Notes from the Director

The end of the Cold War has brought countless benefits for Americans, including lower defense spending and diminished risk of nuclear war. But there has also been at least one unfortunate consequence: greater insularity, suspicion towards international institutions, and indifference toward peoples and cultures beyond our shores. For all the talk about globalization, and despite our cultural, economic, and military involvements abroad, a growing number of Americans seem unconcerned about international affairs, less interested in learning foreign languages, less willing to study and empathize with foreign cultures, and more inclined to believe that “globalization” and “modernization” mean that other countries are becoming more American and more English-speaking. There are real dangers in such a simplified view of the world, especially in a country that is today the world’s dominant superpower.

An organization like the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ISEEES) has many important functions on campus, but perhaps the most important today is to try to counter these trends by informing the public, as well as our students and faculty, about political and economic developments, intellectual trends, and different ways of thinking outside the United States. At the same time, area centers need to alert our constituents to important policy issues that may profoundly affect our lives in the coming decades.

As we move to the end of the first year of the Bush presidency, the evolving relationship between the United States and the postcommunist states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and particularly between the US and Russia, presents a compelling object of study. The Russian foreign policy elite—and judging by the Russian press, the country’s public at large—are deeply opposed to the administration’s stated intention to build a National Missile Defense (NMD) system and withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Russians (as well as many Americans and US allies in Europe) see the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of an arms control regime that has provided for strategic stability between the world’s nuclear powers since 1972. A possible second round of NATO expansion to incorporate the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) is another wedge that may drive Russia and the US further apart. And these are only the most important of the many sources of tension in US-Russian relations under the new Putin and Bush administrations.

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During the coming academic year, ISEEES will present a series of lectures, conferences, and roundtable discussions designed to explore and assess the evolving relations between the US and the postcommunist states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Some highlights in the fall include a roundtable discussion, “The ‘New Realism’ in US Foreign Policy Toward Russia” (date to be announced); a lecture by Igor Zevelov, “Russian
and American National Identities and Security Strategies: A Comparative Analysis,” on September 25; and a lecture by Viktor Ishaev, Governor of Khabarovskii krai in the Russian Far East and close confidant of Putin, “Putin, Pragmatism, and Russia’s Future,” on October 8. In the spring, Strobe Talbot, US Deputy Secretary of State in the Clinton administration, will deliver the 2002 Colin Miller Memorial Lecture on US-Russian relations during the Clinton-Yeltsin era. Our annual Outreach Conference for Teachers, to be held on April 13–14, 2002, will be entitled, “Reconfiguring East and West in the Putin-Bush Era.” Additional lectures on our theme for the year will be announced once they have been arranged.

Complementing our effort to promote awareness and foster public discussion about US policy toward our region is a special “Chancellor’s Forum on Nuclear Danger and Global Survival.” The UCB forum provides public discussions of nuclear dangers and other threats to global survival. As part of the initiative, we are cosponsoring an event in early November, which will be organized by the UC Berkeley Institute of International Studies, on international reactions to NMD deployment.

As usual, ISEEES will be organizing and sponsoring other events as well. This past summer, from July 30 to August 3, the Center for Slavic and East European Studies, which is the ISEEES Title VI National Resource Center, cooperated with the UCB Office of Resources of International and Area Studies (ORIAS) to hold the annual ORIAS workshop for K-12 teachers. The workshop dealt with “Cultural Representations in Children’s Literature: Exploring Resources and Themes in Global Education.” You can read more about the workshop and the excellent work of ORIAS elsewhere in this newsletter.

The Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies (BPS) is preparing for another active year. Our Carnegie-funded seminar series, New Directions in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, will continue. The seminars allow faculty members and visiting scholars affiliated with BPS to present recent publications and works-in-progress to faculty and graduate students and discuss exciting and innovative developments in their respective disciplines. Last year, the series featured presentations by ten UCB faculty members from six departments, which allowed us to explore the remarkable variety of scholarship and perspectives in our area of study. Our Carnegie grant also brings Vadim Volkov, Professor of Sociology at the European University in St. Petersburg, to campus this semester. Professor Volkov, a specialist on crime and corruption in post-Soviet Russia, will participate in the Carnegie seminar series and lead a pro-seminar for BPS graduate students.

In August, BPS welcomed a new administrative assistant, Andrée Kirk, on board. Andrée brings with her a B.A. in Modern Literary Studies from UC Santa Cruz, an M.A. in English and American Literature from Mills College, as well as a love of Russian literature.

Our recently established Caucasus and Central Asia Program (CCAsP) exemplifies our effort to provide new opportunities for faculty and graduate students who are interested in Eurasian studies. CCAsP is planning many activities for the current academic year, including a major conference on March 15–16, a visiting speakers series, and a newsletter. We are also very pleased to report that a new undergraduate major in Eurasian Studies has been introduced by the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures. With funds from our Title VI grant, CSEES is also supporting a spring semester course in the IAS Teaching Program entitled “Gender in Post-Socialist Transitions: New Roles, Challenges, and Opportunities for Women in the Caucasus and Central Asia,” to be taught by Armine Ishkanian, a recent Ph.D. in anthropology from UC San Diego.

ISEEES is hosting an outstanding group of scholars during the current academic year, including three Fulbright scholars. Dr. Oleg V. Bilyy will be visiting from Kiev, where he presides over a research group on the philosophy of culture at the Institute of Philosophy of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences. At UCB, he will be working on a study entitled “The Nation State and the Politics of Identity.” Dr. Miroslava Ianova, director of the Institute for Marketing and Social Surveys/MBMD Research in Sofia, will be conducting research on a project, “Structural Changes in Public Opinion in the Conditions of Radical Transformation: The Bulgarian Case of Transformation from Totalitarianism to Democracy and Market Economy.” Dr. Ruben Safrastyan comes to Berkeley from Yerevan where he is the director of the Turkish Department of the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Armenian National Academy of Sciences. His current research project is “Between Geopolitics and Historical Memory: Armenian-Turkish Relations, 1991–2000.” In addition to the Fulbrighters, Dr. Shorena Kurtsikidze, who taught a course in Georgian language and culture for us two years ago, will assist in a course taught at the Slavic department by Professor Johanna Nichols.

We look forward to seeing everyone at the ISEEES annual reception on October 10 from 4 to 6 p.m. at the Alumni House. Be sure to take a look at our events Web page (http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~iseees/events.html) for updates and a comprehensive list of forthcoming events.

Victoria E. Bonnell
Director, Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies
Professor, Department of Sociology
Fall 2001 Courses
Selected Faculty Course Offerings and Selected Area-Related Courses

Anthropology C160 (ISF C160) Forms of Folklore
Anthropology 166 Language, Culture, and Society
Anthropology 250X.3 From Socialism to Post-Socialism: Former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China
Comparative Literature 225 (Eng 250:4) Nabokov After Lolita
Dramatic Art 126:2 (SLL 134E) Performance Literature: Chekhov
Dramatic Art 166:4 (Film 140:1) Stanislavsky in Hollywood: Method Acting in the American Film
Economics 260A Economics of Transition I
English 125C The European Novel
English 143N:3 Prose Nonfiction: Exile and Immigration
English 250:4 (Comp Lit 225) Nabokov After Lolita
Film Studies 25A Silent Film History
Film Studies 100 History of Film Theory
Film Studies 140:3 Film Acting: Conspiracies of Truth
Folklore 250A Folklore Theory and Techniques
Geography C55 (NES C26) Introduction to Central Asia

In addition to the listings above, the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures offers language courses in Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian, Polish, Russian, and Serbian/Croatian.
Dr. Stephan Astourian returns as the William Saroyan Visiting Professor in Armenian Studies for the academic year. He is teaching courses on Armenian history through the Department of History.

Dr. Oleg Bilyy is visiting ISEEES this year as a Fulbright scholar, conducting research on national and social identity as the basis for state-building in postcommunist societies. He heads the research group in the Department of Philosophy of Culture, Institute of Philosophy, Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences.

Dr. Maarten Fraanje comes to the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures this year from Leiden University, the Netherlands. Author of *The Epistolary Novel in Eighteenth-Century Russia* (Munchen, 2001), he will be working on a project on love in eighteenth-century Russian culture.

Dr. Miroslava Ianova is a Fulbright scholar at ISEEES this fall. She is the executive director of the Institute for Marketing and Social Surveys, MBMD Research, in Sofia and a professor of electoral sociology at Paisiy Hilendarsky University in Plovdiv, Bulgaria. She is conducting research on Bulgaria’s transition to democracy and a market economy.

Dr. Armine Ishkanian will be a visiting lecturer in the spring, teaching a course on women in postcommunist societies funded by our Title VI grant from the US Department of Education. She earned her Ph.D. in anthropology from UC San Diego, and her dissertation is entitled “Hearths and Modernity: The Role of Women in NGOs in Post-Soviet Armenia.”

Dr. Matthew Kay is visiting the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures this year. He is working on East Slavic “sacred philology” and on narratology of folklore. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard University, and his dissertation, entitled “Translating Holy Writ into East Slavic: The Peresopnyc’ke Jevanhelije,” examines the first translation of the gospel into Ukrainian.

Dr. Shorenia Kurtsikidze is teaching Slavic 298, “Studies in the Languages of the Caucasus: Georgian Language,” with Professor Johanna Nichols this fall. Shorenia holds a Ph.D. in cultural anthropology from the Academy of Sciences of Georgia and a degree in simultaneous interpreting.

Dr. Ruben Safrastyan comes to ISEEES this year from the Institute of Oriental Studies, Armenian National Academy of Sciences. As a Fulbright scholar, he is conducting research on interstate relations between Turkey and Armenia in the 1990s.

Dr. Vadim Volkov is a Carnegie Research Fellow at BPS this fall, conducting research on changing identities and elites in postcommunist Russia. He is an associate professor of sociology at the European University in St. Petersburg.
Report From Bulgaria:  
Introducing His Majesty and 
His Excellency, Mr. Saxecoburgotski

Kristen Ghodsee

Kristen Ghodsee is a Ph.D. candidate in Social and Cultural Studies at the Graduate School of Education. Kristen was in Bulgaria for the June 17 parliamentary elections while completing fieldwork for her dissertation. Comments on this paper may be directed to the author at eustacia@uclink4.berkeley.edu.

“In the eyes of the Bulgarian people the king is less a monarch than a leader. He is the symbol of national unity...”

—A senior official in the German Ministry in Sofia on August 27, 1943, one day before the death of Boris III, Simeon’s father

On June 17, 2001, Bulgarians overwhelmingly supported the first European monarch to (re)gain power through the ballot box since Louis Napoleon’s electoral success more than 150 years ago. Simeon II—or Mr. Saxecoburgotski, as he prefers to be called—and his National Movement captured approximately 43 percent of the vote and gained 120 out of 240 seats in parliament, just one seat shy of an absolute majority. With the highest voter turnout recorded since 1991, the former King’s political party won a clear mandate from the Bulgarian people despite the fact that the National Movement Simeon II (NDSV) had little in the way of a political platform. During the campaign, Bulgarians were not even told who Simeon would choose as Prime Minister, nor were they told exactly what role the monarch would play in the new political party. In fact, his campaign slogan consisted entirely of two words. In the weeks leading up to the elections, cities and towns around Bulgaria were plastered with the NDSV’s posters. These posters featured a simple headshot of Simeon II staring out at the viewer. The portrait of the distinguished-looking gentleman in his sixties with the cool, blue eyes was accompanied only by the words “trust me.” And on June 17, Bulgarians dutifully placed the future of their country into their (ex-) Tsar’s hands.

