Notes from the Director

We have all heard a great deal about the State-wide budgetary crisis that has deepened over the past several years. The UC system, together with other State-funded educational institutions, has faced substantial reductions that are only partially offset by student fee increases. Less well known are the implications of these cuts for the Berkeley campus and, more specifically, for organized research units (ORUs) such as the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ISEEES). Berkeley’s reputation as a premier research university in this country and the world rests, to a considerable extent, on the future prospects for its prestigious institutes, centers, and programs.

During the 2002–2003 academic year, UCB ORUs took a permanent ten percent cut in State funds. This was followed by another ten percent cut, also permanent, for this coming year. Together with all other ORUs, ISEEES has thus lost one-fifth of its State funding. These funds covered the positions of staff and academic coordinators as well as supported specific activities, faculty, and students. What, then, will be the impact of these reductions on our community?

The good news is that, thanks to ISEEES’s endowment funds, the generosity of the Associates of the Slavic Center, and extramural grants, we can continue to support our staff and academic coordinators. There are, however, going to be some adverse consequences from the cuts. Over the next few years, we may be compelled to curtail some of our programmatic activities and support for faculty and graduate student research and travel. We will also have to intensify our ongoing efforts to secure funding from foundations, private donors, and the US government. Increasingly, our ability to provide support for our faculty, graduate students, and undergraduates, as well as our busy schedule of activities and research, will depend on our success in raising money from outside sources. While there has always been a strong incentive to bring in outside grants to ISEEES and its affiliates, the reduction in State funds makes extramural fundraising even more important.

We are determined not to sacrifice our core programs that support faculty and graduate student research and to continue to present a rich and lively program of conferences, lectures, and bag lunches. This will mean, however, that we will have to work harder than ever to fulfill our mission. With a great team of people at ISEEES and our wonderful community of supporters, I am confident that we will rise to the challenge.

The fall semester gets under way this year with our annual fall reception, Tuesday, October 7, 2003 at 4 p.m. in the Alumni House. This will be followed by the annual Colin Miller Memorial Lecture, presented by Jan T. Gross (Department of History, Princeton University). Professor Gross’ lecture, “After Auschwitz: Reflections on Postwar Anti-Semitism in Poland,” will be held on Friday, October 17, 2003 at 3:30 p.m. in the Alumni House, followed by a reception. The annual CCAsP (Caucasus and Central Asia Program) confer-
ence will take place on March 13 and 14 in 2004. The Berkeley-Stanford Conference is scheduled for Friday, April 16, 2004 on the Stanford University campus. The Annual Teacher Outreach Conference will be held on Saturday, May 1, 2004 at the Alumni House.

Increasingly, the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies has become a magnet for international scholars. This year we are fortunate to have a remarkable group of visiting scholars associated with ISEEES. Included among them are several scholars from former Yugoslavia who are on campus this year as participants in the Junior Faculty Development Program administered by the American Councils for International Education (funded by the US Department of State). Liliana Borjanovic is an instructor with the Department of Literature and Language Studies with the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina. She is following courses on TV journalism and literature here to develop new curricula for her teaching. Dejan Ognjanovic teaches in the Department of English Language and Literature at the University of Nis, Serbia and Montenegro. He will develop new courses on American studies while pursuing an interest in American and English Gothic film and literature. Branislav Stevanovic, an instructor in the Department of Sociology with the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Nis, is formulating new courses on political science, particularly democracy studies.

Izabela Filipiak, doctoral student at the Institute of Literary Research of the Polish Academy of Sciences, is spending the fall semester at Berkeley. She is working on her dissertation, “Maria Komornicka and the Construct of the ‘Other.’” Misa Kanda, doctoral student in politics at Kobe University, Japan, is a Rotary Ambassadorial Scholar at Berkeley for the year. Her research focuses on postwar Bosnia. Zenonas Norkus, professor in the Department of Social Theory at the University of Vilnius, Lithuania, is a Fulbright scholar at Berkeley for the year. He will be conducting research on comparative historical sociology in the United States. George Sanikidze, director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Georgian Academy of Sciences, will spend the academic year at Berkeley working on a research project, “Islam, Globalization, and the Caucasus.”

We welcome back to the campus David Wolff, who received his Ph.D. in history from UC Berkeley in 1991. A research scholar with the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, Dr. Wolff will be in residence at Berkeley during the coming year, and he will be teaching in the Berkeley history department in the spring.

As ISEEES and its affiliates expand into the study of the successor states of the former Soviet Union, we have attempted to offer graduate students and faculty opportunities to study languages of the region. We are pleased, therefore, to announce that with the assistance of grants from the US Department of Education under Title VI and from the National Security Education Program, language courses in Armenian, Georgian, and Uzbek are being taught this year through the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, together with the Slavic languages and Hungarian that have been part of the curriculum in the past.

I look forward to seeing friends, colleagues, and students at various ISEEES events during the 2003–2004 academic year, my tenth and final year as director of the Institute.

Victoria E. Bonnell  
Director, Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies  
Professor, Department of Sociology

Join us for the annual  
ISEEES Fall Reception  

Tuesday, October 7, 2003  
In the Toll Room, Alumni House, 4 p.m.  
UC Berkeley campus

ISEEES Newsletter Fall 2003 / 2
## Fall 2003 Courses

### Selected Faculty Course Offerings and Selected Area-Related Courses

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**Language Instruction.** In addition to the listings above, the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures is offering language courses in Armenian, Bulgarian, Czech, Georgian, Hungarian, Polish, Russian, Serbian/Croatian, and Uzbek.
Campus Visitors

Liliana Borjanovic, lecturer in the Department of Literature and Language Studies with the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina, is visiting Berkeley this year on a Junior Faculty Development Grant from American Councils for International Education. She will develop new courses on television journalism and reporting.

Nigora Bozorova is working with Professor Johanna Nichols on Uzbek language instruction in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures. She is a Ph.D. candidate in linguistics at Tashkent State University who has taught Uzbek in her home country.

Izabela Filipiak, doctoral student at the Institute of Literary Research of the Polish Academy of Sciences, is spending the fall semester at Berkeley. She is working on her dissertation, “Maria Komornicka and the Construct of the ‘Other.’”

Yong-Chool Ha, director of the Center for International Studies at Seoul National University, Korea, is visiting Berkeley during fall 2003 to work on a book manuscript on Soviet and Russian politics. He received a Ph.D. in political science from UC Berkeley in 1985.

Andreas Johns is a visiting lecturer with the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures this year, teaching a course on reading and composition and on Slavic and East European folklore. Andreas received his Ph.D. from Berkeley’s Slavic department in 1996.

Misa Kanda, doctoral student in politics at Kobe University, Japan, is a Rotary Ambassadorial Scholar at Berkeley for the year. Her research focuses on postwar Bosnia.

Dr. Alma Kunanbaeva, independent cultural anthropologist, will come to Berkeley in Spring 2004 to teach courses on Kazakh language and nationalism and ethnic identity in Central Asia through the Department of Near Eastern Studies.

Shorena Kurtsikidze is working on the teaching of Georgian in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures with Professor Johanna Nichols. Shorena holds a Ph.D. in cultural anthropology from the Academy of Sciences of Georgia.

Zenonas Norkus, professor in the Department of Social Theory at the University of Vilnius, Lithuania, is a Fulbright scholar at Berkeley for the year. He will be conducting research on comparative historical sociology in the United States.

Dejan Ognjanovic, lecturer with the Department of English Language and Literature at the University of Nis, Serbia and Montenegro, is visiting Berkeley this year on a Junior Faculty Development Grant from American Councils for International Education. He will develop new courses in American studies while pursuing an interest in film.

George Sanikidze, director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Georgian Academy of Sciences, will spend the academic year at Berkeley working on a research project entitled “Islam, Globalization, and the Caucasus.”

Sylvia Sasse will spend another semester at the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures. She is a lecturer at Zentrum fur Literaturforschung in Berlin and has a year-long Humboldt grant, which she began in spring 2003.

Hasmig Seropian is a visiting lecturer in the Department of Slavic Language and Literatures this year where she will be teaching Modern Armenian language in the department’s Eurasian studies program. She has a Ph.D. in linguistics from UC Berkeley.

Branislav Stevanovic, professor in the Department of Sociology with the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Nis, Serbia and Montenegro, is visiting Berkeley this year on a Junior Faculty Development Grant from American Councils for International Education. He will develop new courses on political sociology.

Catherine Taylor-Skarica is a visiting lecturer in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures. She will be teaching Serbian/Croatian language for the year.

David Wolff, research scholar with the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, is a research scholar at Berkeley this academic year. David received his Ph.D. in history from UC Berkeley in 1991.
During the late 1980s, Russians in the USSR and Serbs in Yugoslavia faced a set of broadly similar circumstances. Russians and Serbs each occupied a leading role in their respective multiethnic countries in terms of their numerical representation in the political elite and the population as a whole. Communist regimes in both countries faced crises of legitimacy amidst severe economic downturns and profound social malaise. Furthermore, in each country communist elites sought to shore up the declining legitimacy of their regimes by holding competitive regional elections. However, these elections brought nationalists to power in the non-Russian and non-Serbian republics who began making demands for independent statehood. These demands posed a potential threat to the positions of the Serbian and Russian minorities residing in these republics.

Yet Serbs and Russians responded to these similar conditions in strikingly different ways. Serbs reacted by mobilizing behind a group of nationalist elites led by Slobodan Milosevic who espoused an extreme nationalist ideology. This ideology pointed to the dire threat that Albanians, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims posed to the Serbian nation and the subsequent need to form a Serbian state in which Serbs would occupy an exclusive and dominant role. To accomplish this task, this ideology stressed the tremendous sacrifices the nation would have to undergo, the necessity of subordinating all internal divisions to the nationalist cause, and the need to use any and all available means, including violence, to achieve the nation’s goals.¹

In contrast to the Serbs, however, Russians did not mobilize behind an extreme nationalist ideology. While many Russians were concerned by the nationalist mobilization of non-Russians, they hardly feared such developments to the same extent that Serbs did. As a result, pro-Russian elites, espousing extreme nationalist ideologies directed against non-Russians, failed to rally significant support.

This essay will attempt to account for the differing responses Russians and Serbs put forth in the late 1980s to the collapse of the states in which they had occupied central roles. I argue that two structural differences in the historical experiences of Serbs and Russians explain these varying outcomes. To begin with, from the time they first developed a national consciousness in the nineteenth century, Serbs lacked an established nation-state which contained all Serbs within its borders and provided them with an unquestionably dominant status. Second, states under which Serbs historically lived tended to be internally weak, creating conditions that embroiled Serbs in repeated and violent conflicts with neighboring ethnic groups. These factors created the cultural raw material that enabled nationalist elites to mobilize Serbs behind an extreme nationalist ideology once the Yugoslav state underwent a process of disintegration in the late 1980s. The relative absence of these two factors in the Russian case accordingly explains why, even under similar conditions of state disintegration, pro-Russian elites failed to rally broad support behind an extreme nationalist ideology.

This essay will start by outlining the relevant cultural differences between Serbs and Russians which served as the immediate determinant of the varying outcomes in the late 1980s. I will then outline the two structural factors responsible for producing these cultural differences. The analysis subsequently moves on to a discussion of the role of state disintegration. The essay concludes by outlining a theoretical framework based on the above argument that is capable of explaining whether, when, and against whom a given nation will mobilize behind an extreme nationalist ideology. Also discussed are the possible implications this framework holds for some currently predominant theories of nationalism.

**The Nationalist Discourse**

The most immediate factor responsible for these different outcomes was differences in the two nations’ nationalist
discourses. The nationalist discourse refers to a set of ideas that a given nation holds about itself and its relationship with outside groups. For any given nation, this discourse emerges during the historical period in which its members begin to think of themselves in national terms. It is then transmitted over time and space through literature, oral communication, the arts, and memory. This discourse is always present, even if the political relevance of the ideas in this discourse varies over time. A nationalist ideology, in contrast, is the political articulation of the ideas in a nationalist discourse. Unlike the nationalist discourse, moreover, mass-mobilizing nationalist ideologies are not present at all times in a nation’s history. Thus, the nationalist discourse serves as the raw material from which mass-mobilizing nationalist ideologies are (periodically) made.

The nationalist discourses of Serbs and Russians differed in a number of important respects. First, they varied in their level of familiarity to nation members. Nationalist themes dominate the Serbian arts, and nationalist literature, poetry, and theatre are well-known to most Serbs. As Mihailovich explains, “If one were to take away all the works dealing with Kosovo in one form or another, Serbian literature would be greatly impoverished … No other event in Serbian history has had such immense power to move entire generations of writers, indeed an entire people, over such a long time.” However, national traditions tend to be much less familiar to Russians than they are to Serbs. Surveys of Russian youth reveal that nearly 75 percent have a poor knowledge of Russian “folk traditions.” In addition, nationalist themes are hardly as dominant in the Russian arts.

