Welcome back!

The semester got off to a busy start with a roundtable discussion of the conflict between Georgia and Russia, featuring Steve Fish, Johanna Nichols, Ned Walker, and yours truly. Soon after that we welcomed our students, faculty, alumni, friends, and staff to our annual Fall Reception at the Alumni House.

We have a full slate of visiting scholars for the fall. Nadja Furlan joins us on a Fulbright from the University of Primorska, Koper, Slovenia. She works on Christian feminist theology and women’s studies within different religious systems. Katalin Juhász is also on a Fulbright. She is a doctoral student at Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest, Hungary, and she is writing on Vladimir Nabokov as self-translator. Hee-suk Jung is professor of political science at Kyungpook National University in Daegu, Korea. His topic is pan-Slavism as an ideological foundation of Russian foreign policy in the 19th century and today. A doctoral student at the University of Konstanz, Inga Kokalevská is working on a project related to androgyny and power in the Soviet culture of the 1930s. Julia Lerner is a Fulbright researcher from the Van Leer Institute in Jerusalem, Israel. Her research involves the “Russification” of Western knowledge in the era of globalization. Eun-ji Song is spending her sabbatical year examining discourse structure of Old and Modern Russian and discourse-related phenomena. She is a professor at Seoul National University in Korea.

I am happy to report that ISEEES and the Institute of European Studies at UC Berkeley have joined together in a successful bid to create a new European Union Center of Excellence. Funded by the Delegation of the European Commission in Washington, DC, ours is one of only eleven such centers in the United States. Worth approximately €300,000, this three-year project will fund lectures, conferences, and research grants for students and faculty on a wide variety of EU-related topics.

Our faculty/graduate student seminar series “Ideology and Religion” continues to be very successful, and our Carnegie-supported Field Development Project will bring four more Russian scholars to Berkeley for a two-week visit. For those of you who will be attending this year’s AAASS convention in Philadelphia, there will be a joint Berkeley-Stanford reception Friday evening, November 21, at 7:30 p.m. in the Marriott Grand Ballroom Salon C. Please feel free to drop by and catch up with friends and colleagues. Be sure to check our website (iseees.berkeley.edu) for updates to the calendar.

Lastly, I am very pleased to announce that a new endowment, the ISEEES Graduate Student Support Fund, has been established to fund graduate
Summer in the Caucasus

Erik R. Scott

Erik R. Scott is a Ph.D. candidate in History. He has been in Moscow since January, conducting research for his dissertation on the Georgian diaspora in the Soviet Union. This Fall he plans to continue his research in Tbilisi. This article was written in Moscow in late August 2008.

For the past several years, the summer months have warmed frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In 2004, Georgian and South Ossetian forces opened fire on one another in skirmishes along the cease-fire line, which marked the limits of the territory ruled by Tbilisi. In 2006, Georgians reinforced their control of the upper part of Abkhazia’s Kodori Gorge through a small-scale military operation. Leaders in the region have long been dissatisfied with the status quo, which saw Georgia divided and the two breakaway regions unrecognized internationally. The first months of 2008 witnessed a noticeable increase in overt Russian support for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, despite Russia’s claim to be a neutral mediator in the conflict. Yet few could foresee the extent to which the frozen conflicts would thaw and the wide-ranging consequences of this summer’s fighting in Georgia. While Georgia’s attempt to retake South Ossetia by force on August 8 was a dangerously provocative move, most international observers did not expect Russia to respond with a full-scale military invasion of Georgia proper and a unilateral attempt to redraw the political map of the Caucasus.

