We find ourselves at the end of another academic year. Three major conferences highlighted the Institute’s spring program—all of them aimed at addressing major themes that pertain to the contemporary world.

The XXVIIth Annual Berkeley-Stanford Conference took place in March on the Berkeley campus. Our topic, “The Power of Ideas and Ideas of Power in East Europe and Eurasia,” drew twelve colleagues who presented papers ranging from the idea of the “just Tsar” to ideas of power, nation, and democracy in Eurasia today. Inspiration for the conference came from a collection of papers by the British philosopher and historian of ideas, Isaiah Berlin (1909–1997). Berlin was a great champion of the notion that ideas matter—they are not the epiphenomenal (the consequence of some underlying social or economic structure); they can operate autonomously; and they sometimes change the course of history. The conference was thus a salute to Berlin who contributed so much to the study of Russian intellectual history and to our understanding of the powerful ideas—fascism, communism, and democracy—that moved people to action in Eastern Europe and Eurasia during the twentieth century.

Soon afterward, the Caucasus and Central Asia Program (CCAsP) organized a conference, “Rocks and Hard Places: Society and the Environment in Central Asia.” Nine speakers from the United States and abroad examined the relationships between environments and communities in Central Asia historically, as well as the links between policies and politics in the region today. These themes provided a point of departure for a wide range of papers on environmental concerns such as security and shared water sources, conservation, and land reform. Still others dealt with the impact of the physical environment on modernization efforts and the role of the environment in shaping governance in Central Asian states. The papers from the 2002 CCAsP conference, “Currents, Cross-Currents, and Conflict: Transnationalism and Diaspora in Central Asia and the Caucasus,” will be published by Routledge under the provisional title Central Asia and the Caucasus: Transnationalism and Diaspora, with the CCAsP executive director, Dr. Sanjyot Mehendale, as the editor.

The XXIXth Annual Teacher Outreach Conference, held at the end of April, was devoted to an exploration of “The Muslim World in Eastern Europe and Eurasia.” Nine speakers from the United States and abroad examined the relationships between environments and communities in Central Asia historically, as well as the links between policies and politics in the region today. These themes provided a point of departure for a wide range of papers on environmental concerns such as security and shared water sources, conservation, and land reform. Still others dealt with the impact of the physical environment on modernization efforts and the role of the environment in shaping governance in Central Asian states. The papers from the 2002 CCAsP conference, “Currents, Cross-Currents, and Conflict: Transnationalism and Diaspora in Central Asia and the Caucasus,” will be published by Routledge under the provisional title Central Asia and the Caucasus: Transnationalism and Diaspora, with the CCAsP executive director, Dr. Sanjyot Mehendale, as the editor.

The XXVIIIth Annual Teacher Outreach Conference, held at the end of April, was devoted to an exploration of “The Muslim World in Eastern Europe and Eurasia.” We focused on the context and experiences of Muslims in four regions (Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Balkans) and the implications of Islam as a religious faith, an ethno-culture, a practice for everyday life, a set of institutions, a strategy for collective action, and a prescription for political rule. During the late Communist era, Islamic institutions and practices not only survived decades of Communist governance but, together with other traditional religions, experienced a popular revival. Over the past fifteen years, the importance of Islam in Eastern Europe and Eurasia has come to world attention through a combination of circumstances and events, most notably the Islamic profile of some of the Soviet successor states, post-Communist conflicts and wars in which Muslim peoples were involved (notably, former Yugoslavia,
A Nation on a Journey: 
Adam Mickiewicz and the Paradigm of the Polish Pilgrim

Ingrid Kleepsies

Ingrid Kleepsies is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures. This paper was presented at a workshop entitled “East Looks West: Travel Writing on European Identities and Divisions” that was hosted by the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, London, in February 2003. The topic of paper is part of the larger project of her dissertation that traces the images of wanderers, nomads, and pilgrims in early nineteenth-century Russian and Polish literature and the importance of these forms to constructions of national identity during that period.

In his paradigmatic 1832 text The Books of the Polish People and of the Polish Pilgrimage,¹ the Polish Romantic poet Adam Mickiewicz offered his Polish readers a vision of an identity that encompassed being Polish without Poland.² Such an identity was not passive, but active, colored as it was by the ultimate goal of restoring Poland as a state. Mickiewicz conceived of this goal as the endpoint of a national pilgrimage. The formal disappearance of the state heightened concerns over Polish identity; the individual Polish citizen no longer belonged to a national body. Rather, the Polish nation functioned as an idea, and it was an idea that resided solely in the individual minds of those who defined themselves as its loyal but now homeless citizens. In Mickiewicz’s formulation, individual Poles could rectify the situation by becoming pilgrims journeying not towards a geographical destination, but towards a temporal-abstract one. In the Books, the Polish nation is an entity on the move; exile and emigration are transformed into a national journey, and Poles into national travelers.

Before moving to The Books of the Polish People and of the Polish Pilgrimage, however, I will briefly discuss the “national traveler” and the case of Russia, as this background illuminates the discussion of Poland. In the late eighteenth century, as national consciousness emerged in both these countries, the idea of being “East” of a “West” began to occupy a more central position in national thought. Russia and Poland belonged to a Slavic culture traditionally perceived both by the West and by themselves to be “outside” or beyond the borders of Western Europe. This is perhaps less extreme in the case of Poland, where Poles saw their Catholicism as a vital link to the West. They posited themselves as the “last bastion” of Western-ness before the wild East, as a buffer between western Europe and the threat of the Mongol hordes or the expansive Russian empire. For Russia and Poland more generally, however, certain writers and thinkers understood this location beyond Western geo-political borders to be accompanied by a cultural and historical dislocation. In particular, writers such as the Russian philosopher Piotr Ivanovich Chaadaev described Russia as so far beyond the historical and geographical borders of European civilization as to be nomadic.

Chaadaev’s still famous Philosophical Letter Number One branded Russians as permanent and lost travelers—as a people moving, but not towards a goal: “We are like billeted soldiers in our houses, in our families we look like strangers, in our cities we are like nomads, we are worse than nomads … for nomads are more tied to their deserts than we are to our cities.”³ To simplify greatly, Chaadaev maintained that the schism between the Orthodox church and Rome had cut Russia off from the tradition and shared history of Western Europe. In Chaadaev’s view, this lack of history excluded Russia from the field of European “civilization,” a separation that essentially forced a cultural nomadism on the Russians. Important European philosophers such as Kant and Rousseau wrote about the link between the origins of civilization (and history) and sedentary life.⁴ “Nomads” in this construction possessed neither history nor culture; the lack of a homeland, of territorial fixity or roots, prevented a temporal, historical existence. The word nomad in Chaadaev’s use similarly implies a lack of rootedness and cultural alienation. Russia’s position “East of a West,” then, locates it “beyond civilization.” Mickiewicz’s construct of the Polish pilgrim arguably functions as an antithesis to Chaadaev’s nomadic Russian.

The Romantic worldview of the early nineteenth century foregrounded themes of social exile, alienation, rebellion, and transgression. One facet of Romanticism’s disavowal of conventional society was an emphasis on wandering or vagabondage. How did this concept, emphasizing the troubled relationship of the individual to society, and propagated in the life and work of such important English Romantic poets as Byron, come to be construed as an expression of political-cultural identity in Eastern Europe? The ideas of social alienation and rootlessness were translated into the politically repressive contexts of the Russian empire and the partitioned Polish territories with the result that political resistance superseded social
rebellion as a form of Romantic expression. In such uncomfortable political circumstances, the romantic wanderer came to be a convenient image, for it embodied the "homeless" state of the liberal resister in Russia or the Polish nationalist, both alienated from the ruling political system.

In the case of Poland, the Romantic worldview of the period greatly enriched the construction of Polish identity. Mickiewicz’s status as a romantic poet afforded him a position as the spiritual authority for Poles during the Romantic period. He is still widely considered to be Poland’s most important writer. His life also mirrored the themes of travel and exile so important to the construction of Polishness he helped to create. He was born in Lithuania in 1798 in the Russian Partition. There he was arrested as a young man for his participation in unauthorized literary and cultural societies during his studies at the University of Vilnius. His punishment was exile to Russia for five years. During his time in Russia, he traveled to the southern part of the empire, most notably to the Crimea. He received permission to leave Russia for Western Europe in 1829, and he never returned to Poland or Russia, except for one failed attempt to return to occupied Poland during the doomed November Uprising of 1830.

He traveled extensively in Europe, living first in Rome, then in Dresden, and spending most time in Paris and Switzerland. Like Byron, whom he greatly admired, Mickiewicz died in the East, in Turkey in 1855. He had traveled there upon the outbreak of the Crimean War with the intention of organizing a Jewish legion to fight the Russian army. Recent scholarship has shown that Mickiewicz’s mother, Barbara Majewska, was very likely of Jewish descent. In keeping with the fashion of the time, Mickiewicz was very interested in the Kabala,

Notes from the Director, continued from page 1

Chechnya, and Nagorno-Karabakh), and the global reach of terrorist organizations that appeal to Islam to justify their actions. Today we live in a world increasingly fragmented by conflicts that involve mass mobilization around ideologies that conjoin religious beliefs, political visions and institutions, and local or regional social practices. The conference helped us understand how, why, and with what consequences these issues are being played out in Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Balkans in the early twenty-first century.

During the spring semester, the Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies (BPS) inaugurated a new and lively seminar series attended by graduate students and faculty, “Extremism in the New Eurasia.” Funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the seminars are part of a program that also includes a working paper series, a web page, and other activities designed to examine the varieties of extremist organizations and ideologies in Russia, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Speakers in the spring included Stuart Kaufman (University of Kansas), Vitaly Naumkin (visiting professor, UCB and Institute of Oriental Studies, of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow), Steven Fish (UCB), Thomas De Waal (Institute for War and Peace Reporting), Yuri Slezkine (UCB), and Olivier Roy (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris). The series will resume during the coming academic year.

A new “Series of Lectures on the Balkans” got under way this spring. Funded in part by our Title VI grant from the US Department of Education, the series brought several speakers to the Berkeley campus. It culminated in a presentation by Dr. Ivan Vujacic, ambassador to the US from Serbia and Montenegro, who spoke on “The Challenges Facing Serbia and Montenegro.” Our annual Peter N. Kujachich Annual Lecture in Serbian and Montenegrin Studies, to be delivered by Dr. Audrey Helfant Budding, lecturer on social studies at Harvard University, will be rescheduled for the coming fall semester.

Looking ahead to the next academic year, our Annual Fall Reception will take place on Tuesday, October 7. The Colin Miller Memorial Lecture will be presented on Friday, October 17 by Jan Gross, professor of political science at New York University. Professor Gross is the author of Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland, a pathbreaking and controversial study that was nominated for a National Book Award. Professor Gross will speak on the topic, “After Auschwitz: Reflections on Postwar Anti-Semitism in Poland.”

I want to take this opportunity to extend my appreciation to ISEEES colleagues, visiting scholars, graduate students, the staff, the academic coordinators, and members of the community for their exceptional enthusiasm and esprit de corps over the 2002–2003 academic year. We have had an unprecedented level of programmatic activity during the past nine months and an equally strong show of support from presenters, participants, and spectators at our numerous events. The ISEEES staff and academic coordinators deserve special recognition. Without them we would be unable to mount such an array of conferences, seminars, bag lunch talks, working groups, and lectures. Thanks to you all!

Victoria E. Bonnell
Director, Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies
Professor, Department of Sociology
but he also made extensive use of the concept of the Jewish nation as a nation-in-exile as a metaphor for Poland’s own plight.9

As noted above, the Polish nation was itself understood to be in a state of exile; Mickiewicz developed a poetic figure that encapsulated this exile and transformed it into an active pilgrimage. While the categories of exile and pilgrim overlap on certain points—both an exile and a pilgrim travel, are separated from home, and are outsiders in the place they travel—the image of a pilgrim differs from that of an exile in several important ways. The pilgrim is typically understood to be ascetic, to endure physical hardship by choice, and to live simply, even meagerly. The exile may live this way as well, but these conditions are forced upon him rather than directly chosen. Pilgrims have destinations and religious or sacred purposes, while exiles are largely defined, not by their present or future intentions, but by what they have already done and by what they have left behind. In contrast, the figure of a pilgrim has a future. Perhaps more importantly, the pilgrim is the agent of his actions: he chooses to travel to his destination. He moves through time and space towards a goal, while the exile is often perceived to be static and is defined by the fact that he is located outside certain familiar territory. Mickiewicz’s transformation of the Polish exile into a pilgrim gives rise to interesting tensions: the pilgrim-exile is both agent and passive victim of his fate.

The pilgrim proved to be an important literary figure for Mickiewicz even in his early work.

The pilgrim proved to be an important literary figure for Mickiewicz even in his early work. The image of a pilgrim first appears as a double for the poet’s persona in the 1826 Crimean Sonnets, a series of eighteen poems that emerged from Mickiewicz’s travels in the Russian South while still in exile there. The pilgrim in the Sonnets is a traveler from Lithuania who experiences the spiritual, eastern power of the Crimean landscape. This pilgrim’s destination is not revealed; rather, the reader only knows where the pilgrim is coming from. He travels with an Eastern companion and guide, the mirza. The pilgrim’s companionship with the mirza suggests that the pilgrim has an affinity with the East and the Other, perhaps based on the fact that both the Turkish mirza and the pilgrim have suffered at the hands of imperial Russia.

The figure of the pilgrim reappears in the famous Digression to Mickiewicz’s dramatic poem Forefather’s Eve. Here the pilgrim again functions as a double for the poet’s own persona, but in this poem the pilgrim is an overtly political figure. The Digression chronicles the journey of the poem’s Polish hero Konrad (who is called “the pilgrim”) into exile in Saint Petersburg. In the description of the pilgrim’s travel across Russia, the Russian people are described as empty, barren, and failing to make a mark on world history. This rendering of the Russians strongly echoes Chaadaev’s depiction of Russians as nomadic and beyond the bounds of “civilization.”10

The image of the specifically Polish pilgrim is first explicitly named and is most fully developed in Mickiewicz’s 1832 The Books of the Polish People and the Polish Pilgrimage. In addition to the usual religious meaning associated with the term, Mickiewicz’s Polish pilgrim has a messianic coloring, for in this text Mickiewicz makes an analogy between Christ’s suffering and that of Poland. Poland, he asserts, suffers in order to redeem the world, just as Christ suffered to redeem men’s souls. In this context, the individual pilgrim, as the bearer of Polishness, both acts and suffers in order to bring about not just Poland’s redemption, but universal salvation.11 Fittingly, the language of the Books is biblical in tone.

Leaving aside the rhetorical strategies of the Books, there are several important points which underlie the pilgrim paradigm. Initially, Mickiewicz’s pilgrim is contrasted with a “man who wanders without a goal” and with an “exile.” The pilgrim is declared not to be these things, despite the fact that he might appear to be a wanderer or an exile. These distinctions demonstrate a crucial point in Mickiewicz’s construction of the Polish pilgrim: he is an agent of his travels, he moves by choice, not force, and his journey is a matter of active will, not the result of accident, error, or punishment.

The Polish pilgrim is charged with the task of “making a pilgrimage” away from Poland in order to restore it. Movement is essential to the pilgrim, for departure from Poland is one of the central tenets of the pilgrim’s identity. Those who stay in Poland and tolerate oppression lose the Fatherland, and here I quote from the Books in English: “Whosoever remains in the Fatherland and tolerates oppression in order to preserve his life, will lose the Fatherland and life; but whoever leaves the Fatherland in order to defend Freedom at the risk of his life, will defend the Fatherland and will live forever.” Yet the complication of the pilgrim’s actually reaching a destination remains: like the errant Russians, Mickiewicz’s pilgrim can lose his way, make a mistake, and in so doing, delay the restoration of Poland.13 In Mickiewicz’s formulation, the pilgrim should leave Poland in order to defend it, and he should continue to behave as a pilgrim once he does.