Apart from familiarity, these discourses differed in content as well. The Serbian arts are filled with themes that are consistent with an extreme nationalist ideology. A prominent theme in this discourse is the nation’s weaker position vis-à-vis outside groups. Referring to their Turkic overlords, one popular folk song asserts that “If all the Serbs were changed to grains of salt/We could not even salt one dinner of theirs.” The permanent threat posed by these external enemies constitutes a second theme of this discourse. Constant references to the tenuousness of the nation’s survival are found in the Serbian arts. Serbian literature, for example, is preoccupied with the ability of more powerful enemies to “destroy completely our nation and our country.” Maintaining national unity in the face of these threats is imperative. A predominant message in the Serbian nationalist discourse holds that the Serbs prospered when united and suffered when divided. According to Serbian popular thought, the demise of the medieval Serbian state following the Serbs’ historic defeat at the legendary Battle of Kosovo in 1389 owed much to internal “disloyalty and discord.” Nationalist Serbian leaders have long exploited the popular myth that “internal schism provoked the downfall of the medieval state,” to use the words of a prominent nineteenth-century colonel.

If the Serbian nationalist discourse warns against the dangers posed by external enemies, it also justifies taking all means necessary to ensure the nation’s survival against these outside threats. All Serbs must be prepared to undergo the ultimate sacrifice in defense of the nation. “Here I am, O my poor Serbian country,” remarks Popovic, the nineteenth-century writer, “ready for a dreadful sacrifice for your happiness” to avoid “seeing the downfall of the Serbian lands.” Personal sacrifice on behalf of the nation is not simply a virtue but an obligation, the failure to fulfill which is considered a deplorable act. One of the most famous poems in the Serbian literary tradition sets down this duty:

Whoever is a Serb, and of Serbian blood/And he comes not to fight at Kosovo/May he never have any progeny/His heart desires, neither son nor daughter/Beneath his hand let nothing decent grow/Neither purple grapes nor wholesome wheat/Let him rust away like dripping iron/Until his name shall be extinguished!

The surest way to maintain the nation’s survival is to build a national state that contains all Serbs within its borders. The misery of losing a state, the task of constructing a state, and the glory of obtaining a state constitute the defining points of departure in the Serbian nationalist discourse. Three epochs in Serbian history, all considered by Serbs as critical junctures in the nation’s long quest for its own state, serve as the main reference points in practically all epic poetry and historiography: the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, the uprisings of 1804–1805, and the wars of 1912–1918.

Unlike the Serbian discourse, the Russian nationalist discourses have traditionally been defined by themes other than external domination, the threats posed to the nation’s existence, and the need for heroic sacrifices to obtain a national state. Most of the post–World War II nationalist writers, for instance, primarily focused on the corruption of society and the nation’s moral decay as the primary dangers facing the national community. Absent is the preoccupation with the need to build and maintain a national state to protect the nation from hostile outside enemies. If anything, the Russian discourses take the existence of a Russian national state for granted. In this important respect, the Russian nationalist discourses are distinct from their Serbian counterpart, which has one focus: the imperative of obtaining a state to ensure the nation’s very survival.

Furthermore, while Serbs have one discourse that provides decisive answers to the question of who the Serbs are and what their mission is, Russians are divided between competing nationalist discourses. Indeed, the very question of “who the Russians are” is a subject of great contention among both elite and ordinary Russians. Russian thought has traditionally been torn between a “Westernizing” discourse, which views the nation as culturally and historically part of Europe, and an alternative “Slavophile”
version, which stresses the nation’s unique, non-Western character. There are also differences of opinion among Russians as to whether the multiethnic Rossiskii or the ethnically-based Russkii concept of Russian nationhood best defines the Russian nation.12 If nationalist discourses are the stuff from which nationalist ideologies are made, the persistence of competing Russian discourses explains why no single ideology—much less an extreme nationalist one—successfully mobilized Russians from 1987 to 1991.

Most importantly, perhaps, are differences in the collective memories that comprise the nationalist discourses of Russians and Serbs. Serbs have salient memories of extreme victimization historically imposed on them by other nations who lived in Yugoslavia—mainly Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Albanians. These memories inform a large part of popular culture. For instance, Vuk Draskovic’s famous book, The Knife, graphically depicts Muslim and Croat massacres of Serbs during World War II.13 Such memories would later become manifest in Serbian nationalist movements led by Milosevic, Draskovic, Vojislav Seselj, and Radovan Karadzic which warned against the threat to Serbs posed by Croats, Albanians, and Bosnian Muslims.14 Russians, too, remember historical instances of externally-imposed victimization, but this hardship is seen to have come at the hands of the West, Islam, and Asia, not from other nations who lived in the USSR. To the extent that the Russian nationalist discourses do refer to non-Russians, they are generally viewed as non-threatening.15 “Let the Uzbeks, Tatars, and Georgians concern themselves with their antiquity, their history, let them pride themselves on their individual cultures,” exhorts one Soviet-era Russian nationalist.16 Far from fear and hostility, the views of Russians toward non-Russians can even approach what Anatol Lieven labels “post-colonial guilt.” One Russian poet even laments that “I too am to blame for the occupation and enslavement of the Baltic states.”17

In the current analysis, collective memory played the crucial role of determining which groups the nation would mobilize against, or would not mobilize against; the nationalist ideology the nation would come to support in the late 1980s would target those groups whom the nationalist discourse identifies as the nation’s historical victimizers.

The Extent to Which the Nation Historically Possessed an Established Nation-State

Thus, the Serbian nationalist discourse stresses the constant threat posed to Serbs by hostile outside enemies, the need to obtain a national state at all costs, the need for great personal sacrifice on behalf of the nation, and the need to maintain national unity at the expense of internal divisions. These ideas are precisely the ones that defined the nationalist ideology that mobilized Serbs in the late 1980s. Yet, unlike the Serbs, the Russian nationalist discourses generally do not contain themes consistent with an extreme nationalist ideology.

Two underlying structural factors account for these differences in the Serbian and Russian nationalist discourses. The first is the extent to which each nation had what I term an established nation-state during the historical period in which their members underwent the process of social mobilization and accordingly began thinking of themselves in national terms.18 For the Serbs, this period comprised the early to mid-twentieth century. For the Russians, this period occurred from the late Tsarist period until the late 1930s when the modernization process was nearing completion.

Both the Tsarist and Soviet states were effectively regarded by Russians as their own states; both states contained within their borders most of the worldwide Russian population and gave a clearly dominant role to Russians. Also, these states were very strong, both internally and in relation to other states. However, neither the nineteenth-century Serbian kingdom nor the interwar Yugoslav state were defined by these characteristics to the same extent. The kingdom was externally vulnerable and, more importantly, left a large population of ethnic Serbs stranded beyond its frontiers. While in interwar Yugoslavia Serbs had now become united under a single state, they neither made up an absolute majority of the population nor dominated the composition of the country’s political and economic elite; the membership of this elite now included many Croats and Slovenes as well. In addition, Serbs perceived Croat and Albanian nationalism to pose serious internal threats to the state.19

Differences in the extent to which each nation had an established nation-state during their respective nation-building periods had two important effects on the character of their respective nationalist discourses. The first was the incentives for nation-building elites to define the nation’s identity on the basis of ethnic particularism. Serbian political elites during this period did not have an established nation-state under their control but were rather trying to expand and consolidate the authority of their state. They consequently had to find a way to legitimize these efforts and did so by laying claim to this yet-to-be-constructed state on behalf of the Serbian nation. They subsequently worked hard to define the Serbian nation on the basis of its distinctiveness from neighboring groups. The Serbian kingdom defined its mission as the achievement of a national state that would include all nation members. All of the political parties in the Serbian kingdom except the socialists adopted nationalist platforms that were virtually indistinguishable.20 In the words of King Aleksandar I, it was the kingdom’s destiny to consolidate all “territories in which Orthodox Serbs dominate because it is our historical right, and also because it is their aspiration to unite with Serbia.”21 The strong national cohesion of Serbs was already evident by the start of the Balkan wars in...
1912. Serbia was able to quickly mobilize an army of 350,000 from a population of 2.9 million that succeeded in “retaking” Kosovo in nine days.22 The result of these efforts was the development of a Serbian nationalist discourse that contains ideas about the Serbian nation that are uniform, consistent, and well-known to the average Serb.

However, since Russian elites already controlled an established and powerful state, they were much less compelled to undertake vigorous efforts to instill a sense of Russian ethnic distinctiveness from neighboring groups. This was true both of the Tsarist empire23 and the Soviet Union, where “Great Russian Chauvinism” was deemed the “main threat” to the prospect of successful socialist development.24 As a result, the Russian nationalist discourses do not provide clear answers to the question of what it means to be a Russian but rather offer highly conflicting answers to this question.

The second effect this factor had on the two nations’ nationalist discourses was the conception the nation had of its role vis-à-vis outside groups; in particular, it determined whether these discourses viewed the nation as occupying a dominant or dominated position in relation to neighboring groups. Since Serbs lacked an established nation-state during the nation-building period compared to Russians, the Serbian nationalist discourse came to conceive of Serbs as a nation dominated by outside enemies—particularly Croats, Albanians, and Bosnian Muslims. As a result, the nationalist discourse that emerged among Serbs stressed the nation’s tenuous prospects for survival and the subsequent need to maintain national unity in the face of these external threats. Above all, the discourse highlighted the challenge of overcoming the nation’s subjugation by creating an established nation-state that would include within its borders all Serbs. Yet the Russian nationalist discourses viewed the Russian nation as occupying a clearly dominant role in relation to non-Russian groups residing within the Russian and Soviet states, a view reflected in official Soviet propaganda characterizing Russians as the “leading nation” in the empire.

**The Extent to Which the Nation Historically Lived Under a Singular and Strong State with Neighboring Groups**

Thus, the first underlying factor accounting for the differences in the Serbian and Russian nationalist discourses was variations in the extent to which each nation had an established nation-state during their respective nation-building periods. A second structural factor also contributed to these differences. This was the fact that Russians historically lived under singular and strong states with other nations who resided in the USSR, while Serbs generally did not. Rather, states under which Serbs lived with Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Albanians proved to be fundamentally weak. This created conditions that embroiled Serbs in repeated instances of violent conflict with these other nations from the late nineteenth century onward. These conflicts are well-documented elsewhere and do not warrant extensive review here.25 As a result, the Serbian nationalist discourse came to be defined by a salient collective memory of severe victimization suffered at the hands of these groups.

In contrast to the Serbs, however, Russians traditionally lived under singular and strong states with other nations who resided in the USSR. As a consequence, the history of relations between Russians and these other nations was generally not defined by instances of mutually-inflicted violence, and this is certainly true when compared to relations between Serbs and other nations living in ex-Yugoslavia. While successive Russian empires experienced periodic uprisings among Poles, Chechens, and the Baltic nations, these episodes were not characterized by the massive use of violence against ethnic Russians that Serbs experienced in their own relations with neighboring ethnic groups. Unlike the Serbs, then, the Russian nationalist discourses generally do not contain memories of victimization suffered at the hands of nations who lived in Tsarist Russia and the USSR.

**The Disintegration of the Yugoslav and Soviet States**

Thus far we have seen how Serbs developed a nationalist discourse containing ideas consistent with an extreme nationalist ideology while Russians did not. These differences were due, in turn, to variations in the extent to which each nation had an established nation-state during their respective nation-building periods and in the extent to which each nation historically lived under a strong state with neighboring nations.

However, we have yet to examine the conditions that transformed the Serbian nationalist discourse into a mass-mobilizing ideology in the late 1980s. How did Serbian elites gain the opportunity to employ such an ideology in defiance of the central leadership of the Communist Party? Moreover, after having been deprived of mass-adherence for nearly half a century, why did this ideology suddenly find a popular receptiveness among Serbs during the late 1980s and not the late 1960s? The answer to these questions is found in the disintegration of the Yugoslav state, a process which began in the late 1960s and reached a critical stage in the 1980s. State disintegration is what determined the timing of the extreme nationalist ideology’s rise to political prominence.

The disintegration of the Yugoslav state signaled a decline in the state’s capacity to maintain stability in inter-ethnic relations. Beginning in the late 1960s with the nationalist mobilization of Croats and Albanians for greater

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Surveying the Silk Road: A Review of Recent Political Science Contributions

Regine Spector

Regine Spector is a graduate student in the Department of Political Science. She studied Uzbek language in Tashkent during the past summer.

Over the decade since the former Soviet republics of Central Asia gained independence, a growing body of political science literature is beginning to shed light onto this relatively understudied corner of the world. The purpose of this short article is to review the existing political science research on the region and to suggest future areas of study based on my observations in Tashkent, Uzbekistan this past summer.

The review begins by exploring recent contributions to the political science literature in the subfields of institutional development, regime change, political economy, political identity, leadership, and international relations. I show how the often competing understandings and explanations of particular questions reflect the diversity of theoretical approaches and methods employed in this body of research. I conclude by offering my own suggestions for future research.

Political Science Contributions to Understanding Post-Soviet Central Asia

Institutional Development. One of the overarching questions in the political science literature asks to what extent Soviet-era institutions remain in post-Soviet Central Asia. In her recent book, Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia, Pauline Jones Luong chooses three Central Asian countries (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan) as case studies to shed light onto her puzzle: upon independence, why did each country adopt a different electoral system, in light of the shared Soviet institutional legacy? To answer her question, she builds upon and combines two approaches in the study of institutional origin and change: historical institutionalism (HI) and rational choice institutionalism (RCI). HI helps to explain the historical backdrop for the electoral negotiations, in particular the Soviet institutional legacy that strengthened regional identities of elites, as opposed to ethnic, republican, or religious ones, especially in the political sphere. Given this historical setting, RCI then shifts the focus to the individual level and helps to explain how regional and central elites bargained, taking into consideration their perceptions of one another’s relative power, to achieve the final outcome: a particular form of electoral system. In this way, Jones Luong makes the case that regionalism, defined as “identities based on the internal administrative-territorial division established under the Soviet regime,” in contrast with other identities, best explains the outcome of institutional reform in these three countries.