The break-up of the Soviet Union, hailed as a remarkably peaceful end to a heavily militarized empire, has always been remarkably violent when seen from the perspective of the Caucasus region. Since 1991, there have been two wars in Chechnya, ongoing separatist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and bursts of fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Thousands have died, hundreds of thousands have been displaced, and in the best of times the situation is one of an uneasy peace. The unrecognized but de facto independent states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, sharing a border with Russia, existed as legal gray zones operating beyond the jurisdiction of recognized governmental bodies, unregulated by the global financial system, and dependent on illicit trade and murky Russian investment for survival. The failure to find a stable, lasting peace in Chechnya, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh generated instability for the region as a whole and made weapons readily available. Firefights, bombings, and assassinations became regular occurrences in the neighboring regions of Ingushetia and Dagestan. On this bleak map, Georgia, though far from the unabashed democratic success it was claimed to be by the Bush administration, was at least cause for optimism. Elections, media, and civil society, though not without their problems, were freer, more tolerant of dissonant voices, and more open to change than those institutions in Russia itself.

While analysts abroad declared the end of the post-Soviet era, and while Georgia sought closer integration into European institutions, the legacy of the Soviet Union became increasingly important in the minds of Russian policymakers and among the Russian population at large. Russia’s national anthem is now sung to the same melody as the Soviet anthem, and Russian soldiers invaded Georgia under the old flag of the Soviet Red Army; both the hymn and the standard were reintroduced under Vladimir Putin, who described the end of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the twentieth century.” Many Russians see their country as the natural heir to the Soviet Union, and they perceived Russia’s actions in Georgia as a restoration not only of their country’s power, but of its national pride.

Russia has claimed that its actions in Georgia are those of a typical Great Power reasserting hegemony in its “near abroad.” Yet the Soviet Union was not a typical nation-state but rather an ideology-driven multinational empire, and Russia’s current position is, if not one of outright imperialism, then at least one of confused post-imperial nostalgia. While powerful nations do intervene in the affairs of less powerful countries—and here the United States is
no exception—a typical nation does not grant citizenship en masse to populations in neighboring countries with the goal of annexation, as Russia did in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Typical nations at least pay rhetorical respect to the sovereignty of their neighbors, rather than referring to their territories, as Russian policymakers do, as the “near abroad,” and to their populations as “our people.” On the one hand, Russia, like the Soviet Union before it, is a multinational federation made up of numerous autonomous regions and republics where citizenship is not based on ethnicity; on the other hand, Russia claims to represent the interests of ethnic Russians beyond its borders, especially in the so-called near abroad. Russia justified its intervention in South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the grounds that the population there had Russian citizenship, then made a great show that it was recognizing the independence of these territories on behalf of the Ossetian and Abkhaz peoples. Russian media reports reveal confusion over whether Russia was “defending” its own people or de facto independent nations against Georgian “aggression.” The confusion has found its place among the aisles of Moscow wine shops, where Abkhazian wines are sometimes grouped with Russian wines, other times grouped under the flag of the independent republic of Abkhazia, recognized only by Russia. The sole reason why Abkhaz wines are being marketed with such zeal is that Russians have placed an embargo on the Georgian wines that have long been a fixture of the Russian table. What we are witnessing is not the emergent hegemony of a powerful nation-state, but rather the identity crisis of a collapsed empire.

If the break-up of the Soviet Union has been messy in the Caucasus, the reassertion of Russian power in the mold of the Soviet empire threatens to be even more destabilizing. Some of the worst violence in the recent conflict in South Ossetia was perpetrated by irregular forces from the North Caucasus fighting alongside the Russian Army. The presence of these armed irregulars, and the thousands of people they helped displace now located in Russia and Georgia, will fuel violent crime in both the North and South Caucasus. There is renewed fear that Russia might back decisive measures that could un-freeze conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria. Meanwhile, Russia has increased its overtures to ethnic Russians in Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. Ukraine, like Georgia an aspirant to NATO, has grounds to worry about Russian efforts to topple its pro-Western ruling coalition. A resurgent Russia might also claim grounds to intervene on behalf of its co-ethnics in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Russia’s invasion and continued occupation of Georgian territory has shown the limits of international support these small nations might receive in the event of Russian meddling.