Simeon II is the grandson of Tsar Ferdinand of Coburg, a German prince handed the Bulgarian throne in 1886 after the Treaty of Berlin. Ferdinand’s greatest personal accomplishment was the arrangement of Bulgaria’s full independence from the Ottoman Empire after almost 500 years of occupation. Ferdinand was succeeded by his son, Boris III, a much loved monarch best remembered internationally for his role in saving Bulgaria’s Jews from the death camps. Although never officially crowned as King, Simeon succeeded his father Boris after the latter’s suspicious death in 1943. Because he was only six years old at the time a regency was formed, and for a while Bulgaria qualified as yet another historical anomaly—a communist monarchy. As the communists eventually consolidated power, however, a referendum was staged. The monarchy was abolished in 1946.

Simeon II fled with his family first to Egypt and later to Spain where he has resided until his recent entrance into the world of Bulgarian politics. After the collapse of communism in 1989, the specter of Simeon’s return loomed large in the minds of politicians. The new Bulgarian constitution, approved on July 12, 1991, specifically introduced a requirement that candidates for the Bulgarian presidency had to have been resident in the country for at least five years prior to the election. This measure was introduced precisely to prohibit Simeon’s candidacy in 1991, and it was this same provision, which the constitutional court upheld in early 2001 when Simeon finally declared his intention to run for that office. Barred from the presidency, Simeon hastily put together a political party and registered the NDSV in April in “alliance” with a little-known Bulgarian women’s party.

The NDSV’s political platform hardly differed from the platform of the incumbent party, the Union of Democratic Forces (ODC). The only concrete proposal Simeon put forward was the promise to turn the Bulgarian economy around in 800 days. The vast majority of candidates he chose to put on his election lists were a hodgepodge of little known athletes, journalists, bankers, even a catwalk model. Few of them had any political experience, and Simeon himself never revealed exactly who would be in charge of the new government should his party win the election. Yet despite the ambiguities in his campaign, support for the NDSV for overwhelming and remarkably diverse in its constituencies. On June 16, the day before the election, many pollsters were predicting that the NDSV would take no more than 30–33 percent of

CSEES Newsletter Fall 2001 / 5
the vote. But as the exit polls began to trickle in on Sunday evening, it was clear that Simeon would have well over 40 percent. What was equally remarkable was the fact that this 40 percent was consistent across almost all demographic sub-groups. Approximately 40 percent of both young and old, rural and urban, male and female, as well as those in different educational stratifications voted for Simeon’s party. The NDSV even managed to attract a significant portion of the ethnic Turkish vote, a Bulgarian subgroup that traditionally votes exclusively along ethnic lines for the Movement for Rights and Freedom party.

Almost a month later, after weeks of anticipation and speculation, Simeon finally announced that he would be Bulgaria’s next Prime Minister on July 15th. The new government was approved by the National Assembly on July 24. Mr. Saxecoburgotski swore himself to the Bulgarian republican constitution, temporarily laying to rest any questions as to whether Simeon would attempt to restore the monarchy. For many Bulgarians and international observers Simeon’s election has proven that Bulgaria is still a “proto-democracy” where cults of personality can still catapult both Kings and Communists back into power at any time. Other observers see the Saxecoburgotski’s election as a sign that democracy is working. They characterize the victory of the NDSV as a protest vote against the ruling incumbents, demonstrating that it is very difficult “for reforming governments to win re-election if they have inflicted necessarily harsh medicine on their voters, even though they may have set their country on the road towards a recovery that cannot be instant.” Because of the relative inexperience of his cabinet, some fear that the government will eventually fall apart, bringing most unwelcome political instability to a country striving desperately for accession to the European Union. As Simeon and the NDSV begin the task of governing this often forgotten Balkan country, only time will tell exactly what the former monarch will or will not be able to do for his people.

Although there are many political and economic uncertainties, there have already been some significant positive effects of Simeon’s return. Firstly, Bulgaria has in and out of the international press consistently since February when the Tsar declared his intentions to enter the fray of Bulgarian politics. Sandwiched between Romania’s orphans and poverty and the former Yugoslavia’s wars and ethnic cleansings, Bulgaria has traditionally been ignored by the international community. This so-called island of stability in the Balkans has suffered greatly from the economic embargo against Serbia and from the NATO bombings, which cut off Bulgaria’s land routes to Western Europe and devastated its tourism industry. Civil unrest in nearby Macedonia threatens to destabilize the region yet again. In spite of this, Bulgaria has consistently supported NATO’s efforts, a fact which is seldom acknowledged in the West. Considered one of the economic laggards of Eastern Europe, Bulgaria’s small domestic market has attracted comparatively little in the way of foreign direct investment. Much of this may be due to Bulgaria’s relative invisibility; few Americans can even find Bulgaria on a map. Simeon’s return has suddenly thrust Bulgaria into the limelight. Recent articles in the Financial Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the Economist, to name but a few, may be just the thing to increase international interest in the small but growing economy.

Secondly, whatever Simeon’s actual intentions, he is perceived as one who has the symbolic authority to unite Bulgarians divided by 12 years of postcommunist jockeying for power. If his new government is any indication, it seems the only opposition to the NDSV is the ODC, and even they may be forced to cooperate with Simeon since his own political and economic agendas are so similar to theirs. In an official coalition with the Movement of Rights and Freedom, two ministerial posts have been given to ethnic Turks. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is a Bulgarian Jew. More surprising is the fact that two ministries were also awarded to two members of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, a move that few predicted. Simeon has also appointed a large number of women and young people to his government. Two women were given ministries and two key posts, the Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Economy and the Minister of Finance were accorded to a 31 year old and a 35 year old respectively. The relative inexperience of the rest of his cabinet also attests to Simeon’s uncanny desire to spread the power around.

Perhaps even more important than his perceived role as national unifier is Simeon’s value as a role model to the nation’s young, ambitious, and nouveaux riches. After the fall of communism in 1989, the new ascendant class was a strange mixture of former nomenclatura, ex-state security agents, and “retired” athletes, collectively known as the Mafia. Fast cars, easy money, and “loose women” became the new aesthetic; popular culture canonized criminals and kept women. Fashion, music, architecture, and lifestyles reflected the primacy of the Mafia’s somewhat “Las Vegas-y” tastes. Legitimate and successful businesspeople in Bulgaria had to accommodate themselves to the wild excesses of the Mafia whose consumer preferences dictated the kinds of goods and services that would be imported or established in the country. Simeon’s mere presence has already begun to change this aesthetic. Simeon speaks perfect (if not slightly archaic) Bulgarian in addition to seven other languages. He presents himself as a quiet and mild

The NDSV won overwhelming support with a campaign slogan that consisted entirely of two words—trust me.
mannered gentleman of means. His suits are impeccably tailored while still being understated, making Simeon perhaps the best dressed leader of any of the Central and Eastern European countries. He has forgone the clichéd German luxury sedan for the more practical black sport-utility vehicle, a move which has sparked a sudden spike in SUV imports to Bulgaria. A new preference for things “aristocratic” has replaced the old fascination with nylon track suits, micro-miniskirts, and shiny, Versace everything. This may finally shave the cynicism off many young Bulgarians who have (perhaps rightly) been convinced that the only way to success was through crime, corruption, or emigration.

Which brings me to the final and most important impact of Simeon’s return, the fact that he is bringing young, educated, and professional Bulgarians back to their country for the first time. The Bulgarian National Statistical Institute (NSI) estimates that between 500,000 and 650,000 young people have left the country since the changes in 1989, a staggering high number for Bulgaria’s small population of 8 million. Between emigration and declining birthrates, the forecasts for 2020 are even more pessimistic. In 20 years, the NSI predicts that the population will decline by another one million and that every fourth Bulgarian will be a pensioner. For years the Bulgarian press has been preoccupied with the chronic brain drain as the best and brightest Bulgarians fled low wages and the economic chaos that characterized the postsocialist period. Not only responsible for the demographic decline, the estimated half a million young people who have left Bulgaria are also collectively held responsible for the country’s social, political, and economic woes. Daily articles in the Bulgarian press bemoan the fate of those left behind. The few Western journalists visiting Bulgaria are quick to catch on to the situation. The title of one article in the Christian Science Monitor in 1997 is telling: “Behind Bulgaria’s Troubles: Exodus of the Educated.”

The national preoccupation with the “Bulgarian intelligensia in exile” led to high-profile, ODC-sponsored publicity events such as Velikden and Rozhen in 1999 and 2000. At these two nationally publicized meetings, the government used budgetary funds to fly in professional Bulgarians living abroad in order to build links and encourage the young people to return. In actuality, the government offered little in the way of incentives, and few Bulgarians living abroad answered the call. Mr. Saxecoburgotski, however, has managed to lure many former ex-patriots from high-flying and well-paying careers in the United States and the United Kingdom. Many of the NDSV’s ministers are young people who were educated abroad with professional experience working for Western companies. More importantly, the Bulgarian community abroad has begun to take an active interest in the political situation in Bulgaria, finally being given the chance to believe that they too could one day do something to help out their county. Many young Bulgarians in the US are surely still kicking themselves for not getting involved with Simeon’s movement when the Prime Minister made his first call for Bulgarians abroad in May. Although politically inexperienced, the Bulgarians in government who have returned from abroad are a powerful symbol to the nation that things in Bulgaria might just have the possibility of improving. Why else would they come back? And if there is one thing that this small nation on the edge of Europe racked by twelve years of brutal post-communist poverty and hardship desperately needs, it is hope. No matter what his political shortcomings, few could deny His Majesty/His Excellency, Mr./Tsar, Simeon II/Saxecoburgotski—whatever you want to call him—has finally brought hope back into the equation.

Notes
3 Many believe that Boris III was poisoned by Hitler for Bulgaria’s refusal to give up its Jews and for failing to make a commitment against the Russians on the Eastern front.
5 Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, pg. 223.
6 Of course, many still believe that Simeon may try to push through a constitutional amendment reinstating the monarchy.
7 “Return to the Czar: After 55 years in exile, Simeon II has formed a new political party to contest Bulgaria’s elections,” Time International, 157:23 (June 11, 2001): 38.
11 Maria Stoilkova, dissertation in progress, Department of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley.
International Intervention and Recent Regime Changes in Croatia and Serbia

Andrej Krickovic

Andrej Krickovic is a second year graduate student in the Department of Political Science. His primary area of interest is international influences on domestic politics in the postcommunist countries. Before joining the Ph.D. program at Berkeley, Andrej worked as a journalist in the former Yugoslavia and covered the 2000 parliamentary elections in Croatia firsthand.

The year 2000 marked a turning point in the history of the countries of the former Yugoslavia. In January Croats flocked to the polls to vote Franjo Tudjman’s Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) out of office. Only a few months later, in September, the people of Serbia overwhelmingly voted against the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in presidential elections. When Milosevic tried to annul the election results the country’s citizens took to the streets, forcing his resignation. The fall of these two regimes was greeted with great enthusiasm in the West. Many Western observers regarded the Tudjman and Milosevic regimes to be directly responsible for the violent breakup of the former Yugoslavia. Both regimes have been succeeded by fledgling democratic governments that renounced their authoritarian and radical nationalist policies and promised to bring peace and stability in the region.