Regime Change. The majority of new studies on the region focus on explaining variation in post-Soviet Central Asian regimes, the common premise being that they have diverged from their common Soviet legacy upon independence. Kathleen Collins, in a series of recent publications based on her dissertation, builds on the regime change literature by asking why three Central Asian states departed significantly in their political systems after independence, despite the common Soviet past.

The outcomes in Central Asia initially ranged from an authoritarian regime (Uzbekistan) to a reform agenda (Kyrgyzstan) to a civil war (Tajikistan). In order to explain these different outcomes, she builds upon the transitions literature, which argues that pacts made between elite reformers and hardliners determine the nature of the transition by adding a new variable, clans. Collins argues that the nature of clan pacts in Central Asia determined not only whether or not the transition would be stable or violent, but also the level of reform implemented in the stable countries.

She also uses this approach to explain in her dissertation why countries like Kyrgyzstan diverged from their initial liberal trajectory in the mid-1990s. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, she argues that clan pacts concluded prior to the transition allowed President Akaev to come to power and also allowed him to implement a democratic-oriented program due to high levels of trust within the clan. Yet precisely these clan loyalties have required Akaev (and other Central Asian leaders) to distribute political power and economic resources among their clan members, leading to an over-reliance on his group to the exclusion of others. She concludes that this has resulted in the more authoritarian policies that have been observed over the course of the 1990s.

The question of “reversion to authoritarianism” has also been addressed by three other scholars. In her book
discussed above, Jones Luong also takes the case of Kyrgyzstan and argues that Akaev liberalized to include other small parties in the political process because he was “bargaining from a position of weakness relative to other established elites. This implies that he then withdrew his support for democracy later in the transition because he perceived that the balance of power had shifted in his favor.” Thus, according to Jones Luong, Akaev reversed his liberal policies as he regained control over the political and economic situation in the country.

Steve Fish also asks why countries change course, using a different methodology, large-N statistical analysis. In his comparative study of post-Communist countries, Fish focuses on a subset of countries that have reversed their initially democratic trajectories, including Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. After summarizing and evaluating existing arguments for this phenomenon, he offers his own tripartite cause for democratic reversion: the combination of institutional concentration of power in the president, oppositional weakness as defined by the inability to communicate with citizens and mobilize resources and people, and powerful external patronage, usually from Russia and Western countries.

Finally, Eric McGlinchey asks the broad question of why the Central Asian regimes have become more authoritarian, especially in two countries where Western investment and involvement have been greatest. He investigates Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to show how two important Soviet-era institutions—patronage networks and a predatory judicial system—are reinforced in different ways upon independence by outside funders, in the case of Kazakhstan by the energy industry and in the case of Kyrgyzstan by international aid organizations. He argues that neither clan nor regional identities are the determinants of regime outcomes (although these and other institutional factors influence the outcomes). Instead, he finds the leaders’ “access to economic sources of rule” the most important determinant of political reform (in Kyrgyzstan) and authoritarian tendencies (in Kazakhstan and later Kyrgyzstan). In this way, McGlinchey builds on the regime change and political economy literature by merging them, looking at how external funding (economic development) affects regime change.

**Political Economy.** In addition to McGlinchey’s contribution to the political economy literature, other studies in Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon’s edited volume have focused on the energy wealth in the Caspian littoral states of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, in particular on how the development of resources impacts domestic economic and institutional reform (or lack thereof). Terry Karl applies her previously published findings of non-Caspian energy producing states to Central Asia, arguing that the short-term gains of energy production have often stifled political and economic development, a past trend that does not augur well for Central Asia. Pauline Jones Luong builds on this argument by looking at Kazakhstan in particular. She finds that “Kazakhstan’s approach toward its energy sector is aimed at promoting political acquiescence and providing social and economic relief in the short term, yet it is actually increasing the likelihood for political instability and socioeconomic decay over the long term.”

David Hoffman also compares two oil-rich countries in his dissertation, “Oil and State-Building in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan,” in particular focusing on the variation in state capacity of these two countries to promote long-term economic growth. The driving question for Hoffman is how economic growth in the short term, powered largely by the rich energy sector, impacts the development of state institutions, which in turn greatly affects the long term trajectory for national economy more broadly. He argues that while both countries have started from a similar institutional legacy and adopted a similar policy of focusing on the development of the energy sector, the two countries ultimately diverge in the development of state institutions. He isolates two independent variables causing this difference: the relationship between regional and ethnic groups in society and government, and the nature of the ruling regime. In particular, he argues that the Kazakhstani state has been making greater progress in economic management and administrative reform than Azerbaijan, in this way increasing the prospects for the former to broaden its economic base.

**Identity Politics.** While Collins has studied clans in order to explain regime outcomes, Edward Schatz in his doctoral dissertation employs a case study of Kazakhstan to answer two different questions regarding subethnic identities (including clans): first, how did subethnic identities survive despite the Soviet attempt to eradicate them and second, what role does subethnic competition (as contrasted with other identifications such as ethnic identity) play in contemporary politics today? Schatz argues that the particular ways in which Soviet policy attempted to subsume subethnic identities actually sustained their existence. Among other reasons, he argues that the constant shortages in Soviet Central Asia resulted in the distribution of benefits along subethnic networks. In raising these questions, he contributes to our understanding of the conditions under which subethnic identities survive and affect political processes and power struggles.

**Leadership.** A new body of literature highlights presidential leadership as an important variable in explaining the regimes in post-Soviet Central Asia. In her most recent book Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise, Martha Brill Olcott traces the consolidation of President Nazarbayev’s power over the past decade: “In this book, I discuss how, with time, Kazakhstan’s leaders have grown more confident in advancing the national cause of the Kazakh people and are doing so in a way that increasingly works to their own personal advantage.” She highlights the circumstances, some within the leadership’s control and some
Beyond, that have led to such a great divide between the leadership and the general population.

An edited volume by Sally Cummings sets out to better understand and compare the nature of authoritarian regimes in post-Soviet Central Asia by focusing on the leaders and their policies. Sally Cummings and John Ishiyama in their respective chapters, offer approaches to classifying the types of authoritarian regimes and explanations for these variations. Ishiyama categorizes all five regimes as neopatrimonial, a political system where the president "maintains authority through personal patronage rather than through ideology or law." He then differentiates the Central Asian countries based on level of participation and competition in the political system, with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan scoring higher on these indicators than Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Cummings offers one explanation for these differences, namely that the level of consolidation and centralization within the elite prior to the collapse of the USSR and after determines the types of leadership. The other authors, including Eugene Huskey and Roger Kangas, shed light on this question in their individual country case studies, bringing in cultural, economic, political, and social factors as explanations for the differences in types of authoritarian regimes.

**International Relations.** While much of the political science literature has focused on domestic politics in the region, a few new publications explore topics in international relations. One new edited volume by Robert Legvold offers a new perspective on what is called a "mature" weak state, surrounded by great powers and complex interconnections with neighboring countries. Keith Darden in his doctoral dissertation, "The Origins of Economic Interests: Economic Ideas and the Formation of Regional Institutions among the Post-Soviet States," asks why the fifteen newly independent states, despite their common institutional legacies, adopted such different approaches to international affairs, in particular, why some joined certain regional economic institutions and others did not. He surveys a number of different approaches to the origin of interests, finally settling on the importance of actors' ideas and cultures in explaining their behavior. In particular, he finds that the ways that decision makers think about economics impacts whether the country joins the WTO, joins the economic institutions of the CIS, or pursues autarchy. In this way, he adopts a pragmatic constructivist approach that focuses on the role of ideas over other traditional international relations approaches such as realism or liberalism.

**Summary.** The premise for most of the contemporary studies on post-Soviet Central Asia rests on Mills’ Method of Difference, that is the studies explain divergent outcomes in spite of common Soviet legacies (Jones Luong, Collins, Darden, Hoffman). A number of authors also explore the nature and extent of continuity from the Soviet and pre-Soviet systems. Jones Luong argues that Soviet institutional legacies have largely remained in the newly independent states in the form of strong regional identification, Collins and Schatz argue that pre-Soviet clan-based affiliations were in fact reinforced by Soviet policies, and McGlinchey points to two Soviet institutional legacies that were reinforced upon independence. Darden traces the extent to which Soviet economic ideas remained salient in the minds of leaders of the newly independent states. The authors have also looked at the creation of the electoral system (Jones Luong) and institutions of the state (Hoffman), adding a new perspective to the theoretical literature on institutions that often focuses on their impact, not their creation.

Methodologically, most authors have used small-N comparisons (Jones Luong, Collins, McGlinchey, Hoffman) or case studies (Olcott, Cummings, Schatz, Legvold). A few scholars have used all the post-Communist countries for larger-N statistical analyses (Fish) and for comparison of ideas (Darden), the former a quantitative approach and the latter a constructivist one. Theoretically, the approaches vary widely as well, building on the historical institutionalist school (Jones Luong, Hoffman) and the constructivist school (Darden, Schatz), among others.

**Ideas for Future Research**

While in Central Asia this past summer, I observed a number of new areas where political science research could contribute to our understanding of Central Asia. The first is to do with the nature of authoritarianism in Central Asia. While the literature has begun to address this question as noted above, a better understanding of how the regimes differ on policies toward economic, political, religious, and other social issues will help to inform our understanding of authoritarianism. For example, while in Tashkent, I was surprised to learn that my host family had access to cable TV, which included BBC, CNN, and Deutschewelle. Indeed the small minority who can afford such services were able to access these stations, while the majority of the population watches only the state-run, highly censored stations. Comparing each regime’s policies on such issues as access to information, religion, and the economy might yield interesting insights into the growing cleavages in society, primarily between rich and poor, and the political implications of such cleavages.

On the topic of economics, most attention has focused on the development of the oil and gas sectors in Central Asian countries. Yet prior to independence, many of the countries, especially Uzbekistan, were large producers of other products such as cotton and wheat. There were also important manufacturing and industrial centers in Central Asia during the Soviet Union. Since the USSR collapsed, many of these sectors have withered away, especially the manufacturing and industrial base. A study of the rise and
fall of these sectors would help to shed light onto the current economies and economic networks in Central Asia. In particular, as a result of these collapsed industries, poverty and migration flows have increased as people flee to find work in neighboring countries and shift to other sectors in the formal and informal economy, including shuttle trade and trafficking in drugs, humans, and small arms. These are especially important topics, as much of the livelihood for a broad segment of society appears largely dependent on such income. A study of the impact of these new informal economic trends on social structure and political coalitions would be a welcome addition to the field.

While much of the discussion on Islam in Central Asia focuses on Islamic extremism and other fringe groups, the nature of Islam in everyday Central Asian life and politics remains an understudied topic. The traditional communities, mahallahs, are becomingly increasingly divided on the issue of what form of Islam to adopt. At the local level, some seem to envision the adoption of a more cultural understanding of Islam, while others seem to desire a stricter interpretation of Islam, the latter with important social and political implications. Instead of seeing the question of Islam in Central Asia as a choice between Islamic fundamentalism and secularism, it could be viewed more as a dynamic process of redefinition at the community level, the development of which will be influenced by the economic situation and complex relationships between individuals, community leaders, and political elite at the regional and national levels.

Finally, when in Uzbekistan, it is impossible not to notice the bright, shiny new Daewoo Ticos, Nexias, and Damases crowding the streets of the major cities. This growing trade and investment relationship with South Korea signals an important new trend in economic development and foreign relations, the origin of which would make for an interesting study. While Uzbekistan has effectively closed its borders to regional neighbors (allegedly to stop militants from crossing), it has opened its doors to significant investment and joint ventures with South Korea. An investigation of the region’s relations with bordering neighbors, in particular China and Afghanistan, in addition to countries further away such as the US (which now hosts numerous military bases in the region) and South Korea, would help to place these countries in a broader regional framework.

Conclusion

This literature review has highlighted the range of questions that have been asked and the diversity of methodologies and theories that have informed these studies, indeed signs of both the complexity of the region and the diversity within the discipline. My suggestions call attention to the range of exciting new possibilities for political science research in Central Asia. While many of the contemporary political science contributions have focused on elite politics and institutions (regional elite, clan elite, leaders of countries, electoral systems, and state institutions), many of my ideas call for an analysis of the impact of current trends on the population more broadly. This is not to suggest that elites and institutions are not central to our understanding, but rather that the range of our academic attention should be expanded. Part of the challenge for researchers today rests in the difficulty of gathering reliable information on the mass level, especially given the lack of openness within many of these societies. Yet an awareness of the exceedingly complex and often non-transparent nature of politics in the region is the first step to overcoming the difficulties in finding reliable data. For important new work to be done, researchers will have to be creative and persistent in finding ways to access and collect information in the region.