Russia’s longing for Soviet-style dominance in the region may prove to be self-defeating. While authoritarian governments in Belarus and Central Asia welcome Russian financial support, they are unlikely to want Moscow to intervene militarily in their countries. This fact could explain why Russia received only the faintest of support for its actions in Georgia from staunch allies like Belarus and Kazakhstan, and why at the time of writing no other state has joined Russia in recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Unlike during the Soviet period, there is no ideology to bind together Moscow and its motley coalition of international allies. Russia is economically linked to the world economy, and every bellicose statement by Putin or President Dmitry Medvedev sends the Russian stock market tumbling further. Russians who yearn for the international prestige their country enjoyed during the Soviet period might soon find that empire-building in Eurasia will only gain them international criticism and isolation.

Finally, by extending its rule over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia is bidding its final farewell to a land that has been seen as a prize for the Russian and Soviet empires for over two hundred years. During the Soviet period, Georgia had a near mythical status as a Mecca for Soviet tourism, and it was renowned as the homeland of both prominent Soviet political leaders and entertainers and famous among Russians for its food and song. For Georgians, Russia was a gateway to Europe and to modernity. The two nations fought alongside one another, sang one another’s praises, and in some cases intermarried. Today, a new generation of Russians thinks of Georgia only as a country of lawlessness and American geopolitical interests, while an upcoming generation of Georgians views the Soviet period as one of outright occupation. Needless to say, more Russians now take their vacations in Turkey and Egypt rather than in Georgia, and most Georgians now learn English rather than Russian as a second language. The most intimate links of the Soviet empire are being painfully but decisively severed even as a resurgent Russia attempts to regain its former glory.

Mikhail Lermontov, Tiflis, 1837
## Fall 2008 Courses

Selected faculty course offerings and selected area-related courses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course Code</th>
<th>Course Title</th>
<th>Instructor</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slavic R5A</td>
<td>Reading and Composition</td>
<td>Matich, O.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slavic R5B</td>
<td>Reading and Composition</td>
<td>Matich, O.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slavic 24</td>
<td>Freshman Seminar</td>
<td>Mcelean, H.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slavic 45</td>
<td>Nineteenth-Century Russian Literature</td>
<td>Stone, J. C.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slavic 131</td>
<td>Literature, Art, and Society in 20th-Century Russia</td>
<td>Ram, H.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slavic 134F</td>
<td>Nabokov</td>
<td>Naiman, E.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slavic 140</td>
<td>The Performing Arts in Russia and Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Muza, A.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slavic 158</td>
<td>The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Alexander, R.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slavic 181</td>
<td>Readings in Russian Literature</td>
<td>Muza, A.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slavic 239</td>
<td>Twentieth-Century Slavic Literary Theory</td>
<td>Ram, H.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slavic 245B</td>
<td>Russian Realism (1840s-1900)</td>
<td>Paperno, I.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slavic 246A</td>
<td>Russian Modernism (1890s-1920s)</td>
<td>Matich, O.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slavic 280</td>
<td>Studies in Slavic Literature and Linguistics</td>
<td>Nichols, J. B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics 215A</td>
<td>Political Economics</td>
<td>Roland, G. R.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economics 260A</td>
<td>Comparative Economics</td>
<td>Roland, G. R.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economics 295</td>
<td>Survey of Research in Economics</td>
<td>Roland, G. R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Film Studies 200</td>
<td>Graduate Film Theory Seminar</td>
<td>Nesbet, A.</td>
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<tr>
<td>History 100</td>
<td>The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Connelly, J.</td>
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<tr>
<td>History 280B</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Connelly, J.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History 285B</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Slezkine, Y.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music 76</td>
<td>History of Western Music</td>
<td>Taruskin, R.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Music 220</td>
<td>Topics in Music History and Criticism</td>
<td>Taruskin, R.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Buddhist Studies C120</td>
<td>Buddhism on the Silk Road</td>
<td>Mehendale, S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Geography C55</td>
<td>Introduction to Central Asia</td>
<td>Mehendale, S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Near Eastern Studies C26</td>
<td>Introduction to Central Asia</td>
<td>Mehendale, S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Near Eastern Studies 290A</td>
<td>The Art of Ancient Afghanistan</td>
<td>Mehendale, S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Science 191</td>
<td>Junior Seminar</td>
<td>Fish, M. S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Science 200</td>
<td>Major Themes in Comparative Analysis</td>
<td>Fish, M. S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Science 140</td>
<td>Topics in Comparative Politics: Contemporary Muslims in Westernized Environment</td>
<td>Roy, O.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Science 141C</td>
<td>Politics and Government in Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Wittenberg, J.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Science 149B</td>
<td>Special Topics in Area Studies</td>
<td>Wittenberg, J.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Science 249R</td>
<td>Topics: Comparative Perspective on Religion</td>
<td>Roy, O</td>
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<td>Sociology 202B</td>
<td>Contemporary Sociological Theory</td>
<td>Bonnell, V. E.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sociology 101A</td>
<td>Sociological Theory</td>
<td>Burawoy, M. B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater and, Dance St. 98</td>
<td>Directed Group Study</td>
<td>Gordon, M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater and, Dance St.125</td>
<td>20th Century Russian Theatre</td>
<td>Gordon, M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater and, Dance St. 139</td>
<td>Playwriting</td>
<td>Gordon, M.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Slavic Department has courses in Armenian, Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, Bulgarian, Czech, Georgian, Hungarian, Polish, and Russian. The German department offers Yiddish.
Campus Visitors