The conception of Poles as a traveling, unsettled nation in diaspora is reinforced by the narrator’s repeated assertion that the Polish pilgrim is an outsider wherever he goes. Phrases such as “You are among foreigners like a shipwrecked man on a foreign shore”14 are addressed to the pilgrim at regular intervals throughout the Books. Constant reminders of outsidership such as these reflect the actual
situation of many Poles in emigration, but, more importantly, they charge Poles with the task of maintaining their difference, and they serve as injunctions that prevent Poles from settling down outside of “Poland,” or acquiring a non-Polish identity. Indeed, the narrator of the Books fears that the trappings of European civilization are such that they may well overtake the pilgrim and distract him from this journey. Mickiewicz associates these dangers with Western Europe, though they seem to be emblematic of “civilized” or sedentary life more generally: good food, wine, and corporeal pleasures. Mickiewicz’s narrator warns that civilization (what he calls dobry byt) is easily mistaken for citizenship in the classical sense of the term. Bourgeois life, or dobry byt, is a great danger to Polish patriots; it slows the pace of their resistance and quells their appetite for struggle. In contrast, Mickiewicz offers a program for being Polish that disavows dobry byt. He suggests a way in which to live a polski byt (Polish life), or what I will call a pilgrim lifestyle, instead: “The idolaters amongst whom you live observe their native holidays, whether happy or sad, in one manner only, that is with food and drink. The table is their altar, and the stomach their god. You should observe your native holidays in the manner of your forefathers, by going to church early in the morning and fasting for the entire day.”

While being enjoined not to eat too much or wear fancy European clothes, the pilgrim is also instructed to use language as a weapon. To think and to speak for Poland are actions as important as fighting for it with a sword, perhaps more important. In a context such as that of post-Partition Poland or nineteenth-century imperial Russia, in which political action was severely restricted or even impossible, social behaviors, including speech and even thought, came to be construed as political acts in and of themselves. In this vein, one might recall Iuri Lotman’s description of the Decembrists in nineteenth-century Russia and their practice of coded social behavior, which proved to be one of the most effective means of demonstrating political resistance for early nineteenth-century Russian liberals. This behavior included the spoken as well as the written word. As is clear, not simply from Mickiewicz’s text, but from his biography as well, language was his most successful means of resistance or political provocation. In Mickiewicz’s formula, the realm of the mind—the most private, interior space of the self—is as politicized as the public realm of actions. The notion of “being Polish,” then, extends to the deepest levels of the individual self and encompasses all forms of what may, in the broadest sense, be defined as behavior.

In essence, Mickiewicz provides a program of behavior and a model of an active Polish identity for his compatriots to follow. This image is a severe yet dynamic one: the Polish pilgrim never rests, never lays down his cause, and never stops traveling in search of his ultimate goal. In following the paradigm established in the Books, a devotee of Mickiewicz would be easily recognizable to others as a Polish pilgrim, and easily imitated, despite the fact that there may have been certain tensions between the pilgrim ideal and the actual lifestyles of the Polish exiles.

Mickiewicz’s pilgrim proves to be an extremely productive image for Polish citizenship in the mid-nineteenth century. Where Chaadaev defined Russians as temporal and cultural nomads, banished to an eternal present, Mickiewicz’s paradigm “rescued” the Pole from what was potentially a similarly unpromising state by transforming the exiled Pole into an active traveler, making a pilgrimage through the present to a definite future, that of a restored Poland and a redeemed Europe. The image of the Polish pilgrim in part serves to resolve tensions between individual and national identity. Here the individual Pole is cast as the embodiment of the Polish nation, but this image is also about negotiating the place of Poland in relation to Western Europe. Caught between the demarcations “East” and “West,” Poles defined a role for themselves as negotiating between the two, a role that developed, with the help of Mickiewicz, from that of protecting Europe from the Mongol hordes to suffering in order to redeem all of Europe.

Notes

1 Księgi narodu polskiego i pielgrzymstwa polskiego.

2 The entire territory of Poland was partitioned between the imperial powers of Russia, Prussia, and Austria in the years 1773 to 1795. The carving up of Poland caused the Polish state to disappear from the map of Europe.

3 “В домах наших мы как будто определены на постой; в семьях мы имеем вид чужестранцев; в городах мы похожи на кочевников, мы хуже кочевников...ибо те более привязаны к своим пустыням, нежели мы к нашим городам.” П. И. Чаядаев, “Пис’мо певозве,” Polnoe sobranie sochinenii i izbrannyie pis’ma, t.1, Moscow: Nauka, 1991, p. 324. (All translations are mine unless otherwise noted.)

4 See, for example, Kant’s essays “Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History” and “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose” in Political Writings, ed. H. Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) and Rousseau’s The Social Contract.

5 Noted Polish scholar Wiktor Weintraub writes that the Romantic poets considered themselves the natural “spiritual
leaders” of their nations; this was no less the case with Mickiewicz whose presence helped to fill a leadership void among the émigré Poles (149). See Witk Weintraub, “National Consciousness in Polish Romantic Literature,” Cross Currents 6(1987): 149–58.

6 For an interesting and important discussion of Mickiewicz’s role in Polish culture and Polish literary studies, see Halina Filipowicz’s introduction to the forum “Mickiewicz: East and West.” She comments on Mickiewicz's enduring popularity that the poet and his work have come to function as a stand-in for the Polish homeland. She states further that Mickiewicz “troped as Poland” has helped to support the illusion of Polish culture as essentially monolithic (608). “Mickiewicz: ‘East’ and ‘West,’” Slavic and East European Journal 45:4 (2001): 606–23.

7 Mickiewicz was initially assigned to a teaching post in Odessa in 1824. He spent the first part of his exile in the southern port city, but never assumed any teaching duties. In 1825 he made a trip to the Crimea in the company of a few members of Odessan high society. (For a description of this trip, see Izabela Kalinowska, “The Sonnet, the Sequence, the Qasidah: East-West Dialogue in Adam Mickiewicz’s Sonnets,” The Slavic and East European Journal 45:4 [2001]: 641–59.)

8 In Zmatki obcej (Of a Foreign Mother Born) (London: Polska Fundacja Kulturalna, 1990), Jadwiga Maurer demonstrates convincingly that Mickiewicz’s mother was of Frankish/Jewish descent, and that Mickiewicz himself, his family, and several of his later biographers attempted to destroy or conceal this aspect of his identity.


10 The striking similarities between Chaadaev’s depiction of Russia in the Philosophical Letter Number One, and Mickiewicz’s description in the Digression have been noted elsewhere. There is no evidence that the two writers ever met, though they were in Moscow at the same time and had friends in common, most notably the Russian poet Pushkin. For a comprehensive discussion of the parallels between Mickiewicz and Chaadaev’s approach to Russian history, see Waclaw Lednicki, Russia, Poland and the West: Essays in Literary and Cultural History (New York: Roy Publishers, 1955).


12 Księgi, 57. “Bo kto siedzi w Ojczyźnie i cierpi niewoł, aby zachował życie, ten straci Ojczyznę i życie; a kto opuscił Ojczyznę, aby bronni Wolnośc z narazieni życia swego, ten obroni Ojczyznę, i będzie życ wiecznie.”

13 “Ale narod polski nie jest bóstwem jak CHRYSTUS wiec dusza jego, pielgrzymując po otchłani, zbłądzic moze, i by był odwleczen powrot jej do ciała i zmartwychstanie.” Księgi, 45. (“For the Polish people are not a divinity like CHRIST, thus the people’s soul, making a pilgrimage on uncertain ground, may lose its way, and its return to the body and resurrection would be delayed.”)

14 Księgi, 62.

15 The critique of the Western emphasis on material interests and the bourgeois “good life” proves to be a shared concern in both Polish and Russian nation-building. Chaadaev worries that Russia has failed to create solid ideological convictions, and has simply followed the dictates of material interests. Mickiewicz fears Western material interests will be mistaken for civil society.

16 Księgi, 53–4. It is worthy of note that Mickiewicz also edited a short-lived weekly paper in Paris entitled Pielgrzym Polski (The Polish Pilgrim) from 1832 to 1833. This organ was less biblical in tone than the Books, but it urged emigré Poles to act for their country. For a description of the paper, see Witko Weintraub, Poeta i prorok: rzecz o profetyzmie Mickiewicza (Warsaw: Panstwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1982), 303.

17 Księgi, 65–6.

18 For a close look at the role of language in Mickiewicz’s thought, see Karen Underhill’s “Aux Grands Hommes.”

19 For a seminal discussion on the semiotics of behavior in the Decembrist period, see Iu. M. Lotman, “The Decembrist in Daily Life (Everyday Behavior as a Historical-Psychological Category) in Alexander D. and Alice Stone Nakhimovsky, eds, The Semiotics of Russian Cultural History (Ithaca, N.Y., and London: Cornell University Press, 1985), 95–149. Decembrists were easily recognizable to their contemporaries by their serious demeanor, their practice of “speaking loudly at balls” on socially and politically sensitive topics, their refusal to dance, and so on. In other words, they practiced coded, recognizable behavior similar to that which Mickiewicz suggests for the Polish pilgrim.

20 Mickiewicz’s Books were quite popular in their own time. A French edition was published just after the Polish, and many French liberals and democrats were impressed by Mickiewicz’s formulation of Poland’s national mission, as was the Italian radical Mazzini. For a fuller description of the Western European reception of the Books, see Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism, 251–2.

CSEES Newsletter Summer 2003 / 6
A Tale of Three Cities: Considering Divided Cities in the Former Yugoslavia

Emily Shaw

Emily Shaw, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science, is researching the role of social identity and group threat in international politics. A longer version of this paper was presented at a conference on reconstruction and development in southeastern Europe, sponsored by the Center for Russian and Eastern European Studies at the University of Toronto, February 6–8, 2003.

In attempting to aid social reconstruction in the Balkans—the process of putting divided towns back together—international organizations have focused on individual interethnic relationships and respect for individual human rights. The local offices of UN bodies and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and Kosovo all operate on this principle, as do all locally-deployed international non-governmental organizations. This perspective is mirrored in the comments of some analysts that the real problem with the post-war period is that international organizations have failed to properly implement peace and reintegration agreements in the divided localities, such as Hans Koschnick’s early failures in integrating Mostar. Both of these approaches suggest that the problems divided towns face can be solved if the organizations can simply hit upon the right inducements or treatment for the individuals who live there. However, the fact is that towns with divided administrations contend with considerably more than mere interpersonal animosity in attempting to reintegrate and return to function. Plans to fix these towns often neglect the fact that although the wars are officially over, the small wars within the towns are not merely the product of local relations but the old, large-scale war carried on in miniaturized form: they are symbolic flashpoints of a larger group conflict. The conflict within the town becomes greater than the town, existing as a type of proxy war that, like the last visible smolderings of a forest fire, indicates the degree of heat that’s been pushed underground.

To take the opposing perspective from most intervening organizations, this paper focuses on the ways that larger groups, rather than local events and people, helped to create and maintain the divisions within Vukovar, Mostar, and Mitrovica. Next, this paper looks at how larger-group politics embed separations within administrations that both reinforce separation among individuals of different ethnicities and depend on their continued division for the achievement of larger-group goals. The administrative/institutional link is important for teasing out the links here. Though it can sometimes be hard to identify who is controlling the local events—whether it is a larger-group norm or a problem between people in the locality—the effect of the larger group can generally be traced in the way that it makes itself felt organizationally, through economic support, (para)military control, or both.

Vukovar, Mostar, and Mitrovica are unusual towns for a number of reasons. Within the compass of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), each city played a significant role in the economy of its respective republic or province. Due to the industries located in each of these centers, Vukovar, Mostar, and Mitrovica all acted as large employment centers and thus contained populations of unusually mixed ethnicity, as compared to the ethnic makeup of the agricultural villages near each town. Vukovar’s shoe and tire factory employed over 20,000 people, both ethnic Croats and ethnic Serbs drawn from Yugoslavia’s northeast. Shipping and transport from the Danube called for additional labor, while large-scale agriculture added yet further wealth to the region. Mostar hosted several large industries, including a large aluminum
manpower, an airplane factory, and a textile mill. Altogether, these industries employed around 15,000 people, drawn from all ethnic groups that had traditionally lived peacefully together in the town, even through the ethnically divisive second World War. Mitrovica, the northernmost main Kosovar town with a pre-war population that was evenly split between ethnic Albanians, ethnic Serbs, and other groups, is just south of the Trepca mineral mines that have acted as the town’s economic base for centuries.

In recent years these towns came to share the even more unusual condition of maintaining divided administrations. However, though they share this highly uncommon characteristic, they are rarely grouped together for the purposes of analysis. First, the divisions took place at different times; second, they have manifested differently; and each division involved different combinations of ethnic groups, with different patterns of locally and internationally perceived guilt or innocence. Thus, in each case the separation of the town is viewed as an unfortunate and temporary side-effect of the war, and no systematic attention is paid to the quality of separation itself.

This is partly due to the way that the concept of nationalism has functioned within analysis of the Yugoslav wars. Though “nationalism” is very prominent in any explanation of why divided cities continue to be divided, intervening organizations do not have a very clear idea of how nationalism manifests or perpetuates itself. The problem of understanding nationalism is one of translation, with an answer somewhere in the disjunct between theory and practice. Though the process and function of nationalism are well understood in the academic theoretical context—in a way that has somewhat spilled over to popular discourse—its processes have not been similarly traced in the tangible world. This means that organizations attempting to employ the theory have run up against the problem of a reality that functions in a more complex and subtle way.

In theoretical terms, nationalism is understood to be a group phenomenon in the sense that it refers to the superiority of a particular group of people over other groups, or that it is an aspiration of a group of people—in Ernest Gellner’s famous definition, “a political principle...that the political and national unit should be congruent.” (Gellner, 1983) At the group level, nationalism is popularly seen by theorists as a collectively rational strategy for achieving instrumental goods. However, in practical terms and at the contemporaneous rather than retrospective position, nationalism is not experienced as a smoothly continuous entity. It is experienced in pieces, at the individual level or the level of individual events—rallies, a memorable memorandum, an outbreak of violence. When encountered by individuals, nationalist expression is usually experienced as a type of madness or irrationality. It is often expressed in terms of being taken away from one’s true self, in the sense of Slavenka Drakulic’s phrase, to be “overcome by nationhood.”(Drakulic quoted in Brubaker, 1996: 20) Similarly, many residents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular, report of being confused by the outbreak of war, very much expressing a sense that nationalism was something outside of them that came in and took over their hometowns. If theories of nationalism state that groups have strategic aims and execute them, practical experience finds that individuals in nationalist wars appear to be largely reactive, frightened, and often confused.

Nonetheless, given that “nationalism” remains the dominant explanation for what happened, international organizations continue to target it as the problem. However, because international organizations do not work with theoretical nationalist groups but with actual individuals, they do not perceive their “clients” as theoretical groups working smoothly towards a rational trajectory. They see them as individuals, and interpersonally, an individual expressing nationalism in a multiethnic context is experienced as something unreasonable, paranoid, or racist. However, given that this is generally the only way that nationalism can be experienced at the individual level, and given that international organizations are not working with theoretical groups but with people, this individualized insanity is perceived to be the nationalism that is the target of reconstruction. In practical terms, thus, nationalism is experienced within individuals as a choice to be unreasonable or an illness to be treated.