Notes

1 Snuggled between the Caspian Sea and the western border of China, the term “Central Asia” has often referred to precisely these five new countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Yet historically, prior to the USSR, Central Asia included the territories of present-day Afghanistan and western China. For the purposes of this article, Central Asia refers to this latter, broader understanding, while the five former Soviet Central Asian republics (also termed post-Soviet Central Asia) will be referred to as such.

2 As a participant in the ACCELS summer Uzbek language program, I had the opportunity not only to learn Uzbek, but also to talk with people in a number of cities and regions in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Yet, given the short duration of my stay, my comments are simply those—observations and suggestions for future avenues of research. The author would like to thank the Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies and the Graduate Fellowship Office for making this trip possible.


4 Ibid., p. 52.


6 Jones Luong, Institutional Change, p. 28.

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Malcontent in Cambridge

Izabela Filipiak

Izabela Filipiak, Ph.D. candidate in the Institute of Literary Research of the Polish Academy of Sciences, is a visiting scholar at ISEEES. This essay is from her dissertation in progress, entitled “Maria Komornicka and the Construct of the ‘Other,’” from a longer chapter that explores Komornicka’s memoir of the women’s college of Newnham. A very singular memoir, it vividly describes the young writer’s experiences from a distinctly modern point of view.

Maria Komornicka (1876–1949) is the most intriguing poet and author of Polish modernism. She was born in a family of landed gentry, made her literary debut at the age of 16 and cowrote the first manifesto of Polish modernism in 1895 (together with Nalkowski, a socialist thinker, and the assimilated Jewish writer Jellenta). Under the clandestine male pen name of Piotr Wlast (Komornicka’s medieval renegade-ancestor), she held the enormously influential post of novel reviewer at the elitist literary magazine Chimera. In 1907 she chose a male identity, attempted to call herself Piotr Wlast in her private life as well, and subsequently, by her family’s decision, spent the next seven years of her life in a string of expensive mental clinics. Komornicka was released from treatment with the outbreak of World War I, returned to the family mansion in Grabow, and set to work on the idiosyncratic Book of Idyllic Poetry, a nearly 500-page-long autobiography in verses. She signed it with her chosen name, Piotr Wlast.

In the essay “Malcontent in Cambridge” we meet 18-year-old Maria Komornicka, passionate, clever, and spontaneous. Her reluctant trip to Cambridge in the fall of 1895—to the women’s college in Newnham—became the source of her brilliant account of this sojourn published in the Warsaw press a year later and not republished since. Komornicka observes the colonial pomposity of Cambridge with the critical eye of a foreigner who grew up distrustful of slogans under imperial rule in a partitioned country. She seems to be drawn to Newnham because of its renowned feminism but soon voices her disappointment: Newnhamites aren’t radical enough for her expectations. Maria Komornicka seems strikingly close to the liberal postmodern sensibility in her approach to the issues of colonization, nation, race, and gender—and if she lacks the tools provided by late-twentieth-century thinkers such as Michael Foucault, Julia Kristeva, and Luce Irigaray, she makes up for this lack with her spontaneity, irony, and passion, as well as her ability to draw from the reservoir of romantic concepts.

Nostalgia

In the fall of 1894, when Maria Komornicka departs for Cambridge, she is brimming with creative energy. Her debut collection of short stories has been published earlier in the same year, and her drama in two acts, Skrzywdzeni (The Injured), was introduced in the weekly Gazeta Poznanska in sequels. The author is 18 years old, and it remains to be seen whether the development of her character will keep pace with the precocious expression of her talent. Her talent becomes her credo, a principle of personal faith and the pivot upon which she orients all her actions. Like the heroines of her recently published stories—intractably dissatisfied with what they have been offered, even when they do the choosing—Komornicka is about to commit her first grand ironic act. Or rather, strictly speaking, she is about to rewrite the latest events of her life so they will resemble an ironic act, an ingenuous and witty statement.

If Maria Komornicka had been given time to consider where she would prefer to study—or if the idea of her study came under a lesser pressure—she would have done better to choose Switzerland, more welcoming to women students arriving from Eastern Europe. The ambitious idea of Cambridge originated in the beginning of 1894, when her father Augustyn Komornicki decided to do away with the family’s Warsaw apartment. He had found himself excluded from his wife and daughters’ urban life and responded to this exclusion with an intention to bring them back to the family estate in Grabow. The consolation prize was to be a live-in English tutor, a governess imported hastily for his daughters. Yet, as the sister Aniela Komornicka notes in her short memoir:

To such a resolution Marynia would not consent; conversely, the father could not allow for her independent stay in Warsaw; he offered her a choice between Grabow and the departure to Cambridge, to study at the university under the exemplary care of sanctimonious Miss Gladston, the minister’s sister. Marynia chose England.¹

Cambridge was a symbol of Augustyn’s thwarted ambitions, as he was made by his stepfather to choose between inheriting Grabow and his plans to study. He subjected himself to this harsh condition and allowed his hopes for a law degree at the renowned Jagiellonian University to be dashed. The daughter would become her father’s surrogate, take over his heritage—conceptual, spiritual—and inscribe a happy ending to the family script of educational hunger.

¹ See footnote.
It was against the subjugation of her own life to somebody else’s narrative that the 18-year-old author might have rebelled, when she renounced the pleasure of touring Paris and London on the family trip to England. Her sister Aniela remembers that:

Marynia’s aversion to this compulsory journey was so strong that throughout the whole trip she would sit out for days in a hotel, and couldn’t be convinced to come out and sightsee the capitals of Europe. Such was an expression of her passive protest against the almighty paternal will.2

Here is the ingénue of the family comedy; of a dinner table anecdote recounted with the dessert course and thumbed like a napkin. The endpoint of the trip was Cambridge, where Maria would be settled for her studies. Although she behaved as if she had no expectations, she must have invested this journey with some hope, or she wouldn’t have been disappointed. As it is, her disappointment forms an axis of A Memoir of Cambridge. It draws in the events and makes them cohere. It sets Maria apart from the women professors, as well as students who might have been her natural allies. What is she gaining from all this loss? Making dissatisfaction into her standpoint, Maria ennobles herself as an artist and a romantic wanderer. She sets out on a journey to find the grander world. But, lo:

An ironic twist of faith! One leaves Warsaw because it had been intoxicating us with its destitute atmosphere, so as to find in Cambridge the same confined—even more so—scope of life, the same fetid morality, the same wrenching hunger for sensation. (11:190)3

The flow of letters seems to sustain her but, when a pen pal whose name she withholds (one of her much older literary colleagues she left behind in Warsaw) wagers—in a patronizing twist—that her nostalgia might be the mark of her own rusticity, Komornicka retorts:

I have quested for these omni-worldly impressions in England, and for this inter-human bond meant to call up our brother in a foreigner. And haven’t found any. Why? (10:175)4

For now, when we already know what she wished to come upon and failed to, let us reveal that Maria Komornicka was never a student of Cambridge. Her name is not mentioned in the list of Newnham College students for the year 1894. In fact, the author of A Memoir of Cambridge never admits to being a student. Also, her sister Aniela in her in memoriam tactfully avoids conceding that Maria Komornicka might not have been enrolled. She must have arrived at the end of summer and most certainly studied for her entrance examination (her memoir mentions it, but we don’t know what happened later). Perhaps she didn’t pass or did not measure up to the academic standards. If she failed, was the reason as simple as a lack of linguistic fluency? Or did she shrink from scholarly duties, never before having attended a day of school in her life? Was it her impious attitude or bureaucracy; or maybe that the nostalgia and repulsion prevailed and she simply skipped the exams? Or was she advised to attend classes of her own choosing and sharpen her skills before enrolling full time into Newnham?

Whatever the case, the sense of alienation built into the text had a more formal than existential basis from which to grow. Maria feels alienated from the group of students because she doesn’t belong. She becomes painfully aware of the hierarchy and bias because she is not included in the mutual support which helps the Newnham students withstand the impact of stultifying prohibitions and discover their own power in spite of them.

Youth’s Paradise: A Memoir of Cambridge, as the full title reads, is an account of time spent in Cambridge from September 1894 to February 1895. It must have been written during her stay but was probably revised in the second half of 1895, between the publication of Forpoczty, the modernist manifesto which she both inspired and participated in, and the publication in serial form of Remembrance from Cambridge in the beginning of January 1896. Its narrative, shaped as a heroic tale, introduces the “creative self” of Maria Komornicka in the leading role. Hence the “self” propelled by its longing for an “omni-human, ideal society” and, additionally, motivated by “illusions” ignited to equal “desire” (10:175) sets out to journey abroad. After clashing with England—chilling like “an iceberg to those rather fervent gusts which soon quench hissing like kindled embers when water is poured on …” (5:79)—the racing little boat of self takes on water and sinks.

“A storm of premonitions, derision at the naive ardor which accompanied me here, rush across my soul like the hurricane—leaving me infinitely defeated, divided” (5:79). So now we know it wasn’t an order which brought her to Cambridge but most surely ardor. In the collision with an “iceberg” the enthusiastic subject rends itself into the one who wanted too much and the other one who derides her own “naive ardor.” The mechanism of self-preservation is set in motion when the defeated ego pleads for the retrieval of balance. The mocking eye turns to look at the outside, and the subject establishes herself at “a point from which the image itself looks at the spectator, the point of the ‘gaze of the Other.’”5

Her Gaze

Here is the young woman wandering through Cambridge. Whatever she sees, she will note down, setting herself to the task of observation and redefining. As a very mobile subject, Maria plans to convince us that her gaze is remarkable; she is a woman and a foreigner, and this makes her twice as alien. In addition, after the initial impasse, she doesn’t wish to annul her otherness; the very otherness will soon become for her the actual basis for self-reliance.
As I look at the B. family, for instance, with whom I stay, on the tender ties of parents to their children, on their social “position”, on “recognition” they receive—then I no longer bear the pain of my seclusion and I am proudly content to be—alone—sole—among the locals, consanguineous and settled; the one with no acquaintances who have seen me “in diapers” and, step by step, with a thriftiness of a Warsaw busybody, follow my moves; the one unknown and locked tight within myself, the one knowing all about myself, the one not recognizing uncles nor aunts, speaking to herself in an unknown tongue, uninteresting to all. (11:193)

Perhaps no one knows—not her hosts, nor her professor-guardian—that Komornicka is in Cambridge with an individual agenda. While other women students at Newnham learn the ropes of collaboration, her task is different, to design her identity as the Other; that is, the one who stays on the outside; who therefore does not profit from sojourning inside, who is not involved in negotiating.

Komornicka makes her apartness her basis, while her “lone memory, free from somebody else’s banal recollections, transforms the past into a relic, a treasure, a talisman of solace, strength, self-reliance ….” As she squirrels “the talisman of the past” away, she finds herself “strong, Ibsenian-style—because ‘I stand alone’, because all that is mine, in the mist, behind the fogs, is evident but to my memory, called forth only by my own spell” (11:193). Because she attends several classes, she is at times inside and, at other times, outside. In the best of cases it means she is on the edge.

Establishing herself as the Other, Komornicka wishes to convince us that she is capable of noticing more than the inhabitants of Cambridge, more than the Newnham students. If her perception is not richer, then at least it is more acute. There is a price that needs to be paid, though. The more her gaze is perfected, the more it sets her apart from the group. The pain of her isolation is the incentive that shapes this gaze. She takes a step sideways, and, with a thriftiness of a Warsaw busybody, follow my moves; the one unknown and locked tight within myself, the one knowing all about myself, the one not recognizing uncles nor aunts, speaking to herself in an unknown tongue, uninteresting to all.

Because she attends several classes, she is at times inside and, at other times, outside. In the best of cases it means she is on the edge.

Colonial England

Apparently, as she wanders through Cambridge, she cannot help noticing the fully-entitled, i.e., male, students: “I watch their voluptuous bodies, the arrogance of their toned muscles and the lack of spirit in their faces.” She favors “moving out of their way on the street, so as not to brush against the brutal mass of them,” even though she fears that she may be “thereby marking (she says “marking,” not “making”) but a formal concession.” At the same time she notices the lonely figures of African students. They are alien, too, and, like her, alienated. They don’t herd together in savage packs; they sidle alone as she does, and they carry a mark of apartness inscribed in their skin.

As I looked at them, apart from the deep sadness, compassion and liking, I also experienced an emotion of shame: an emotion that pervades us before a poor person or with a brother—hunchback … a sense of disgrace and violence inflicted on justice—as if we were privileged by their misery, better endowed for life by their weakness, healthy by their handicap, wealthy by their destitution … And I felt shame for my white face, shame for my hereditary culture, shame for nature and its pitiless, cruel, “rational” laws. (6:100)

This is an extraordinary confession, first because Maria, while being suffused with sympathy, does not yield to the colonizing temptation to identify with the African
students. She is apart—and they are apart. And moreover, she—in the presence of them—becomes part of us. The us is a certain formation, an abstract presence that has solidified into actual being, at times flippant, at other times judgmental identity that makes promises, admits, ignores. But sometimes it will let one flit in. Unless one opens one’s mouth, the usher will not know if this woman is British or a foreigner. And she may mislead us, may disguise herself for a man—in the realm of gazes she is not permanently marked.

