the recent dismantling of the independent Russian media empire, Media-MOST. She related such events to President Putin’s personal beliefs of the role of the press, to the Kremlin’s move to control the only independent national television station, and to the public’s dwindling support of freedom of the press. While Lipman’s description did not paint an optimistic picture for freedom of the press in Russia today, her personal commitment as a journalist and her strong belief in the notion of a free society gave her presentation an unstated note of hope.

Jenik Radon, lecturer at the Stanford School of Law and the Stanford Business School, drew on his personal experience advising the Estonian and Latvian governments to present “The Baltics from the Soviet Union to the European Union in Lightning Speed.” He began by stressing that the term “the Baltics” is a misnomer that lumps three distinct countries—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—into one category, ignoring their separate ethnic, linguistic, historical, and religious identities. But each nation is moving towards integration with Europe with “lightning speed”—for example, Estonia applied to the European Union in 1995, having only become independent in 1991. How did they get there so fast? During the perestroika period, the Baltic countries laid a foundation for privatization, restitution law, a separate Baltic currency. Then they sought to “restore” their independence, laying the legal foundation for their separation from the Soviet Union. The environment is an important issue for the three Baltic states, because the Green movement formed the basis for their popular front movement and because it is a critical factor in their current efforts to attract industry. Their assertion of distinction from the rest of the Soviet Union is an effort to connect with Western Europe through membership in the European Union. Today they are quickly approaching EU membership, with Estonia leading the way, and Radon claims that will, culture, and sheer stubbornness in their goals have allowed them to get so far.

Dominique Arel, assistant professor at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, spoke next on “Ukraine: From Consolidation to Debacle.” The creation of Ukraine in 1991 was unexpected, and elites in Ukraine who were in power in 1990, stayed in power when Ukraine became independent. This caused a lack of change early on that still lingers. Ukraine formed as a country only under Soviet rule. It can be broken down to 75% Ukrainian and 25% Russian ethnically but 50% Ukrainian and 50% Russian linguistically. Thus its integration into Europe is a symbolic move away from Russia.
The Ukrainian economy is not doing well, having gone through three phases: a cycle of printing more money to cope with inflation, which in turn caused more inflation; a period when no one was paid; and a period of brokering export licenses that put large profits into private pockets and failed to produce revenues for the state. Arel discussed the current Kuchma tape scandal, illuminating Ukraine’s political tribulations. Arel also discussed how the discourse of European integration fraudulently uses the symbol of Ukraine as an independent nation prior to Russian annexation. Ukraine’s current elite remains continuous with Soviet elites. It may be expelled from the Council of Europe at the same time it is trying to join Europe, but international isolation makes Ukraine open to either a takeover by or a return to Russia.

David Wolff, senior research scholar with the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, gave the next presentation, “Ten Years on Their Own: Siberia and the Russian Far East After the USSR.” The Russian Far East is not so well known, as it was closed to foreigners until 1989. Siberia and the Russian Far East are rich in natural resources but have small populations and, with prohibitive costs, can no longer afford to ship most of their products. Oligarchs have filled in the void left by the Russian state, taking up control over these areas. The territory is overlain with five different layers of powers, such as oblasts and republics. Republics, for example, were organized around ethnic identity, while regions were based on geography. This complex structure of powers causes many questions about legal title and makes attracting business difficult. Shortly after Yeltsin’s dissolution of the Soviet Union, these republics and regions declared their sovereignty one after another, the centrifugal breakup expanding from Moscow outward. Currently, President Putin is attempting to reverse this motion to a centripetal force, pulling the regions back in under Moscow’s control.

Kathleen Collins, assistant professor of government at Dartmouth College, kicked off the second day of the conference with “Transition to What? Central Asia Ten Years Later.” The five successor states of Soviet Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—have faced a more complex and less successful transition than the other Soviet successor states. While there remain some positive legacies of the Soviet Union, such as electrification, Central Asia was treated more as colonies than as republics within the Soviet Union and must come to term with the legacies of the resulting economic exploitation, such as the environmental and economic results of its cotton monoculture. The Central Asian states were the last to declare their sovereignty from the USSR; although they wouldn’t admit to it now, they didn’t really want independence. While these states were really a homogeneous subset of the Soviet Union, their political and economic trajectories have diverged since 1992. They have faced, to varying degrees, three forms of political trajectories: democratization, neo-authoritarianism, and—in the case of Tajikistan—regime collapse followed by civil war. Economically they still have much progress to make, as money is generally becoming concentrated in the hands of a few, elite control of the cotton monoculture is leading to the “refeudalization” of rural areas, and governments’ attempt to control hard currency is causing a loss of foreign aid and investment. They also face the following threats to stability: internal civil unrest; the possibility for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism; drug trafficking; and the somewhat contradictory interference by Russia into the region. However, the progress that these five states have made is better than originally expected. For example, inter-ethnic stabilization has been kept and freedom of religion has been maintained. Central Asia will still need foreign investment to complete the transition, and the fact that youth are open to change is a hopeful sign.