In assigning a preeminent role to the antipathetic feelings of individuals of one ethnicity towards individuals of another ethnicity, analysts and international organization workers begin to see the divisions as essentially voluntaristic, a madness based in individuals for incomprehensible, Balkan reasons. Alternatively, international organization workers become friendly with local individuals in their generally monoethnic work location and come to view their friends as reasonable and the opposite side as unreasonable and the carriers of the incomprehensible madness. All in all, organizations typically believe (as a result of transmuting the theoretically collectively rational nationalism into the individually irrational madness) that divisions should be relatively easily curable if one can simply “heal” the town by increasing the degree of goodwill between individuals.

While this perspective does play an important role in the potential integration of divided towns, international organizations have focused less on the degree to which two structural characteristics—the concerns of larger-scale groups and the logic of institutional self-maintenance—also contribute to the continuing division within towns. It is more difficult to see these aspects as they do not manifest in the behavior of individuals. The impact of larger-group norms is difficult to measure and account for; internal efforts to maintain organizational structures are also difficult to grasp without a sustained focus on them. Thus, in addition to the convenient discourse on the madness of nationalism, these aspects may have been relatively neglected also because it is far easier to focus on the
Vukovar

The story of Vukovar, divided city and preeminent symbol of Croatia’s homeland war, began when Croatia’s June 1991 declaration of independence from Yugoslavia elicited declarations of autonomy from several regions with high proportions of ethnic Serbs. Even before this, though, Eastern Slavonia was primed to become one of the major battles sites of the war. After earlier fighting in the Krajina region, Borovo Selo, a village near Vukovar town, began erecting barricades. Tensions heightened when the future Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak and a small group of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) officials fired three shoulder-launched rockets into the village while on an ostensible peace-building mission. The attack was used both by politicians in Belgrade to demonstrate the legitimacy of suspicions of future attacks on Serb villages and by activists within Borovo Selo to justify greater distance from Croatia. Susak’s action suggests the HDZ’s early interest in making Vukovar a border-zone and stage for ethnic conflict. (Silber & Little, 1997: 14) Borovo Selo subsequently became the first scene of fighting in eastern Croatia when four policemen attempted to enter the village at night in order to replace a Yugoslav flag with a Croatian one. After the policemen were shot at, a second group of Croatian policemen were sent in, only to be killed at an organized ambush. Later, Serbian officials acknowledged that the villagers had been armed by Serbia. Vojislav Seselj further claimed that his “Chetniks” had taken part in the ambush, revealing the extent to which Serbia was already involved in the battle for the region.2

The fighting was accompanied by some of the earliest examples of what was to become known as “ethnic cleansing” in the wars of Yugoslav secession. In activities organized by people like Zeljko “Arkan” Raznatovic, a former assassin for the Yugoslav secret police, the war breached all manner of rules regarding treatment of civilians. Most notably, several hundred male Croat civilians were led away from a hospital, executed, and buried in a field in the neighboring village of Ovcara. Around 80,000 ethnic Croat civilians were expelled from the area. (HRW, 1999) Overall, the intention of fighting was clearly to terrorize as well as to win territory, to encourage population movement beyond the bounds of actual fighting, and to intensify the growing interethic conflict within Croatia. Meanwhile, the Croatian military was clearly receptive to the provocation. In retaliation, Croatian military rounded up and executed 120 Serbs from Gospic who were loyal to Croatia on one September evening, an event which triggered heavy fighting in the area. (Silber & Little, 1997) Incidents like these, which were clearly organized and planned rather than eruptions of spontaneous feeling, suggest that terror and provocation was a strategy pursued by both military sides, to the end of separating and alienating different civilian ethnic populations.

Under the justification that they were defending a couple of small Serb villages, Yugoslav National Army (JNA) soldiers and Serb paramilitaries besieged and took the town of Vukovar after three months of fighting, adding it to acquisition of Croatian territory that covered up to one-third of Croatia at the height of JNA activity. The three months of fighting that leveled Vukovar was extremely important for the city’s development as a national symbol of Croatian independence under attack. The degree to which international sympathies were raised over the image of Vukovar, an attractive Danubian town bombarded by forces that seemed to have little objective but to level it, raised suspicions among some Croatian soldiers that Vukovar was being deliberately left to hang for the sake of enhancing Croatia’s bid for international recognition. (Silber & Little, 1997) This perspective was made more credible by the high frequency of talks between Croatian president Franjo Tudman and Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic in the months leading up to the outbreak of war. Having certainly discussed the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a number of historians have agreed that the two presidents held discussions also about the fate of certain sections of Croatia and some (mainly Serbian) commentators have asserted that arrangements were agreed upon for Eastern Slavonia. (Karabeg, 2001) Similarly, some have argued that the lack of strong Croatian defense of Dubrovnik in the Montenegrin attack on this “pearl of the Adriatic” was

individual than on the concept of the formally or informally organized larger group. In the collective rationality of these two kinds of operations, one can see an echo of nationalism theory.

Moreover, with the recognition that “nationalism” might be more clearly observed beyond the level of individual townspeople in the divided locality, taking a larger-group perspective can then permit us to see how the feelings of residents are directed by the reality of living in a divided town, within the larger reality of a divided country. In the context of larger-group concerns, we can ask questions that do not make sense from the perspective of the individual “nationalist.” In what ways are the divided cities of the former Yugoslavia crucibles of larger-group conflict? In what way is each city a symbol of those battles, too important for leaders of the larger group to “lose” to the other side—or to a position of compromise? Can we trace the administrative and economic decisions of the larger groups to support their most favored outcome within the divided cities?

Vukovar

The story of Vukovar, divided city and preeminent symbol of Croatia’s homeland war, began when Croatia’s June 1991 declaration of independence from Yugoslavia elicited declarations of autonomy from several regions with high proportions of ethnic Serbs. Even before this, though, Eastern Slavonia was primed to become one of the major battles sites of the war. After earlier fighting in the Krajina region, Borovo Selo, a village near Vukovar town, began erecting barricades. Tensions heightened when the future Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak and a small group of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) officials fired three shoulder-launched rockets into the village while on an ostensible peace-building mission. The attack was used both by politicians in Belgrade to demonstrate the legitimacy of suspicions of future attacks on Serb villages and by activists within Borovo Selo to justify greater distance from Croatia. Susak’s action suggests the HDZ’s early interest in making Vukovar a border-zone and stage for ethnic conflict. (Silber & Little, 1997: 14) Borovo Selo subsequently became the first scene of fighting in eastern Croatia when four policemen attempted to enter the village at night in order to replace a Yugoslav flag with a Croatian one. After the policemen were shot at, a second group of Croatian policemen were sent in, only to be killed at an organized ambush. Later, Serbian officials acknowledged that the villagers had been armed by Serbia. Vojislav Seselj further claimed that his “Chetniks” had taken part in the ambush, revealing the extent to which Serbia was already involved in the battle for the region.2

The fighting was accompanied by some of the earliest examples of what was to become known as “ethnic cleansing” in the wars of Yugoslav secession. In activities organized by people like Zeljko “Arkan” Raznatovic, a former assassin for the Yugoslav secret police, the war breached all manner of rules regarding treatment of civilians. Most notably, several hundred male Croat civilians were led away from a hospital, executed, and buried in a field in the neighboring village of Ovcara. Around 80,000 ethnic Croat civilians were expelled from the area. (HRW, 1999) Overall, the intention of fighting was clearly to terrorize as well as to win territory, to encourage population movement beyond the bounds of actual fighting, and to intensify the growing interethic conflict within Croatia. Meanwhile, the Croatian military was clearly receptive to the provocation. In retaliation, Croatian military rounded up and executed 120 Serbs from Gospic who were loyal to Croatia on one September evening, an event which triggered heavy fighting in the area. (Silber & Little, 1997) Incidents like these, which were clearly organized and planned rather than eruptions of spontaneous feeling, suggest that terror and provocation was a strategy pursued by both military sides, to the end of separating and alienating different civilian ethnic populations.

Under the justification that they were defending a couple of small Serb villages, Yugoslav National Army (JNA) soldiers and Serb paramilitaries besieged and took the town of Vukovar after three months of fighting, adding it to acquisition of Croatian territory that covered up to one-third of Croatia at the height of JNA activity. The three months of fighting that leveled Vukovar was extremely important for the city’s development as a national symbol of Croatian independence under attack. The degree to which international sympathies were raised over the image of Vukovar, an attractive Danubian town bombarded by forces that seemed to have little objective but to level it, raised suspicions among some Croatian soldiers that Vukovar was being deliberately left to hang for the sake of enhancing Croatia’s bid for international recognition. (Silber & Little, 1997) This perspective was made more credible by the high frequency of talks between Croatian president Franjo Tudman and Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic in the months leading up to the outbreak of war. Having certainly discussed the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a number of historians have agreed that the two presidents held discussions also about the fate of certain sections of Croatia and some (mainly Serbian) commentators have asserted that arrangements were agreed upon for Eastern Slavonia. (Karabeg, 2001) Similarly, some have argued that the lack of strong Croatian defense of Dubrovnik in the Montenegrin attack on this “pearl of the Adriatic” was
deliberate, intended to allow the world media to see the Yugoslav forces as entirely senseless and barbaric. (Judah, 1997) Naturally, the decision to attack Dubrovnik unquestionably demonstrates the complete failure of Yugoslav forces to grasp the new significance of international media in Yugoslavia’s future political relations with Western states. However, if there was a strategic Croatian intent to allow them to demonstrate that by failing to mass strong defense at Dubrovnik, this may reveal something about the potential strategy around Vukovar.

Once Serbian forces had consolidated their control over Vukovar and the surrounding area, the JNA agreed to withdraw in return for the deployment of UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) soldiers in the Serb-held areas under a plan designed by Cyrus Vance. This situation held, with sporadic fighting, until 1995. Given the interests of the ostensible combatants— Croatian Croats and Croatian Serbs—it was an odd and obviously temporary plan that achieved the objectives of neither group. Rather than guaranteeing the Croatian Serbs the right to remain in Yugoslavia, the Vance plan emphasized, even prior to Croatia’s international recognition, that the JNA had no proper role to play in Croatia. Rather than satisfying the Croats’ desire for an integrated Croatian state, the Vance plan left the ultimate status of the territories up in the air for four years. While the rest of Croatia waited to hear what would be worked out for the hard-fought regions, Tudjman believed that he would benefit from the sense of uncertainty and therefore called early elections for 1995; unexpectedly, however, the HDZ did not win an overwhelming majority.

For Vukovar, though, the damage had been done. Local agriculture was destroyed, and the Borovo Company was decimated. It had held $750 million in assets at the end of 1990; during the war, the official company headquarters relocated to Zagreb and lost 95 percent of its assets. In 2001, the official Borovo network employed only 1,200 people and had $82 million in holdings—a loss representing a massive blow to the local Vukovar economy. Analysts had suggested that Vukovar’s military importance lay in its agricultural resources and its location as a shipping point for oil, but it was difficult to see what economic gain had been won out of the destructive fighting. Rather, Vukovar’s economy became most notable in its absence: as a Serb-held area outside of Serbia, Vukovar became a place where Serbian companies would register in order to avoid paying tax—“the Serbian mafia’s own private Lichtenstein.” (Judah, 1997: 258) Likewise, little information is available about the funding of the administration of Vukovar under Mayor Slavko Dokmanovic, who would later be indicted by the Hague Tribunal for his role in the massacre at Ovcara.

Then, as the tide turned in fighting across Croatia, Vukovar became the destination for ethnic Serbs fleeing the Krajina region. Operations Storm and Flash slammed through the UN protected areas under the Vance plan in the summer of 1995. The operations targeted civilians quite directly in another governmental effort at terror-driven population transfer. Similar to the effort of Serb forces in Eastern Slavonia, monitors brought out descriptions of shocking events, including a UN report that documented a woman being tied with fishnet and a tire being placed around her neck before she was set on fire. Also similar to the effort in Eastern Slavonia, the effort succeeded in its intention. Two hundred thousand Serbs would travel across Croatia. (HRW, 1999) A number would travel on to Serbia, but some would stay in Vukovar.

The obvious success of Operations Storm and Flash in returning large sections of UN-administered land to Croatia gave the Croatian government the upper hand in negotiating the future of Vukovar and Eastern Slavonia. During the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, Tudjman and Milosevic agreed officially to return Eastern Slavonia to Croatia over a transition period under the supervision of UN administrators (UNTAES). UNTAES was charged with ensuring that Croatia was contributing properly to the region’s economic development, creating a structure to protect the rights of Croatian Serbs, and facilitating two-way return for Croats and Serbs throughout Croatia. The UN declared that Croatia had sufficiently met the necessary standards in 1998 and declared the territory “reintegrated.” However, some 45,000 Serbs left the area under the UNTAES mandate, including 17,000 long-term residents. Further, some observers noted that while Croatia had repealed most discriminatory legislation against Serbs,

Serbs remain second class citizens in Croatia. They are frequently unable to exercise the most basic rights: to live in their own homes, to receive pensions and social security benefits after a lifetime of work, to be recognized as citizens in the country of their birth, and in many cases, to return to and live freely in Croatia. As a result of discriminatory laws, and above all discriminatory practices, Croatian Serbs do not enjoy their civil rights as Croatian citizens. (HRW, 1999)

The existence of these problems at an administrative level suggests that it is not problems within Vukovar that maintain these divisions. Rather, Vukovar is where they are played out. The Vukovar area remains the largest concentration of Serbs in Croatia, even after UNTAES-facilitated attempts at return. The attitude of the Croatian government that Vukovar is symbolically foreign territory is most evident in the policy of the Croatian government towards economic reconstruction. The unemployment rate remains double what it is in the rest of Croatia. (Hedl, 2002) Given that the main industry in Vukovar was generally destroyed and that what remained of it was removed to Zagreb, economic reconstruction is a prerequisite for any local development. However, even under the new Racan government observers noted that in the Vukovar region, “…not much progress has been achieved in the last three or four years…housing and infrastructure reconstruction prevailed in all initiatives, while neglecting economic restructuring,
privatization and business start-ups.” (Walker, 1999) Local Croats and Serbs both express suspicion about the government’s failure to invest in Vukovar, linking it strongly to the continuing ethnic tension.4 Other observers feel that the town is purposely being kept as a “living museum of war.” (Domazatovska, 2002)

Meanwhile, though the local Serbian administration had been disbanded, the spirit of separate government was maintained through the Croatian government’s legislation on minority cultural rights. Though the legislation was intended as a way to protect individual minorities, the effect at the locality has been to enforce segregation at the level of kindergartens, where the implementation of “cultural rights” has meant that ethnic Croat and ethnic Serb school-children are given separate classes. (Hedl, 2002) Further reinforcing the sense of separatist continuity, the local government continues to reflect the goals of the old administration. Though the HDZ lost in nearly every other municipality, it won in Vukovar in 2000, and HDZ mayor Vladimir Stengl continues to fan the flames by announcing that the town’s Serbs should stay home on the day when Croats commemorate the Ovcara massacre.

**Mostar**

Commentators saw echoes of Vukovar in the early stages of fighting in Mostar, another beautiful city on the river being destroyed in fighting. Here too fighting commenced between the JNA and the Croat forces of the HVO (Croatian Defense Council), of which many members had also fought in Croatia.5 In Mostar, however, the intention of the fighting continued on page 21

---

**Conferences and Symposia**

**Cosponsored by ISEEES during 2002–2003**

**July 29–August 2, 2002**  **ORIAS Summer Institute for Teachers:** “The Role of Food in World History.” Sponsored by the Office of Resources for International and Area Studies and the UC Berkeley Title VI National Resource Centers, including ISEEES.

**Sunday, September 29, 2002**  **Panel Discussion:** “Rodchenko Redux.” Sponsored by the Berkeley Art Museum/Pacific Film Archive and ISEEES.

**Friday, October 18, 2002**  **Annual Colin Miller Memorial Lecture:** “America and the World: Foreign Policy in an Age of Preeminence” by Strobe Talbott, former US Deputy Secretary of State and president of the Brookings Institution. Sponsored by ISEEES.