And yet Komornicka in Cambridge was not privileged, even though she feels so in the presence of the African students—and to cap it all, she feels privileged at their expense. Her shame is real—and it is not shared by other members of Cambridge community who are indubitably privileged in relation both to her and to African students. Maria Komornicka had not contributed to such conditions, but she is ashamed for them, as well as for those who aren’t ashamed. Such a dash of recognition is not to be found in the literary culture of the end of the nineteenth century among Victorian or Polish writers. Both compassionate and discreet, she is taking responsibility in a manner that began to be shaped in European culture only after the Second World War and was emphasized, as well as reformulated, as a principle of the heightened political awareness in the liberal movement of 1968 and the Parisian intellectuals’ notable anti-establishment slogan “We are German Jews.” But the matter is even more tangled and this is why, I believe, she feels compassion, not affinity—because the students of color, being male, carry privileges she doesn’t share.

Such manner of thinking is perilous, or subversive, because each individual belonging to a particular group (in this case to the group of white inhabitants of Cambridge) models his or her identity on the basis of selective features related to the difference (and I am using this term both in the Deleusian and in the common sense). The presence of virtues within the privileged circle, as much as their lack outside of it, has to be both proven and pronounced for the difference to be established and formalized. All this means that the privileged group must be in some way shameless. Its shamelessness—in regard to what it considers to be the facts constituting the difference—is the sine qua non of preserving the social and cultural division. Maria doesn’t assent to the shamelessness, even though she subscribes to the naturalness of the difference—temporarily and only to further rebel against it, though. Thus she forfeits her chances to be provisionally accepted into the domain of “us.” From now on, the creative woman and the foreigner are two powerful characters interchanging within the landscape of Cambridge as the figure(s) of exclusion.

Maria Komornicka is not only an artist, she is also a young patriot. She is already so accustomed to having the most original minds for her teachers that, as she customarily tends to outgrow her mentors, it is regrettable no one seemed to fit into this role in Cambridge. Through her teachers and mentors, such as the literary historian Piotr Chmielowski and an early sociologist Waclaw Nalkowski, she learned to take it for granted that a man or a woman of letters, deserving of this name, should wish for the enfranchisement of their nation. She is widely read in Romantic poets pleading for the rights of other not yet enfranchised nations to be respected. In the earlier days she liked to shock her family (and especially her sister-in-law) by insisting she couldn’t commune with God because she was in a “state of potential faith.” Now she strides to the Sunday sermon. This could be due to her curiosity—Maria Komornicka has never experienced the Mass in the Anglican rite before—or a spiritual need, or even an intention to come closer to the community. This is how she arrives at the first of the two key crowd scenes, in the narrative of The Youth’s Paradise, featuring the community as a collective hero:

Some famous missionary returned from Australia and will give a speech—in the church. As we enter, the academic youth gathers in the choir, pink and puerile, in the voluminous and folded blackness of the gown. Below, the pews in three parallel, separate rows. In the middle—the place for “authorities”; on the sides—separately—men and women. Such a speech can begin with nothing less but the thanksgiving. The choir flows clear, felicitously, with not
one off-key note. Everybody holds their hymnals before their eyes; the order and attention are being overseen by the university police in togas, who, with glaring eyes call the absent-minded to ecstasies; their mere presence forces the students and the young ladies to more cautious communication with their eyes; on myself, for not having a prayer book and not belonging to the singing, they glower with a demonic frown—and hand me an open book, pointing with their finger to a suitable hymn, which, naturally, as an infidel, doesn’t impress me. The song subsides. The speaker appears at the pulpit.

He talks of savage peoples, of missionaries’ travails, of conversion miracles, of how the barbarians, so hardened, need to be forced with violence to acknowledge the truth … relates their ignorance, their impenitent hearts, their reluctance with regard to the donors of the light. And above all he recounts the power of England, its growth, the perfection of its civilization and its laws, and how in every part of the world it has captured spoils and slaves, and how it is the chosen nation. “English civilization and English law,” pronounced with an insistent voice every now and then, return to his lips, making a kind of leitmotif of his thesis. And no one else, presumably, seems to feel what strikes me with a head of a hammer and has me flinching, like a stinky smell … that this imperturbable, self-assured speaker—is not a pioneer of illumination—but an English “kulturkampfer”, not a zealous priest-apostle but an adherent of the brotherhood of plunder, an ally of the British fleet. (5:82)

Here is the celebration of the law as a profession of faith. More precisely, the English law with an inset of the colonial ideology. Men and women stand in separate aisles. As a matter of fact, into the main nave a lady may enter solely under a gentleman’s care (11:190), and yet, although divided, they together comprise the “us” mentioned above. And the “pink and puerile” academic youth—at least these young men who weren’t lucky enough to be first-born or fairly rich—will take public posts in India, Ceylon, or the Cape of Good Hope. There the no longer pampered youth will fight with scorpions and quell rebellions, catch (rioters and malaria), go berserk with heat, earn (gastric ulcers, governmental pensions), perish. The women present in this church are, or will be, their sisters and their wives. They will together breed new officials whose fate will not differ from making an untimely judgement … her walkout is not an act of rebellion but, primarily, of self-preservation. For she suffocates, quite literally, in the Anglican church; she lacks air “in the atmosphere of the collective British egoism,” and concomitantly, she witnesses the simulation of her own death, “the agony of the first illusion.” It is time for the dénouement, the main street of the city of Cambridge is perfectly still as its inhabitants derive tranquility from indoctrination. Which is just as well, for at last one can breathe. Maria walks through the deserted town, until:

As if from under the asphalt, a stream surfaces, a tributary of the Cam. I follow its course, I let it guide me … and it ushers me so sensibly: out of the town. An alley opens up before me; over the fence, across the water, swaying with the wind are clumps of trees of the Botanical garden (the university’s property). The stream, confined to the level stone banks, flows where I cannot follow it any longer—across the free-souled meadows, enclosed from this side by the pale. (5:82)

Like nature, Maria is an alien body in the structure of Cambridge. Although she remains there, she is nonetheless exiled. And yet she cannot deport herself any further, she seems unable to forsake the place of exile by her own wish. Or, to make it more poignant, there seems to be no safe haven within her reach. Cambridge is a restricted area,
barred from “free-souled” nature as strictly as if the campus was a precursor to the clinic; an establishment where she would find herself confined in about twelve years. The scene seems to be endowed with a symbolic dynamic: a mass—a street—a stream—a fence; as if it were a harbinger, a rehearsal for the real thing.

Notes

1 Aniela Komornicka, “Maria Komornicka w swych listach i mej pamieci” (Maria Komornicka in her letters and my memory), in Stanislaw Pigon and Maria Dernalowicz, ed., Archiwum Literackie, Vol. 8, Miscelanea, (Wroclaw, 1964), 307. Throughout her memoir Aniela consistently calls her sister by her diminutive family surname Marynia. When Aniela began to write her short memoir in 1959, her sister, who had died at the age of 73, was already gone for 10 years.

2 Ibid., 309.

3 Maria Komornicka, “Raj młodziezy. Wspomnienie z Cambridge” (Youth’s paradise: A memoir of Cambridge), parts 1–10, Przegląd Pedagogiczny (Pedagogical Review), 1896, nos. 5–7, 10–16, 24. Quotations from this work are cited in the text with abbreviations including the issue number and page number.

4 Maria Komornicka coins new words in this fragment: an adjective “omni-worldly” stands for worldwide, all-embracing, widespread; “inter-human” stands for interpersonal, congenial.


6 The Shakespearean Queen of Richard II, called in to the postmodernist chamber of intimations by Slavoj Zizek, deserted by her King, glances into the fissured glass surface of her anxiety to discover “shadows” of grief to come, with an accord to such logic: “a detail of a picture that ‘gaz’d rightly,’ i.e., straightforwardly, appears as a blurred spot, assumes clear, distinguished shapes once we look at it “awry,” at an angle.” Zizek, Looking Awry, 11.

7 These words remain in original English and, as such, are encrusted into Maria Komornicka’s narrative.

Surveying the Silk Road, continued from page 12


8 Ibid., pp. 66–75.


10 Ibid., p. 11.


12 Terry Lynn Karl, “Crude Calculations: OPEC Lessons for the Caspian Region,” chapter 3 in Ebel and Menon, eds.

13 Pauline Jones Luong, “Kazakhstan: The Long-Term Costs of Short-Term Gains,” chapter 5 in Ebel and Menon, eds.


Nationalism, continued from page 8

autonomy and accelerating after the death of Tito in 1981, the decline in state authority presented Serbs with the possibility of a major shift in the ethnic balance of power in favor of the other constituent nations in Yugoslavia. If Serbs had already grown concerned about the devolution of central power to the non-Serbian republics in the 1970s, the eruption of massive Albanian demonstrations in 1981 caused these concerns to grow into widespread fears of the possibility of renewed Serbian victimization at the hands of Albanians. Thus, by triggering the destabilization of inter-ethnic relations, the process of state disintegration made ordinary Serbs more receptive to the ideas in their nationalist discourse, ideas which now took on a greater practical relevance to their everyday lives.

Apart from destabilizing inter-ethnic relations, state disintegration also weakened the institutional controls that had formerly bound political elites to regime-defined norms of political action. For elites who were seeking out autonomous bases of support, state disintegration created opportunities to utilize nationalism as a means of mobilizing a mass following. Slobodan Milosevic undertook such an effort, embarking on a successful bid to consolidate his own power in Serbia at the expense of the central government. Beginning with his famous 1987 speech in front of an audience of Kosovar Serbs, Milosevic went on to stage over 100 anti-government mass demonstrations throughout Serbia. He succeeded through these protests in removing the leaderships of Vojvodina and Montenegro, replacing them with his own supporters.26

In this environment, the elites who ultimately gained power among Serbs were those who espoused an extreme nationalist ideology. This is because such an ideology was consistent with the themes present in the nationalist discourse. In Serbia in the late 1980s there was virtually no difference among the political platforms set forth by competing elites; they all amounted to a single ideology that came to reflect what one observer termed “the homogenization of Serbian opinion.”27 According to this ideology, the Serbian nation faced a dire threat to its very existence. Vuk Draskovic, who would become a prominent opposition leader, expressed this view quite clearly at a 1986 meeting of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU): “Can we remove the knowledge that one whole nation, the Serbian nation in Kosovo and Metohija, are being subjected to a campaign of organized terror by their Albanian neighbors, and the government in that area, which is now only formally considered part of Serbia?”28

This nationalist ideology called for extreme measures to confront this threat. All internal divisions would have to be suppressed in the name of maintaining national unity. The nation had to embark on a struggle to gain an independent state that would include all nation members. That objective, according to this ideology, would be pursued through any and all available means, including violence. In the words of Milosevic, “We simply consider it as a legitimate right and interest of the Serb nation to live in one state … And if we have to fight, by God we are going to fight.”29 “This is no time for sorrow; it is a time for struggle,” he told a Belgrade rally in November 1988.30 Placards carried by supporters at these rallies expressed unequivocally the lengths to which the nation would go to protect itself against outside threats. Typical were slogans along the lines of “If necessary we will fight for freedom” and “We will not give up the land of Obilic without the shedding of blood.”31 Practically all of Milosevic’s speeches warned of the malicious intentions of outsiders. Other nations both within Yugoslavia and beyond were not simply viewed as competitors but as mortal enemies: “We shall win the battle for Kosovo … despite the fact that Serbia’s enemies outside the country are plotting against it, along with those inside the country.”32

The emergence of an extreme nationalist ideology among Serbs, in turn, provoked similar reactions among Croats and Muslims—themselves having nationalist discourses similar to that of the Serbs. In an environment characterized by increasing fears of renewed Serbian hegemony and diminishing institutional controls on regional officials, political movements boasting extreme nationalist ideologies gained power among Croats and Muslims.

The rise of such movements, in turn, generated mass fears among Serbs of the return of victimization historically imposed by these groups. This exacerbated nationalist sentiments among Serbs, further entrenching the popular legitimacy of Milosevic and the ideology he espoused. So, unlike the other two factors, state disintegration did not shape the character of the nationalist discourse but rather determined the timing of the nationalist discourse’s transformation into a mass-mobilizing ideology.

During this same period the Soviet state was undergoing a similar process. The political reforms undertaken by Gorbachev—in particular the holding of competitive elections to national and regional-level legislative bodies—served to undermine the institutional constraints that previously tied the fates of regional-level officials to their superiors in Moscow. Moreover, in the absence of effective new institutions to replace the old ones, non-Russian elites in the republics began to mobilize informal bases of support by adopting mass-based nationalist ideologies. In places such as Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova, and the Baltic republics, the nationalism espoused by newly-sprouted political organizations came close to approximating extreme nationalist ideologies.