Sanjyot Mehendale, program coordinator of the Caucasus and Central Asia Program within ISEEES, expanded the previous talk by presenting “Uzbekistan: Narratives in Transition.” She reiterated that Uzbekistan’s independence in 1991 came from outside forces and not from the desire to leave the Soviet Union. Mehendale described the situation in Uzbekistan today: ethnic divisions are excluding more minorities; economic problems are causing a brain drain; a high birth rate and high unemployment have led to a large population of restless youth; and environmental and public health problems abound. There is very little change in politics, as Uzbekistan has no deep tradition of democracy but a strong tradition of authority and hierarchy. Mehendale reiterated many of Collins’ points about the economy: a state-controlled cotton monoculture, the slowness of privatization, and the need for foreign investment. Currently, Uzbekistan is facing a reinvention of tradition. Old heroes, such as Amir Timur (Tamerlane), are being reintroduced in the search for an Uzbek identity. In an effort to move from what it sees as a period of Russian colonization, Uzbekistan has discarded Cyrillic script in favor of Latin, a conscious linking to “the West.” Most Uzbeks consider themselves Muslim, but it is a secular identity, and they support a separation of church and state. Again, transition is complex and difficult, but the situation is optimistic overall.

John Dunlop gave the final presentation of the conference, entitled “Russia Confronts Chechnya: The Northern Caucasus Region After the Collapse of the Soviet Union.” Dunlop described how the Soviet regime’s attempt to limit Islamic mountain consciousness—by limiting land, watering down the concentration of the population, attempting to Russify the region, and limiting the economy—all assisted in the growth of a Chechen identity. In 1989 under Gorbachev’s leadership, the Soviet Union opened the dialogue about the 1940s deportations, continued on page 25
The third scenario is a worst case one—more political chaos, humanitarian crises, and warfare throughout the region, beginning with yet another inter-communal war, this time in Macedonia, that might draw in outside powers. This could entail more violence and ethnic cleansing of Serbs from northern Kosovo, intensified fighting in the Presevo Valley, violence over Montenegro’s attempt to secede from Yugoslavia, civil war in Albania, the collapse of the Kostunica administration in Belgrade and political turmoil in Serbia, and the complete abandonment of the Dayton solution for Bosnia. While this doom and gloom scenario in unlikely to unfold in toto, a partial version of it seems considerably more likely than either of the first two visions of general stabilization.

The final scenario, and in my opinion the most likely, is what might be called “uneven stabilization.” There would be no general peace settlement, and the region would continue to suffer from episodic crises, particularly in the area of what might be the “Inner Balkans”—that is, Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro. Elsewhere, the prospects for a “turn to Europe,” and for gradual and sustainable economic growth, are best in Croatia. Serbia, in contrast, is almost certainly going to find both economic and political stabilization considerably more difficult and its relations with Europe far more problematic. In Bosnia, the most likely scenario is a continuation of the international community’s insistence on the fiction of a unified state, a decline in the rate of repatriation, and acceptance that inter-communal relations will be much more limited than before the war.

As for the “Inner Balkans,” my guess is that it will remain a zone of instability for decades to come (much like Russia’s North Caucasus region). Economic prospects are grim. The region is geographically remote, predominately rural, with deep rooted social problems resulting from, inter alia, years of relative neglect by the Communist regime in Belgrade and, in the case of Albania, the far more devastating legacy of Stalinism under Enver Hoxha, coupled with the violence and destruction in the years since 1989. Generations have lost the opportunity to a decent education; the social infrastructure is in a deplorable condition; unemployment is high and is likely to remain so; a good deal of the existing infrastructure (housing stock, roads, bridges, railroads, and so on) has been destroyed; organized crime, petty crime, and official corruption are endemic; and the prospects for attracting foreign investment for the foreseeable future are minimal.

It follows, then, that the West should strap in for the long haul. Above all, Western governments should stop deluding themselves, or trying to delude their publics, into thinking that all will be well now that Milosevic is gone. Regardless of whether one believes that Milosevic was largely responsible for the wars of Yugoslav succession, the genie of intense interethnic enmity and fear is now out of the bottle, and it will be impossible to put it back in easily or quickly.