**Sunday, November 3, 2002**  **Panel Discussion:** “Malevich Paradox.” Sponsored by the Berkeley Art Museum/Pacific Film Archive and ISEEES.

**Friday–Sunday, November 8–10, 2002**  **Conference:** “One Ring to Rule Them All? Power and Power Relations in East European Politics and Societies.”

Sponsored by ISEEES through a bequest from Marjorie Koenig, and the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London; with support from the Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies; the Arts and Humanities Division of the College of Letters and Science; the Social Sciences Division of the College of Letters and Science; the Institute of European Studies; the Doreen B. Townsend Center for the Humanities; the Institute of International Studies; the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation; and the Consulate General of the Republic of Hungary; in conjunction with the First Annual Breslauer Graduate Student Conference.

**Sunday, November 10, 2002**  **Annual George W. Breslauer Graduate Student Conference:** “Power and Power Relations in East European Politics and Societies.” Sponsored by International and Area Studies, through an anonymous gift in honor of Dean George Breslauer, and by ISEEES.

**Friday, March 7, 2003**  **Annual Berkeley-Stanford Conference:** “The Power of Ideas and Ideas of Power in Eastern Europe and Eurasia.” Sponsored by ISEEES and the Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies at Stanford University.

**Friday-Saturday, March 14-15, 2003**  **Annual CCAsP Conference:** “Rocks and Hard Places: Society and the Environment in Central Asia.” Sponsored by the Caucasus and Central Asia Program and ISEEES.

**Thursday, March 27, 2003**  **United Nations Association Film Festival:** “Humanity is Indivisible.”

Sponsored by ISEEES and the United Nations Association Film Festival, the United Nations Association East Bay Chapter, the World Affairs Council of Northern California, the California Arts Council, the UC Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism.

**Tuesday, April 22, 2003.**  **Panel Discussion**

“The Destruction of Bamyan Buddhas in Context: Iconoclasm, Art, and Politics.” Sponsored by the Caucasus and Central Asia Program, ISEEES, the Department of Art History, and the Townsend Center/Asian Art and Visual Culture Working Group.

**Saturday-Sunday, April 26-27, 2003.**  **Annual Teacher Outreach Conference:** “The Muslim World in Eastern Europe and Eurasia.” Sponsored by ISEEES.
Public Lectures Cosponsored by ISEEES during 2002–2003


Kate Baldwin, assistant professor, Department of English, University of Notre Dame: “Beyond the Color Line and the Iron Curtain: Reading Encounters Between Black and Red, 1922–1963”

Houri Berberian, assistant professor, Department of History, California State University Long Beach: “Traversing Boundaries and Selves: Iranian-Armenian Identity During the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1905–1911”

Evgenii Bershtein, assistant professor, Department of Russian Language and Literature, Reed College: “Otto Weininger in Russian Symbolism and Revolution”

Bernard S. Black, professor of law, Stanford University: “Institutional Reform in Russia”

Yuri Blagov, associate professor, St. Petersburg School of Management: “Russia in 2002/2003: Crisis or Stabilization?”

Igor Boguslavskii, professor, Institute for Information Transmission Problems of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow: “‘Even’ in Discourse: The Interaction of Lexical Semantics and Interpretation Strategies”

Eliot Borenstein, assistant professor of Russian and Slavic languages, New York University: “Selling Russia: Prostitution, Masculinity, and Metaphors of Nationalism after Perestroika”

Xavier Bougarel, researcher, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris: “Bosnia: How Do International Actors Divide a Society They Claim (and Believe) to Reintegrate?”

Vladimir Bozovic, head of the Department for Justice and Human Rights within the Coordination Center of FRY and Republic of Serbia for Kosovo and Metohija: “The Judiciary System and the Status of Human Rights in Kosovo and Metohija”

Steven Cassedy, professor of literature and associate dean, Office of Graduate Studies and Research, University of California, San Diego: “Dostoevsky and the Problem of Belief”

Levon Chookaszian, UNESCO chair of Armenian art history, Yerevan State University, Armenia: “The Art of Medieval Armenia and the Balkans”


Edith Clowes, professor of Slavic languages and literatures, University of Kansas: “Philosophy as Tragedy: Shестов, Бердяев, Лосев, Мамardashvili”

Roumen Daskalov, visiting professor, Department of History; Associate Professor, Department of History, University of Bulgaria and the Central European University in Budapest: “Interpreting the Bulgarian National Revival”

Thomas De Waal, Caucasus project manager, Institute for War and Peace Reporting: “Myth and Reality in the Nagorny Karabakh Conflict”

Devin DeWeese, director, Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, Indiana University: “Muslim Shrines and Pilgrimage in Central Asia: Historical Perspectives on Contested Visions of Islam in the Post-Soviet World”

Gisela Erbsloeh, freelance radio journalist and author: “Ecology and Ecological Initiatives on the Russian Pacific Rim”

Bryan Hanks, lecturer, Department of Archaeology, University of Sheffield: “Fractured Realities: Zooarchaeological Modeling and the Socio-Economic Complexity of Eurasian Steppe Pastoral Nomads”

Andreas Johns, visiting lecturer, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures: “Slavic Creation Narratives: The Sacred and the Comic”

Andrew Kahn, fellow and tutor in Russian, St. Edmund Hall, University of Oxford: “The Iron Age in Golden Age Poetry and Thought: Baratynsky’s Cultural Critique”

Maimul Khan, visiting professor, Boalt Hall School of Law, UC Berkeley: “Human Rights and Islamic Law (Sharia) in Post-Taliban Eurasia”

Ronald Kim, postdoctoral fellow, Department of Linguistics, Cornell University: “The Value of Slavic for the Reconstruction of Proto-Indo-European Verbal Accentuation”

Elena Kuzmina, professor, Institute for Cultural Research, Moscow: “Genesis of the Indo-Iranians: Archaeological and Linguistic Aspects”

Alexander Leskov, Rodney S. Young fellow and visiting scholar at the University of Pennsylvania, and former head,
Department of Archaeology and Ancient Art, Museum of Oriental Art, Moscow: “Iranians in Central Asia: Scythians and Scythian Art”

George Liber, associate professor, Department of History, University of Alabama at Birmingham: “Alexander Dovzhenko: A Life in Soviet Film”

Gary Marker, professor, Department of History, SUNY Stony Brook: “An Imperial Saint: St. Catherine of Alexandria and the Legitimation of Female Rule”

Dimitre Minchev, colonel in the Bulgarian Army, chief of the Military History Center at the G.S. Rakovski Defense and Staff College in Bulgaria, and Fulbright scholar, Loyola University: “The Macedonian Question as a Source of Regional Tension in the Balkans”

Anna Muza, lecturer, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures: “An Optimistic Tragedy: Anna Karenina in the Moscow Art Theater, 1937”

Ghia Nodia, chairman of the board, Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy, and Development, Tbilisi: “Beyond Shevardnadze: The Coming Succession in Georgia”

Martha Brill Olcott, senior associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise: “Kazakhstan’s Unfulfilled Promise: Challenges for the US”

David T. Onoprishvili, Fulbright scholar, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University: “The Republic of Georgia: Pipelines and Geopolitics”

Lada Panova, researcher, Institute of Russian Language, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, and Fulbright Scholar, University of Southern California: “Aleksandriiskie pesni M. Kuzmina: liubovnyi scenarii”

Galina Rylko, assistant professor of Slavic studies, University of Florida: “Russian Modernism: Its Makers and Undertakers”

Hovann Simonian, Ph.D. candidate, University of Southern California: “The Hemshin: Muslim Armenians or Armenian-Speaking Turks?”

Inger Skjelsbaek, Ph.D. candidate International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, and Fulbright scholar, ISEEES: “War-Time Sexual Violence from Post-War Perspectives: A Case Study of Bosnia-Herzegovina”

Alfred Thomas, visiting professor, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures: “Golems, Robots and Femmes Fatales: Capek’s Early Drama in its Modernist Context”

Galin Tihanov, lecturer, Department of European Studies, University of Lancaster, United Kingdom: “Hermeneutics and Sociology between Germany and Russia: Gadamer, Hans Freyer, and the Theory of the Novel”

Gyorgy Vlasenko, independent film director and poet: “Wars in the Caucasus: Between Myth and Massacre, 1817–2003”

Ivan Vujacic, Ambassador of Serbia and Montenegro to the United States: “The Challenges Facing Serbia and Montenegro”

Veljko Vujacic, professor of Sociology, Oberlin College: “Two Years After Milosevic: The State of Democracy in Serbia”

Stephen Wheatcroft, associate professor, Department of History, University of Melbourne, Australia: “The Yezhovshchina in Perspective”

Alexey Vladiimirovitch Yablokov, biologist, Russian Academy of Science and member of the Center for Russian Environmental Policy: “The State of the Russian Environment and the Environmental Movement”

Azat Yeghiazaryan, director of the Institute of Literature, State University at Yerevan: “Eastern Armenian Literature at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century”

---

Join a Bear Trek to Russia
The Pageantry of St. Petersburg

Celebrate the 2003 tercentennial of St. Petersburg with Bear Treks, October 5–13, 2003. Visit such famous sites as the Peter and Paul Fortress, the Hermitage Museum, Catherine the Great’s summer palace at Tsarskoye Selo, and Peter the Great’s grand palace, Petrodvorets. ISEEES executive director, Dr. Barbara Voytek, will accompany the Trek. Plus, there is an optional three-night extension to Moscow for those who want to see it all. The tour is open to members of the California Alumni Association, but you need not be a Cal alum to join. For more information or to request a brochure, call Bear Treks at (510) 642-3717 or (888) 225-2586.
CSEES Newsletter Summer 2003 / 14

Book Review:

All Russia Is Burning!

Lisa K. Walker


There are not many histories of Imperial Russia that will make your skin crawl. Cathy A. Frierson’s excellent second book showcases, among other things, her ability to bridge the chronological and cultural distance between her nineteenth-century subject and her twenty-first-century readers. The passage that had the aforementioned effect on this reader is just one example: it graphically depicts what an asset the lack of a chimney could be in a peasant hut. While the smoke that seeped through the home brought a certain amount of discomfort, at least it kept at bay the creeping miasma of bedbugs, lice, and cockroaches that would otherwise be crawling over—and into—the hut’s human inhabitants. To be sure, Frierson’s new book does much more than this in presenting a first-rate, thorough analysis of the role of rural fire in Russian cultural and material life in the decades following the Great Reforms of the 1860s. But one refreshing quality of Frierson’s own distinctive writing is her skill in using present-day observation and insight to delve deeper into her historical subject, without distracting the reader or detracting from her professional aims as a scholar.

While All Russia Is Burning! clearly picks up on the theme of educated society’s conceptions of the peasantry that Frierson examined in her first book, Peasant Icons: Representations of Rural People in Late Nineteenth-Century Russia, this second project builds upon the previous one in a wonderfully intelligent way to provide an even richer study.

Rural fires were materially a very important part of life in the Russian Empire, and their destructive effects had become demonstrably worse by the middle of the nineteenth century. More importantly for Frierson, however, rural fire captured the imagination of privileged society, playing a cultural role that extended quite far beyond its already very tangible significance. A national “fire narrative,” as Frierson calls it, the intent of which was to understand and solve the fire epidemic, developed during the half century following the emancipation of the peasantry. This narrative functioned in much the same way as passionate debates about the physical health of the Russian public in the same period: they both represented discursive microcosms in which to deliberate on the future of the Russian Empire and its society. Frierson shows that the fire discussion was in some ways unique, however. Anxieties about the uncontrolled elemental force of fire—from which urbanite Russians were estranged and which they thus understandably feared—paralleled to a certain extent educated society’s fears about the potential of the freed peasantry. No longer subject to their noble protectors and wielding new but as yet undisciplined power as property-owners and participants in local representative government, the peasants embodied much of what alarmed educated Russians about the destructive potential of fire.

Frierson argues that from the mid-1860s to 1905 the narrative surrounding fire underwent a shift. While early on the problem was described using apocalyptic, religious overtones, it came to be framed as a historically-based set of material events whose cause could be studied, whose prevention could be approached rationally, and which a Russian society dedicated to modern progress could overcome. And perhaps to an even greater degree than a preventive approach to disease, this perspective on fire carried with it a morality that allowed some observers to attach blame to behavior that was identified as part of the etiology of the fire plague. Whether peasants played the role of hapless, ignorant onlookers to an accidental fire, or that of vengeful arsonists in the criminal conflagrations that attracted more of privileged society’s attention toward the turn of the century, greater agency—and often culpability—was ascribed to rural Russians as this materialist conception of fire took hold.

Frierson’s study is structured in three parts. The first of these large sections serves as an introduction, where she presents some of the basic ways in which peasants understood fire as a spiritual element of daily life, and as a tool and a technology, while members of educated society viewed it primarily as a phenomenon that was affecting the empire in an alarmingly destructive way. In this initial section, a chapter is also devoted to the material realities of that destruction, an important element of any broad cultural study of this kind.1 Although the material reality of fire is by no means ignored in the rest of the book, Frierson does well to include this separate chapter. This is an aspect of the story that she tells equally as well as she does the way that fire haunted Russians’ minds and served to give voice to broader fears.

Each of parts two and three of the book presents a nuanced analysis of a single element introduced in the initial overview. In part two, Frierson presents a close examination of arson in rural Russia. Here she endeavors to reshape fundamentally what is now a traditional social historian’s reading of arson as a form of class-based protest, situating the intentional use of fire instead within a more complex cultural system. Part three takes up another aspect of Russia’s late Imperial “fire
Frierson’s audience consists first and foremost of social historians, especially students of rural Russia and the peasantry, as well as the more general population of late Imperial Russian historians. But her book also engages a broader audience, including those interested in environmental and disaster history, for whom fire often serves as a lens through which to read world history. She also draws upon the work of economic historians who argue that success or failure to overcome unmitigated calamities such as fire is a significant factor in explaining Europe’s industrial and political ascendency in the modern world.

Frierson has at least one very clear and specific historical goal. Our contemporary understanding of arson and its historical significance has been molded to a large extent by Marxist-influenced historical inquiry and the portrayal of arson almost exclusively as a tool of social and political protest as interpreted through the analytical framework of class. While the scholars who pioneered this interpretation analyzed arson in English society, Frierson points out that this thesis was particularly well developed among Soviet historians. Within the context of the Soviet Union, this reading of nineteenth-century arson had the potential to build a neat explanation of the ultimate triumph of proletarian class consciousness. The trouble was, as Frierson reports from her archival research, that the enthusiasm for this perspective led historians and publishers to shape our understanding, not only of the significance of arson, but also of the documentary basis for this interpretation. Frierson finds that the range of evidence available in the archives does not support the overwhelming preponderance of peasant-against-noble violence in the twentieth-century published record.

Arson was indeed employed as an element of popular rebellion and revolution beginning in 1905, in what Frierson argues constituted a very real change from past behavior, but to read backward from there and understand the intentional use of fire solely in this context, Frierson claims, is not accurate in light of the full range of evidence of how arson functioned in rural communities in the nineteenth century. She presents a convincing case that arson was more often practiced within village communities, by peasants seeking a form of censure or justice against fellow peasants. Indeed, to the extent that peasants used arson against the gentry in the years prior to 1905, Frierson shows that the burning of noble grain stocks and barns—not residential structures—fits rather seamlessly within a tradition whose purpose was to reinforce a moral economy according to which the arson victim was perceived to have committed a misuse or abuse of natural resources. This is something subtly different from the interpretation of such behavior as acts of social protest or resistance that Eric Hobsbawm, Teodor Shanin, or even Sheila Fitzpatrick would have us accept. Indeed, the subtlety of this argument may deserve a somewhat more careful exposition than Frierson affords it; at times the reader finds the evidence and analysis flying dangerously close to the flame of the class-based social-protest argument and fears that the delicate distinction will go up in smoke.