However, even under conditions of state disintegration, Russians did not mobilize behind an extreme nationalist ideology. Despite the often anti-Russian rhetoric emanating from such organizations as the Estonian and Latvian “Citizens Congresses,” radical Russian nationalists failed
in their attempts to mobilize widespread support among ethnic Russians. At the Russian polls, nationalists suffered a humiliating defeat. In the March 1990 Russian parliamentary elections, only two out of the 79 candidates of the nationalist Patriotic Bloc secured seats in the Supreme Soviet. Meanwhile, the moderate Democratic Russia received 56 seats.33 In the June 1991 presidential elections in Russia, Zhirinovsky, the most popular extremist candidate, collected only seven percent of the vote.34 Pro-Russian elites fared no better in the other republics either. The Baltic “Interfronts,” for example, failed miserably in their repeated attempts to organize local Russian speakers to participate in general strikes and protests against the republican governments.35

These politicians failed to gain support precisely because the ideas they promoted were inconsistent with the themes present in the Russian nationalist discourses. Most local Russian speakers simply did not fear the changing ethnic balance of power. Instead, for most Russians during 1987–1991, socio-economic issues trumped nationalism rather than the other way around. Indeed, the sweeping presidential election victory of Boris Yeltsin, whose main promise to Russians was the deliverance of economic prosperity rather than nationalist salvation, signaled the subordination of nationalist to socioeconomic issues.36 Given the character of the Russian nationalist discourses, this outcome is not surprising; the ideas that defined the Russian nationalist discourses were not consistent with an extreme nationalist ideology. Unlike in Serbia, then, political elites attempting to appeal to Russians through the use of such ideologies failed to build significant support. In fact, the existence of multiple nationalist discourses among Russians rather than a single discourse ensured that no single ideology—let alone an extreme nationalist one—mobilized a majority of Russians during the late 1980s.

Possible Implications for Theories of Nationalism

The argument presented in this essay can be turned into a framework for explaining whether, when, and against whom a given nation will mobilize behind an extreme nationalist ideology. The first independent variable is the extent to which the nation had an established nation-state during the historical period in which its members underwent social mobilization. The second independent variable is the internal strength of states—as territorially-bounded agencies that seek to monopolize violence—under which the nation has lived since that historical period. These two independent variables, in turn, account for the content of the nation’s nationalist discourse, which serves as an intervening variable in the present analysis. A third independent variable—the disintegration of the state where the nation currently lives—creates the conditions under which the nationalist discourse becomes transformed into a mass-mobilizing nationalist ideology.37

If this framework, in a most general sense, outlines the factors that lead the members of a national community to support a particular nationalist ideology, many currently predominant theories of nationalism attempt to do the same. Benedict Anderson highlights the rise of print capitalism and its role in promoting the idea of the nation in Western Europe and then spreading the concept to Europe’s overseas colonies.38 John Breuilly points to the rise of the modern state and the nationalist opposition generated by this development.39 Karl Deutsch ties the emergence of nationalism to the growth of mass communications systems, communities built around shared socio-economic preferences, and the social processes unleashed by industrialization.40 Ernest Gellner explains nationalism in terms of the imperatives of industrialization and its role in creating “standard high cultures.”41 Finally, Rogers Brubaker examines how the institutionalization of nationhood along with the conflictual interplay between competing nationalisms established the conditions for nationalist mobilization in the post-communist region.42

While some or all of these factors may be preconditions for nationalism to arise within a particular community, they tend to be too broad, too static, and too universally applicable in their effects to explain important variations within and across nations. The question these scholars ask is indeed a necessary one; as a regional and global phenomenon, we need to look for sources of nationalism that are regional and global in scope. But this endeavor should not crowd out the equally important task of explaining relevant variations across time and space in the forms and patterns that nationalism takes. Why, over the last decade-and-a-half, have Serbs, Croats, Lithuanians, and Chechens exhibited a greater degree of nationalist mobilization than Macedonians, Ukrainians, Belarussians, and Chuvash? Why is Russian nationalism more so directed against Germans than Lithuanians, and why does Croatian nationalism afford a greater degree of hostility to Serbs than to Bosnian Muslims or Albanians? And why has the nationalist mobilization of Serbs, Croats, Armenians, and Azerbaijanis been more intense in some historical periods than others?

In order to explain these variations, I argue that it is not sufficient to focus on large-scale processes and institutions alone. It is also necessary to look at the character of the nationalist discourse, the forces that shape this discourse, and the factors that cause it to change over time.

Notes

1 In this essay the term “nation” will refer to a community of people who believe, on the basis of their perceived uniqueness, that they should have their own state. It will sometimes be used interchangeably with “ethnic group.” “Nation” will accordingly not be used to refer to a state,
country, or society, as is sometimes the case in scholarly and popular discourse.


3 Vladimir Chuprov and Iulia Zubok, “The Ethnic Consciousness of Russian Youth,” in Christopher Williams and Thanasis D. Sfikas, eds., Ethnicity and Nationalism in Russia, the CIS, and the Baltic States (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1999), 113.


12 Chuprov and Zubok found that 80 percent of Russian youth identify more with the multiethnic conception rather than the ethnic notion of Russian national identity. “The Ethnic Consciousness of Russian Youth,” in Williams and Sfikas, eds., Ethnicity and Nationalism in Russia, the CIS, and the Baltic States, 115.


15 For instance, Jeffrey Brooks found that Russian popular literature before World War I took a much more tolerant and open-minded view of other nationalities in the empire than did American and British literature at the time. He is cited in Mark von Hagen, “The Great War and the Mobilization of Ethnicity in the Russian Empire,” in Barnett R. Rubin and Jack Snyder, eds., Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building (New York: Routledge, 1998), 36.


18 Social mobilization is “the process in which major clusters of old social, economic, and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior.” One of the new forms of socialization that occurs during this process is the formation of national consciousness. See Karl Deutsch, “Social Mobilization and Political Development,” American Political Science Review 55 (September 1961), 493–513.


23 For an excellent analysis of the Tsars’ half-hearted Russification policies, see Theodore R. Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914.

24 While this policy was subsequently abandoned, giving way to a more Russo-centric policy, this later policy was not aimed at promoting Russian ethnic distinctiveness but rather consisted of making the notion of “Russian” synonymous with “Soviet” in education, official history, and propaganda; the existence of ethnic distinctions in the Soviet Union was simply ignored. See Gerhard Simon’s excellent work, Nationalism and Policy Toward the


24 Thomas, The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s, 44–51.

25 The term is Thomas’ from The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s, 44–51.

26 Ibid., 39.


28 Judah, The Serbs, 163.

29 Ibid., 45.

30 Ibid., 163.

31 Brudny, Reinventing Russia, 238–245.

32 Except for the anomalous 1993 parliamentary elections, Zhirinovskiy’s electoral support would remain marginal throughout the 1990s.

33 For an overview of the failed attempts by Soviet loyalists and Russian nationalists to mobilize the Baltic Russians against independence, see Lieven, The Baltic Revolution, 188–201.

34 To take another example, according to polls conducted in Estonia since independence, most Russian-speakers did not wish to reunite with Russia, whether through emigration or Russian territorial expansion. Informing these sentiments was the widespread belief that their living standards would improve by remaining in the country. See Richard Rose and William Maley, “Conflict or Compromise in the Baltic States?” RFE/RL Research Report 3:28 (15 July 1994), 33.

35 I have recently come across an article by Veljko Vujacic entitled “Historical Legacies, Nationalist Mobilization, and Political Outcomes in Russia and Serbia: A Weberian View,” in Theory and Society 26:6 (December 1996) that addresses a question similar to that examined in the current study. He attempts to explain why a communist-nationalist authoritarian leadership assumed power in Serbia but not Russia in the late 1980s and early 1990s. There are significant differences between his argument and mine. According to Vujacic, while the Serbs had an independent nation-state in the nineteenth century that contributed to a sense of ethnic solidarity among nation members, Russians had not a nation-state but an empire and, therefore, never developed a cohesive ethnic identity that meaningfully demarcated them from other groups in the empire. I argue the opposite, that it was the relative absence of a nation-state that the Serbs could consider “their own,” and the presence of a such a state in the Russian tradition, that accounts for the higher degree of ethnic solidarity among Serbs. Furthermore, Vujacic points, as I do, to the role of collective memories of victimization. However, in his framework, collective memory is relevant to the extent that Serbs, as opposed to Russians, hold salient memories of mobilization against successive imperial states in which they lived. In my argument, it is the collective memory of victimization vis-à-vis neighboring nations that matters, not the memory of victimization at the hands of imperial states, for it is this factor which determines that groups the nation will mobilize against and which groups it will not. Finally, I argue that Russians and Serbs faced a set of similar contingent conditions in the 1980s—namely those produced by similar processes of state disintegration in Yugoslavia and the USSR. Vujacic, on the other hand, points to the important role of differences in the contingent conditions faced by Russians and Serbs during this period. Chief among these were Milosevic’s and Yelstin’s different leadership styles, a reform “ethos” on the part of Gorbachev which de-legitimized military intervention as a political tool to reign in the non-Russian republics, and the revival of anti-Stalinism, which focused Russian grievances toward the imperial center rather than the non-Russian ethnic groups. In my argument, however, both Russians and Serbs faced similar contingent conditions of state disintegration yet reacted differently to these conditions due to their divergent historical nation-building experiences.


ISEEES Newsletter Fall 2003 / 22
The ORIAS Summer Institute for Teachers, “Religion in World History,” emphasizing the sixth, seventh, and tenth grade world history curricula, was held July 28–August 1, 2003. ISEEES contributed the following two speakers to the program.

**John Klentos**, Assistant Professor of Eastern Orthodox Christian Studies at the Patriarch Athenagoras Orthodox Institute in Berkeley, gave an introduction to the development and character of Eastern Orthodox Christianity. He focused his presentation around a timeline of Christian churches, including 313 AD when Emperor Constantine made Christianity legal, the Great Schism between the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church, and the fall of Constantinople in 1453. Spanning more than one thousand years, the Byzantine Empire allowed Eastern Orthodox Christianity to flourish, to the point that there was sometimes little distinction between Christian faith and imperial politics.

Orthodox Christianity has a complete set of beliefs, and missionaries translated these beliefs into local languages, providing immediate access to the religion. This brought literacy to those places that did not yet have writing system. The use of the vernacular also created the localization of churches, which creates both a powerful unifying force but can also create an unhealthy, nationalistic church where people fail to draw the line between the spiritual and the political. As an example, Klentos mentioned a recent debate in Greece about listing religion on the national identity card. Being Orthodox Christian is such a part of Greek culture that some felt a need to distinguish those who are not; they could not see the irrelevance of religious faith for national identity.

Having their belief system in written form codified church practices at an early stage. Today, the Eastern Orthodox church liturgy is the same in any country and in any language, and prayers dating as far back as the eighth century are still recited. This gives the religion a profound sense of tradition and stability and connects Orthodox Christians to each other, across national borders.

Furthering the conflation of the spiritual and the political, Orthodox Christians have lived as minorities or under occupation by hostile groups. Whether under the Ottoman Empire or Communist rule, Orthodox Christian cultures derived a good part of their ethnic identity from their faith, and it was this Christian identity that often made them yearn for political freedom. Orthodox cultures did not go through the Enlightenment, so they have not developed the separation of church and state as the West did. Klentos pointed out that churches living in newly found freedom today are facing new struggles, such as the difficulty of allowing people to make their own choices or the challenge of meeting the needs of people undergoing economic and political transition.

To be an Orthodox Christian in the Byzantine era meant being caught in a tension between Christian faith and imperial politics. Today it often means being caught in a tension between the spiritual, political, and national. This, along with a sense of enduring tradition, profoundly shapes the identities of people from Orthodox cultures.

**Dr. Anton C. Vrame**, director of the Patriarch Athenagoras Orthodox Institute, spoke for us on “Icons: Communicating Through Forms and Ritual.” A specialist on icons and Orthodox education, Vrame focuses in his scholarship on how icons function as educational tools, most notably in his book The Educating Icon: Teaching Wisdom and Holiness in the Orthodox Way. In his presentation, Vrame described the purpose of icons, the context of their use, and their pictorial conventions; he also showed examples to illustrate these points.

Orthodox Christian icons came of age in the Byzantine empire, and they have changed little over the centuries. Their purpose is not only religious but liturgical, that is, they function within worship and prayer. As such, while they can be considered as works of art, they do not concern themselves with the rules of art. For example, iconographers work with traditional forms, making innovations within those forms rather than looking for ways to break the rules as an artist might. Also, icons do not attempt to depict three-dimensional space, a single moment in time, or other conventions of “realism” found in the Western art tradition. Vrame first showed an icon of the Nativity, pointing out that it contained multiple scenes, the central scene of the Virgin Mary with baby Jesus, a scene of Jesus being bathed in one corner, a bewildered Joseph having his doubts fed by the devil occupying another corner of the icon. Vrame referred to this depiction of multiple points in time and space as “the original split screen view.” What is important to icons...
is showing the divine presence. Icons are said to be written (iconography), and as they once served the illiterate, they continue to educate today.

Vrame explored the concept that icons inform, form, and transform, a notion he borrows from Thomas H. Groome, a Roman Catholic educator. First, they inform by telling a story, depicting an actual person or event. Secondly, icons form the Orthodox Christian’s point of view. Children grow up using icons in the home. Furthermore, the location of icons in a church creates and reinforces a particular world view. For example, the iconostasis—the "icon screen," or wall of icons that divides the sanctuary from the nave of the church—places the lives of Jesus and Mary at the top level, and icons of saints are located below, at the level of the churchgoer. The hierarchy from God down to the ordinary person is made literal. Finally, icons transform the Orthodox Christian. The churchgoer engages with the stories and people in the icons, learning the way one ought to live.