Nadja Furlan is a visiting scholar with ISEEES during the Fall 2008 semester. She is a Research Assistant at the Science and Research Centre of the University of Primorska, Koper, Slovenia. Her visit is sponsored by a Fulbright grant. She holds a Ph.D. in religious studies, and during her stay at Berkeley she will work on topics relating to religious feminism.

Katalin Juhász is a visiting student researcher with ISEEES from 9/08-2/09. She is currently a Ph.D. candidate in Modern English and American Literature at the Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest, Hungary. Her visit is sponsored by a Fulbright grant. Her research focuses on Nabokov’s art as a translator and self translator.

Hee-Suk Jung is a visiting scholar with ISEEES during the 2008-2009 academic year. He is an associate professor at the Kyungpook National University in Daegu, South Korea. His stay is funded by the Kyungpook National University. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences. His research at Berkeley will focus on trends of study on pan-Slavism in the 20th and 21st centuries.

Inga Kokalevska is a visiting student researcher with ISEEES during the Fall 2008 semester. She is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Slavonic Studies at the University of Konstanz, Germany. Her university is funding her visit, and her research topic during her stay at Berkeley will be “Androgyny and Power in the Soviet Culture of the 1930s.”

Julia Lerner is a visiting scholar with ISEEES during the 2008-2009 academic year. She is a professor at Ben Gurion University, Israel. Her visit is funded by a Fulbright grant and by Ben Gurion University. She holds a Ph.D. in sociology, and her research topic during her stay at Berkeley will be "Critique in Transition: Critical Knowledge in Russia and Israel."

Eun-Ji Song is a visiting scholar with ISEEES during the 2008-2009 academic year. She is assistant professor in the Department of Russian Language and Literature, Seoul National University, South Korea. She holds a Ph.D. in Slavic languages and literatures from UCLA. She will research early Russian history and Slavic linguistics during her stay in Berkeley.

CASE-UC Berkeley Field Project: Fall 2008

The Berkeley Program in Eurasian and East European Studies is pleased to present our newest CASE scholars arriving from Russia on November 8 for a two-week stay. Our CASE scholars are Kirill Kolesnichenko, Darima Amogolonova, and Maxim Barbashin. Kirill is from Vladivostok, where he is a sociology instructor at the Vladivostok Institute of International Studies of the Asia-Pacific Region. Darima is from Ulan-Ude. She is a senior researcher at the Institute for Mongolian, Buddhist, and Tibet Studies of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMBT). Maxim is from Rostov-on-Don, and is a senior research fellow at South Federal University. Four graduate students will be working with them. Sener Aktuk is paired with Kirill, Nicole Eaton and Alex Beliaev with Darima, and Charles Shaw will be working with Maxim. The CASE scholars will primarily be working on academic projects but will also spend time getting to know California through events such as tours of San Francisco and the Marin Headlands. A fourth scholar, Tamara Troyakova from Vladivostok, who is a professor at the Far Eastern State University, will come to Berkeley to participate in the program in January 2009.