Frierson’s claims about the shift that took place within Russia’s fire narrative, from apocalyptic rhetoric to positivist thinking, is certainly not a change that we would expect to occur quickly or even uniformly, yet this interesting argument might have been strengthened by more consistency in its chronology and documentation. In the section where she examines this narrative most closely, chapter two, Frierson locates the shift at about 1890, the same point at which in her earlier Peasant Icons she noted a similar positivist strain taking hold in educated Russians’ overall views of the peasantry. While it makes sense that these two shifts might have occurred simultaneously, the reader wonders whether such a stark change in the fire rhetoric was confined to the literary representations upon which Frierson primarily relies in chapter two. She convincingly demonstrates that a change did occur in the late 1880s or early 1890s among fiction writers and journalistic observers, yet her later chapters indicate that a materialist perspective on fire was taking hold significantly earlier within the zemstvos, for example, where shortly after their creation in 1864 rational solutions to the fire epidemic were already being formulated.

Where does Frierson stand on the burning questions of the nature of Russian society and the direction it was headed in the early twentieth century? As I have indicated, the structure of the book as well as much of the analysis emphasizes the divisions in Russian society, in particular the broad
cultural gulf that separated the peasantry from the educated elite. Yet her own conclusion and the overall framing of her study indicate that she views her book as a contribution to the literature investigating the ways in which a civil society was taking root in the early twentieth century, including efforts made by some to speak across the more obvious cultural and social fissures. Frierson also places herself clearly in the camp of students of the Russian peasantry who see more prosperity than decline in the years following 1880. Her book was written with the clear intention of rehabilitating peasant subjects as active, entrepreneurial participants in Russia’s fire history, as is evidenced from her depiction of rural Russians’ dependence upon and mastery over fire as a domestic and agrarian technology, her explanation of the use of fire as an instrument of community control, and her emphasis on peasant contributions to the fire prevention and firefighting movements. But ultimately I am not sure that her book completely convinces the reader of these optimistic positions.

These are complex questions, to be sure, and have justifiably engendered decades of debate among historians. Perhaps it should not be surprising that certain chapters of this book provide better evidence than others for this picture of a jerkily improving, increasingly integrated society of educated modernists and peasants who also in some cases adhered to a modern progressive approach to Russia’s fire problem. The chapters that support her optimistic conclusions are slightly less convincing than some others, which do not present so clear a positive picture (or which indeed contradict such a picture). For instance, Frierson’s analysis of the volunteer firefighting movement—the final substantive chapter in the book—is ostensibly the most supportive of her overall conclusions about the strength of civil society. The firefighting history she presents is truly very fascinating, especially as an example of a segment of educated society that refuses to fit easily into the categories we have ready for it. The leaders of this movement were gentry men motivated by a mix of a traditional service ethos and messianic beliefs about their own role in rural Russian society and Russia as a whole, all infused with a familiar faith in and admiration for scientific technology and rational organization. Yet I found this chapter’s conclusions about the seedlings of civil society that volunteer firefighters were (perhaps unwittingly) watering with their buckets and hoses less convincing than the portrait of a deeply divided society that grows out of other sections of the book. The pair of chapters that comprise the book’s part two, for example, show how “the poverty of state institutions” (and, one must assume, civil society) in rural Russia made arson a reliable and continued manner of getting the results or sending the message one wanted, a preferred alternative to the judicial system (272). The persistence of a quite separate cultural language of fire, in the form of arson, which was wielded within a rural society only superficially penetrated by the legal institutions that might have bound Imperial society together sadly speaks volumes more to me than the collaboration that existed within the firefighting movement.

Overall, however, Frierson is to be commended for having produced a masterful piece of new scholarship, a major contribution to Russian historiography, and a generally fascinating read. No one author can be faulted for not answering the broad questions about Russian society mentioned above, and Frierson has presented us with a wealth of material for continuing to debate them while also indicating a number of paths for future research. This includes not only suggesting topics for further examination, but opening up a way of approaching topics whose documentary bases may have been obscured in a similar way that arson’s was by undue political influence upon historians and editors in the Soviet period. One can take heart in the fact that the putative damage to the historical record came only the form of obfuscatory archival organization or overzealous publication of unrepresentative acts of arson, and that the manuscripts were not burnt or otherwise destroyed by nature or human agency. Let us hope—and act to ensure, when necessary—that they will remain intact and accessible for continued research in future years.

***

Lisa K. Walker is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History, currently finishing her dissertation, entitled “Public Health, Hygiene, and the Rise of Preventive Medicine in Late Imperial Russia, 1874–1912.”

Notes

1 Russian historians will recall the published discussion of Laura Engelstein’s influential The Keys to Happiness, in which the participants attempted, in part, to pin down some of the material realities of a subject that was discussed masterfully but almost exclusively from the perspective of its cultural impact and intellectual perception of professional elites. See “Symposium: ‘The Keys to Happiness: Sex and the Search for Modernity in Fin-de-Siecle Russia,’” edited by Irina Paperno, Slavic Review 53:1 (Spring 1994): 193–224.

2 The primary author upon whose work Frierson relies in employing this perspective is Stephen J. Pyne, whose “Cycle of Fire” series includes Vestal Fire: An Environmental History, Told through Fire, of Europe and Europe’s Encounter with the World (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1997).

3 The prime example of this approach is Eric L. Jones, author of the now classic The European Miracle: Environments, Economies, and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
Quinn Mecham (Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University) gave us “An Overview of Islam and Islamic Movements.” He began with the Muslim world as a whole, giving its size in terms of population and area and discussing its diversity both in terms of the ethnicity and culture of Muslims and in terms of doctrine. Next, Mecham discussed the central beliefs and practices of Islam, such as the belief in prophets and the five “pillars” of Islam. There are numerous variations and sects of Islam: Sunni Islam, which includes about 85 percent of Muslims worldwide; Shi’a Islam; Sufism, a form of mysticism that emphasizes direct personal contact with God; and a controversial form, Wahhabism, which calls for the return to fundamental origins.

Mecham covered Islamic history from the life of Muhammad and his immediate successors, major schisms, and the spread of Islam. The early spread of the Islamic Empire under the Umayyads, for example, challenged the Byzantine Empire, and the Abbasid Empire reached into the Caucasus and Central Asia. One of the longest Islamic empires, Ottoman Turkey, brought Islam to the Balkans. Next, Mecham gave some highlights of Islamic civilization, including art and architecture, literature, science, philosophy, institutions, social life, and politics. Islam is often thought of as a total social system (diin wa dawla, or religion and state), though in practice this is not the case.

Finally, Mecham discussed the perceptions by Americans about Islamic civilization and vice versa. Students must think critically about common assumptions and how that may affect our interpretations of events such as terrorist acts. Islam is rapidly growing in the United States, perhaps as many as three percent of the population are Muslim, and Islam is dominant in the African American community. Muslims abroad are concerned about American cultural exports and US foreign policy, but many also greatly appreciate the opportunities available to them in the US and choose to make their home here.
Federation also face the challenge of reconciling secularism and religion. There is some interest in using Islamic traditional law (sharia) as the main legal system for Muslims, but Islam and Christianity can peacefully coexist in Russia as long as each side has consideration for the other and behaves accordingly. The real threat to this peace is extremism.

Edward W. Walker (Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies) presented “Islam and the Conflict in Chechnya.” He began with a background on the conflict, mentioning Imam Shamil and the resistance against the Russian Empire in the 19th century, the Stalinist deportations of the Chechen and Ingush in 1944 and their subsequent rehabilitation and return in 1957, Chechnya’s declaration of independence from Russia in late 1991, the first war in 1994 to 1996, and the second, current war.

Walker stressed that being Muslim is only part of Chechen culture and identity. Islam arrived in Chechnya during the late 18th century and was blended with the local culture into a uniquely Chechen form. Chechen ethnic identity includes many aspects, such as being a member of the Chechen-Ingush linguistic community, being a member of a Sufi brotherhood, or being from a particular locale.

Chechens declared independence from Russia not as Muslims, but as Chechens. During perestroika, Checheno-Ingushetia was considered to be relatively conservative and pro-Communist and had been relatively untouched by the Islamic revival in the Soviet Union.

The changing point in Chechen politics took place in 1991 after the failed coup in Moscow. Oppositionists, led by Dzhokhar Dudaev, threw out the existing leadership and formed the Chechen resistance. It was ethnonationalist in character, like other post-Soviet nationalist movements. In fact, only after it was clear that the West wasn’t going to support Chechnya’s independence movement did Dudaev introduce religious identity into the formula.

Islamism (the embrace of political Islam) gradually appeared in Chechnya during the first war (1994–1996). The image of the Afghan mujahedin battling the Soviet invasion added to the romanticization of a Muslim struggle. Furthermore, an appeal to Islamism helped secure support from international Islamic sources. Still, the Chechen resistance remained predominantly ethnonationalist rather than Islamist. In 1997, after Dudaev’s death and the ceasefire with Russia, Chechens elected Aslan Maskhadov, Dudaev’s military chief of staff who ran as a moderate and a Chechen nationalist. Walker believes that Maskhadov began to promote Islamist ideology during this interwar period (1996–1999) because it was effective for restoring order in the republic. Maskhadov faced a crisis of nation building, and since Communism was dead and western liberal democracy did not support Chechnya, Maskhadov turned to Islamism.

Then, Shamal Basaev and Ibn al-Khattab, two field commanders, led incursions into Dagestan, and afterwards, apartment buildings were bombed in Moscow and southern Russia. Russian federal forces returned to Chechnya at the end of 1999, touching off the second war (1999 to the present). There is less press coverage of the current war, but Islamism seems to be playing a stronger role. Still, Maskhadov continues to use Chechen ethnonationalism with his Islamist rhetoric. Walker described divisions in the resistance movement, between secularists and Islamists; moderate Islamists and radical Islamists; those who support partisan warfare and those who condone terrorist acts; and a growing generational divide. Walker ended with a description of the seemingly endlessness of the war. Maskhadov claims a willingness to negotiate with Russia, but he does not control the highly decentralized resistance. And, unfortunately, Russia refuses to negotiate with terrorists, as they have branded the whole of the Chechen movement. It is a grim situation indeed.

M. Nazif Shahrani (Anthropology, University of Indiana, Bloomington) spoke about “Reclaiming Islam in Post-Soviet Central Asia.” The concept of “reclaiming” Islam implies that something had been lost, in this case, the role of religion in many aspects of people’s lives. Islam came to Central Asia from outside and was adopted by the rulers (Khans) of Turkic-speaking peoples. Islam became a state religion and was dominant in every aspect of people’s lives, from birth to death. No community existed without a mosque, the most important social institution outside of the family. When Tsarist Russia came to power in Central Asia, it left issues of religion and culture mostly untouched.

Soviet secularism opposed all religious institutions and activities until the creation of spiritual boards in 1942, and its impact on Central Asia was significant. Many mosques were either physically destroyed or desecrated, and three pillars of Islam—fasting, prayer, and pilgrimage—were illegal. Numerous clerics were killed, and at least a half million people fled to Afghanistan and elsewhere. The script of Central Asian languages was changed from the existing Arabic to Latin, to reformed Arabic, back to Latin, and then to Cyrillic, essentially denying people access to their heritage. The break with Islamic tradition was complete: people became completely ignorant about their religion and were Muslims only in name. What was left were the “little traditions” of Islam, such as visiting the tombs of great scholars, which were encouraged by the Soviets.

The Soviet Union did not impact Islam in Central Asia uniformly. It was difficult for villagers to go incognito, especially as people were encouraged to inform on their neighbors. Instead, religion survived in urban settings—except in the historic Islamic centers of Bukhara and Samarkand which the Soviets watched carefully. Those who kept their religion took part as little as possible in the Soviet system, receiving the minimum of a Soviet education, avoiding membership in Soviet organizations, and taking up menial professions instead of government jobs.

In the 1970s, Mullah Mohammed Rustamov Hindustani, a well-trained scholar, founded an underground madressah (school) in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. He was a traditional Hannafi scholar who preached tolerance, but by the 1980s,
some of his students had become politicized, one of the most prominent was Abduvali Mirzoev. This new generation questioned the religious basis of some of the traditional practices that were becoming oppressively lavish. Mirzoev was a very popular teacher in Andijon, Uzbekistan, drawing in some 15,000 people to his weekly classes on the Qur’an. He focused on education rather than calling for political activity, but the KGB spread false information about him to President Karimov. In 1995, Mirzoev, and the two others with him, disappeared from the Tashkent airport and has yet to be seen.

Reclaiming Islam has caused some serious consequences for Uzbekistan, though Uzbek president Karimov has demonstrated a Muslim identity. By 1992 each Central Asian state had criminalized Muslim political movements in any form. There were also new laws in Uzbekistan after the 1999 bombings in Tashkent, and over two-thirds of registered mosques have closed since 1997. Until 1996, there was no armed Islamic movement in Uzbekistan. By 1997, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) had surfaced, along with the peaceful Hizb al-Tahrir, but all political movements have been labeled as radicals. In this current political climate, the opportunity for reform has been lost.

Gail Lapidus (Institute of International Studies, Stanford University) added to the previous presentation with “Political Islam in Central Asia.” She pointed out that recent US partnering with secular authoritarian regimes in Central Asia to combat radical terrorist groups raises serious questions: the US must recognize that these governments have failed to address—and have even exacerbated—some of the problems that lie at the roots of these political movements. To accurately understand the situation and to effectively deal with it, Lapidus cited several points: distinguishing general Islamic revival from emerging political Islam; placing into context the region’s struggle to define the role of religion in government; and understanding that there is not a single unified movement but a variety of movements and of states’ responses to them.

Next, Lapidus discussed the consequences of the Sovietization of Central Asia. The artificial division of the region into republics based on ethnicity in time created ethnic identities. The use of Russian language and the Cyrillic script denied Central Asians access to their heritage. The isolation of Central Asia within the Soviet sphere stunted the natural growth of Islam there. The industrialization and urbanization of the region radically changed society; for example, women received a full education and could pursue a profession. Finally, the isolation from the larger Islamic world caused a loss of high-level religious training, a loss of real understanding of Islam, and a loss of creativity in religion.

Lapidus named four factors that influenced Islamic revival in Central Asia: the Iranian revolution, which raised questions about the relationship between Islam and politics; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which exposed Central Asians to an Islamist movement; perestroika, which created an ideological vacuum that could be filled by Islam; and the civil war in Tajikistan. The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan also impacted the region by providing military training, refuge, and sources of funding through drug trafficking. Two key factors have troubled the region since 1991: the states are ruled by increasingly authoritarian and corrupt governments; and each country has faced severe economic and social crises. The governments’ inability to deal with these problems causes resentment and frustration. Unable to oppose politics on political grounds, some have turned to Islam instead. Lapidus gave examples to show the variety of political movements have emerged in the region: the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a militant group that calls for the creation of an Islamic state in that country; Hizb al-Tahrir, which calls for education to bring about the creation of an Islamic state in a nonviolent political struggle; and the Islamic Revival Party, a coalition group of Islamists and liberal, democratic reformers in Tajikistan who found a way to work together.

Some Soviet legacies—a high level of education, the transformation of roles for women, and the access to world culture through Russian language—might help to create a new and modern form of Islam in Central Asia. But the governments’ inability to address economic and social crises in their countries and their repression of even moderate opposition could, instead, bring about extremism. The US might make a difference if it encourages its partners in this region to work with their opposition.