References
2 This talk was given in March of 2001. This issue of the Newsletter is going to press in early June. Ed.
3 Slobodan Milosevic was arrested in Belgrade on April 1. Since that time, Kostunica has signaled that the Yugoslav government will not block extradition to the Hague but wants Milosevic to stand trial first in Belgrade for corruption and abuse of power. A draft law on extraditing suspected war criminals is being considered by the Yugoslav Parliament. Ed.
4 Djukanovic and his backers won a majority of seats in the new legislature in the April 22. However, they did not receive the clear mandate for independence that had been predicted and will have to form a coalition government. The election results made clear that the Montenegrin electorate is deeply divided over the question of independence. Djukanovic has indicated that a “cautious and prudent policy” is called for, and he is accordingly prepared to negotiate the terms of Montenegrin “statehood” with Belgrade. Moreover, his planned referendum on independence has been postponed until January 2002 at the earliest. Nevertheless, Djukanovic has also stated that his vision of the “basic national strategic road for Montenegro” (i.e., eventual independence) remains unchanged. Ed.
6 A cease-fire was arranged in March but fighting continues as this issue goes to press. Both NATO and the EU are trying to broker an agreement between the main political parties in Macedonia, including Albanian parties; the Democratic Party of Albanians and the Party of Democratic Prosperity. Ed.
7 At the time of publication, Serb forces had control of the Presevo Valley. Amnesty had been granted to ethnic Albanian guerrillas who left the Zone for Kosovo with a cut-off date for amnesty of May 31. Ed.
Conferences and Symposia Cosponsored by the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies During AY 2000–2001

October 16, 2000  Annual Colin Miller Memorial Lecture
Anders Aslund, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Where is the Russian Economy Going?”

February 16–17, 2001  Soyuz Conference
“From the ‘Internationale’ to the Transnational: Repositioning Post-Socialist Cultures”

March 9, 2001  Annual Berkeley-Stanford Conference
“Memories, Generations, and Life Histories in the Making of Post-Communism”
Speakers: Victoria Bonnell, Berkeley; George Breslauer, Berkeley; Oksana Bulgakova, Stanford; Michael Burawoy, Berkeley; Gil Eyal, Berkeley; Gregory Freidin, Stanford; Tomek Grabowski, Berkeley; Nancy Kollmann, Stanford; Olga Matich, Berkeley; Norman Naimark, Stanford; Irina Paperno, Berkeley; Yuri Slezkine, Berkeley; Reginald Zelnik, Berkeley.

April 6, 2001  Film screening
United Nations Association Film Festival: What I Saw in Hebron; Collateral Damage: The Balkans after NATO’s Air War; and Hidden Wars of Desert Storm.

April 21–22, 2001  Conference
“Central Asia Palimpsest: (Re) Emerging Identities and New Global Imprints”
Speakers: Siamak Adhami, Saddleback College; Shirin Akiner, School of Oriental and African Studies, London; Kathleen Collins, Dartmouth College; William Fierman, Indiana University; Andre Gunder Frank, Florida International University; Dru Gladney, University of Hawaii, Manoa; Gregory Gleason, University of New Mexico; Frantz Grenet, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris; Natalya Khan, Tashkent State Institute of Oriental Studies, Uzbekistan; Anatoly Khazanov, University of Wisconsin; Alma Kunanbaeva, UC Berkeley; Beatrice F. Manz, Tufts University; Uli Schamiloglu, University of Wisconsin; Rustam Suleymanov, Institute of Archaeology, Samarkand.

April 26, 2001  Peter N. Kujachich Lecture in Serbian and Montenegrin Studies
Veljko Vujacic, Professor, Department of Sociology, Oberlin College. “The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic”

April 28–29, 2001  Annual Teachers Outreach Conference
“The Former Soviet Union Ten Years After the Collapse”
Speakers: Dominique Arel, Brown University; Kathleen Collins, Dartmouth College; John B. Dunlop, Hoover Institution; Sanjyot Mehendale, UC Berkeley; Masha Lipman, Itogi; Jenik Radon, Stanford University; Edward W. Walker, UC Berkeley; David Wolff, Woodrow Wilson Center.

May 11–12, 2001  Berkeley-Stanford Film Workshop
“Russians in Hollywood / Hollywood on Russia: 1920s–1930s”
Speakers: Oksana Bulgakova, Stanford; Scott Bukatman, Stanford; Katerina Clark, Yale; Gregory Freidin, Stanford; Jeff Karlsen, UC Berkeley; Olga Matich, UC Berkeley; Russell Merritt, UC Berkeley; Anna Muza, UC Berkeley; Anne Nesbet, UC Berkeley; Harsha Ram, UC Berkeley; David Shepard, independent scholar; Yuri Tsivian, University of Chicago.
Lectures Co-sponsored by the
Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies
During AY 2000–2001

Levon Hm. Abrahamian, Academy of Sciences of Armenia; Professor of Ethnology, Yerevan State University. “Victor Turner at the Soviet Celebrations: Structure, Hyper-structure, Anti-structure.”

Leila Alieva, visiting scholar, Caucasus and Central Asian Institute, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University. “Prospects for Integration and Cooperation in the Caucasus.”


Yair Auron, Seminar Hakibbutzim State Teachers’ College, Tel Aviv. “Attitudes of the Jewish ‘Yishuv,’ the Zionist Movement, and the State of Israel Towards the Armenian Genocide.”