Sener Akturk

Sener Akturk is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science, UC Berkeley

Introduction: Contradictions of Ethnic Regimes in Central Asia and Prospects for the Future

Ethnicity regimes, even in the most liberal democratic states, often harbor internal contradictions that threaten the stability of the system. Most prominently, Germany’s pledge to treat all its citizens equally, without any regard to their ethnic background, was and still is sharply contradicted by an immigration and citizenship regime that grants immediate citizenship to ethnic Germans from the former Soviet republics, while denying the same right to Turkish and other immigrants living in Germany for generations (Brubaker 1992; Joppke 2005; Gokturk 2007). United States and Australia also favored only white, European immigrants for a long time throughout their history, de facto tilting the political and demographic playing field against their African, Asian, and other non-European citizens; Israel still maintains an immigration policy that favors Jews (Joppke 2005). Central Asian states, to the extent that they espouse an official ideology of multi-ethnic statehood, face the same dilemma, and create a similar gap between policy and rhetoric when they favor some immigrants over others based on their ethnic background, or when they deport or purge from employment citizens based on their ethnic background. However, as I will try to demonstrate in this article, there is significant variation from a fairly mono-ethnic approach to state-building, exemplified by Turkmenistan, to a relatively multi-ethnic approach to state-building exemplified by Kyrgyzstan, with the other Central Asian republics falling in between. This article provides a thematic, theoretically driven, comparative, and typological synopsis of present trends regarding state policies on ethnicity in the five post-Soviet Central Asian republics, relying for its empirical data primarily on secondary sources, research, and reports by other scholars and researchers.

Regimes of Ethnicity in Central Asia: Soviet Heritage and Post-Soviet Variations

The Soviet Union, variably described as a “communal apartment,” “empire of nations,” or “state of nations,” went to great lengths in terms of officially recognizing and politically institutionalizing ethnic differences in pursuit of an egalitarian goal within the framework of a multi-ethnic state (Slezkin 1994; Hirsch 2005; Martin 2001; Suny 2001). However, since the multi-ethnic Soviet Union was designed such that it was made up of a union of republics, each with a single titular ethnic group, the collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in attempts to realize the elusive and dangerous goal of mono-ethnic statehood in Central Asia and elsewhere in the post-Soviet geography. While acknowledging the sociological complexity of issues related to ethnicity and nationality, and while also recognizing the limitations inherent in not having conducted field research in the region, this article compares the official state policies related to ethnicity in the five Central Asian republics.

The approach to the subject of state policies on ethnicity is informed by the concept of regimes of ethnicity. “A regime of ethnicity denotes the rules governing the permissible expression, codification, and political uses of ethnicity. Regime of ethnicity refers to the official rules and regulations at the state level and does not describe the non-official societal norms and informal institutions relating to people’s coping mechanisms with ethnic diversity in everyday life.” (Akturk 2007) Ethnicity regimes are defined along two axes: membership and expression. Simply put, if a state seeks to limit acquisition of membership (citizenship) in the nation to one ethnic category (titular ethnics), then that state maintains a mono-ethnic regime. States that do not aspire to limit membership in the nation to one ethnic category and consciously admit ethnic diversity in their citizenry can be further classified as having “anti-ethnic” and “multi-ethnic” regimes depending on their treatment of ethnic diversity. If they seek to assimilate different ethnic categories into a national culture (often linguistically and culturally defined), then they have an anti-ethnic regime. If they maintain the legal recognition and institutionalization of ethnic differences on an equal basis, then they have a multi-ethnic regime based on consociation. The Soviet Union was perhaps the most extreme example in modern history of a state legally and institutionally based on a consociation of different ethnic categories, governed by a multi-ethnic regime as a whole. Individual titular republics, autonomies, and regions within the Union, however, had the seeds of a mono-ethnic orientation.