Most observers have sought to explain these two extraordinary regime changes by pointing at economic factors or the exhaustion of the nationalist ideologies that seemed to have had such a profound hold over these two societies. Ethnic violence and economic dislocation took a tremendous toll on the populations of these two countries. At the same time the supporters of these regimes (and particularly those close to the Tudjman or Milosevic families) often grew rich at the expense of their fellow citizens. According to these interpretations the Tudjman and Milosevic regimes were ousted because most citizens had grown disappointed and disillusioned with their nationalist policies, which only increased their suffering and poverty and did not deliver on the promises of a better life.

These interpretations do capture the feelings of disillusionment and anger that prompted voters in Serbia and Croatia to turn against the regimes they had supported for so long. However, they only tell part of the story. They ignore the role that the West has played in bringing about these regime changes. The US and EU identified the Tudjman and Milosevic regimes as potential sources of instability in the region, and they actively sought to bring about a change of government in both countries. They pursued a foreign policy towards Tudjman’s Croatia and Milosevic’s Serbia that was designed to punish and isolate these regimes. At the same time Western NGOs, many of them funded directly by and working closely with Western governments, aided the political opposition in their efforts to wrest power away from the incumbent regimes.

These policies had a profound impact on domestic politics in these countries. Western foreign policy designed to isolate these regimes eroded popular support for them and helped mobilize the electorate against them. The efforts of Western NGOs helped the domestic opposition in both countries to overcome their own internal differences and the unfair advantages held by the incumbent regimes. Indeed, Western pressure on these governments and Western aid to the opposition played a crucial role in bringing about these regime changes. Given the incumbent regimes’ dominance over the political process in these countries, it is unlikely that these regime changes would not have come about without the West’s active participation.

Croatia

Tudjman and his ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) were brought to power by the country’s first postcommunist democratic elections and they continued to dominate the Croatian political scene for the next decade. The regime enjoyed a certain amount of democratic legitimacy. Tudjman handily won presidential elections in 1992 and 1997 and the HDZ won parliamentary elections in 1990, 1993, and 1995. Nevertheless, the Croatian president and ruling party were repeatedly criticized by Western and domestic observers for their heavy-handed and undemocratic tactics. Tudjman looked to establish the HDZ’s dominance over all segments of society. In doing so the government severely restricted citizens’ civil liberties. Elections were marred by fraud, intimidation, and violence against opposition candidates, and by unequal access of candidates and parties to state media during the campaign. The HDZ corrupted the privatization process, using it to dole out the choicest parts of the economy to HDZ cronies. The ruling party then used these resources to strengthen its grip on power. The HDZ also cracked down on the free press and established its complete
dominance over the state electronic media, by firing independent journalists and replacing them with HDZ loyalists. Those who publicly opposed the regime were demonized by the ruling party and state media as traitors and enemies of Croatian independence and subjected to legal prosecution and harassment by the secret services.

Political opposition to the HDZ did exist. The country’s opposition parties had consistently managed to win over 40 percent of the vote in all of the country’s parliamentary elections. Yet they were never able to capitalize on this support to obtain real political power. The opposition parties represented the wide range of the political spectrum, from former communists to liberal democrats to traditional populist conservatives. They were divided on key political issues and highly distrustful of each other. The HDZ skillfully manipulated these divisions to its own advantage. The ruling party established coalition governments with the more conservative opposition parties in several local governments. This drove a wedge between the more liberal and left-leaning parties, which rejected any form of cooperation with the HDZ on principle, and the more conservative and national-ist parties, which believed that a deal could be made with the HDZ to include the opposition in the national government. The HDZ also weakened many of these parties from within by buying off prominent opposition politicians and encouraging them to defect over to the ruling party. These divide and rule tactics weakened the opposition and prevented it from emerging as a unified alternative to the HDZ. They also weakened the integrity of the opposition parties in the eyes of the public. Many voters saw opposition politicians as being just as corrupt and self-serving as the HDZ.

The West’s policies towards Croatia helped to turn the tide against Tudjman and the HDZ. The US and EU looked to isolate the Tudjman regime by keeping the country out of international organizations and shutting the country off from participation in programs designed to advance the process of European integration. Croatia was denied the opportunity to begin negotiations for a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU. The country’s application for membership in the WTO was also ignored. Membership in this organization would have reduced tariffs on Croatian goods to Western markets and provided a boost to the Croatian economy. Croatia was also not allowed to participate in the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP), regarded to be an essential stepping stone for eventual membership in NATO and the EU. The fact that countries like Albania, Moldova, and even Turkmenistan were members of PfP highlighted the extent of Croatia’s isolation. Moreover, Western diplomats in Zagreb and representatives of international organizations constantly criticized the Tudjman government for its shortcomings in the fields of human rights and minority rights and for its heavy-handed practices vis-à-vis the media and opposition.

These foreign policy efforts helped to turn public opinion against the HDZ. Isolation exacerbated the country’s economic difficulties. Without access to Western aid and markets the HDZ found it extremely difficult to deal with the country’s economic problems. The policy of isolation also scared off many Western investors. The economy shrank a staggering 7.8 percent in 1999 and exports fell by over 9 percent in the same year. At the same time, unemployment rose from 17.2 percent in 1998 to over 19 percent in 1999. Most Croatian citizens tied the country’s economic difficulties to the government’s strained relations with the West.

Citizens were also troubled by the country’s growing isolation. Croatian voters believed that their country belonged historically to the West and that European integration was the only way of bringing the country economic prosperity. The HDZ had won power by promising to bring Croatia independence. But they also made an equally important promise: to bring the country into the Western community of nations. The HDZ had failed to live up to these promises. The ruling party had only

The public increasingly began to see the HDZ regime as an obstacle to Croatia’s economic and political development.

...distanced the country from the West. As a result, the public increasingly began to see the regime as an obstacle to the country’s economic and political development. This was particularly true of Croatia’s intellectual community who resented of the country’s growing isolation. Many of these people had initially supported Tudjman and the HDZ’s rise to power. Now these same intellectuals openly criticized the regime and its policies.

Western NGOs provided significant aid to the country’s opposition parties, helping them prepare for the parliamentary elections of 2000. The International Republican Institute (IRI) conducted several periodic nationwide polls, which predicted that the opposition would win the elections by a wide margin. These polls instantly gained widespread popularity because they were perceived to be much more “objective” than the polls conducted by the Croatian media and the political parties themselves. The polls aided the opposition’s cause in that they demonstrated to the electorate that real change was possible and that the HDZ trailed too far behind to steal the elections through dirty tricks alone.

The IRI also conducted numerous focus group polls whose results were not made available to the general public. These were designed to give opposition parties a much better grasp of the political landscape and shifting
political trends. The opposition used these polls to come up with concrete campaign strategies and focus their campaigns on reaching swing voters. According to Ellen Yount, the director of IRI’s Croatian program, “The opposition parties applied IRI polling data to sharpen their campaign message, develop specific slogans, and design comprehensive communications strategies.” These efforts allowed the opposition to mount a professional political campaign that was in tune with the concerns of Croatia’s voters and which was able to capitalize on their dissatisfaction with the HDZ.

IRI polls also aided the opposition’s coalition building efforts. The polls provided the parties with data that demonstrated which coalition combinations were most advantageous to the parties. They also discouraged the opposition parties from coming out for the elections alone. They illustrated how like-minded parties steal votes from one another rather than from opponents. They showed that some of the smaller parties were unlikely to get a sufficient number of votes to enter parliament without coalition partners. The IRI held out the Slovak opposition, which had successfully unified to beat the nationalist and authoritarian regime of Vladimir Meciar in elections in 1998, as an example. The institute organized several “coalition building” conferences in Croatia that brought Croatian opposition leaders together with IRI advisors and Slovak political leaders. The main goal of these conferences was to impress upon the Croatians the need for unity. Shortly after their last conference in July 1999, the Croatian parties announced the formation of the two electoral coalitions that eventually won the elections and now form Croatia’s new government.

The National Democratic Institute (NDI) also offered substantial help to the opposition. The NDI concentrated its activities on two areas: 1) helping the opposition parties organize their campaign at the local and grass roots level and 2) helping Croatian NGOs organize to monitor the 2000 elections. The NDI worked closely with opposition parties. It trained local party branches on how to organize local campaigns, raise campaign funds, and recruit local volunteers. All told, the NDI trained more than 1,100 party activists in these techniques, including 74 activists who stood election as parliamentary candidates.

The NDI also provided funding and assistance to the Croatian NGO Citizens Organized to Monitor Elections (GONG). GONG organized a successful campaign to recruit and train election monitors and to inform citizens about electoral procedures and their electoral rights. NDI instructors trained GONG representatives on how to recruit volunteers and how to solicit donations and support from private and public sources. On election day over 5,600 GONG-trained election monitors were present at the nation’s polling stations. GONG was able to cover 75 percent of the country’s 6,500 polling stations. These efforts helped to dissuade the HDZ from using fraudulent tactics at the polling places to increase their share of the vote.

With the help of USAID, GONG also worked with over 140 other Croatian NGOs in initiating a media campaign to increase voter participation—Glas 99 (Vote 99). High voter turnout was very important for the opposition. A low turnout would give the HDZ an advantage in the voting. The HDZ could count on its core constituency and dependents (like Croat refugees from Bosnia who directly depended on the government for aid) to make it out to the polls on election day. The ruling party could also count on high turnout from pro-HDZ Bosnian Croats, who were allowed to vote for candidates in a separate electoral district. Furthermore, a low turnout would also make it easier for the HDZ to use election fraud to increase their share of the vote and thereby steal the elections. In the event of a high turnout the HDZ would have to manufacture a ridiculously large number of votes to win the elections.

One of the primary objectives of the campaign was to increase turnout of younger voters, aged 18–30. Glas 99’s programs were designed to appeal to this group in a language that they could understand. Glas 99 organized nationwide rock concerts, sports shows, and other social events and enlisted a number of Croatian celebrities to spread its message. Among the promotional material disseminated by the campaign were condoms with the campaign’s logo and voodoo dolls of Croatian politicians. The campaign was modeled on a similar campaign that met with great success in the Slovak elections of 1998. A high turnout among younger voters in Slovakia helped the opposition defeat the Meciar government. Representatives from the Glas 99 campaign even traveled to Bratislava in early 1999 to meet with their Slovakian counterparts and learn from their experiences. In the end, the Glas 99 effort also proved to be a success. Over 75 percent of Croatian voters participated in the elections, including 60 percent of voters between 18–30 years of age.

Western NGOs also helped Croatian journalists break the HDZ’s monopoly on the media. The OSCE made the promotion of open and free independent media one of the priorities of its mission to Croatia. OSCE reports criticized the lack of balance in state media coverage. These reports gained widespread attention in the independent media and helped to erode the public’s

With the help of Western NGOs, independent reporting and journalism were able to survive in Croatia and challenge the ruling party and its allies in the state-friendly media.

continued on page 17
**Outreach Programs**

**Cultural Representations in Children’s Literature:**
**Focus on Russia**

Organized by the Office of Resources for International and Area Studies (ORIAS) on behalf of the Berkeley area studies centers, the ORIAS Summer Institute for Teachers was held July 30–August 3, 2001. This year’s theme, “Cultural Representations in Children’s Literature: Exploring Resources and Themes in Global Education,” focused on the California State Standards for the K-5 classroom that lay the groundwork for complex world history content beginning in the sixth grade. Teachers and librarians from the bay area and around the state came to Berkeley to attend the institute, with some earning graduate credit for their supplemental work.