Bryon Bass, Staff Archaeologist at the URS Corporation and former Research Associate of the University of Zurich. “Current Archaeological Research on Islands off the Southern Dalmatian Coast of Croatia.”

David M. Bethea, Vilas Professor of Slavic Languages, University of Wisconsin, Madison. “Pushkin’s The History of Pugachev: Where Fact Meets the Zero-Degree of Plot.”

Frederick Corney, Assistant Professor, Department of History, University of Florida. “Writing October: Memory and the Making of the Bolshevik Revolution.”


Aleksei Gippius, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. “Starye i novye problemy izuchenija nachal’nogo russkogo letopisanija: k probleme stratifikacii Povesti vremennyx let.”

Dru Gladney, Professor of Asian Studies, University of Hawaii, Manoa. “China’s Muslim Dilemma: Energy, Identity, and Islam.”

Kathryn Hendley, Professor of Political Science and Law, University of Wisconsin. “Going to Court in Russia: A Waste of Time or an Effective Strategy for Russian Businesses?”

Robert Hewsen, Professor of Russian and Byzantine History, Rowan University. “Post-War Karabagh.”

Armine Ishkanian, Ph.D., Department of Anthropology, University of California, San Diego. “The Role of NGOs in Post-Soviet Armenia.”

Serguei Ivanov, Fulbright Scholar, University of Maryland. “Groping for Big Ideas: Contemporary Russian Pseudo-Historians and Their Audience.”


Vakha Khamkhoev, Ingush writer and visiting scholar at UC Berkeley. “The Cultural Heritage of Ingushetia.”

Philip Kohl, Professor of Anthropology, Wellesley College. “The Devolution of Urban Society: The Integration of the Eurasian Steppes into the “Civilized” Bronze Age World, c. 3500–1500 BC.”

Alexei Kuz’min, Professor of Political Science, Russian State University for the Humanities, and Research Director, Institute for Humanities and Political Studies, Moscow. “Putin and the End of Russian Federalism?”

C. C. Lamberg-Karlovsky, Professor of Archaeology, Harvard University and Curator of Near Eastern Archaeology, Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology. “Bronze Age Indo-Iranians?? From the Eurasian Steppes to the Persian Gulf.”

Alphonse La Porta, US Ambassador to Mongolia. “Mongolia’s Relations with China and Russia.”

Matthew Lenoe, Professor of History, University of Arkansas, Little Rock. “NEP Newspapers and the Emergence of Soviet Information Rationing.”

Alexander Leskov, Former Head of the Department of Archaeology and Ancient Art, Museum of Oriental Art, Moscow. “The Caucasus as a Cultural Bridge Between the Near East Civilizations and the World of the Nomads.”


Levon Marashlian, Professor, Glendale Community College. “The Treaty of Sevres, Turkey, and the Armenian Question.”

Michael Minkenberg, Professor of Comparative Politics. Viadrina European University. “The European Radical Right: Some Comparative Reflections on East and West.”

Eric Naiman, Associate Professor, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures. “Perversion in Pnin (Reading Nabokov Preposterously).”

Elzbieta H. Oleksy, Director of the Women’s Studies Center and Chair of the Department of American Studies and Mass Media at the University of Lodz. “A Sparrow with a Broken Wing…and a Lot of Vodka: Visualizations of Women in Polish Post-War Culture.”


Madhavan Palat, Professor, Centre for Historical Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. “‘Rabochii’ (Worker): The History of the Concept.”

Emil Payin, Director, Center for Ethnopolitical and Regional Studies, INDEM Foundation, Moscow. “Evolution of Center-Periphery Relations in the Russian Federation: From Yeltsin to Putin.”


Mark Pluciennik, Visiting Lecturer, Department of Anthropology and Professor of Archaeology, University of Lampeter. “The Archaeologist as Tourist in Albania.”

Dmitri Prigov, Russian verbal and visual artist. Lecture/Performance.

Tatyana Schmidt, House on the Embankment Museum. “Executions and Mass Burials in Moscow during the Great Terror (Rasstrel i massovye zakhoroneniia v Moskve vo vremia Bol’shogo terrora).”

Lawrence Sheets, former Reuters Caucasus region Bureau Chief. “Chechnya: The Islamic Factor and the Second Chechen War.”

Sven Spieker, Associate Professor, German, Slavic, Semitic Studies & History of Art and Architecture, University of California, Santa Barbara. “Il y a: Kabakov’s Refusal to Take Out the Trash.”


Marek Zvelebil, Professor of Archaeology, Department of Archaeology and Prehistory, University of Sheffield. “Eurasian Shamanism and Hunter-Gatherer Ritual Landscapes: An Archaeological Perspective.”
Faculty and Student News

Peter Blitstein (Ph.D. in history, 1999) has been appointed Assistant Professor of Russian History at Lawrence University in Wisconsin.