Icons use specific stylistic conventions. The sensory organs are stylized to show the transformation of the individual: the eyes, ears, and nose are enlarged, while the mouth is made smaller—the emphasis is thus on receiving the word of God. Nature and architecture are highly stylized, suggesting the location in a kind of shorthand without attempting to represent it.

Vrame took us through several other icons. He showed the Deisis icon from the Church of Hagia Sophia, discussing how this important building provided the model for Orthodox architecture and iconography. We saw how icons are meant to be the portraits of actual people, which reinforced the importance of traditional forms and other conventions. This is a real point of difference from the Western art historical tradition which allows for a great deal of artistic interpretation. For example, Orthodox icons show Jesus born in a cave, while the Italian artist Giotto began the use of a manger. Vrame also showed us Andrei Rublev’s icon of the Holy Trinity, marking a transition in the Russian style, with its use of lighter and more translucent colors. In the long history of icons, we can see an evolution of style, but the stable and enduring tradition gives a kind of richness to these objects and their use.

A joint program of the Title VI National Resource Centers at UC Berkeley, ORIAS is dedicated to providing scholarly resources and supporting professional development for educators on international studies. ORIAS can be reached at http://www.ias.berkeley.edu/ORIAS/, orias@uclink4.berkeley.edu, or (510) 643-0868.

Stella Bourgoin is a program representative at ISEEES and works on outreach programs for educators.

**Upcoming Events**

Events are subject to change. For current information on ISEEES-sponsored events, please call (510) 642-3230.


**Monday, October 6, 2003.** Colloquium: Eric Naiman, associate professor, Departments of Slavic Languages and Literatures and Comparative Literatures, will speak on “Hermophobia: On Sexual Orientation and Reading Nabokov.” In 160 Dwinnelle Hall, 4 p.m. Sponsored by the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures and ISEEES. Contact: Slavic Department, (510) 642-2979.

**Tuesday, October 7, 2003.** SF Noontime Concerts: Grigoriy Krumik, bayan, and Clark Welsh, balalaika, will perform Russian classical and folk music. At Bank of America Center, Giannini Auditorium, 555 California St, San Francisco, 12:30 p.m. Fees: $5. Contact: Noontime Concerts, http://www.noontimeconcerts.org/ or (415) 777-3211.

**Tuesday, October 7, 2003.** ISEEES Fall Reception. Please join us in the Toll Room, Alumni House at 4 p.m.


**Wednesday, October 8, 2003.** SF Noontime Concerts: Arlekin String Quartet, will perform Shostakovich’s Quarter No. 8 in C minor. At St. Patrick’s Church, 756 Mission St, San Francisco, 12:30 p.m. Fees: $5. Contact: see 10/7 event.

**Friday, October 10, 2003.** Brown Bag Talk: Khassan Baiev, Physicians for Human Rights, will be our speaker; a title will be announced. In Russian with translation. In 223 Moses, 12 noon. Sponsored by ISEEES, CCAsP, and the Human Rights Center.

**Wednesday, October 15, 2003.** SF Noontime Concerts: Russian Chamber Orchestra will perform works by Prokofiev and Rachmaninov. At St. Patrick’s Church, 756 Mission St, San Francisco, 12:30 p.m. Fees: $5. Contact: see 10/7 event.

**Friday, October 17, 2003.** Annual Colin Miller Memorial Lecture: Jan T. Gross, professor of history, Princeton University, will speak on “After Auschwitz: Reflections on Postwar Anti-Semitism in Poland.” In Toll Room, Alumni House, 3:30 p.m. Sponsored by ISEEES.
Monday, October 20, 2003. Colloquium: Valentina Izmirlieva, assistant professor of Slavic literatures, Columbia University, will speak on “The Lover as a Parrot: Nabokov’s ‘Lolita-Lolita’ List.” In 160 Dwinelle Hall, 4 p.m. Sponsored by the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures and ISEEES. Contact: Slavic Department, (510) 642-2979.

Tuesday, October 21, 2003. SF Noontime Concerts. A program of Russian music will be announced. At Bank of America Center, Giansnini Auditorium, 555 California St, San Francisco, 12:30 p.m. Fees: $5. Contact: see 10/7 event.

Wednesday, October 22, 2003. Brown Bag Talk: Gyorgy Vlasenkov, independent Russian film director and poet, will be our speaker; a title will be announced. In 270 Stephens Hall, 12 noon. Sponsored by ISEEES.

Wednesday, October 22, 2003. SF Noontime Concerts: Daniel Glover, piano, will perform works by Tchaikovsky and Liapanoff. At St. Patrick’s Church, 756 Mission St, San Francisco, 12:30 p.m. Fees: $5. Contact: see 10/7 event.

Wednesday, October 22, 2003. United Nations Association Film Festival: Black and White in Colour (M. Erdevicki, Czech Republic/UK, 59 min.), a portrait of Vera Bila, Romany cabaret diva. At Cubberley Auditorium, School of Education, Stanford University. The film begins at 10:05 p.m., but the session runs 9–11 p.m. Fees: $8 general, $5 students per session; $15 daily pass; $50 festival pass. Contact: UNAFF, http://www.unaff.org/ or (650) 724-5544.


Sunday, October 26, 2003. United Nations Association Film Festival: Whose Is This Song? (A. Peeva, Albania/Bosnia and Herzegovina/Bulgaria/Greece/Macedonia/ Serbia/Turkey, 70 min.). The director looks for the origin of a common Balkan song. At Cubberley Auditorium, Stanford. The film begins at 4:05 p.m., but the session runs 4–7 p.m. Fees and Contact: see 10/22 film event.


Wednesday, October 29, 2003. SF Noontime Concerts: Arlekin String Quartet, will perform Tchaikovsky’s Souvenir de Florence. At St. Patrick’s Church, 756 Mission St, San Francisco, 12:30 p.m. Fees: $5. Contact: see 10/7 event.


Monday, November 3, 2003. Colloquium: John MacKay, assistant professor, Slavic department, Yale University, will speak on “Narratives of Enlightenment: Primers for Freedpeople in the US and Russia, 1860–1890.” In 160 Dwinelle Hall, 4 p.m. Sponsored by the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures and ISEEES. Contact: Slavic Department, (510) 642-2979.

Friday, November 7, 2003. Third Annual Peter N. Kujachich Lecture in Serbian and Montenegrin Studies: Audrey Helfant Budding, associate of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, will speak on “Nation/People/Republic: Self-Determination in Yugoslavia’s Collapse.” In the Home Room, International House, 4 p.m. Sponsored by ISEEES.


Monday, November 17, 2003. Colloquium: Irene Masing Delic, professor, Slavic and East European Languages and Literatures, Ohio State University, will speak on “Who are the Tatars in Aleksandr Blok’s ‘The Homeland’? The East in the Literary-Ideological Discourse of the Russian Symbolists.” In 160 Dwinelle Hall, 4 p.m. Sponsored by the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures and ISEEES. Contact: Slavic Department, (510) 642-2979.

Save the Date

Saturday, March 13, 2004. Annual CCAsP Conference. This year’s conference will focus on Xinjiang. A schedule and a campus location will be announced. Sponsored by CCAsP and ISEEES.

Friday, April 16, 2004. Annual Berkeley-Stanford Conference. At Stanford University. A topic and schedule will be announced. Sponsored by the Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies at Stanford University and ISEEES.

Saturday, May 1, 2004. Annual Teacher Outreach Conference. A topic and schedule will be announced. In the Toll Room, Alumni House. Sponsored by ISEEES.
FLAS Fellowships Awarded for Summer 2003

Boris Barkanov, Ph.D. candidate in political science, Russian language
Angela Bortel, J.D. candidate in the School of Law’s Social Justice Program, Russian language
Molly Brunson, Ph.D. candidate in Slavic languages and literatures, Russian language
Christine Evans, Ph.D. candidate in history, Uzbek language
Rebecca Falkoff, Ph.D. candidate in Italian studies, Albanian language
James Krapfl, Ph.D. candidate in history, Hungarian language
Andrej Krickovic, Ph.D. candidate in political science, Russian language
Julia McAnallen, incoming student in Slavic languages and literatures, Russian language
Mary Papazoglou, Ph.D. candidate in anthropology, Russian/Croatian language
Dana Sherry, Ph.D. candidate in history at UC Davis, Russian language
Holland Smith, Ph.D. candidate in Slavic languages and literatures, Russian language

FLAS Fellowships Awarded For AY 2003–2004

Neil Abrams, Ph.D. candidate in political science, Russian language
Christine Evans, Ph.D. candidate in history, Russian language
Jordan Gans-Morse, incoming graduate student in political science, Russian language
Anzhelika Khizhnya, incoming graduate student in Slavic languages and literatures, Russian language
Ingrid Kleepsies, Ph.D. candidate in Slavic languages and literatures, Russian language
James Krapfl, Ph.D. candidate in history, Hungarian language
Elena Morabito, incoming graduate student in Slavic languages and literatures, Russian/Croatian language
Mary Papazoglou, Ph.D. candidate in anthropology, Russian/Croatian language
Cinzia Solari, Ph.D. candidate in sociology, Russian language
Juliet Stein, M.S.W. candidate in the School of Social Welfare, Russian/Croatian language

BPS Fellowships Awarded for Summer 2003

Mieczyslaw Boduszynski, Ph.D. candidate in political science, received a Summer Field Research Fellowship to conduct research in the former Yugoslavia.
Jeremy Darrington, Ph.D. candidate in political science, received a Summer Language Training Fellowship to study Russian language at Berkeley.
Conor O’Dwyer, Ph.D. candidate in political science, received a Summer Research Fellowship to conduct dissertation research.
Regine Spector, Ph.D. candidate in political science, received a Summer Language Training Fellowship to study Uzbek language in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
Jane Zavisca, Ph.D. candidate in sociology, received a Summer Research Fellowship to conduct dissertation research.

BPS Fellowships Awarded For AY 2003–2004

Boris Barkanov, Ph.D. candidate in political science, received a Graduate Training Fellowship.
Diana Blank, Ph.D. candidate in anthropology, received a Dissertation Fellowship.
Elif Kale, incoming student in sociology, received a Graduate Training Fellowship.
Jarrod Tanny, Ph.D. candidate in history, received a Graduate Training Fellowship.
Suzanne Wengle, incoming student in political science, received a Graduate Training Fellowship.

Graduate students affiliated with the Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies (BPS) are eligible to apply for funding for graduate training, language training, field research, and dissertation writing. For information on BPS and affiliation eligibility, consult http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~bsp/ or contact Connie Hwong, program assistant, at (510) 643-6737.

Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) fellowships enable US citizens and permanent residents to acquire a high level of competency in modern foreign languages. FLAS funding for studying Russian and Eastern Europe comes to UC Berkeley through a Title VI grant from the US Department of Education to ISEEES. Applications are accepted through the Graduate Fellowships Office.
Jose Alaniz, Ph.D. candidate in comparative literature, has accepted a position as assistant professor with the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures at the University of Washington, Seattle. He will receive his degree from Berkeley in December.

Mieczyslaw Boduszynski, Ph.D. candidate in political science, received an ACLS Grant for East European Studies for 2003–2004 to pursue his project on post-Communist regime change in the Yugoslav successor states.

Christopher J. Caes, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, received an ACLS Grant for East European Studies for 2003–2004 to pursue his project on historical trauma, contingency, and individual agency in Polish literature, film, and culture, 1955–1962.

Catherine Dale (Ph.D. in political science, 2001) is currently a political advisor to the commander with the US Army V Corps. Although based in Heidelberg, Germany, she has recently been stationed in Iraq.

Robert Geraci (Ph.D. in history, 1995) received a Individual Advanced Research Grant from IREX for 2003–2004 for his project “Nationality, Ethnicity, and Capitalist Enterprise in the Russian Empire.” He is an assistant professor of history at the University of Virginia.

Kristen Ghodsee (Ph.D. in education, 2002) received an IREX short-term travel grant for her project “It Takes a King? Simeon Saxecoburgotski and Women’s Political Participation in Post-Communist Bulgaria.” Kristen is an assistant professor of women’s studies and Eurasian and East European studies at Bowdoin College in Maine.

David Isao Hoffman (Ph.D. in political science, 2000) has accepted a position as democracy advisor with the USAID Mission in Afghanistan. He has most recently served as democracy advisor with USAID’s Central Asia Regional Mission.

Lise Morje Howard (Ph.D. in political science, 2001) has accepted a position as assistant professor of government at Georgetown University. She was previously on the faculty at Wesleyan University.


Dr. Armine Ishkanian, ISEEES research associate, has accepted a position as lecturer on NGOs at the Department of Social Policy and Centre for Civil Society at the London School of Economics.

Raymond June, Ph.D. candidate in social and cultural studies at the Graduate School of Education, received funding an ACLS Grant for East European Studies in 2003–2004 for his project on the making of the Czech “governance intelligentsia.”

Dan Kronenfeld, Ph.D. candidate in political science, has accepted a position as foreign affairs officer with the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration in the US State Department where he’ll be working on humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. He is filing his dissertation this fall.

Ethan M. Pollock (Ph.D. in history, 2000) has accepted a tenure-track position as assistant professor with the Department of History at Syracuse University.


Boris Rodin, incoming student in the Department of Comparative Literature, has been named a Discovery Fellow by the Townsend Center for the Humanities. His undergraduate research, also conducted at Berkeley, focused on Russian and Classical literatures.