After beginning with sessions on finding, evaluating, and using international materials and on comparative narratives, the week was filled with scholars and educators speaking on the various world areas. Our region was represented by Glen Worthey, a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, where he is completing his dissertation tentatively entitled “Author, Authority, Authoritarian: The Russian Child from Tolstoy to Stalin.” The combination of his scholarly knowledge and first-hand experience teaching children—Glen regularly leads seminars on music and world culture at his daughter’s elementary school—allowed him to speak with great insight.

Glen Worthey began his focus on Russia with an excellent example of a lesson plan for teaching young students about world cultures. After showing his own passport to the class, Glen had given each student a passport-like booklet in which to record their sessions “visiting” countries around the world. The end result, an example of which we saw, was a writing exercise, an outlet for creative expression, and a record about the countries that could later be reviewed. The passport project, which is simple and inexpensive to create, is now posted on the ORIAS Web site (http://ias.berkeley.edu/orias/) in PDF format and can be downloaded and photocopied.

Taking up Russian culture as it is reflected in children’s literature, Glen introduced common figures in Russian folklore as things to look out for: Prince Ivan and the Firebird; Vasilisa, a girl who may also be called “The Brave,” “The Wise,” or “The Beautiful”; Baba Yaga, a witch who lives in a house that walks on chicken legs and who rides around in a mortar and pestle; Ivan the Fool, who triumphs in spite of his foolishness; “Koloebok,” the Little Bun whose provenance and fate are similar to the Gingerbread Man; and the Turnip, a vegetable that grows so large that it requires a group effort to pick it. Images of many of these characters were shown from the illustrations of Russian artist Ivan Bilibin, enabling the group to better comprehend how a witch might ride through the air in a mortar, paddling with a pestle. (Head of the Humanities Digital Information Service in the Stanford University Libraries, Glen had scanned many of the books he described so that everyone present could see the projected images as he spoke.)

Such figures from Russian folklore may be found in children’s literature either in the repetition of traditional tales or in the introduction of the characters into new stories. For example, the turnip’s tale has been retold numerous times in American books, although it usually changes to a more familiar vegetable, say a carrot, and the cast of characters trying to pull it varies. A good source for traditional Russian folklore is *Russian Fairy Tales*, collected by Aleksandr Afanas’ev in the nineteenth century. The volume translated into English by Norbert Gutterman was published in 1945 by Pantheon Books (subsequently reissued by them) and by Random House in 1976; it can still be found in print. After reading the tales in this book, it is easy to see why some of them might be adapted before being presented to children, though it is also apparent why these powerful tales endure.

Moving on to literature written for Russian children, Glen began in the nineteenth century with Alexander Pushkin, the first important author of children’s literature in Russia. (During the eighteenth century little children’s literature was published.) Leo Tolstoy also wrote children’s literature. In fact, at one time, Tolstoy started a school for peasants, wrote a journal about his pedagogy, and published his students’ stories in this journal. Fyodor Dostoevsky, however, never wrote literature intended for children.

The October 1917 revolution ideologically created a time for childhood in Russia, though this was greatly contradicted by the reality of orphans. (Of course, Russians became Soviets, and we must remember that people of numerous ethnicities contributed to Soviet culture.) Emphasizing ideology, there were many books about Vladimir Ilyich Lenin for Soviet children. Lenin’s widow, Nadezhda Krupskaya, believed strongly in the power of children’s book and wrote many (dull) books about Lenin. Although dull stories may not become popular, Mikhail Zoshchenko wrote many popular stories, but was expelled for his irony from the Soviet Writers Union, and suffered the banning of his books.
Through a strong emphasis on ideology, Soviet children’s literature sought to overturn old ways and beliefs and to create a new culture. Pavlik Morozov’s story is emblematic of this movement. During the early 1930s, when peasants were joining collective farms, often under force, Pavlik denounced his father to the authorities for hoarding grain and selling it for a profit. When Pavlik was killed in revenge, he became a martyr for the cause and a mascot of the Young Pioneers, the Soviet scouting group that all children were expected to join. Though it failed to show how “good” behavior would be rewarded, Morozov’s gruesome story showed how the state had supplanted the traditional role of the family.

Children’s literature was so highly esteemed in Soviet times that major authors wrote for children. The poet and great translator Kornei Chukovsky wrote poetry for children and translated other works into Russian, including Mother Goose rhymes. While much of Russian children’s literature remains inaccessible to English speakers, some of Chukovsky’s work has been translated. Listening carefully to children and collecting what they said, his ideas about writing for children were published in English as From Two to Five, though now out of print (Berkeley: UC Press, 1966). He wrote funny poems that chose delighting children over propagandizing, such as the story of a crocodile named Krokodil Krokodilovich. Although Krupskaya took offense at his anthropomorphic animals, starting a debate about whether children’s literature should be realistic, Chukovsky’s work endured. His wacky story Telephone (translated by Jamey Gambrell; New York: North-South Books, 1996) is now out of print but can be found in public libraries.

Another great Soviet writer, Samuel Marshak, known for translating Shakespeare’s sonnets and other English poetry, also wrote for children. Second in command of the Soviet Writer’s Union, he wrote propagandizing stories such as Mister Twister (Mister Twister). Mister Twister is an evil American capitalist who travels to the Soviet Union to amuse his bored and spoiled daughter. Upon entering the hotel at which they intend to stay, Mister Twister sees a black man and refuses to stay at an establishment that is not segregated. Extolling the equality of all people in the Soviet Union, the book follows his fruitless search to find a hotel he deems proper. Though a classic of Soviet children’s literature, this work has not been published in English.

Marshak’s titles in English include: The Absentminded Fellow (translated by Richard Pevear; New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1999), the story of a scatterbrained man who simply tries to get dressed and catch a train; and Hail to Mail! (translated by Richard Pevear; New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1990; out of print), the story of a letter that travels around the world as it just keeps missing its recipient. No doubt, these books have been valued for their timeless humor.

A contemporary of Marshak, Daniil Kharms wrote nonsense poems and absurdist stories, in addition to his popular children’s literature. In 1941, Kharms was arrested for his unconventional writing; he was too strange to tolerate any longer, and his work—and soon thereafter, his life—ended. He was republished in the USSR in the 1960s and again in the 1980s. A number of his stories are now translated into English: First Second (translated by Richard Pevear; New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1996), an account of two boys who encounter an extraordinary assortment of companions while going for a walk; and The Story of a Boy Named Will, Who Went Sledding Down the Hill (New York: North-South Books, 1993; out of print), the story of a boy who cumulatively picks up a number of characters while sledding. Still other stories by Kharms have been retold by Mirra Ginsburg: Across the Stream (New York: Mulberry Books, 1991) and Four Brave Sailors (New York: Greenwillow Books, 1987). But while Ginsburg’s books are charming, these adaptations have lost some of the quirkiness of the original Kharms texts. An anthology of Kharms’ poetry, It Happened Like This (translated by Ian Frazier; New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1998) is currently available as a children’s book, but it is neither well-translated nor well-illustrated and contains some of Kharms’ work intended for an adult audience.

Finally, Glen showed some late Soviet/early post-Soviet literature for children, all of which were only in Russian. The work of Grigorii Oster, an extremely popular author of cartoon scripts, contrasts strongly and deliberately with the propaganda in Soviet literature. His Book of Problems (Zadachnik), for example, gives word problems for children, but in one arithmetic problem, readers are asked to calculate the number of Young Pioneers who must
turn in their parents to emulate Pavlik Morozov. The illustration of a smiling Pioneer with an axe stuck in his head tops off the scathing irony. Another work by Oster, whose title translates to Dangerous Advice (Vrednye sovety), proclaims itself to be a book for disobedient children. Its message is clearly meant to be reverse psychology, but under the surface, the author relishes disobedience just a little too much, benefiting from the freedom that people such as Kharms never had.

Many thanks to Glen Worthey for covering the topic so thoroughly and for preparing such an excellent presentation! Feedback from the teachers and librarians show that the Summer Institute, thanks to everyone involved, was a huge success.

ORIAS has summaries of the talks and other materials from the Summer Institute. Consult their Web site at http://www.ias.berkeley.edu/orias/ or contact Michele Delattre at orias@uclink4.berkeley.edu or (510) 643-0868.

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ORIAS Weekend Institutes for Teachers

Topics in Social and Cultural Geography:
Scripts, Spices, and Stories

ORIAS (the Office of Resources for International and Area Studies at UC Berkeley) and BAGEP (the Bay Area Global Education Program at the World Affairs Council of Northern California) are pleased to announce their second annual series of weekend teacher institutes on international themes from the history curriculum in Grades 6–10.

The series scheduled for the 2001–2002 school year will address the evolution of writing systems and economic and cultural exchange in early societies. The series may be audited by teachers at no charge or taken for 2 graduate credits through UC Berkeley Extension’s concurrent enrollment. Morning lectures by university area specialists will be followed by lunch, afternoon discussions, and curriculum workshops. A limited number of tuition scholarships or $300 stipends will be available from BAGEP for teachers completing the entire series.

The institutes will present:

**Mapping communication.** Writing systems in 6th and 7th grade area studies (two days): Cuneiform; Sanskrit, Latin, Greek, Cyrillic; Chinese characters; Mayan glyphs.

**Mapping the movement of goods.** The maritime spice trade from the Spice Islands of Indonesia to the Chinese Empire and to the Roman Empire.

**Mapping the story of Hanuman, monkey-warrior** (two days). Beginning with children’s literature portraying Prince Rama’s loyal servant in the Indian epic *Ramayana*, the institute will look at the historic social, religious, and political setting of the story and other versions found in Southeast Asia and China. Finally, performers will demonstrate performance traditions across Asia.

Applications will be available on the ORIAS Web site (http://www.ias.berkeley.edu/orias/) once the schedule has been finalized.

For more information contact Michele Delattre, ORIAS Program Assistant, at orias@uclink4.berkeley.edu or (510) 643-0868.

Sponsored by Office of Resources for International and Area Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, with funding by the UC Berkeley Title VI National Resource Centers, and by the Bay Area Global Education Program at the World Affairs Council of Northern California.
Book Review:

To the Harbin Station

Elizabeth McGuire


“Yakov is seriously ill and cannot write to you. And his illness is of the kind that used to be treated in Harbin by Dr. Mozgovoi.” Thus the family of Berkeley’s own Simon Karlinsky was secretly warned in a letter from an aunt that return to the Soviet Union from Russian Harbin in 1935 could be dangerous: Dr. Mozgovoi had been the prison director in Harbin, so the letter meant that Uncle Yakov had been arrested. Increasingly alarmed by fascism and the brutality of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, many Russian residents of Harbin fled in the 1930s to the Soviet Union, Israel, and, of course, California. In this way the multinational tapestry of Harbin society unraveled; the Chinese city of three million that stands in its place today has only its fanciful architecture as a reminder of its origins.

David Wolff’s To the Harbin Station: The Liberal Alternative in Russian Manchuria, 1898–1914, is concerned not with Russian Harbin’s dramatic denouement, but with its debut on the world stage at the climax of colonial ambition in late Imperial Russia. Wolff’s first chapter is a detailed account of the contingencies, technicalities, and fanfare that attended the city’s birth. Founded in 1898 where Russia’s Trans-Siberian Railroad met the Sungari River, the town quickly mushroomed into Manchuria’s trade capital and the source of Russian hopes, fears, and rivalries on a grand scale.