1 An earlier version of this paper benefited from comments and criticisms at the European Society for Central Asian Studies Conference in Ankara in September 12-14, 2007, and from two anonymous reviewers of Europe-Asia Studies.

2 In Soviet terminology, “nationality” (nationalnost) was used to denote what is usually referred to as “ethnicity” in Western scholarship, that is, the social category based on a subjective belief in common descent.
Ethnicity regimes\(^3\) in Central Asian states demonstrate considerable continuity with Soviet policies, especially the identification of every state with one titular ethnic group and the granting of social, economic, linguistic, and political privileges to members of the titular ethnic group, as in the Soviet policies of *korenizatsiia* (indigenization). This continuity manifested itself in three major areas in all Central Asian states in the post-Soviet period: first, the idea that the top political and administrative positions should be reserved for members of the titular ethnic group; second, the titular ethnic group’s share of the population should increase, while the population at large should become competent in the titular language, though the urgency and importance accorded to the demographic and linguistic goals differ significantly between the five cases; and third, that the historical myths, heroes, symbols, and history education in general should be organized around real or imagined heritage of the titular ethnic group. These policies point to a general mono-ethnic orientation common to all Central Asian republics, since a mono-ethnic regime is defined by the identification of the “nation” with one ethnic category (Akturk 2006).

Beyond this basic orientation towards mono-ethnic statehood, there are significant differences in four policy areas that I will examine in this article: 1) immigration and citizenship, 2) language(s) mentioned in the constitution, 3) an official ideology of multi-ethnic statehood, or lack thereof, and 4) ethnic engineering policies of the state, or lack thereof. First I will review similarities in demographic trends, political leadership, and the creation of new ethnic myths, and then I will concentrate on the differences in the four policy areas mentioned above.

**Demographic Overview: Titular Ethnics Increase Their Share of the Population**

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the share of the titular ethnicities in all five Central Asian states increased significantly. In other words, Kazakhstan is more ethnically Kazakh today than it was in 1992, and this is also true for titular ethnic groups in all Central Asian states. This demographic change in favor of the titular ethnic groups is a strong empirical indicator of mono-ethnic nation building projects in Central Asia.

**Table 1. Demographic Change in the Central Asian states, 1992-2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% Titular, 1992</th>
<th>% Titular, 2007</th>
<th>% Change in Titular</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>+29% (53/41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>+25% (65/52)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (CIA 1992, 2007)

Despite observable increases in the share of titular ethnic groups, none of the Central Asian states achieved the level of ethnic homogeneity of Armenia, the most ethnically homogenous post-Soviet state with a 98% ethnic Armenian population, and none of them is likely to become that homogenous in the near future. One can point to two secular trends across all five cases that helped ethnic homogenization since 1991, both related to the position of Slavic and European populations in Central Asia. First, Slavic (Russian, Ukrainian) and European (German) people emigrated from Central Asia following the collapse of the Soviet Union, even in the absence of any direct compulsion from official or non-official actors. Second, Slavic and European populations had a lower population growth than the titular ethnic groups in Central Asia. These two general observations hold for all five states, but they cannot explain the demographic change in its entirety, as there were state policies of ethnic engineering and intimidation against non-titular ethnics in some cases. Moreover, there are non-Slavic and non-European minorities, such as the Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, who do not have lower population growth than the titular ethnic groups. Nonetheless, emigration of Slavic and European populations can be considered a symptom of mono-ethnic nation building efforts by the Central Asian states across the region.

The process of political geographic sifting of populations in Central Asia is consistent with the “unmixing of peoples” that one observes in the aftermath of empires (Brubaker 1997). Other 20th century instances of such ethnic homogenization resulting from massive population transfers occurred between Turkey and Greece in the 1912-1922 period, between India and Pakistan, and between Israel and the Arab Middle Eastern States, the latter two cases both in 1947-1948.