Mieczyslaw Boduszynski, Ph.D. candidate in political science, received an Individual Advanced Research Grant from the International Research and Exchanges Board for next academic year. Mike also received the George Ballou Memorial Endowment Scholarship from the World Affairs Council to attend the 2001 Asilomar Conference in Pacific Grove, California.


Victoria Bonnell (chair of ISEEES and professor of sociology), Yuri Slezkine (professor of history), and Alexei Yurchak (assistant professor of anthropology) received an International and Area Studies Small Grant this summer to prepare a grant application to the Carnegie Corporation on behalf of BPS for a faculty research project on post-Communist Russia.

Chad Bryant, Ph.D. candidate in history, presented “Whispering, Laughing, and Hating, or How Czechness Survived the Final Years of Nazi Occupation, 1943–1945” at the Czech Cultural Studies Workshop, held at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, March 23–25, 2001.


Richard M. Buxbaum, Jackson H. Ralston Professor of International Law, has been elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Professor Buxbaum, along with ten other Berkeley faculty, will formally join the Academy in July 2001.

M. Steven Fish, associate professor in the Department of Political Science, received a Fulbright Scholars Grant to spend AY 2001–2002 at the European University in St. Petersburg.

David Frick, professor in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, received a Short-Term Grant for 2001 from the International Research and Exchanges Board. He is conducting research in Poland and Lithuania this summer for his project, “Vilnius, 1640: Neighborhoods and Networks in a Multi-Confessional City.”

Mirjam Fried (Ph.D. in linguistics, 1995), who taught Czech in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, has been appointed Assistant Professor in Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures at Princeton University, where she will work on building the program in Czech language, literature, and culture.

Kristen Ghodsee, Ph.D. candidate in social and cultural studies at the Graduate School of Education, presented a paper on “International Organizations, Women, and Civil Society in Post-Socialist Bulgaria” at the Third Annual Graduate Student Workshop hosted by the Kokkalis Program on Southeastern and East-Central Europe at Harvard University on February 9, 2001.


Anne Hruska (Ph.D. in Slavic languages and literatures, 2001) will begin teaching this fall as Visiting Assistant Professor of Slavic Languages and Literatures at the University of Missouri, Columbia.


Darya Kavitskaya, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Linguistics, will be assistant professor in Department of Linguistics at Yale University next year. Her expertise includes Russian, Czech, and Serbian/Croatian, and she did part of her graduate work in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, where she also taught Russian and Serbian/Croatian as a GSI.

Daniel Kronenfeld, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science, received a Fulbright grant to spend the past academic year in Latvia conducting research for his study of “Dynamics of Ethnic Accommodation.”

Lisa Little, lecturer in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, received a Spring 2001 Instructional Development Fellowship from the Berkeley Language Center for her research project, “Performance and Placement: Designing a Plan for Testing in the Undergraduate Russian Program.”
Tatyana Mamut, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Anthropology, received a Paul and Daisy Soros Fellowship for New Americans in Spring 2001.


Czeslaw Milosz, professor emeritus in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, recently published in A Treatise on Poetry, originally written in 1955–1956 and published in serial. This volume has been translated by Robert Haas.

Professor Milosz also published Milosz’s ABC’s in January 2001, translated by Madeline Levine.

In December 2000, Jan Plamper, Ph.D. candidate in history, began a two-year position as researcher at the University of Giessen, Chair of Russian History. His is completing his dissertation on the Stalin Cult in the visual arts.

Harsha Ram has been promoted to associate professor in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures.

John Randolph (Ph.D. in history, 1997) received a tenure track position as assistant professor at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.

David Shneer (Ph.D. in history, 2001) was appointed Assistant Professor of East European Jewish History at the University of Denver.

Maria Stoilkova, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Anthropology, presented a paper entitled “Exiles at Home and Abroad: Bulgarian Intelligentsia in Emigration” at the 6th Annual Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, April 5–7, 2001.

Richard Taruskin, Class of 1955 Professor of Music, spoke on “Stravinsky and Us” at the 88th Annual Faculty Research Lecture on April 4. The Faculty Research Lectures were established in 1912 to highlight research by distinguished Berkeley faculty.

Barbara Voytek, executive director of ISEEES, spoke about the Czech Republic to the Orinda-Tabor Sister City Foundation in Orinda, California on March 22.

Dr. Voytek also presented the findings of her on-going research on “The Early Holocene in the Northern Adriatic: Excavations at Grotta Dell’Edera” at the annual meeting of the Society for American Archaeology in April.

Veljko Vujacic (Ph.D. in sociology, 1995) has been appointed Professor of Sociology with tenure at Oberlin College. Veljko returned to Berkeley as our Peter N. Kujachich Lecturer in Serbian and Montenegrin Studies this year, presenting the lecture “The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic” on April 26.