Roumen Daskalov (History, New Bulgarian University and Central European University) covered “The History of Islam in the Balkans.” Islam came to the Balkans during the Ottoman Empire, in a long and fluid process over 150 years during which the region had been fragmented from advanced feudalism and the power struggles between medieval states and the Byzantine Empire. Daskalov gave some key dates during this period, such as the Battle of Kosovo, the fall of Constantinople, the Battle of Mohacs, and the failure to take Vienna.

During the period of conquest, the region suffered massive loss of lives and the dislocation of populations. Large numbers of Christians emigrated, and many within the empire relocated, causing larger towns to be denationalized and cosmopolitan. Muslims immigrated from Anatolia, Crimea, and the Caucasus, and small numbers of Turks came as administrators, soldiers, and religious leaders. Notable is the immigration of Jews who found refuge in the empire after fleeing persecution in Christian Europe.

The native ethnic groups were able to preserve their identities during the centuries of subjugation due to sheer numbers and also through a protection of the Ottoman administrative system. Classifying people as religious communities rather than by ethnicity, they allowed Orthodox Christians, Gregorian Armenians, and Jews a certain amount of autonomy. But while these millets had a certain amount of protection, all non-Muslims were second-class
citizens, subject to taxation, unable to hold government positions, and so on.

Muslims in the Balkans were comprised of both immigrants and converts. Their conversion to Islam can be a touchy subject for modern nationalist ideology, often seen as not only a betrayal of Christianity, but as a more serious betrayal of nationalism. It is important to keep in mind that nationalism did not have the same meaning and role that it has now. Conversions took place at all points along the scale between totally voluntarily and the fear of annihilation. Sometimes conversion was forced punitively on a place that had strongly resisted invasion, but conversions en masse were an exception rather than a rule.

On the other hand, the devshirme system involved the forced conversion of non-Muslims. To the empire’s shortage of personnel, males, ages 10–15, were periodically taken, raised in Muslim families, and trained to serve in the Sultan’s elite janissary corps. During some 300 years (14th–17th centuries), an estimated 200,000 Christian boys were officially taken, though the policy did not apply to certain occupations, residents in cities, married males, and Greeks and Jews. Janissaries did gain economic advantages, but the loss in human, ethnic, and economic terms cannot be overlooked. Another involuntary conversion to Islam came from the slave trade, which involved trading prisoners of war and people from captured lands as domestic servants. Some were forced to convert, while others converted under duress to win their freedom.

Finally, people did freely choose to convert to Islam, which could be achieved with an administrative application and which was encouraged by the empire. Some chose to do so for economic advantages, others for the prestige and social promotion. As discrimination against Christians grew at the end of the empire, conversions increased. The conversion of Albanians and Bosnians are special cases. Between wanting to break their resistance and fearing outside Catholic support, the Ottomans put serious economic pressure on the Albanians until they converted to Islam. There are various reasons given for the early and thorough conversion of Bosnian Christians: persecuted Bogomils turned to a new religion; living in a borderland put an extra pressure on them to assimilate; or perhaps mixing with Turkish colonists influenced them. Whatever the reason, Bosnians gave up some of their ethnic and linguistic identity for a Muslim identity.

Between the 16th century and the mid-19th, the Muslim to Christian ratio increased from about 1:4 to about 1:3. Then the empire deteriorated, which particularly affected Christians, and this led to national revivals and struggles for liberation. The Congress of Berlin in 1878 and the Balkan war of 1912–1913 brought a serious loss of territory, and many Muslims left. Muslims remained and increased in Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. Greece and Turkey “exchanged” populations after the 1921–1922 war, and Muslims were expelled from Bulgaria in 1948 to 1951.

Today, Muslim minorities in the Balkans generally have a lower economic, social, and cultural status than the majority groups, though they are treated in varying ways in the region. Communist governments had been fairly successful at integrating Muslims. In communist Albania, Muslims suffered a loss of some religious and traditional culture, while Yugoslav decentralization actually strengthened Muslim communities. Finally, post-Communist Bulgaria, between democratization and a concern for human rights, has reversed earlier anti-Turk practices and has improved the status of its Muslims.

Ronelle Alexander (Slavic languages and literatures, UC Berkeley) gave the last presentation of the conference on “Bosnian Identity in the Former Yugoslavia,” putting Bosnian identity into historical context and defining it in relation to Serbian and Croatian identity. Bosnia occupies a strategic location, overlapping the boundary between western and eastern Christianity and sitting at the geographic center of former Yugoslavia. The medieval state was founded in 1180, and the Bosnian kingdom was at its largest around 1390. During Ottoman Empire at which time they became Muslim, in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and until World War II, Bosnia retained its name and basic territory. Alexander pointed out that this territorial continuity is key to Bosnian identity, which emphasized a stable sense of place with a fluid heritage.

In contrast, Serbia and Croatia both had strong medieval empires but did not maintain their physical continuity through the centuries. Instead, their identities formed around a fluid sense of space and a stable ethnic heritage: Croatian identity made a connection to West European culture and a literary tradition in the vernacular, and Serbian identity made a connection to medieval art, the Cyrillic script, and heroism in battle. Additionally, in the 19th century, both identities included the concept of “Christianity triumphant,” of maintaining their Christian heritage during Muslim occupation. Bosnians downplayed their religion as the Ottoman Empire was on the decline and emphasized their geographic heritage, which was multifaith and multicultural.

The concept of Christianity triumphant is part of an interesting narrative, one that emphasizes the shared heritage of South Slavs but can also be used for separate nationalist goals. In the 19th century, Croatian high school geography textbooks claimed that Bosnia territory was actually part of Croatia, which was composed of Croats, though some had become Muslim and others Orthodox. The Serbian counterparts claimed that Bosnia was part of Serbia and that Bosnians were actually Serbs, though some were Muslim and others Catholic. Combined with an Orientalist conception that Bosnians were backward and in need of modernization, the story of the prodigal son—after the Ottoman Empire, Bosnians were free to return to Christianity—came into play here. Alexander stated that Serbian and Croatian disappointment that Bosnian Muslims kept their faith can explain in part the brutality of the recent wars.

The shared heritage of Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats centered around their shared Slavic language. They may
Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, became Mate Boban, of the Bosnian branch of the HDZ, and ever, the ethnic character of the fighting was shortly the JNA out and captured East Mostar on June 17. How-
1992 had begun shooting at the city from their barracks. in independent state against the JNA forces, which in April appeared they were unified in seeking to defend the newly-
was at that point a reasonably multiethnic army. Together, it (ABiH), which, with over 30 percent non-Muslim members, first cooperated and fought alongside the Bosnian Army army built in Bosnia under the control of the HDZ, they at
lines but political ones. Though the HVO was a Croat-only fighting in Mostar that lines were not drawn along ethnic Instead, it could have been interpreted at the beginning of
Mostar were both fighting to divide the country—the only combatants would or would not succeed in dividing the
was slightly different. Rather than fighting over whether combatants would or would not succeed in dividing the country, the main combatants in the opening battle for Mostar were both fighting to divide the country—the only question being at what point.
At first, it was not altogether clear what was going on. Instead, it could have been interpreted at the beginning of fighting in Mostar that lines were not drawn along ethnic lines but political ones. Though the HVO was a Croat-only army built in Bosnia under the control of the HDZ, they at first cooperated and fought alongside the Bosnian Army (ABiH), which, with over 30 percent non-Muslim members, was at that point a reasonably multiethnic army. Together, it appeared they were unified in seeking to defend the newly-independent state against the JNA forces, which in April 1992 had begun shooting at the city from their barracks.
 Fighting between the JNA and the combined HVO/ABiH forces lasted for three months, until the HVO pushed the JNA out and captured East Mostar on June 17. However, the ethnic character of the fighting was shortly revealed, and the meaning of a May meeting held between Mate Boban, of the Bosnian branch of the HDZ, and Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, became clear. In July, Boban announced the founding of the “Union of Herceg-Bosna,” the new autonomous entity for Croats to be carved out of western Hercegovina. The two had agreed to the general idea that Bosnia and Hercegovina would be partitioned to give Croats 20 percent of the territory, Serbs 65 percent, and Muslims 15 percent. However, fighting in Mostar had continued because they had not come to agreement over the question of whether Mostar would or would not be divided. (Glenny, 1996)

Thus, as it turned out the essential conflict over Mostar had not been over an interest in turning back “Serbian aggression,” but rather a question of where the new boundaries were to be drawn. According to the planning of the JNA, the Neretva river was to be the border between Serb- and Croat-held Bosnia and Hercegovina, so they regarded eastern Mostar as land to be incorporated into their holdings.6 (Judah, 1997) However, according to the HVO’s plan, the whole of Mostar was to be the capital of Herceg-Bosna. Thus, while it appeared that the goal of the HVO had been to defend a part of Bosnia and Hercegovina against division, it had not in fact been fighting for the territorial integrity of the state. Rather, it too was committed to carving out an ethnically clean, “autono-
mous” statelet that could later be merged to the mother state.

A Tale of Three Cities, continued from page 11

This summary was written by Stella Bourgoin, ISEEES program representative.
Ironically, the division of Mostar was to occur anyway. Subsequent to the HVO/ABiH victory over the JNA in Mostar, fighting began in earnest as the ABiH and HVO fought over the munitions dump left by the retreating JNA; below Mostar, the HVO’s cleansing of West Hercegovina led to the flight of thousands of Muslims north to Mostar and beyond. Muslims who lived in West Mostar were expelled and the HVO, having concentrated the remaining Muslims of Hercegovina and West Mostar on the east bank of the Neretva, managed to drive the Bosnian Army 4th Corps to the east as well. On November 9, HVO artillery destroyed the old bridge over the Neretva—which for many had symbolized the peaceful coexistence of the Bosnian ethnic groups—to finalize the division of the town. For nine months, the HVO besieged East Mostar in an attempt to recapture it, the army itself estimating that it fired over 100,000 shells into that part of the city. (Ambrosio, 1996)

Early events in Mostar tended to support the idea that the outcome of much of the war’s fighting was arranged between the heads of state in Croatia and Serbia. The meeting between Boban and Karadzic also seemed to have laid the groundwork for a great deal of mutuality between Croat and Serb forces in the coming months, particularly as concerned the opening of a two-front war on the struggling ABiH. In June, for instance, the 111th HVO Brigade fought openly alongside Serb forces against the Bosnian Army in Zepec and Zavidovici. (Bryant, 1993) The reality that Mostar had been “ceded” to Croatia was only effectively demonstrated once Tudjman was called to task for intervening on the side of the Bosnian Croats. Having openly sent several thousand Croatian soldiers in early 1994 to Western Herzegovina to fight the Bosnian Army, Western Europe and the US finally condemned Croatia’s action. Tudjman’s strategic decision to maintain the West’s approval of Croatia led him to force Boban’s resignation and enter into peace talks along with Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat leaders. (Ambrosio, 1996)

An agreement was officially reached in Washington in March 1994 and provided for the integration of Muslim and Croat-held land into a Bosnian Federation. Once again, to quell the difficulties inherent in reintegrating “autonomous” territory, a neutral outside body—this time the European Union—would supervise the transition. Outside parties recognized that freedom of movement between the two territories was a prerequisite to any real peace, to say nothing of economic function.

Nonetheless, despite the official signatures to the contrary, the HVO refused to let more than a few Muslims into Bosnian Croat territory. The Herceg-Bosna wartime administration, though officially disbanded, continued to exist in a number of forms. There were separate police forces, armies, and pension funds. Further, violence against civilians continued to recur despite numerous attempts on the part of international organizations to quell it through new periodic agreements and initiatives like joint police training. This recalcitrance to allow the locality to reinte- grate may have appeared to have been a local problem were it not for the revelations of the post-Tudjman era. After Tudjman’s death in 1999, it was discovered that the Croatian government had been continually funding the separatist Bosnian Croat movement with millions of dollars a year in public funds.

However, larger-group conflict does not work in one direction only. An inevitable response to ethnic polarization, the multiethnic ideals of the Bosniak party, the SDA, had faded considerably in the last years of the war. In the run-up to elections in 1996, independent observers noted that, “Although the SDA publicly supports political pluralism, the political reality in East Mostar is quite different. The participation of opposition parties in the governance of the town is minimal and under heavy SDA patronage. The SDA was the only party allowed to display its electoral posters in public places.” (Kajtaz & Behram, 1996)

Ultimately, the fall of the Tudjman administration—and not local efforts—would make a serious difference in the degree of partition in Mostar. New president Stipe Mesic quickly revealed his interest in ending the relationship with Mostar, announcing in one interview that:

As far as Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned, the situation there is more difficult, since Croatia had been following Milosevic’s politics there, that is, aiming to divide Bosnia. Croatia does not accept that anymore, and it now considers Bosnia and Herzegovina as a neighbouring and friendly country in which Croats are a constitutive nation. The Croats there should be a bridge for co-operation between our countries, but they should co-operate with Croatia through Sarajevo. My visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina showed me that solutions will probably go in the right direction, and that they will not burden us anymore as neighbours or Europe as a whole. (Central Europe Review, 2000)

With the new leader of the larger group expressing the change in norms, the organization that had been built up in Mostar was all that was left. This too has been challenged, however. Mostar experienced one last major standoff with the international community when the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina took over Hercegovacka Banka in 2001 after discovering it to be at the heart of a money-laundering operation to fund parallel
Mitrovica

Mitrovica, meanwhile, like Kosovo as a whole, presents an interesting case in thinking about the potentially oppositional motives of larger groups versus localities. In a way untypical for the rest of the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo can be considered to have effectively done away with integrated localities far before the actual war. The separation of Kosovar society was part of a long-term process rooted in divergent larger-group demands. Kosovo had been integrated into the SFRY as a province of Serbia, largely in deference to Serbian sentiment that Kosovo represented a major part of Serbia’s national heritage. Kosovar Albanians, who had certainly formed the overwhelming majority of the population of Kosovo since the inception of the SFRY, had consistently argued that they should be given the status of an independent federal republic. Though some variation marked the expression of these conflictual demands from 1945 onward, these positions remained essentially fixed until the end of the 1990s when they finally took on their most extreme manifestation: seeking an ethnically clean Serbian province or a completely independent Albanian state.

While contradictory, these positions had nonetheless allowed Kosovar Serbs and Kosovar Albanians a moderately peaceful coexistence as long as they were not triggered by larger-group concerns. The very failure to allow Kosovo the status of an independent republic—which would have been fairly logical given the ethnic makeup of the territory—was itself a decision based on the dynamics of larger-group concerns within Yugoslavia. Tito was concerned that Kosovar independence might trigger Albanian irredentism towards the potential republic, in addition to feeling that granting independence to Kosovo would severely alienate Serbia—which he already perceived to be irritated by Yugoslav power arrangements. (Malcolm, 1998) Thus, while Kosovar Albanians periodically sought independent republic status, the episodes were certainly rarer than one might expect if the question of political dominance was an everyday question in people’s minds.