Wolff points out that, while historians have condemned Russia’s Eastern ambitions as misguided distractions, at the turn of the century the Imperial government’s Asian ventures appeared fantastically successful and were seen at home and abroad as the fulfillment of Russia’s special mission in the East. What more tangible proof that Russia could link Europe and Asia than a Russian city in Manchuria?

Inside Petersburg, Harbin was more divisive. Wolff excels in his treatment of the rivalry the city inspired between the ministries of finance and war. Russia’s own Far East had been highly militarized, and the War Ministry expected a similar level of control in Manchuria. Finance Minister Witte kept the military at bay until the Boxer Rebellion in 1900; when Russian soldiers subsequently failed to depart in a timely manner and a Viceroyalty was created to govern Manchuria, the Japanese became convinced that Russia intended war. Wolff argues that the military was stalling out of unwillingness to cede control to civilians. Myopic turf wars, then, may have hastened the real thing.

Although Witte ultimately lost control over Manchurian policy, Wolff attributes Harbin’s relatively liberal political regime to his influence. To counter China’s successful efforts at colonization of Manchuria, Witte favored not military or Cossack colonization, which would have reduced his own influence, but a “wager on the strong.” He hoped that enterprising urbanites and religious minorities would be attracted voluntarily to Manchuria by the freedom of movement and of religion enjoyed by settlers, as well as by the region’s economic potential. Stolypin later borrowed not only Witte’s idea of a wager on the strong, but also two key bureaucrats with Far Eastern experience to oversee his reforms. Harbin, Wolff argues, became a testing ground for liberal policy.

Ultimately, though, Harbin was both more and less than a sum of its parts as envisioned in Petersburg. Settlement followed the logic of events, swelling with railway construction, trade, and war, and including many
more Chinese than anyone hoped. It was an outpost of Russian culture, but also a ghetto city saturated with disease and crime, blooming with brothels. Wolff’s account, mostly high politics and demographic data, could have stood a bit more sensational detail from memoirs or local publications and still remained this side of scholarly respectability.

Harbin’s mix of religions, ethnicities, and classes must have yielded a fascinating local culture, which Wolff largely leaves unexplored. To illuminate the nature and significance of the city’s cultural identity would require a closer study of everyday life, including of relations among the various religious groups as well as between Russians and Chinese. Wolff argues that tolerance extended toward Harbin’s Chinese residents, but without a more detailed account from Chinese sources it is difficult to evaluate his evidence. A similar question arises in regard to his assertion that orientologists educated in the borderlands (the subject of his last chapter) were more likely to promote economic cooperation than military experts from St. Petersburg. If Manchuria is to be understood as a distinctive region rather than an outgrowth of the imperial powers that governed it, one might look not only for a hybrid culture but also for patterns of interaction among its multinational inhabitants that differed from patterns at the national level. Wolff’s treatment implies such a difference but cannot fully establish it without more Chinese sources and more focus on daily life.

What does emerge from Wolff’s account is a clear sense of Russian Harbin’s political identity vis-à-vis St. Petersburg. Although the Russian government viewed the city as an instrument of its objectives and although Russians in Harbin were eager for Petersburg’s support, in reality Harbin’s interests could contradict the center’s. War bolstered Harbin’s economy, and Petersburg politics reverberated faintly with local overtones. Wolff’s account of 1905 in Harbin is the highlight of the book, because he is able to show how Russian politics in Manchuria both reflected and contradicted Petersburg’s at a dramatic moment. Striking railway workers in Harbin still made sure that 90 percent of trains departed on schedule, partly from fear of their main cargo, soldiers anxious to return home. Afterward local authorities went easy on strikers; the “prison” where some stayed was nicknamed the El Dorado, and many were rehired by the railroad upon their release, over Petersburg’s objections.

Given Wolff’s major thesis that Harbin represented a liberal alternative for Imperial Russia, it is logical that his tale ends in 1914—though readers might be curious how the liberal mentalities of Russian Harbin held up under subsequent pressures. The story of Harbin-as-region, however, can hardly end here, with revolution and the Japanese occupation of Manchuria lingering in the city’s future. One can only hope for a sequel.

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Elizabeth McGuire is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History where she is studying Sino-Soviet relations.
Croatia and Serbia, continued from page 10

The US NGO International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) also worked with the country’s independent local television and radio stations. Under the guidance of IREX’s Zagreb ProMedia office, these radio and television stations developed a nationwide network devoted to promoting a joint-news broadcast. Other Western NGOs like the Soros Foundation also provided aid and funding to individual media outlets like the weeklies Feral Tribune and Nacional and Zagreb’s Radio 101. Through these efforts independent reporting and journalism were able to survive in Croatia and challenge the pro-regime picture of reality presented by the ruling party and its allies in the state-friendly media.

In the end the Croatian opposition handed the HDZ a decisive defeat in the January 2000 parliamentary elections. The opposition captured 95 out of 151 seats in parliament and formed a new government. Western efforts played a definitive role in bringing about this political turnaround. Western policies isolated the Tudjman regime, making it another Balkan pariah state, like Milosevic’s regime in Serbia. This exacerbated the economic situation and eroded the regime’s support. It also eroded the ruling party’s popularity, as the living standards of the citizens dropped and more and more people were thrown into poverty and unemployment. Most Croats regard their country to historically be part of the West, and they voted for the HDZ in previous elections because they believed the party would bring the country “back” into the Western family of nations. They eventually turned their backs on the country’s leadership because they realized it was only bringing them down the road of isolation and increased poverty. The efforts of Western NGOs also helped the opposition parties overcome their differences and come up with an effective election campaign. At the same time Western aid to local NGOs and to the independent media helped the opposition level the political playing field and prevented the HDZ from using fraud to steal the elections.

Serbia

The Milosevic regime in Serbia was not a pure dictatorship; rather it was a strange hybrid of democracy and dictatorship. Timothy Garton Ash has gone so far as to coin a new phrase to describe it—“democratura.” There were always competitive multi-party politics under Milosevic, and Milosevic gained a measure of democratic legitimacy among the people by winning elections. To be sure, these were not free and fair elections. The regime dominated the media, engaged in massive fraud to win the elections, and used police and secret police repression (and even assassination) to keep the opposition in check. However, throughout the entire period a certain amount of political pluralism did exist. Privately owned newspapers, radio stations, and TV stations challenged the regime’s monopoly on the dissemination of information in the country. Opposition parties could organize and openly campaign. People were allowed to openly criticize the regime and even demonstrate in the streets.

Despite this opposition, Milosevic was able to take advantage of Serbian nationalist feelings to establish a firm grip on power. Milosevic created a siege mentality in the country. Nationalist feelings are strong in Serbia, and the Serbian national myths continue to have a profound hold over the country’s imagination. Most Serbs firmly believe that they have legitimate grievances against the West over the fate of Serbian populations in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Milosevic was able to manipulate these feelings to close the country off from the rest of the world. At the same time, he presented himself as the only person in the country who could protect the Serbian national interests. In order to maintain this siege mental-

Despite opposition to his regime, Milosevic was able to take advantage of Serbian nationalist feelings to establish a firm grip on power and close the country off from the rest of the world.

Milosevic also skillfully manipulated divisions within the opposition, preventing it from emerging as an alternative to his rule. He used state television and radio to whip up the Serbian people’s anxieties and fears about their own nation’s survival. He also used the state media to discredit the opposition and portray them as lackeys of the West. This strategy was particularly successful in rural areas and small towns, where people had few other sources of information.

Milosevic also skillfully manipulated divisions within the opposition, preventing it from emerging as an alternative to his rule. He was able to break up the opposition coalition Zajedno, which organized 88 days of massive street demonstrations against the regime in 1996–97, by co-opting one of its three main leaders, Vuk Draskovic. Draskovic and his Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) left Zajedno in order to win Milosevic’s backing for their efforts to gain control of the Belgrade city government (and all the resources of patronage and corruption that went with it). Later Draskovic also became a minister in the Serbian government. These kinds of maneuvers, combined with the state media’s aggressive anti-opposition campaign, discredited the opposition in the eyes of the public. It also caused many ordinary Serbs who opposed the regime to retreat into political apathy and abstain from participation in politics altogether. Many of the country’s youngest and brightest citizens demonstrated their opposition to the regime in the only way that seemed open to them: emigration out of the country.
The weakness of the opposition, the people’s political apathy, and Milosevic’s ability to use the state media and vote rigging to influence the outcome of the elections all gave Milosevic an overwhelming edge over the opposition. Nevertheless, change was possible. Milosevic could not rule without some measure of popular legitimacy. He had to periodically hold competitive elections to legitimize his hold on power. He could use a variety of tactics to influence the vote count. But Milosevic still had to win the support of a sizable percentage of the electorate to maintain control. This opened the door for political change. Popular dissatisfaction with the regime had been on the rise since Milosevic first assumed power. The opposition could defeat Milosevic if it 1) unified against him and 2) successfully mobilized popular dissatisfaction with the regime. The West’s policies towards Serbia and Western aid played an important role in helping the opposition bring about these two goals.

The turning point came with NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. The public had rallied around Milosevic during the NATO bombing campaign. Yet this support quickly began to dissipate once the crisis was over and Serbia had lost Kosovo. For most Serbs Kosovo is sacred Serbian territory; it holds a special place in the national mythology. The loss of Kosovo, coming as it did after defeats in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia, eroded any remaining support that Milosevic held among nationalist-minded Serbs. Milosevic could no longer portray himself as the defender of Serbian interests. On the contrary, Milosevic’s efforts to defend the national interest had failed miserably. The regime’s efforts to portray the loss of Kosovo as a “victorious capitulation” failed to win back this support. In fact these propaganda efforts—which were in such stark contrast to the reality of the war—only added to Milosevic’s growing unpopularity.

The loss of Kosovo also hampered the regime’s ability to use electoral fraud to manipulate the outcome of the elections. In previous elections Milosevic used fictitious votes from the province to help him win national elections. In the 1997 Serbian presidential elections, Milosevic’s ruling Serbian Socialist Party (SPS) candidate Milan Milutinovic narrowly edged out Serbian ultranationalist Vojislav Seselj by winning the votes of 200,000 Kosovo Albanians.8 Without the ability to manufacture votes from Kosovo, Milosevic would have found it exceedingly difficult to steal enough votes to win the elections.