Boris Wolfson, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, received a Spring 2001 Instructional Development Fellowship from the Berkeley Language Center for his research project, “Formative Computer-Based Testing in First-Semester Russian: An Error Analysis.”

Jane Zavisca, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Sociology, received a grant from the National Science Foundation for doctoral dissertation research on “Consumption in Late Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia.” She will conduct research in Kaluga, Russia during 2001.

Victor M. Zhivov, professor in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, presented “Sintaksicheskie strategii i traditsii delovoi pis’memnosti v Moskovskoi i Litovskoi Rusi” at the conference “Language and Identity: Linguistic Reality and Linguistic Consciousness in Eastern/Central Europe (14–17th Centuries),” held at UCLA in February.

Outstanding GSIs

On April 30, the Graduate Student Instructor (GSI) Teaching and Resource Center recognized the outstanding GSIs for AY 2000–2001. The following students who study our area were award recipients:

Lara Kaufman was recognized by the Department of Architecture.

Maria Klemenc was recognized by the Department of Music.

Teresa Sharpe was recognized by the Department of Sociology.

Antonina Staros was recognized by the Department of Sociology.

Boris Wolfson was recognized by the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures.
The Center acknowledges with sincere appreciation the following individuals who have contributed to the annual giving program, the Associates of the Slavic Center (or have been enrolled due to their particular generosity toward Cal to support some aspect of Slavic & East European Studies), between February 1 and April 30, 2001. Financial support from the Associates is vital to our program of research, training, and extra-curricular activities. We would like to thank all members of ASC for their generous assistance.

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For those of you who are not yet members, we encourage you to join. We believe you will enjoy the stimulating programs; even if you cannot participate as often as you might wish, your continuing contribution critically supports the Center’s mission and goals.

**Members ($10 to $100).** Members of ASC receive monthly “Updates” and special mailings to notify them of events and special activities, such as cultural performances and major conferences. In this way, notification of even last-minute items is direct.

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**Benefactors ($500-up).** ASC Benefactors receive invitations to the dinner and evening programs associated with our annual conferences, such as the annual Berkeley-Stanford Conference in the spring.

**Center Circle ($1,000-up).** In addition to enjoying the above-mentioned benefits, donors within the Center Circle will also become Robert Gordon Sproul Associates of the University. Benefits of the Sproul Associates include invitations to two football luncheons and eligibility for membership in the Faculty Club.

*It is a policy of the University of California and the Berkeley Foundation that a portion of the gifts and/or income therefrom is used to defray the costs of raising and administering the funds. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent allowed by law.*

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Hertelendy Fellowship Awarded

The Hertelendy Graduate Fellowship in Hungarian Studies for 2001–2002 was awarded to Eiko Kuwana, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History. Funding will enable her to complete her dissertation “Intellectuals, Culture, and Politics in Turn-of-the-Century Budapest.”

Eiko’s dissertation investigates a group of intellectuals in turn-of-the-century Budapest who belonged to the 
Huszadik Század (Twentieth Century) Circle, centering around a journal by that name. Led by sociologist Oszkár Jászi and mostly Jewish in origin, this group was a modernizing force to bring Hungary into the company of West European intellectuals.

Eiko conducted the foundation of her research during two stays in Budapest, particularly at the National Széchenyi Library of Hungary. This summer she will conduct additional research in Hungary before completing her dissertation.

The Hertelendy Graduate Fellowship in Hungarian Studies was established by a generous gift to the university by Martha and Paul Hertelendy and is administered by ISEEES.

Kujachich Endowment Funding

Following a competition in March 2001, several important initiatives and proposals received the benefit of funding from the Peter N. Kujachich Endowment in Serbian and Montenegrin Studies. The Endowment supports such activities as research, instruction, colloquia, symposia, lecture series and publications, and creative thought and writing in the social sciences, humanities, and arts that focus on the experience of the Serbian and Montenegrin peoples.

Ms. Anna Vrska, a senior at Cal in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, was awarded $1,500 toward travel to Belgrade, Yugoslavia, for research that continues on the theme of her senior thesis. She has been examining the role of women in Serbian epic poetry. This summer, Anna will conduct extensive research on the topic in the archives of the Serbian National Library and the Belgrade University of Philology.

A second proposal to receive funding came from the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, coauthored by Professor Ronelle Alexander and the chair of the department, Professor Irina Paperno. The request for assistance to support a lecturer to teach Serbian/Croatian every year within the department met with success. Thus, we are pleased to announce the expansion of training in a language of major cultural, social, and strategic importance.

Finally, ISEEES itself was the benefactor of funds from the Kujachich Endowment. We have established an Annual Kujachich Lecture in Serbian and Montenegrin Studies. Besides honoring the donor, we requested the seed money for this lectureship in order to guarantee an annual event that focuses on a part of our region that demands attention and understanding. The lectureship began this spring with the visit of Veljko Vujacic, professor of sociology at Oberlin College, who spoke on the topic, “The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic.”