Lisa K. Walker, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History, has accepted a position with the US Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Global Health Affairs. She is a program manager at the Biotechnology Engagement Program, which engages former Soviet biological warfare researchers in civilian biotech research and development projects in collaboration with US scientists. Lisa is filing her dissertation on public health in Imperial Russia this fall.

Boris Wolfson, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, has been named a Graduate Student Fellow of the Townsend Center for the Humanities for the current academic year. His dissertation is entitled “Staging the Soviet Self: Literature, Theater, and Stalinist Culture, 1929–1939.” Boris was awarded a dissertation write-up fellowship for 2003–2004 from the Eurasia Program of the Social Science Research Council.
Alexei Yurchak, assistant professor of anthropology, has been named to the Townsend Center Fellowship Group for 2003–2004. His research project will focus on “The Imaginary West of Soviet Socialism: Technologies and Networks of Non-Official Knowledge, 1950–1980s.”

Daniel Ziblatt (Ph.D. in political science, 2002) was recently recognized by the American Political Science Association for the best dissertation on European politics. He is currently an assistant professor of government and an associate at the Minda de Ginzburg Center for European Studies at Harvard University.

In the summer 2003 issue of this newsletter, we reported that a Festschrift in honor of Professor Martin Malia, under the title The Cultural Gradient: The Transmission of Ideas in Europe, 1789–1991, was edited by UC Berkeley alumni and included contributions by UC Berkeley faculty. The following Berkeley alumni also contributed to the volume:


Catherine Evtuhov (Ph.D. in history, 1991), “Guizot in Russia”


Glennys Young (Ph.D. in history, 1989), “Terror in Pravda, 1917–1939: All the News That Was Fit To Print”

ASN Convention 2003

The Association for the Study of Nationalities held its eighth Annual World Convention at Columbia University in April 2003. The following UC Berkeley affiliates and alumni took part in the presentations:

Laura Adams (Ph.D. in sociology, 1999) presented “The Future of the Performing Arts in Uzbekistan” at the panel “Art Nationalized: Movement Towards the Modern in Central Asia.” Laura is currently an associate of the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University.

Mieczyslaw P. Boduszynski and Victor Peskin, Ph.D. candidates in political science, presented “The Politics of State Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia” at the panel entitled “International Efforts in Post-War Yugoslavia: Whose Lessons Learned?”

Keith Darden (Ph.D. in political science, 2000) served as a discussant on the panel “Linguistic, Ethnic, and Civic Identities in Ukraine.” Keith also presented “The Scholastic Revolution: Explaining Nationalism in the USSR” at the panel on “Social Science Theory and National Identity Construction.” He is currently an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Yale University.

James Krapfl, Ph.D. candidate in history, presented “Czech Perceptions of Roma in the First Republic” at the panel on “Roma in East Central Europe: Identity and Recognition.”

Edward W. Walker, executive director of the Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, chaired the panel on “Islam in Russia.” He also served as a discussant to the panel on “Nation, Recognition, and Self-Determination.”
ISEEES acknowledges with sincere appreciation the following individuals who have contributed to the annual giving program, the Associates of the Slavic Center (or have been enrolled due to their particular generosity toward Cal to support some aspect of Slavic & East European Studies), between May 16 and August 31, 2003. Financial support from the Associates is vital to our program of research, training, and extra-curricular activities. We would like to thank all members of ASC for their generous assistance.

Members ($10 to $100). Members of ASC receive monthly “Updates” and special mailings to notify them of events and special activities, such as cultural performances and major conferences. In this way, notification of even last-minute items is direct.

Sponsors ($100-up). ASC Sponsors also receive a uniquely designed notepad folio which promotes Slavic and East European Studies at Berkeley. They also receive invitations to special informal afternoon and evening talks on campus featuring guest speakers from the faculty as well as visiting scholars.

Benefactors ($500-up). ASC Benefactors receive invitations to the dinner and evening programs associated with our annual conferences, such as the annual Berkeley-Stanford Conference in the spring.

Center Circle ($1,000-up). In addition to enjoying the above-mentioned benefits, donors within the Center Circle will also become Chancellor’s Associates of the University, joining a select group of alumni and friends who support Cal through unrestricted giving. Membership in this group offers a number of University benefits.

Send a check, payable to the Regents of the University of California, to:
Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies
University of California, Berkeley
260 Stephens Hall # 2304
Berkeley CA 94720-2304

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It is a policy of the University of California and the Berkeley Foundation that a portion of the gifts and/or income therefrom is used to defray the costs of raising and administering the funds. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent allowed by law.
Fellowships and Other Opportunities

ISEEES Travel Grants provide up limited travel support for faculty and ISEEES-affiliated graduate students to present a paper at a meeting of a recognized scholarly organization. Awards are made on a first-come, first-served basis, and priority is given to those who did not receive ISEEES funding in the past AY. To apply send request with budget. Deadline: none. Contact: Barbara Voytek, ISEEES, UC Berkeley, 260 Stephens Hall # 2304, Berkeley CA 94720-2304; Tel: 510-643-6736; bvoytek@socrates.berkeley.edu.

American Association of University Women
American Fellowships support women doctoral candidates completing dissertations or postdocs seeking research or publication funds. Applicants must be US citizens or permanent residents. Deadline: 11/1/2003 to request application; 11/15/2003 for submission.

International Fellowships are awarded for full-time study or research in the US to women who are not US citizens or permanent residents. Deadline: 11/1/2003 to request application; 12/16/2003 for submission.

Contact: AAUW Educational Foundation, Department 60, 2201 N Dodge St, Iowa City IA 52243-4030; Tel: 319-337-1716, ext. 60; info@aauw.org; http://www.aauw.org/.

American Council of Learned Societies
Library of Congress Fellowships in International Studies provide a stipend of $3,500/month for 4-9 months of postdoctoral research using the library's foreign language collections. Deadline: 11/1/2003. Contact: Fellowship Office, ACLS, 228 E 45th St, New York NY, 10017-3398; Fax: 212-949-8058; grants@aclsl.org; http://www.acls.org/.

Eastern Europe Program Dissertation Fellowships fund up to $15,000 for one year of dissertation research and writing on Eastern Europe. Only US citizens or permanent residents may apply. Deadline: 11/1/2003. Contact: ACLS, Office of Fellowships and Grants, 228 E 45th St, New York NY 10017-3398; Tel: 212-697-1505; Fax: 212-949-8058; grants@aclsl.org; http://www.acls.org/eeguide.htm.

ACTR/ACCELS
The Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe Language Program provides up to $2,500 for language training in Albanian, Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian, Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian, Macedonian, Polish, Romanian, Slovak, or Slovene. Deadline: 10/1/2003 for spring; 1/15/2004 for summer, fall, or AY.

The Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe Research Scholar Program supports 3-9 months of research and/or language training in Albania, the Baltics, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and former Yugoslavia. Applicants must be US citizens or permanent residents. Deadline: 10/1/2003 for spring; 1/15/2004 for summer, fall, or AY.

Contact: Outbound Program, American Councils for International Education, 1776 Massachusetts Ave NW Ste 700, Washington DC 20036; Tel: 202-833-7522; Fax: 202-833-7523; outbound@actr.org; http://www.actr.org/.

Association of American Geographers
Dissertation Research Grants up to $500 are awarded to grads preparing doctoral dissertations in geography. Applicants must have been an AAG member for at least one year. Deadline: 12/31/2003. Contact: Ehsan M. Khater, Association of American Geographers, 1710 16th St NW, Washington DC 20009-3198; Tel: 202-234-1450; Fax: 202-234-2744; gaia@aag.org; http://www.aag.org/.

Brookings Institution


DAAD
Grants for Study in Germany fund 1-10 months of research in Germany next AY. Berkeley undergraduate seniors, grad students, and postdocs (up to 2 years after the Ph.D.) may apply. Deadline: 11/18/2003. Contact: Graduate Fellowships Office, 318 Sprout Hall # 5900; Tel: 510-642-0672; http://www.grad.berkeley.edu/events/feldead.htm.

Fulbright-Hays
Harriman Institute

Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies

Harvard University
The Davis Center for Russian Studies offers Postdoctoral Fellowships for research in residence. Both US and foreign citizens can apply. Applicants must have received their Ph.D. in the past five years or by the end of the academic year. Deadline: 12/16/2003. Contact: Fellowship Program, Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University, 1737 Cambridge St, Cambridge MA 02138; Tel: 617-495-4037; Fax: 617-495-8319; daviscrs@harvard.edu; http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~daviscrs/.

Human Rights Watch
Schell and Finberg Fellowships in International Human Rights provide a $40,000 salary plus benefits for postdocs to work full time for one year with one or more divisions of Human Rights Watch. Fellows monitor developments in various countries, conduct on-site investigations, draft reports, and engage in advocacy efforts. Deadline: 11/1/2003. Contact: Human Rights Watch, Attn: Fellowship Committee, 350 Fifth Ave 34th Fl, New York NY 10118-3299; Tel: 212-290-4700, ext. 312; http://www.hrw.org/hrw/about/info/fellows.html.

Institute for Advanced Study
Membership in the School of Historical Studies is available for one or two terms while in residence. Deadline: 11/15/2003. Contact: Administrative Officer, School of Historical Studies, Institute for Advanced Study, Einstein Drive, Princeton, New Jersey, 08540; mzelazny@ias.edu; http://www.hs.ias.edu/.

IREX
Individual Advanced Research Opportunity Grants provide 2-9 months of predoctoral and postdoctoral research at institutions in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Only US citizens and permanent residents are eligible. Deadline: 11/1/2003. Contact: IREX, 2121 K St NW, Ste 700, Washington DC 20037; Tel: 202-628-8188; Fax: 202-628-8189; irex@irex.org; http://www.irex.org/.

National Security Education Program
The David L. Boren Graduate Fellowship funds up to 6 semesters to study a modern foreign language and to study an area and culture deemed critical to US national security. Recipients must be willing to enter into a service agreement. Deadline: 1/31/2004. Contact: Academy for Educational Development/NSEP, 1875 Connecticut Ave NW Ste 900, Washington DC 20009-1202; Tel: 202-884-8285; Fax: 202-498-9360; nsep@aed.org; http://www.aed.org/nsep/.

Social Science Research Council
Eurasia Program Dissertation Write-Up Fellowships provide $15,000 for one AY to doctoral students in the social sciences and humanities who will complete the dissertation during the award year. Deadline: 11/3/2003. Contact: Eurasia Program, Social Science Research Council, 810 Seventh Ave, New York NY 10019; Tel: 212-377-2700; Fax: 212-377-2727; eurasia@ssrc.org; http://www.ssrc.org/.

Eurasia Program Predissertation Training Fellowships provide $3,000-$7,000. Grad students in their first or second year may apply. Deadline: 11/3/2003. Contact: Eurasia Program, Social Science Research Council, 810 Seventh Ave, New York NY 10019; Tel: 212-377-2700; Fax: 212-377-2727; eurasia@ssrc.org; http://www.ssrc.org/.

International Dissertation Field Research Fellowships provide up to $17,000 to Ph.D. candidates in US programs for 9-12 consecutive months of dissertation field research on all world regions. Deadline: 11/3/2003 to register; 11/10/2003 for arrival of application. Contact: IDRF, Social Science Research Council, 810 7th Ave, New York NY 10019; Tel: 212-377-2700; Fax: 212-377-2727; idrf@ssrc.org; http://www.ssrc.org/.

Woodrow Wilson Center
East European Studies Short Term Grants provide a stipend of $100 a day, up to one month, to grad students and postdocs engaged in specialized research requiring access to Washington, DC, and its research institutions Grants do not include residence at the Wilson Center. Deadline: 12/1/2003; also 3/1, 6/1, 9/1 each year. Contact: East European Studies, Woodrow Wilson Center, One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington DC 20523; Tel: 202-691-4000; Fax: 202-691-4001; kneppm@wwic.si.edu; http://wwics.si.edu/ees/.
BPS Working Paper Series

These new titles are now available to download as PDF documents from the BPS Publications Web page, http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~bsp/publications.html. The series is also posted to the California Digital Library’s eScholarship Repository at http://repositories.cdlib.org/iseeesbps/.


Armine Ishkanian, Is the Personal Political? The Development of Armenia’s NGO Sector During the Post-Soviet Period, Spring 2003.

Silk Road Project Publication

Cal Performances has recently published The Silk Road Project: Arts and Humanities Programs at Cal Performances, University of California, Berkeley, highlighting the April 2002 festivities at Berkeley. The volume lists the activities undertaken during the project and includes texts of the presentations from the conference “Sound Travels: A Musical Journey Along the Silk Roads.”

To obtain a free copy of this publication, please contact ISEEES at iseees@uclink4.berkeley.edu, (510) 642-3230, or by mail at ISEEES, UC Berkeley, 260 Stephens Hall #2304, Berkeley CA 94720-2304.

The Silk Road Project, Inc., was founded by Yo-Yo Ma, who serves as artistic director. The project’s visit to Berkeley was sponsored in part by Cal Performances through generous corporate and private support, the Consortium for the Arts, the Silk Road Working Group of the Doreen B. Townsend Center for the Humanities, and the Caucasus and Central Asia Program of ISEEES.