Yet, most significantly, the war devastated the country’s economy, leading to an increased deterioration of the Serbian standard of living. The NATO bombing campaign destroyed many factories and enterprises, throwing tens of thousands of people out of work. By January 2000 the unemployment rate was at nearly 40 percent.9 The bombing campaign also destroyed much of the country’s infrastructure, including roads, bridges, and power stations. The country’s distribution networks were completely laid to waste, and the regime had to resort to rationing to bring even the most basic staple goods, like flour, sugar, and cooking oil, to the public. Most of the country was on electricity rationing, and the Capital itself experienced daily eight-hour power shutdowns. In addition to these difficulties the country also had to absorb 150,000 Serb and Roma refugees from Kosovo. The standard of living in the country was at the lowest point it had been since the end of World War II. Wages plummeted to nearly one-third their pre-1999 level. For the first time since the years immediately following WWII hunger became a real problem. Nearly 10 percent of the population relied on government and International Red Cross field kitchens for their sustenance.10

The West refused to provide the government with loans or other forms of aid to rebuild the country. In fact the West made Milosevic’s removal from power a precondition for aid. Rumors dominated the independent press that the US and EU were ready to provide Serbia with a 600 million dollar aid package if Milosevic was overthrown. On September 18, just days before the country held presidential elections, the EU announced that it would lift sanctions against Yugoslavia and provide aid and loans for reconstruction if Milosevic was ousted in the elections. The US administration followed up with a similar appeal the next day. The message from the West to the Serbian electorate could not be clearer: get rid of Milosevic and we will help you rebuild. In the end this message had a profound effect on Serbian voters who knew that they could only rebuild their country with Western help. A poll commissioned by the NDI just prior to the September 24th presidential elections predicted an overwhelming opposition victory. It also revealed that economic recovery and ending the country’s international isolation were of primary concern to Serbian voters and took precedence over issues of national sovereignty.11

The West also provided significant aid to the opposition in preparation for the 2000 presidential elections. Ousting Milosevic became a priority for the Clinton administration. The US provided 25 million US dollars to aid the opposition’s election campaign.12 The US also opened a special office in Budapest to coordinate these activities, and US Ambassador to Croatia William Montgomery was appointed to head the office. Montgomery had worked closely with the NDI and the IRI in Croatia prior to the January 2000 elections. The NDI and the IRI worked closely with Serbian opposition parties to develop effective door-to-door political campaigns. With

The West made Milosevic’s removal from power a precondition for aid to rebuild Serbia after the NATO bombing campaign.
Milosevic dominating the electronic media (the government shut down many of the country’s independent radio and television stations just prior to the beginning of the election campaign), these efforts played an important role in getting out the opposition’s message. No less important were independent polls commissioned by the NDI and the IRI. These consistently showed the public that the opposition enjoyed a huge lead in the polls and that Milosevic would have to manufacture nearly one million votes to steal the elections in the first round.

Western aid also helped to keep the country’s few outlets of independent media alive during a period where Milosevic was stepping up pressure on them. With the help of US funding and technical support Serbian independent journalists formed a nationwide alternative electronic news media network, ANEM. ANEM used the internet to disseminate alternative news reports to local independent radio and TV stations—thereby sidestepping federal laws that put restrictions on nationwide news broadcasting. According to an ANEM poll conducted shortly after the elections, over 20 percent of the population regularly watched ANEM TV news programs or listened to ANEM’s radio reports. Western NGOs and governments also provided direct financial support to individual Serbian radio and TV stations, newspapers, and journals. These efforts helped break the stranglehold that Milosevic held on the country’s media and kept alternative sources of information alive in Serbia.

The youth organization Otpor (Resistance) played an instrumental role in bringing about Milosevic’s defeat. Founded in 1998 by students from the Belgrade University, the group organized demonstrations, meetings, and other types of public displays against the regime. Though Otpor was initially a student movement, it soon developed a more popular mass base. By 1999 the organization had established a network of over 80,000 activists throughout Serbia. Otpor’s tactics combined non-violent protest with civil disobedience to demonstrate that resistance to the regime was possible and indeed alive in Serbia.

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The movement combined youthful energy and clever (often ironic) humor to get this message across. For example, Otpor activists would stand in ration lines with other citizens wearing T-shirts that read, “Everything is Fine.” In another action in the southern Serbian town of Nis Otpor activists began collecting signatures in support of Milosevic’s resignation. When police began to crack down on these activities, Otpor activists began to collect signatures in support of Milosevic. They were only able to collect one signature in the course of 24 hours. In the end the befuddled police arrested the Otpor activists. Yet the event gained widespread attention in the Serbian independent press and was retold throughout Serbia.

Otpor had no hierarchical organization or prominent leaders. Instead it operated on the grass roots level through its local activists, whose activities were funded and loosely coordinated through the organization’s central offices in the capital. The absence of a clear hierarchy made it impossible for the regime to co-opt the movement the same way it had bought off many of the country’s opposition parties in the past. It also strengthened the organization’s credibility in the eyes of the public. This was not an opportunistic political party vying for their votes. This was the country’s youth, ready to risk life and limb because of their concerns about their country’s future. The regime’s attempts to silence Otpor through repression only reinforced the movement’s message about the need for political change. Over 1,500 Otpor activists were arrested and taken into custody in July 2000 alone. Many of these young people were beaten and tortured by the police. These acts of repression awakened the moral outrage of parents and relatives and turned these people against the regime.

Though Otpor lacked a hierarchical structure and operated mostly on the grass roots level, the organization was well funded and its activists were well trained in the use of non-violent tactics and civil disobedience. Most of this funding and training came from US NGOs like the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the IRI. According to NED and IRI sources, both organizations have provided Otpor with about 4.8 million US dollars in aid since 1999. Yet this may just be the tip of the iceberg. According to New York Times journalist Roger Cohen, Otpor activists have claimed that they also received substantial covert aid.

Otpor’s methods and tactics were also heavily influenced by their contacts with Western NGOs. The NED and the IRI tutored Otpor activists on the use of non-violent protest and civil disobedience. For example, the IRI organized a seminar for Otpor leaders in Budapest from March 31 to April 3, 2000. Cohen reports that instructors at this meeting included a retired US Army colonel, who lectured them to find ways to use non-violent protest to undermine the regime’s pillars of support: the police, army, and state-run media. According to an Otpor activist present at the meeting and quoted in Cohen’s article, “We focused on breaking Milosevic’s authority, on ways to communicate to dissatisfied people that they are the majority and that the regime could only dig itself into a deeper hole through repression.”

Otpor’s activities had a profound effect on the country’s political landscape. They showed that political
change was possible and that a real opposition existed. Otpor also spread political opposition to the provincial and rural areas, which had long been a Milosevic stronghold. This had particular significance because, in the end, it was rural Serbia that brought the regime down. When Milosevic tried to annul the election results in October, Serbs from the countryside and small towns flocked to Belgrade to defend the opposition’s electoral victory. Though the scene of Milosevic’s fall took place in Belgrade, it wasn’t the citizens of the capital or the leaders of the opposition parties that took Milosevic down. Young toughs from the provinces, including the Otpor activists, were the vanguard of this short and relatively bloodless Serbian revolution. They were the ones who stormed the parliament and state TV and radio buildings in Belgrade. They were the ones who did battle with the riot police and braved the tear gas. And ultimately it was their actions that convinced Milosevic to concede defeat.

As was the case earlier in Croatia, the West played an important role in bringing about the opposition victory. Serbia’s loss in the Kosovo war severely weakened the regime. The loss of Kosovo eroded Milosevic’s support among nationalists. The economic damage unleashed by the war and the country’s plummeting standard of living also increased popular dissatisfaction with the regime. Moreover, the West continued to treat the regime as a pariah after the war, denying the Serbs aid in their efforts to reconstruct the country after the NATO bombings. In the end many Serbs voted to oust Milosevic because they no longer saw him as being capable of defending their national interests. They also realized that ousting Milosevic was the only way of guaranteeing the necessary Western support to rebuild their country and to improve the dire economic situation. Western NGOs also helped the opposition mobilize Serbian voters against the regime. The NED and the IRI provided aid and training to opposition groups and helped them mount an effective election campaign. Western NGOs and governments also helped the independent media survive at a time when Milosevic tried to annul the election results in October, Serbs from the countryside and small towns flocked to Belgrade to defend the opposition's electoral victory. When Milosevic tried to annul the election results in October, Serbs from the countryside and small towns flocked to Belgrade to defend the opposition's electoral victory. When Milosevic tried to annul the election results in October, Serbs from the countryside and small towns flocked to Belgrade to defend the opposition’s electoral victory. Though the scene of Milosevic’s fall took place in Belgrade, it wasn’t the citizens of the capital or the leaders of the opposition parties that took Milosevic down. Young toughs from the provinces, including the Otpor activists, were the vanguard of this short and relatively bloodless Serbian revolution. They were the ones who stormed the parliament and state TV and radio buildings in Belgrade. They were the ones who did battle with the riot police and braved the tear gas. And ultimately it was their actions that convinced Milosevic to concede defeat.

Conclusion

It would be a mistake to see these transitions as being purely the product of Western efforts. A democratic opposition existed in both countries, from the very beginning. The political opponents of these two regimes often risked life and limb to voice their opposition to the regime. Public opinion in both countries also began to

The policies of Western governments and the efforts of NGOs helped the political opposition in both Croatia and Serbia overthrow the existing regimes.
gain access to the material benefits of greater association with the West and eventual membership in the EU.

Notes

2 Interview with Ellen Yount, Jutarnji List (November 28 1999). Author’s translation.
3 These figures are taken from NDI’s official Web site, http://www.ndi.org/.
5 These figures are taken from Glas 99’s official Web site, http://www.izbori.hr/glas99/.
7 There are no reliable figures on emigration. But estimates on the emigration of young, urban, and educated people from Serbia range from between 200,000 and 600,000 people.
10 Figures provided by Aleksandar Jankovic, Director of the International Red Cross Committee Office in Novi Sad Serbia during a telephone interview on July 21, 2000.
13 Taken from ANEM’s Web site, http://www.anem.opennet.org/.
14 Roger Cohen writes: “Otpor leaders intimate they also received a lot of covert aid—a subject on which there is no comment in Washington.” In “Who Really Brought Down Milosevic,” New York Times (November 26, 2000).
15 Ibid., pg. 12.

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Documents and Reports by NGOs

Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia (FYROM) and Kosovo International Assistance to Media, A Report by Mark Thompson, Vienna: OSCE Representative for the Freedom of Media, 2000.


Bear Trek to Prague and Budapest

A Bear Trek traveled to Prague and Budapest during May 2000, with an optional extension of a trip to Vienna. The group of Berkeley alumni saw the sites, attended cultural performances, and brushed up on their regional knowledge with enrichment lectures from Dr. Barbara Voytek, executive director of ISEEES. Bear Treks are a service of the California Alumni Association, providing educationally-oriented travel to the University of California community.
José Alaniz, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Comparative Literature, has been named a Townsend Center Fellow for 2001–2002. His dissertation is entitled “Necrotopia: Discourses of Death and Dying in Late/Post-Soviet Russian Culture.”

Victoria E. Bonnell, director of ISEEES and professor of sociology, and Thomas B. Gold, professor of sociology, are the editors of The New Entrepreneurs of Europe and Asia: Patterns of Business Development in Russia, Eastern Europe, and China (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001). This volume is the product of a Sawyer Seminar funded by the Mellon Foundation and cosponsored by ISEEES and the Center for Chinese Studies.

Mike Boduszynski, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science, received an Individual Advanced Research Grant from IREX to conduct research in Croatia for the academic year. His project is entitled “The International Dimension of Democratization in Croatia.”

Richard Buxbaum, Ralston Professor of International Law, has been named a Townsend Center Faculty Fellow. He is working on the influence of public international law and of international relations on reparations and restitution in postwar Germany.

Stephen Collier, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Anthropology, and Lucan Way (Ph.D. in political science, 2001) received a NCEER grant for 2001 for their project “Local Welfare Regimes, Fiscal Crisis, and Institutional Change in Post-Communist Eurasia.”

Scott Gehlbach, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science, received an IREX Individual Advanced Research Grant to conduct research in Russia for the academic year. His project focuses on “New Democratic Institutions and Corruption in Post-Communist Countries.”