Outreach Programs, continued from page 17

and this created an awakening of native political movements. By 1991, the Russian North Caucasus faced a rapid growth in its population, low education rates, major unemployment, and public health crises. Then the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 accelerated Chechen separatist sentiments, and when Chechnya prepared for presidential elections that fall, Russia moved in to stop them. Efforts to resolve the situation broke down, and the first war took place during 1994–1996. With weapons left in the region from the USSR, Chechnya had moved to a criminal economy, which included the increase of kidnappings during 1996–1999. The second war began in the fall of 1999, and Dunlop has been researching the causes and unfolding of the current conflict. Perhaps the best summary is, as Edward Walker mentioned in his conference introduction, “The great blight on Russia’s record is the disastrous conflict in Chechnya.”

For a schedule of this conference and related materials, visit the Web pages dedicated to our Teachers Outreach Conferences:

http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~csees/outreach.html
Funding Opportunities

ACTR/ACCELS
Grants for Research in Central Europe fund travel, tuition, lodging expenses for 3-9 months to Ph.D. students for research. Programs are available in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Croatia, Albania, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Deadline: on-going. Contact: ACTR/ACCELS, 1776 Massachusetts Ave NW Ste 700, Washington DC 20036; Tel: 202-833-7522; Hettlinger@actr.org; http://www.actr.org/.

Fulbright/IIE
Grants for Graduate Study and Research Abroad provide round-trip travel, tuition, books, and stipend for one academic year. Applicants must be US citizens holding a B.A. or equivalent. Details can be found at the program Web site, http://www.iie.org/fulbright/us/. Deadline: 9/10/01 for campus interview; 9/24/01 for campus application. Contact: Fulbright Program Advisor, Graduate Fellowships Office, 318 Sproul Hall # 5900; Tel: 510-642-0672; http://www.grad.berkeley.edu/grad/.

Human Rights Watch
Fellowships in International Human Rights are available to recent graduates of law schools or graduate programs in journalism, international relations, or area studies from any university worldwide. Funding provides a salary of $35,000, plus benefits, for one year. Deadline: 11/1/01. Contact: Human Rights Watch, Attn: Fellowship Committee, 350 Fifth Ave 34th Fl, New York NY 10118-3299; Tel: 212-290-4700, ext. 312; http://www.hrw.org/hrw/about/info/fellows.html.

IREX
Individual Advanced Research Opportunities offer two- to nine-month grants to predoctoral and postdoctoral scholars for research at institutions in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia. US citizens and permanent residents are eligible to apply. Scholars in policy research and development, and cross-disciplinary studies are strongly urged to apply. Deadline: 11/1/01. Contact: IREX, 1616 H St NW, Washington DC 20006; Tel: 202-628-8188; Fax: 202-628-8189; irex@irex.org; http://www.irex.org/.

Kosciuszko Foundation
The Metchie J. E. Budka Award provides $1,500 to grad students at US universities and to postdocs in their first three years. This award is made for outstanding scholarly work in Polish literature (14th Century to 1939) or Polish history (962 to 1939). Deadline: 7/18/01. Contact: Metchie J. E. Budka Award, The Kosciuszko Foundation, 15 E 65th St, New York NY 10021-6595; Tel: 212-734-2130; Fax: 212-628-4552; thekf@aol.com; http://www.kosciuszkofoundation.org/.

Society for Slovene Studies
A Graduate Student Prize in the amount of $1,000 is awarded to the best paper in any discipline written by a grad student on a topic involving Slovene studies. Slovene citizens and students studying in Slovenia are not eligible to apply. See Web site for application requirements. Deadline: 8/1/01. Contact: Professor Timothy Pogacar, Editor, Slovene Studies, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green OH 43403; http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/~ljubljan/gradprize.html.

The Rockefeller Foundation
One-month residencies at the Bellagio Study Center near Lake Como, Italy offer room and board. Residencies provide the opportunity for work uninterrupted by the usual professional and personal demands. Residents must expect their work to result in publication, exhibition, performance, or other concrete product. Collaborative projects eligible to apply. Email applications only accepted from outside the US. Deadline: 8/25/01. Contact: Rockefeller Foundation, Bellagio Center Office, 420 Fifth Ave, New York NY 10018-2702; bellagio@rockfound.org; http://www.rockfound.org/.