The relative quietude on the ground through the mid-1980s allowed for the development of a certain degree of interethnic friendship. Kosovar Serbs, though in the numerical minority, underwent a higher degree of urbanization than did Kosovar Albanians, resulting in high levels of ethnic diversity in Kosovo’s cities. Mitrovica was no exception, with just over a third of residents being Albanian, a third Serb, and just under a third of residents belonging to other ethnicities. Moreover, residence in larger cities followed a pattern that was typical across the former Yugoslavia: members of all ethnic groups lived in fairly mixed neighborhoods without obvious evidence of ethnic ghettoization. This meant that many city-dwellers had neighbors of different ethnicities. Given the social importance of neighbors and local communities in the former Yugoslavia, coexistence generally translated into the creation of social ties. In interviews of Mitrovica residents in 2000, many older residents reported having had long-standing ties with friends of other ethnicities with whom they had worked or drunk coffee in the morning.8

Nonetheless, the period of relative interethnic peace came to an end in the late 1980s when the national arguments were triggered into their fully conflictual position by the ascendance of Slobodan Milosevic and his reinvigoration of Serbian nationalist goals. After the death of Tito in 1980 and heightening uncertainty about the future status of Yugoslavia, Kosovar Albanian arguments for independence seemed newly threatening. Meanwhile, Serbian intellectuals who used the vacuum in Yugoslav leadership to support the blossoming of the Serbian nationalist program began to enshrine the Kosovar Serbs as a symbol of Serbian victimization, frequently alllying the situation of Serbs in Kosovo with that of Serbia under the Ottoman empire. Serbian police cracked down harder on signs of Albanian dissent. Kosovar Albanians continued to protest for the creation of an independent republic within Yugoslavia. This connection was later capitalized upon by Slobodan Milosevic, who at a 600 year commemoration of the battle of Kosovo Polje linked the Kosovar Serbs directly with that mythic 14th century battle—implying that the Albanians were the historically reviled Turks. Only several months later, in June 1989, Milosevic announced the League of Communist’s success in making Serbia “whole” again, revoking the status of autonomous province that had been granted to Kosovo in 1974. (Mertus, 1999: 296)

After this, the basic structure of Kosovar society was to be determined by larger-group membership. After the revocation of autonomy, the Serbian government enacted a series of “temporary measures” that resulted in the expulsion of up to 100,000 Albanians from the police, public companies, hospitals, education, and media jobs. (March & Sil, 1999) Many who were not directly fired resigned in protest rather than sign oaths of loyalty to Serbia. The numbers of Albanian students in secondary and higher education were severely restricted. In reaction, Kosovar Albanians formed an entire parallel set of state systems.

agencies in Mostar. The takeover of the bank was achieved after a street battle in which 22 SFOR (Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina) soldiers were injured; following the takeover, Hercegovacka Banka employees led a dramatic candlelit vigil to Medjugorje to “pray for the High Representative’s soul.” However, Mostar has been increasingly quiet since then. Though the citizens of Mostar are as pessimistic about Bosnia and Herzegovina’s economic situation as anyone else in the country, a local Bosniak media commentator noted about Mostar at the end of 2002, “that the situation is peaceful, that people are able to move about freely, and that there has been a ‘massive return’ of displaced persons to the homes they inhabited before the war.” (Naegle, 2002b)
Kosovar Albanian parliamentarians who had been locked out of the provincial parliament held a referendum in September 1991; 87 percent of eligible voters in Kosovo voted, 99 percent of those voted to make Kosovo an independent republic within Yugoslavia. (Judah, 2000)

Collecting three percent taxes from those who were working in Kosovo—as well as working from remittances from the up to 400,000 Albanians who left Kosovo after 1989—the parallel government created an education system held mainly in private homes, provided health and social services through the Mother Teresa organization network, and developed an independent media.

Thus, while individuals continued to live with each other through 1998 in Mitrovica, Serbs and Albanians had increasingly less contact with each other. Younger citizens in particular had few opportunities to meet as school was monoethnic, as were the increasingly limited work opportunities. Yet violence was generally fairly absent from the scene while Kosovar Albanians were committed to a strategy of non-violent protest under the guidance of the elected Kosovar “president,” Ibrahim Rugova.

The rise of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) from 1996 to 1998 substantially changed the terms of engagement between the two groups. However, actual fighting did not break out in Mitrovica between the KLA and Serbian forces until 1998, just before the involvement of the Western countries. The diplomatic wrangling between Yugoslavia and the EU led to the introduction of OSCE monitors at the end of 1998; by March 1999, Western governments were pressuring for the Yugoslav government to sign a peace agreement with the KLA at Rambouillet in France. Milosevic’s refusal to do so triggered the beginning of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. Though the fighting between the KLA and Serbian forces had worsened in the weeks leading up to Rambouillet, the cover of the NATO bombing, Serbian police, military, and paramilitary groups forced the exodus of nearly all of the Kosovar Albanians. Mitrovica’s turn came on April 15, when 30,000 Albanians were ordered to leave for Montenegro. (Judah, 1999)

At the end of the bombing in June, the Albanians came back. As they returned, Kosovar Albanians who had been terrorized out of their homes took revenge on the mainly elderly Serbs who remained in the province, killing a number and expelling the rest. In Mitrovica, however, an odd standoff had occurred. After crossing the Ibar River, Serbs who had been fleeing northward stopped and occupied the houses that had been left by Albanians; Albanians attempting to return north of the river were largely driven out again. This situation was permitted by the French NATO troops that had attempted to “oversee” the return of Albanians to their homes. As a result, Kosovar territory north of the Ibar, including North Mitrovica, is populated by Serbs—and no Albanians. South of the Ibar, including South Mitrovica, is Albanian-populated Kosovo, in which the safety of the few remaining Serbs is carefully guarded by international troops.

The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) which was left as the official administrator of the province after the Yugoslav Army pull-out expressed regret that Mitrovica had become divided under their command.

A major mistake, at an early stage, was the failure of the French KFOR [UN Kosovo Force] to insist on an undivided city. Based on past peacekeeping experience, especially in Bosnia, the strategy adopted was to separate Serbs and Albanians in the belief that this was the best way to maintain security. Now it is much more difficult to reverse that strategy...Until the Serbs of Northern Mitrovica accept that they are part of Kosovo, and not Serbia, it will be very difficult to resolve the problem. (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000)

The division has become cemented through the establishment of a new parallel administration, this time in northern Kosovo to serve the minority Serb population. North Mitrovica acts as a base for the parallel bodies. Though the Serbian police are barred from operating in Kosovo, North Mitrovica established its own security force in the form of “Bridgewatchers.” The Bridgewatchers are a couple of hundred of men so named because they check the identification of anyone arriving over the main bridge into North Mitrovica; more significantly, however, they have led violent riots against UNMIK and KFOR and maintain a strong degree of political control within North Mitrovica. The Bridgewatchers are paid by the Serbian Ministry of the Interior in contravention of UN Security Council resolutions on the status of Kosovo; further, Serbia has supplied telephone service, education, and health services while these organs refuse to participate in the Kosovar arrangements overseen by UNMIK. (ICG, 2002) Some allege that many Bridgewatchers are simply plainclothes Serbian police. (Naegele, 2002a)

Since the war, UNMIK has made numerous attempts to forge a united administration in Mitrovica, but these efforts have been continually rebuffed by Serb leaders in North Mitrovica. Violence, though periodically suppressed, erupts sporadically and unpredictably; the worst incident yet came
in April 2002, when snipers and grenade-throwers attacked UNMIK police at a routine checkpoint, wounding 26 UNMIK police officers. Rather, the major problems for the continuing function of the Serb organs in the north appear to come from interparty battles in Belgrade, including the one that resulted in the removal of Serb National Council spokesman Oliver Ivanovic from local power. (Kujundzic, 2002)

The continuing division of Mitrovica is generally thought to be the first step towards the partition of Kosovo, in which Serbia could reintegrate northern Kosovo. The economic significance of the Trepa complex is typically thought to play a role in this strategy. However, rather than express this publicly, Serbian officials have chosen to attempt to implement the plan through the actions of local Serbs in Mitrovica. The idea appears to be “to demonstrate that KFOR and UNMIK are incapable of creating a secure environment for non-Albanians….The primary strategy for realizing this agenda is to appear publicly to cooperate with UNMIK and KFOR, while working actively behind the scenes to create as much discord and unrest as possible.” (ICG, 2002) Meanwhile, the government in Belgrade has not been duplicious about its aims. Yugoslav president Vojislav Kostunica has publicly expressed interest in keeping Kosovo as part of Serbia, as has Nebojsa Covic, deputy Prime Minister of Serbia and the head of the government’s Coordination Center for Kosovo and Metohija. (ICG, 2002)

A first lesson from the review of these three cities is that the divided city is a very difficult thing to overcome. Expectations for divided cities should not be high, given the impact of intergroup tensions. From an urban health standpoint, divided cities should clearly be avoided at all costs if possible from outset; from the events of Berlin on, we see that the impact of division makes it difficult to later “award” cities to one side and expect peaceful integration, because the town becomes symbolic of the intergroup fight.

A second lesson is that it might not make sense to depend on the rationality of individual inducements and relationship-building to heal the divided city. Cities seem to remain divided irrationally, regardless of the effect that the division has on individual residents. It is clear that dividing an urban center is difficult and has many disadvantages, including the destruction of much of the city’s economic value. Dividing a city is clearly not to the benefit of the city residents themselves, who are subject to compromised services, infrastructure, and security as a result of the division. Rather, the act of dividing the city pushes it out of the rational sphere. The divided city is likely to have a clear non-economic value to people beyond the limits of the city—a powerful symbolic or cultural meaning that transcends its physical worth. Despite the physical and tactical costs of dividing or administering a divided city, the symbolic worth of the city to the larger group makes the inconveniences acceptable.

A final lesson that can be inferred from the focus on intergroup conflict is that reduction of the group claim to a city might be the determining factor in easing the tension. As the Mostar case appears to be demonstrating, the willingness of one side to simply concede has a huge impact on the locality. Compromise is another potential manner of expressing a change in group norms. Though the Dayton Agreement is unquestionably flawed, for example, it did end the Bosnian war and create conditions for a degree of civil, state-level government in which all of the previously warring parties participate. A strategy that foresees representatives of the larger groups promoting either concession or compromise, in Mitrovica and Vukovar, could pave the way for a very different dynamic.

Notes

1 Up until the Kosovo War, Mitrovica was called “Kosovska Mitrovica” (to distinguish it from the other Mitrovicas in Serbia). Given Kosovo’s growing independence, the fact that the Albanian name for the town is simply “Mitrovica,” and, further, that it has obtained a far greater degree of publicity than the other Mitrovicas, it seems most appropriate to call it just Mitrovica.

2 Seselj reappropriated the name “Chetnik” from its original meaning—a group of World War II-era Serbian nationalist fighters who sought to restore the monarchy. From the end of World War II, the term had been repurposed in the SFRY to refer more generally to violent Serbian nationalism.

3 Recall that the attack on Dubrovnik occurred not long after the explosion in televised war-coverage that accompanied the US-led Gulf War. Images of the bombardment of Dubrovnik were broadcast globally, sparking a fairly firm association between the Serbian and Montenegrin forces and barbarian hordes.

4 Unpublished interviews performed for the UC Berkeley Human Rights Center by the Society for Psychological Assistance, Zagreb, December 2000.

5 Emphasizing the degree to which the capture of western Bosnia and Hercegovina was already an ethnic Croat, rather than Bosnian Croat, enterprise, Human Rights Watch researchers interviewed a number of HVO soldiers who claimed they were born and lived in Croatia. (HRW, 1992)

6 In fact, pockets of fighting had broken out between Serbs and Croats within Bosnia even before the “official” start of the Bosnian war—April 5—in small towns in Hercegovina and Posavina, most notably in Bosanski Brod. These places would later mark critical territorial divisions between Serb- and Croat-held Bosnia and Hercegovina. “Once the referendum [for Bosnian independence from Yugoslavia] had been held, the Serbs and the Croats of Bosnia knew that the fighting was imminent so it was no surprise that they began to fight in these peripheral, but crucial areas.” (Glenny, 1997: 167)

7 “We Prayed for the Devil to Leave the High Representative,” Vecernji List (Bosnia), May 3, 2001.
Author’s interviews with residents of Mitrovica, August–December 2000.

Works Cited


Faculty and Student News

Diana Blank, Ph.D. candidate in anthropology, was given an Allan Sharlin Memorial Award by the Institute of International Studies for 2003–2004. Her dissertation is entitled “Voices from Elsewhere: An Ethnography of Place in Mogilev-Podolsky, Ukraine.”

Mieczyslaw Boduszynski, Ph.D. candidate in political science, is spending the summer as a research scholar in East European studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. His project is entitled “Explaining Divergent Paths of Post-Communist Regime Change: The Case of the Yugoslav Successor States.”

Mike presented a paper entitled “Tribunals, Transitional Justice, and Democratization in the Yugoslav Successor States” at a conference on reconstruction and development in southeastern Europe at the University of Toronto in February 2003.

Robin Brooks, Ph.D. candidate in political science, was a Civic Education Project visiting faculty fellow at Sofia University, Bulgaria, during the past academic year. She taught in the Master’s program in International Relations and Security.

Kim Codella, Ph.D. candidate in Near Eastern Studies, presented a paper entitled “Recent Archaeological Investigations in Shari Sahz, Uzbekistan” at the annual meeting of the American Schools of Oriental Research, which was held in November 2002 in Toronto.

Roumen Daskalov, who was a visiting professor of history during the spring, presented a paper on “Civil Society and Democracy in Twentieth-Century Bulgaria” at the conference “Citizenship, Civil Society, and Democracy in 20-21st-Century Europe” held in April 2003 at Collegium Budapest. Daskalov holds positions at the New Bulgarian University, Sofia, and the Central European University, Budapest.


In March 2003, a conference was held in honor of the retirement of Stanford University professor Terence Emmons, who received a Ph.D. in history from Berkeley in 1966. Among the presenters, including Emmons himself, were three Berkeley professors: Martin Malia, professor emeritus of history, presented his “Remarks on Terry Emmons’ Place in Historiography”; Nicholas Riasanovsky, professor emeritus of history, gave “Some Remarks on Writing and Teaching Russian Intellectual History”; and Reginald Zelnik, professor of history, presented “Ni Bes ni Angel: Anna Pankratova as Victim and Victorimeter, 1920–1957; The Troubled Life of a Soviet Historian.”

Victoria Frede (Ph.D. in history, 2002) has accepted a tenure-track position as assistant professor at East Carolina University.

Scott Gehlbach (Ph.D. in political science, 2003) has accepted a tenure-track position as assistant professor with the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin at Madison. His dissertation focused on “Taxability and State Support of Economic Activity.”

Robert P. Gerasci (Ph.D. in history, 1995) received tenure at the University of Virginia during the past year. He is currently an associate professor in the Department of History.

Theodore Gerber (Ph.D. in sociology, 1995) has accepted a position as associate professor of sociology at the University of Wisconsin at Madison.

Joan Grossman, professor emerita of Slavic languages and literatures, and Ruth Rischin (Ph.D. in Slavic languages and literatures, 1993) edited the recent publication William James in Russian Culture (Lexington Books, Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), which traces his impact in Russia from the 1890s to the present.

Brian Horowitz (Ph.D. in Slavic languages and literatures, 1993) has been named the Sizeler Family Chair Professor of Jewish Studies at Tulane University in New Orleans. He will also direct the Jewish Studies Program there.

Kari Johnstone (Ph.D. in political science, 2002) has taken the position of foreign affairs officer in the US Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. Her dissertation focused on ethnic minority policy in post-Communist Slovakia and Ukraine.

Raymond June, Ph.D. candidate, social and cultural studies program (anthropology emphasis), received an ACLS East European dissertation write-up fellowship for 2003-04. His dissertation is provisionally titled, “From Dissident Truth to Market Transparency: The Making of the Czech ‘Governance Intelligentsia.’”

Maimul Khan, who was a visiting professor at the Boalt Hall School of Law this spring, is the author of the recently published book Human Rights in the Muslim World: Constitutionalism, Fundamentalism, and International Politics (Carolina Academic Press, 2003).
Marie Alice L’Heureux (Ph.D. in architecture, 2002) has accepted a position as assistant professor in the architecture department of the University of Kansas at Lawrence. She will be teaching a special urban studio in Kansas City.

A Festschrift was published this spring in honor of Martin Malia, professor emeritus of history, under the title The Cultural Gradient: The Transmission of Ideas in Europe, 1789–1991 (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). The book’s coeditors are Berkeley alums, Catherine Evtuhov (Ph.D. in history, 1991) and Stephen Kotkin (Ph.D. in history, 1988). Among the numerous contributions are “Foxes into Hedgehogs: Berlin and Tolstoy” by Hugh McLean, professor emeritus of Slavic languages and literatures, and “Martin Malia and the Understanding of Russia” by Nicholas Riasanovsky, professor emeritus of history.