Lise Morjé Howard (Ph.D. in political science, 2001) is spending the academic year as a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Maryland’s Center for International Development and Conflict Management.

Marc Morjé Howard (Ph.D. in political science, 1999) begins his new position this fall as assistant professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland.

Lilya Kaganovsky (Ph.D. in Slavic Languages and Literatures, 2000) has been appointed Assistant Professor of Slavic and Comparative Literature at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.

Maria Klemenc, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Music, received an IREX Advanced Individual Research Grant to conduct research in Slovenia for the academic year. Her project is entitled “Construction, Arrangement, Revival: Slovenian Vocal Music Practices and National Perception.”


Eric Naiman, associate professor in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures and chair of the Department of Comparative Literature, received an Initiative Grant for Associate Professors from the Townsend Center for the Humanities this year. He will examine the place and role of perversion in the work of Vladimir Nabokov and will then work with Professor Stephen Booth, a Shakespearean scholar, to develop readings on the topic.


Jeffrey Rossman (Ph.D. in history, 1997) received an IREX Individual Advanced Research Grant for 2001–2002 to conduct research in Russia on “Social Identity and the State During the Great Fatherland War, 1941–1945.” He is currently an assistant professor in the Department of History at the University of Virginia.

Yuri Slezkine, professor of history, received a fellowship for 2001 from the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation for his project, “Moscow’s House of Government, 1928–1938.” He is at the Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences at Stanford this academic year.


Alan Timberlake, professor in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, participated in the conference on “Linguistics as a Branch of Russian Studies” hosted by the Institute of Russian Language of the Russian Academy of Sciences in June 2001.


Lucan Way (Ph.D. in political science, 2001) has been appointed assistant professor, tenure track, in the Department of Political Science at Temple University. He will begin at Temple in Fall 2002, after completing his current postdoctoral fellowship at Harvard University.


Reginald Zelnik, professor in the Department of History, has been appointed as a member of the Board of the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (NCEER).

### FLAS Fellowships Awarded for Summer 2001

Mike Boduszynski, Ph.D. candidate in the political science, received funding for Serbian.

Jordan Finkin, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Near Eastern Studies, received funding for Russian.

Tatyana Mamut, Ph.D. candidate in anthropology, received funding for Russian.

Sean McMeekin, Ph.D. candidate in history, received funding for Russian.

Sean Murphy, Ph.D. candidate in the history, received funding for Russian.

Solari Cinzia, Ph.D. candidate in sociology, received funding for Russian.

Eugenia Teytelman, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Slavic Languages & Literatures, received funding for Czech.

### FLAS Fellowships Awarded for AY 2001–2002

Olga Gurevich, Ph.D. candidate in linguistics, received funding for Serbian/Croatian.

Ingrid Kleepsies, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, received funding for Polish.

James Krapfl, incoming student in history, received funding for Hungarian.

Traci Lindsey, Ph.D. candidate in German, received funding for Serbian/Croatian.

Elizabeth McGuire, Ph.D. candidate in history, received funding for Russian.

Sean Murphy, Ph.D. candidate in history, received funding for Russian.

Shawn Salmon, Ph.D. candidate in history, received funding for Polish.

Keith Sanders, Ph.D. candidate in linguistics, received funding for Czech.

Cinzia Solari, Ph.D. candidate in sociology, received funding for Russian.

*Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) fellowships allow US citizens and permanent residents to acquire a high level of competency in modern foreign languages. FLAS funding for studying Russia and Eastern Europe comes to UC Berkeley through a Title VI grant from the US Department of Education to the Center for Slavic and East European Studies (CSEES). Applications are accepted through the Graduate Fellowships Office.*

*CSEES Newsletter Fall 2001 / 24*
BPS Fellowships Awarded for Summer 2001

Mike Boduszynski, Ph.D. candidate in political science, received funding to conduct field research in Serbia.
Heather Carlisle, Ph.D. candidate in geography, received funding for dissertation writing.
Stephen Collier, Ph.D. candidate in anthropology, received funding for dissertation writing.
Laura Henry, Ph.D. candidate in political science, received funding for dissertation writing.
Conor O’Dwyer, Ph.D. candidate in political science, received funding to conduct field research in Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic.
Suzanne Wertheim, Ph.D. candidate in linguistics, received funding to conduct field research in Tatarstan.
Jane Zavisca, Ph.D. in sociology, received funding to conduct field research in Russia.

BPS Fellowships Awarded for AY 2001–2002

Neil Abrams, incoming student in political science, received funding for graduate training.
Mike Carpenter, Ph.D. candidate in political science, received funding for dissertation writing.
John Holmes, Ph.D. candidate in history, received funding to conduct field research in Russia.
Dan Kronenfeld, Ph.D. candidate in political science, received funding for dissertation writing.
Miriam Neirick, Ph.D. candidate in history, received funding for graduate training.
Jan Plamper, Ph.D. candidate in history, received funding for dissertation writing.
Jane Zavisca, Ph.D. candidate in sociology, received funding for dissertation writing.

Graduate students affiliated with the Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies (BPS) are eligible to apply for funding for graduate training, language training, field research, and dissertation writing. For information on BPS and affiliation eligibility, consult its Web site, http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~bsp/, or contact Andrée Kirk, program assistant, at (510) 643-6737.

BPS Working Paper Series

BPS added two titles to its working paper series since the publication of our last newsletter. Funding for the publication of these working papers comes from a grant by the Carnegie Corporation of New York to BPS.


These titles are available to download in PDF format from the BPS publications Web page at http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~bsp/publications.html. A complete list of working papers can be found on that page as well. For more information on this series, contact BPS directly at bsp@socrates.berkeley.edu or (510) 643-6737.
Upcoming Events

Events are subject to change; for current information on ISEEES-sponsored events, please call (510) 642-3230. When no one is available to take your call, you may listen to the recorded message that lists our upcoming events.

A more timely announcement of our events can be found in our Monthly Updates, published during the academic year. Updates are mailed to campus addresses and to Associates of the Slavic Center (see page 28) by first class mail. Additional copies are available at ISEEES, 260 Stephens Hall.


September 11–December 2, 2001. Exhibition: The Armenian Gospels of Gladzor. More than 60 pages of the 14th-century illuminated manuscript are on loan from UCLA’s Special Collections. At the Getty Center, Los Angeles; closed Mondays and holidays. Fees: free; parking is $5 with a mandatory reservation. Contact: Getty Center, http://www.getty.edu/ or (310) 440-7300.

Friday, September 14, 2001. Public Lecture: Isabel Marcus, director of the Institute for Research and Education on Women and Gender at SUNY Buffalo Law School, will speak on “Dark Numbers: Domestic Violence, Law, and Public Policy in Central and Eastern Europe.” In 2240 Piedmont Ave, 12 noon. Sponsored by ISEEES, the School of Social Welfare, and the Center for the Study of Law and Society.


September 28–29, 2001. Performance: The University Symphony Orchestra will perform Igor Stravinsky’s *Symphony in Three Movements*, among other works. At Hertz Hall, UC Berkeley, 8 p.m. Fees: $8 general, $6 students/seniors/UCB staff & faculty, $2 UCB students. Contact: Department of Music, http://ls.berkeley.edu/dept/music/ or (510) 642-4864.

Monday, October 8, 2001. Public Lecture: Viktor Ishaev, governor of Khabarovskii Krai, Russia, will speak on “Putin, Pragmatism, and Russia’s Future.” This lecture will be presented in Russian with translation. In 223 Moses Hall, 12 noon. Sponsored by ISEEES, BPS, and the Institute of International Studies.

Wednesday, October 10, 2001. Annual Fall Reception. Join us as we kick off the academic year. In the Toll Room, Alumni House, 4 p.m. Sponsored by ISEEES.


Wednesday, October 24, 2001. Open Rehearsal: The San Francisco Symphony presents “Gutiérrez plays Rachmaninoff.” This is a rehearsal for the October 27 performance. At Davies Symphony Hall, 10 a.m. Fees: $16 or $28; tickets may be purchased at the SFS Box Office, (415) 864-6000. Contact: SF Symphony, http://www.sfsymphony.org/ or (415) 552-8000.

Saturday, October 27, 2001. Performance: The San Francisco Symphony presents “Gutiérrez plays Rachmaninoff.” At the Flint Center, Cupertino, 8 p.m. Fees: $15-85; tickets may be purchased at SFS Box Office, (415) 864-6000. Contact: SF Symphony, http://www.sfsymphony.org/ or (415) 552-8000.

November 1–3, 2001. Performance: The San Francisco Symphony presents Dvorak’s *Stabat Mater*. At Davies Symphony Hall, 8 p.m. each date. Fees: $15-85; tickets may be purchased at the SFS Box Office, (415) 864-6000. Contact: SF Symphony, http://www.sfsymphony.org/ or (415) 552-8000.


Sunday, November 11, 2001. Performance: Russian Chamber Orchestra. At Mt. Tamalpias United Methodist Church, Mill Valley, 5 p.m. Fees: $20 general, $17 ages 21 and under/ages 55 and over; Ages 12 and under free. Tickets may be purchased in advance at (415) 927-1446 or at the door. Contact: Russian Chamber Orchestra Society, http://www.russianchamberorch.org/ or (415) 927-1446.


**Wednesday, November 28, 2001. Public Lecture**: Nikita Okhotin, Memorial Society, Moscow, will speak on “Istoriiia staliniskikh repressij segodnia: reabilitatsionnyj protsess, pamiat’ o terrore, arkhivnaia situatsia.” This talk will be in Russian without translation. In 270 Stephens Hall, 12 noon. Sponsored by ISEEES, CSEES, and the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures.

**Save the Date**

Saturday–Sunday, March 16–17, 2002. **Annual CCAsP Conference**. This year’s topic will investigate Central Asian diasporas; an exact title will be announced. Sponsored by ISEEES, CCAsP, and the Department of Near Eastern Studies.


Friday, April 26, 2002. **Annual Berkeley-Stanford Conference**: “Cultural Legacies of the Soviet Experience.” At Stanford University. Sponsored by the Center for Russian and East European Studies at Stanford University and ISEEES.

The **Silk Road Project**, established by Yo-Yo Ma, will convene numerous events during April 19–28, including:

**April 19-21, 2002. Performance**: Yo-Yo Ma and the Mark Morris Dance Group. At Zellerbach Hall, UC Berkeley, Fri.-Sat. 8 p.m., Sun. 3 p.m. Fees: $34-68; ask about student/UCB/senior discounts.

**April 23–24, 2002. Performance**: Yo-Yo Ma and the Silk Road Ensemble. At Zellerbach Hall, UC Berkeley, 8 p.m. both dates. Fees: $34-68; ask about student/UCB/senior discounts.

**Sunday, April 28, 2002. Performance**: Silk Road Ensemble, an international ensemble of young musicians. At Hertz Hall, UC Berkeley, 3 p.m. Fees: $34; ask about student/UCB/senior discounts.

For all of these events, contact: Cal Performances, http://www.calperfs.berkeley.edu/ or (510) 642-9988.
ISEEES acknowledges with sincere appreciation the following individuals who have contributed to the annual giving program, the Associates of the Slavic Center (or have been enrolled due to their particular generosity toward Cal to support some aspect of Slavic & East European Studies), between May 1, 2001 and August 15, 2001. Financial support from the Associates is vital to our program of research, training, and extra-curricular activities. We would like to thank all members of ASC for their generous assistance.