The Soros Foundations Network
Paul and Daisy Soros Fellowships for New Americans provide an annual stipend of $20,000 and partial tuition for up to two years of graduate study in the US. Funding allows New Americans to achieve leadership in a professional field or academic discipline in the humanities, social sciences, arts, or sciences. Fellowships are for individuals who have applied for naturalization, have been naturalized as US citizens, or are the children of two parents who are both naturalized citizens. Applicants must have Bachelor’s degree, be pursuing graduate study, or be in their final year of undergraduate studies at the time of application. Applicants must be between 20 and 28 years old. Deadline: 11/30/01. Contact: Paul and Daisy Soros Fellowships for New Americans, 400 W 59th St, New York NY 10019; Tel: 212-547-6926; Fax: 212-548-4623; pdsoros_fellows@sorosny.org; http://www.pdsoros.org/.

Woodrow Wilson Center
East European Studies Research Scholarships provide funding and office space at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC for US citizens and permanent residents in the early stages of their academic careers—between Ph.D. and tenure. Applications are available on line. Deadline: 11/1/01. Contact: East European Studies, Woodrow Wilson Center, One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington DC 20523; Tel: 202-691-4000; Fax: 202-691-4001; http://wwics.si.edu/ees/grants.htm.
East European Studies Short Term Grants provide a one month stipend to grad students and postdocs who are engaged in specialized research requiring access to Washington, DC and its research. Grants do not include residence at the Wilson Center. Deadline: 6/1/01, 9/1/01. Contact: East European Studies, Woodrow Wilson Center, One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington DC 20523; Tel: 202-691-4000; Fax: 202-691-4001; kneppm@wwic.si.edu; http://wwics.si.edu/ees/grants.htm.

Kennan Institute Research Scholarships provide $3,000 per month, for 3-9 months to junior scholars in the early stages of their career (before tenure) or scholars whose careers have been interrupted or delayed. US citizens and permanent residents are eligible to apply. Deadline: 10/1/01. Contact: Fellowships and Grants, Kennan Institute, One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington DC 20523; Tel: 202-691-4100; Fax: 202-691-4001; http://wwics.si.edu/kennan/grants.htm.

Kennan Institute Short Term Grants provide a stipend of $100 a day, for up to one month of research in Washington, DC and its institutions. Grants do not include residence at the Wilson Center. Deadline: 6/1/01, 9/1/01. Contact: Fellowships and Grants, Kennan Institute, One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington DC 20523; Tel: 202-691-4100; Fax: 202-691-4001; http://wwics.si.edu/kennan/grants.htm.

Upcoming Events

Save These Dates!

Our fall reception will be held on Wednesday, October 10, 2001 from 4 to 6 p.m. at the Alumni House.

Our Teachers Outreach Conference has been scheduled for the weekend of April 13–14, 2002 at the Alumni House.

Other Events of Interest


Wednesday, October 24, 2001. Open Rehearsal: The San Francisco Symphony presents Gutierrez plays Rachmaninoff. This is a rehearsal for the October 27 performance. At Davies Symphony Hall, 10 a.m. Fees: $16 or $28; tickets may be purchased at the SFS Box Office, (415) 864-6000. Contact: SF Symphony, http://www.sfsymphony.org/ or (415) 552-8000.

Saturday, October 27, 2001. Performance: The San Francisco Symphony presents Gutierrez plays Rachmaninoff. At the Flint Center, Cupertino, 8 p.m. Fees: $15–85. See October 24 event for contact information.

November 1–3, 2001. Performance: The San Francisco Symphony presents Dvorak’s Stabat mater. At Davies Symphony Hall, 8 p.m. each date. Fees: $15–85. See October 24 event for contact information.


Summer Institute for K–5 Teachers and Librarians

Cultural Representations in Children's Literature
Exploring Resources and Themes in Global Education

The ORIAS Summer Institute for K–5 Teachers and Librarians, "Cultural Representations in Children’s Literature," will be held this summer during the week of July 30 through August 3, 2001. The Office of Resources for International and Area Studies (ORIAS) coordinates an annual workshop for K–12 teachers with the sponsorship of the UC Berkeley Title VI National Resource Centers, including the Center for Slavic and East European Studies.

During the early years of formal schooling, California State Standards stress students’ understanding of their own place in history and the human community. Stories have always been delightful and effective stepping stones for exploring the outside world, and fiction has a central role in the K–5 classroom. The ORIAS 2001 summer institute will focus on cultural representations in children’s literature. Scholars from UC Berkeley’s International and Area Studies Centers, teachers, and librarians will participate in a program of lectures, panels, and workshops on topics such as visual literacy, K–5 content connections, historic empathy, theme studies, and literary evaluation in international children’s fiction.

The institute is free and open to all interested teachers and librarians. Please pass the word to any colleagues you think might be interested. Enrollment is limited to 40. Two graduate credits can be arranged through UC Berkeley Summer Sessions for a tuition fee, and there may be a limited number of scholarships available to cover the tuition fee.

Further information and registration materials can be found on the ORIAS Web site http://www.ias.berkeley.edu/orias/
or by contacting Michele Delattre, ORIAS Program Assistant, at (510) 643-0868.