Rebecca Manley, Ph.D. candidate in history, has accepted a tenure-track job in Russian history at Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario, Canada. Her dissertation, on “The Evacuation and Return of Soviet Civilians, 1941–1946,” will be filed this year.

Elizabeth McGuire, Ph.D. candidate in history, received a Allan Sharlin Memorial Award and a John L. Simpson Memorial Research Fellowship in International and Comparative Studies from the Institute of International Studies for next academic year. The title of her dissertation is “Children of the Revolution: Chinese Communists in Soviet Russia, 1920–1970.”

Sanjyot Mehendale, executive director of the Caucasus and Central Asia Program, received a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities for her “Virtual Catalogue of the Bagram Ivory and Bone Carvings” project. The ancient site of Bagram (Bagram) is northeast of Kabul, Afghanistan. The carvings—one of the most extensive sets of finds formerly housed in the National Museum in Kabul, Afghanistan—were looted, sold on the black market, or destroyed. These unparalleled yet paradigmatic examples of the syncretic nature of Silk Road art and cultural exchange will be made available in digital form for future study.

Conor O’Dwyer, Ph.D. candidate in political science, will spend next year as an Academy Scholar at the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies. His dissertation is entitled, “Runaway State-Building: How Political Parties Shape States in Post-Communist Eastern Europe.”

Irina Paperno, professor of Slavic languages and literatures, spent the spring semester at Yale University as a visiting professor in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures where she taught a course on literature and experience.

Harsha Ram, associate professor in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, is the author of the newly published The Imperial Sublime: A Russian Poetics of Empire (University of Wisconsin Press, 2003).

Ilya Vinkovetsky (Ph.D. in history, 2002) delivered a paper on “Nation Building in Russia” at the Balkan Parliament international student conference, held in October 2002 in Blagoevgrad, Bulgaria. This spring, he became chair of the Department of History at the American University in Bulgaria, where he is an assistant professor.


Lisa K. Walker, Ph.D. candidate in sociology, received a paper on “Sanitas for a Changing Society: Local Public Health Institutions and Practices in Russia’s Provinces, 1888–1905” at the annual meeting of the Southern Conference on Slavic Studies, which was held in Savannah, Georgia, in March 2003.


Daniel Ziblatt (Ph.D. in political science, 2002) has accepted a position at Harvard University beginning in the fall, where he will be an assistant professor of government and an associate at the Minda de Ginzburg Center for European Studies. In December 2002, he published a piece in the German journal Politische Vierteljahresheft entitled “Recasting German Federalism? The New Politics of Fiscal Decentralization in Post-Unification Germany” (December 2002).
The Center acknowledges with sincere appreciation the following individuals who have contributed to the annual giving program, the Associates of the Slavic Center (or have been enrolled due to their particular generosity toward Cal to support some aspect of Slavic & East European Studies), between February 1 and May 15, 2003. Financial support from the Associates is vital to our program of research, training, and extra-curricular activities. We would like to thank all members of ASC for their generous assistance.

CENTRE CIRCLE
Richard and Beatrice Heggie *

BENEFACTORS
Anonymous *

SPONSORS
Carlo E. Anderson *
Richard Castile *
Enid Merle Emerson *
Charles Hughes *
Jane McCoy *

MEMBERS
Mary R. Anderson *
Walter Parchomenko *
Eleanora P. Salanave
Hyshka Stross *

CORPORATE MATCH
Chevron Texaco (gift by Carlo E. Anderson) *

* gift of continuing membership

For those of you who are not yet members, we encourage you to join. We believe you will enjoy the stimulating programs; even if you cannot participate as often as you might wish, your continuing contribution critically supports the Center’s mission and goals.

Members ($10 to $100). Members of ASC receive monthly “Updates” and special mailings to notify them of events and special activities, such as cultural performances and major conferences. In this way, notification of even last-minute items is direct.

Sponsors ($100-up). ASC Sponsors also receive a uniquely designed notepad folio which promotes Slavic and East European Studies at Berkeley. They also receive invitations to special informal afternoon and evening talks on campus featuring guest speakers from the faculty as well as visiting scholars.

Benefactors ($500-up). ASC Benefactors receive invitations to the dinner and evening programs associated with our annual conferences, such as the annual Berkeley-Stanford Conference in the spring.

Center Circle ($1,000-up). In addition to enjoying the above-mentioned benefits, donors within the Center Circle will also become Chancellor’s Associates of the University, joining a select group of alumni and friends who support Cal through unrestricted giving. Membership in this group offers a number of University benefits.

It is a policy of the University of California and the Berkeley Foundation that a portion of the gifts and/or income therefrom is used to defray the costs of raising and administering the funds. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent allowed by law.

Send your check, made payable to the Regents of the University of California, to:
Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies
University of California, Berkeley
260 Stephens Hall # 2304
Berkeley CA 94720-2304
Attn: ASC

Name(s)____________________________________________________
Address ___________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
City ___________________________ State __________ Zip ________
Home Business
Phone _______________ Phone _______________
If your employer has a matching gift program, please print name of corporation below:
__________________________________________________________
___ I have made a contribution but wish to remain anonymous.
American Council of Learned Societies

The ACLS/New York Public Library Fellowship provides up to $50,000 for projects that will be enhanced by access to the collections of the NYPL Humanities and Social Sciences Library. Deadline: 10/1/2003; applicants must apply to both ACLS and Center for Scholars and Writers. Contact: Center for Scholars and Writers, The New York Public Library, Humanities and Social Sciences Library, 5th Ave and 42nd St, New York NY 10018-2788; csw@nypl.org; http://www.nypl.org/research/chss/scholars/scholars1.html.

ACLS/SSRC/NEH International and Area Studies Fellowships provide 6–12 months of funding to pursue research and writing on the societies and cultures of Asia, Africa, the Near and Middle East, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union. Deadline: 10/1/2003. Contact: Office of Fellowships and Grants, ACLS, 228 E 45th St, New York NY 10017-3398; Fax: 212-949-8058; grants@acls.org; http://www.acls.org/.

ACTR/ACCELS

The Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe Language Program provides grants, up to $2,500, for summer study of Albanian, Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian, Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian, Macedonian, Polish, Romanian, Slovak, or Slovene. Applicants should present proposals for attendance at intensive courses offered by institutions of higher education in the US, or, in exceptional cases, for study at the advanced level in courses in Eastern Europe. Deadline: 10/1/03 for spring 2004. Contact: Outbound Program, American Councils for International Education, 1776 Massachusetts Ave NW Ste 700, Washington DC 20036; Tel: 202-833-7522; Fax: 202-833-7523; outbound@actr.org; http://www.actr.org/.

The Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe Research Scholar Program provides $12,000–25,000 as full support for 3–9 months of research and/or language training in Albania, the Baltics, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and former Yugoslavia. Applicants must be US citizens or permanent residents and work in the humanities, social sciences, literature and linguistics, or area studies. Deadline: 10/1/03 for spring 2004. Contact: Outbound Program, American Councils for International Education, 1776 Massachusetts Ave NW Ste 700, Washington DC 20036; Tel: 202-833-7522; Fax: 202-833-7523; outbound@actr.org; http://www.actr.org/.

The Special Initiatives Research Fellowship offers up to $35,000 to postdocs for at least four months of field-based, policy-relevant research in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. Deadline: 10/1/03 for spring 2004. Contact: ACTR/ACCELS, 1776 Massachusetts Ave NW Ste 700, Washington DC 20036; Tel: 202-833-7522; http://www.actr.org/.

British Council

Chevening Awards cover the costs of study in Britain for 3–12 months to citizens or residents of the Russian Federation, ages 35 years and younger. Awards are made for advanced study in the fields of international relations, the media, management, law, economics, urban planning, public administration including health management, environmental science, telecommunications. Candidates should show in their applications how their studies may contribute to change in Russia through further developments in governance, the democratic culture, or the market economy. Deadline: Applications accepted between 6/1/03 and 9/30/03. Contact: Chevening Scholarships, The British Council, BIL, Ul. Nikoloyamskaya 1, Moscow 109189, Russia; Tel: 095-234-0201, 234-0236; Fax: 095-234-0205; bc.moscow@britishcouncil.ru; http://www.britishcouncil.ru/education/scholarship/chevening.htm.

Coordinating Council for Women in History

The CCWH/Ida B. Wells Award is given to an A.B.D. woman grad student working on a dissertation at a US institution. Dissertation topic must be historical but not necessarily in a history department. Deadline: 10/1/2003. Contact: Professor Montserrat Miller, Award Committee, Department of History, Marshall University, Huntington WV 25755; millerm@marshall.edu; http://theccwh.org/wellsapp.htm.

The CCWH/Berkshire Conference of Women Historians Historian’s Award and the Graduate Student Award are for women grad students in history at a US institution who have completed all work up to dissertation stage. Deadline: 10/1/2003. Contact: Professor Gina Hames, Awards Committee, Department of History, Pacific Lutheran University, Tacoma WA 98447; hamesgl@plu.edu; http://theccwh.org/.

Fulbright/IIE

Full Grants for Study and Research Abroad cover round-trip travel, tuition, books, and stipend for one academic year. Applicants must be US citizens holding a B.A. or equivalent. Deadline: September 2003 (date to be announced). Contact: Fulbright Program Advisor, Graduate Fellowships Office, 318 Sproul Hall # 5900; Tel: 510-642-0672; http://www.grad.berkeley.edu/fellowships/fellowships_deadlines.shtml.
Library of Congress

Fellowships on Islamic Studies provide $3,500 per month for 5–10 months of residential postdoctoral research at the Library of Congress in the humanities on globalization and Muslim societies. Fellows will conduct their own research, lead seminars, and participate in the Center’s intellectual life. Deadline: 9/30/2003. Contact: Rockefeller Islamic Fellowships, Office of Scholarly Programs, Library of Congress LJ 120, 101 Independence Ave SE, Washington DC 20540-4860; Tel: 202-707-3302; Fax: 202-707-3595; scholarly@loc.gov; http://www.loc.gov/loc/islamic/.

Kluge Center Fellowships provide $3,500 per month for 6–12 months of residential research in the collections of the Library of Congress. Scholars who have received a terminal advanced degree within the past seven years in the humanities, the social sciences, or in a professional field such as architecture or law are eligible. Exceptions may be made for individuals without continuous academic careers. Applicants may be US citizens or foreign nationals. Deadline: 8/15/2003. Contact: John W. Kluge Center Office of Scholarly Programs, Library of Congress LJ 120, 101 Independence Ave SE, Washington DC 20540-4860; Tel: 202-707-3302; Fax: 202-707-3595; scholarly@loc.gov; http://www.loc.gov/loc/kluge/.

Society for Slovene Studies

A Graduate Student Prize of $1,000 will be awarded for the best paper in any discipline written by a grad student on a topic involving Slovene studies. Slovene citizens and students studying in Slovenia are not eligible to apply. Deadline: 9/15/2003. Contact: Professor Timothy Pogacar, Editor, Slovene Studies, Bowling Green State University, Dept of GREAL, Bowling Green OH 43403; http://www.art.sualberta.ca/~ljubljan/gradprize.html.

Woodrow Wilson Center

East European Studies Short Term Grants provide a stipend of $100 a day, up to one month, to grad students and postdocs who are engaged in specialized research requiring access to Washington, DC, and its research institutions. Grants do not include residence at the Wilson Center. Deadline: 9/1/03, 12/1/03. Contact: East European Studies, Woodrow Wilson Center, One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington DC 20523; Tel: 202-691-4000; Fax: 202-691-4001; kneppm@wwic.si.edu; http://wwics.si.edu/ees/.

Upcoming Events

Saturday, July 5, 2003. Performance: The San Francisco Symphony will perform works by Tchaikovsky. Individual tickets are available now, as this is not part of a series. At Davies Symphony Hall, San Francisco, 8 p.m. Fees: $15–58; tickets may be purchased through Ticketweb, http://www.ticketweb.com/, or by calling the SFS Box Office at (415) 864-6000. Contact: SF Symphony, http://www.sfsymphony.org/ or (415) 552-8000.

Thursday, July 24, 2003. Performance: The San Francisco Symphony will perform “Russian Spectacular,” featuring works by Khachaturian, Rachmaninoff, and Mussorgsky. Individual tickets are available now, as this is not part of a series. At Davies Symphony Hall, San Francisco, 8 p.m. Fees: $15–58; tickets may be purchased through Ticketweb, http://www.ticketweb.com/, or by calling the SFS Box Office at (415) 864-6000. Contact: SF Symphony, http://www.sfsymphony.org/ or (415) 552-8000.

Saturday, September 6, 2003. Performance: The San Francisco Symphony, Michael Tilson Thomas conducting, will perform works by Tchaikovsky. At the Flint Center, Cupertino, 8 p.m. Fees: $26–51; individual tickets go on sale 8/25/03. Contact: SF Symphony, http://www.sfsymphony.org/ or (415) 552-8000.


Save the Date

We will resume our schedule of public events in the fall. Mark your calendar now with these important dates. Please note that these events are subject to change; for current information on ISEEES-sponsored events, you may contact us at (510) 642-3230.

Tuesday, October 7, 2003. Annual Fall Reception. Please join us as we kick off the fall semester. In the Toll Room, Alumni House, 4–6 p.m. Sponsored by ISEEES.

Friday, October 17, 2003. Annual Colin Miller Memorial Lecture: Jan T. Gross, professor, Department of Political Science, New York University, will be our speaker. A topic will be announced. In the Toll Room, Alumni House, time to be announced. Sponsored by ISEEES.
Hertelendy Fellowship Awarded

The Martha and Paul Hertelendy Fellowship in Hungarian Studies for 2003–04 has been awarded to Mr. Marton Dunai, a native of Hungary, who seeks a career in international journalism with emphasis on Hungary and Europe. This will be Mr. Dunai’s second Hertelendy fellowship and will allow him to complete his Masters in Journalism.

Marton Dunai has worked for five years for Nepszabadsag as a journalist and editor and was a correspondent for Transitions Online, the electronic successor to Transitions Magazine. He has in the past received stipends to study journalism in Denmark and the Netherlands. In 2003, Mr. Dunai received a Foreign Press Association Scholarship and an Overseas Press Club Scholarship. ISEEES is pleased to be able to help him finish his studies and continue what promises to be a successful career.

Kujachich Endowment Funding

Grants from the Peter N. Kujachich Endowment for Serbian and Montenegrin Studies were awarded to the following scholars for 2003–04:

**Victor Santiago Pineda**, an undergraduate majoring in International and Area Studies who will be going on to graduate work in City and Regional Planning here at Berkeley, was awarded a grant. Victor has an affinity for Serbia and is also fluent in the Serbian language. His project is to do research and then produce a video on the disabled in Yugoslavia. He has already produced such a documentary about Cuba. Victor, who currently serves on the youth advisory board for the National Council on Disability, will work with the Association of Disabled Students in Belgrade. They will assist with arrangements and logistics there. Victor will be going this summer to Belgrade and will work on the video when he returns.

An award was made to **Ms. Vesna Rodic**, originally from Belgrade, who is a Ph.D. candidate in French Studies. She is planning to do archival research in Belgrade this summer for an article about Ivo Andric. Specifically, she is analyzing a figure in his novel, The Chronicle of Travnik. The article will be published in the October 2003 issue of the Journal of the Ivo Andric Foundation in Belgrade.

Finally, the **Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures** will receive an award to assist with the teaching of Serbian/Croatian next year. There are several students studying the language at each level, making it difficult for one professor to cover everyone. The grant will contribute to hiring a lecturer.