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For those of you who are not yet members, we encourage you to join. We believe you will enjoy the stimulating programs; even if you cannot participate as often as you might wish, your continuing contribution critically supports ISEEES’s mission and goals.

**Members ($10 to $100).** Members of ASC receive Monthly Updates and special mailings to notify them of events and special activities, such as cultural performances and major conferences. In this way, notification of even last-minute items is direct.

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*It is a policy of the University of California and the Berkeley Foundation that a portion of the gifts and/or income therefrom is used to defray the costs of raising and administering the funds. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent allowed by law.*

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Fellowships and Other Opportunities

ISEEES Travel Grants provide up to $400 in limited travel support for ISEEES-affiliated grad students and faculty. Awards are made to those presenting a paper at a meeting of a recognized scholarly organization. Awards are made on a first-come, first-served basis, and priority is given to those who did not receive ISEEES funding in the past AY. To apply send request with budget. Deadline: on-going. Contact: Barbara Voytek, ISEEES, UC Berkeley, 260 Stephens Hall # 2304, Berkeley CA 94720-2304; Tel: 510-643-6736; bvoytek@socrates.berkeley.edu.

American Association of University Women American Fellowships provide $20,000 to grad students and $30,000 to postdocs to support women doctoral candidates completing dissertations or to scholars seeking funds for post-doc research leave or for preparing completed research for publication. Applicants must be US citizens or permanent residents. Application forms may be requested online. Note: Applications must be requested by November 1. Deadline: 11/15/01.

International Fellowships provide $18,000 to M.A. candidates, $20,000 to Ph.D. candidates, and $30,000 to postdocs. Funding is awarded for full-time study or research in the US to women who are not US citizens or permanent residents. Note: Applications must be requested by November 15. Deadline: 12/15/01.

Contact: AAUW Educational Foundation, Department 60, 2201 N Dodge St, Iowa City IA 52243-4030; Tel: 319-337-1716, ext. 60; http://www.aauw.org/.

ACLS / SSRC

Eastern Europe Program Dissertation Fellowships provide up to $15,000 for one year of dissertation writing or for research on Eastern Europe conducted outside Eastern Europe. Only US citizens or permanent residents are eligible to apply.

Eastern Europe Program Fellowships for Postdoctoral Research provide up to $25,000 to postdocs for 6-12 consecutive months of full-time research or writing related to Eastern Europe. Only US citizens or permanent residents who hold a Ph.D. may apply. Funding is intended as salary replacement or to supplement sabbatical salaries or rewards from other sources.

Deadline for both: 11/1/01. Contact: ACLS, Office of Fellowships and Grants, 228 E 45th St, New York NY 10017-3398; Fax: 212-949-8058; grants@acl.org; http://www.acls.org/.

ACTR/ACCELS

Grants for Research in Central Europe provide travel, tuition, and lodging expenses for 3-9 months to Ph.D. students. Programs are available in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Croatia, Albania, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Deadline: on-going. Contact: ACTR/ACCELS, 1776 Massachusetts Ave NW Ste 700, Washington DC 20036; Tel: 202-833-7522; Hettlinger@actr.org; http://www.actr.org/.

Argonne National Laboratory

The Nonproliferation Graduate Program offers a Nonproliferation Internship and Foreign Practicum. Award provides competitive stipend and health benefits to students interested in exploring a career in nuclear nonproliferation with either a domestic or foreign placement. Applicants must be first- or second-year grad students with academic specializations in International Affairs, Political Science, Economics, International Business, or a combined specialization in Science and/or Engineering and International Affairs. Applicants for foreign placement must be fluent in Russian and/or Ukrainian and have previous experience abroad. Deadline: 11/1/01. Contact: Diana Naples, Nonproliferation Program, Argonne National Laboratory, 9700 S Cass Ave Bldg 315, Argonne IL 60439; Tel: 630-252-1239; ngp@anl.gov; http://www.dep.anl.gov/NGP/.

Brookings Institution

Foreign Policy Studies Resident Fellowships provide a $17,500 stipend for Ph.D. candidates in economic, foreign policy, and governmental studies whose research will benefit from access to the Brookings Institution and the Washington, DC area.

Governmental Studies Resident Fellowships provide a $17,500 stipend for Ph.D. doctoral candidates in economic, foreign policy, and governmental studies whose research will benefit from access to the Brookings Institution and the Washington, DC area.

For both: Candidates must be nominated by a graduate dept by December 15, with applications due by February 15. Deadline: 12/15/01. Contact: The Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington DC 20036; Tel: 202-797-6000; Fax: 202-797-6004; http://www.brook.edu/admin/fellowships.htm.

Harvard University

Davis Center for Russian Studies Postdoctoral Research Fellowships provide up to $32,000 for postdoctoral research in the humanities and social sciences on Russia, the Soviet Union, and the Soviet
successor states. Applicants may be either US or foreign citizens and must have received their Ph.D. within the past five years or must receive it by the end of the academic year. Fellows must be in residence for the duration of the award. Deadline: 12/15/01. Contact: Fellowship Program, Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University, 1737 Cambridge St, Cambridge MA 02138; Tel: 617-495-4037; Fax: 617-495-8319; daviscrs@harvard.edu; http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~daviscrs/.

**International Research & Exchanges Board Individual Advanced Research Opportunities** provide funding for 2-9 months to grad students, postdocs, and scholars for research at institutions in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia. US citizens and permanent residents are eligible to apply. Deadline: 11/1/01.

The **Mongolian Language Training Program** awards nine-week intensive language training programs to US scholars who are upper-level undergrad, grad students, or postdocs. To encourage the study of the region, the program funds travel to Ulaanbaatar for Mongolian language study. Deadline: 12/1/01.

Contact: IREX, 1616 H St NW, Washington DC 20006; Tel: 202-628-8188; Fax: 202-628-8189; irex@irex.org; http://www.irex.org/.

**National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowships** provide up to five years of support for research in the social sciences, among other sciences. Applicants must be US citizens, nationals, or permanent residents at or near the beginning of graduate study. See grant website at http://fastlane.nsf.gov/. Deadline: 11/4/01. Contact: Graduate Fellowships Office, 318 Sproul Hall # 5900; Tel: 510-642-0672; http://www.grad.berkeley.edu/events/felldead.htm.

**Social Science Research Council**

The **Louis Dupree Prize for Research on Central Asia** provides $2,500 to recipients of an SSRC/ACLS dissertation fellowship. This prize awards the most promising dissertation involving field research in Central Asia. Deadline: 11/1/01.

**Eurasia Program Graduate Training Fellowships** provide up to $10,000 for 3-9 months of training on the former Soviet Union. Applicants must be US citizens or permanent residents in graduate programs in the social sciences or humanities. Deadline: 11/1/01.

**Eurasia Program Postdoctoral Fellowships** provide up to $24,000 to postdocs (up to 6 years after Ph.D.) in the social sciences or humanities to study the former Soviet Union. Deadline: 11/1/01.

**Eurasia Program Dissertation Write-Up Fellowships** provide up to $15,000 to US citizens or permanent residents in graduate programs in the social sciences or humanities. Funding covers 3-9 months during the final year of dissertation writing on the former Soviet Union. Deadline: 11/1/01.

Contact for above SSRC funding: Eurasia Program, Social Science Research Council, 810 Seventh Ave, New York NY 10019; Tel: 212-377-2700; Fax: 212-377-2727; euasia@ssrc.org; http://www.ssrc.org/.

**Fellowships on Conflict, Peace and Social Transformations** award two years of funding (up to $19,000 per year to grads and up to $38,000 per year to postdocs). The award provides support to promising young scholars to generate new knowledge and theoretical insights to better understand the causes of, and safeguard against, threats to human security. See website for details. Deadline: 12/1/01. Contact: Program on Global Security and Cooperation, Social Science Research Council, 810 Seventh Ave, New York NY 10019; Tel: 212-377-2700; Fax: 212-377-2727; gsc@ssrc.org; http://www.ssrc.org/.

**International Dissertation Field Research Fellowships** provide up to $18,000 to full-time Ph.D. candidates in US programs studying in the social sciences or humanities. Funding supports 9-12 consecutive months of dissertation field research on all world regions. Applicants must have completed all Ph.D. work except fieldwork by the time the fellowship begins. Deadline: 11/5/01. Contact: IDRF, Social Science Research Council, 810 Seventh Ave, New York NY 10019; Tel: 212-377-2700; Fax: 212-377-2727; idrf@ssrc.org; http://www.ssrc.org/.

**Soros Foundations Network**

**Paul and Daisy Soros Fellowships for New Americans** provide a $20,000 stipend and partial tuition for up to two years of graduate study in the US. Awards are for individuals who have applied for naturalization, have been naturalized as US citizens, or are the children of two parents who are both naturalized citizens. Applicants must be 20-28 years, have a Bachelor’s degree, and be pursuing graduate study or in their final year of undergraduate studies at the time of application. Deadline: 11/30/01. Contact: Paul and Daisy Soros Fellowships for New Americans, 400 W 59th St, New York NY 10019; Tel: 212-547-6926; Fax: 212-548-4623; psdoros_fellows@sorosny.org; http://www.psdoros.org/.

**Townsend Center for the Humanities**

**Dissertation Fellowships** provide $15,000 to UCB grad students in the humanities who have advanced to candidacy by the following June. Fellows are expected to participate in the Townsend Fellowship Group, meeting weekly. Deadline: 12/7/01. Contact: Townsend Center for the Humanities.
UC Berkeley

Humanities Research Grants provide funding to grad students who are carrying out original research or other creative projects away from campus during the spring and summer. Students must be in the humanities or the social sciences with a humanities component and be registered at time of application. Research must be completed by the following September. Deadline: 10/24/01.

Jacob K. Javits Fellowships provide up to four years of support for graduate study at the doctoral or M.F.A. level in selected fields in the arts, humanities, and social sciences. Applicants must be US citizens or permanent residents. Deadline: 11/17/01.

Mabel McLeod Lewis Fellowships provide funding to advanced doctoral candidates in the humanities for the completion of a scholarly dissertation project on which significant progress has already been made. Deadline: 12/15/01.

Mangasar M. Mangasarian Scholarships provide funding to Berkeley grad students of Armenian descent and registered for the fall semester. Funding is awarded to eligible students with demonstrated financial need. Deadline: 10/28/01.

The Paul J. Alexander Memorial Fellowship is awarded for the study of Byzantine, ancient, and medieval history. Advanced Berkeley grad students studying in the general area of ancient history may apply. Deadline: 12/3/01.

Contact: Graduate Fellowships Office, 318 Sproul Hall # 5900; Tel: 510-642-0672; http://www.grad.berkeley.edu/events/felldead.htm.

United States Institute of Peace

Jennings Randolph Program for International Peace offers Dissertation Fellowships of $17,000 to outstanding doctoral students enrolled in universities in the US. Awards support one year of dissertation research and writing on topics addressing the sources and nature of international conflict and ways to prevent/end conflict, sustain peace. Deadline: 11/1/01. Contact: United States Institute of Peace, Jennings Randolph Program for International Peace, 1200 17th St NW Ste 200; Washington DC 20036-3006; Tel: 202-457-1700; http://www.usip.org/.

Wenner-Gren Foundation

Join us for our
Annual Fall Reception!

Wednesday, October 10, 2001
In the Toll Room, Alumni House, 4 p.m.

Sponsored by ISEEES, (510) 642-3230.