**Political Leadership and the New Historical Myths: Mono-Ethnicity Entrenched**

The titular ethnic groups’ claim to political leadership in their respective republics is thoroughly entrenched in Central Asia. This is most apparent, however, at the peak of political power – at the presidential level: The idea that an Uzbek can rule Turkmenistan or Tajikistan, or that a Tajik

\(^3\) I use “regime(s) of ethnicity” and “ethnicity regime(s)” interchangeably.
can rule Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan, or a Korean serve as the president of Kazakhstan, is out of the question, at least today. Since much power and patronage is concentrated on the very person of the Presidents in Central Asia, the titular ethnic identity of the president is a significant symptom by itself of titular ethnic ownership claim on the post-Soviet state. This is another one of the most obvious Soviet legacies, known as korenizatsiya, the positive discrimination in employment in favor of titular ethnic groups (Martin 2001). This is a reflection of the quintessential principle of mono-ethnic statehood, which is the idea that a single (titular) ethnic group “owns” the state. However, there is significant variation beyond the presidential level, as in Turkmenistan, where non-ethnic Turkmen are not to be found at senior ranks of administration or at ministerial levels at the mono-ethnic end, and Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, where an ethnic Russian, Igor Chudinov, and an ethnic Uyghur educated in China, Karim Massimov, respectively, have been appointed as Prime Ministers recently, at the multi-ethnic end of the spectrum. But even in Kazakhstan, six out of seven post-Soviet Prime Ministers, including Massimov, are described implicitly or explicitly as ethnic Kazakhs in some sources.

Another reflection of mono-ethnic statehood in post-Soviet Central Asia is the new revaluation of historical figures, symbols, art works, and dynasties belonging to the titular ethnic group, whether it be Amir Timur in Uzbekistan, Samanids in Tajikistan, or the Manas legend in Kyrgyzstan (Akturk 2006; Hall 2003). New ethno-nationalist myth-making is a common feature of all Central Asian states, but in some states, such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, this mono-ethnic myth-making is accompanied by an ideology of multi-ethnic statehood, a topic that will be reviewed later.

At an even more basic level, in the post-Soviet period, none of the Central Asian states changed their mono-ethnic names (e.g. “Uzbek”-istan) assigned to them under Soviet rule. The reality that all Central Asian states have mono-ethnic names is remarkable in characterizing this region. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, one could imagine them reverting back to pre-Soviet or even pre-Russian names, or adopting a geographic or historical name for newly independent states. The fact that this sounds unimaginable today is another indicator of how entrenched the mono-ethnic conception of statehood is in the region. Institutional inertia of the Soviet past cannot be overestimated in analyzing ethnicity regimes in Central Asia.

Language, Constitution, Education: Mono-Lingual, Bilingual, and Multi-Lingual

The language(s) mentioned in the constitution is an important marker of the new Central Asian states’ self-perception. At first glance, one can separate the Central Asian republics into two groups with regards to languages in the constitution: first, a mono-lingual group comprising Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which mentions only the titular language, Turkmens and Uzbek, respectively, in their constitutions, and second, a bilingual group including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, which mentions in their constitutions two languages: the titular language, and Russian as “the language of inter-ethnic communication.” However, the status of the Russian language resembles that of an official language in a bilingual state in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan much more than in Tajikistan.

The recognition of Russian along with the titular language in the constitution has significance beyond making the country officially bilingual: in all three cases where Russian is mentioned alongside the titular language in the constitution, it is recognized as “the language of inter-ethnic communication,” implying an ethnic diversity beyond a duality between Russian and the titular ethnicity, an accurate description of the actual ethnic demography. Russian is indeed the language of interethnic communication, especially in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan (Schulter 2003; Lillis 2007). Going beyond the recognition of two languages in the constitution, in Kyrgyzstan there are schools that teach in Uzbek, Tajik, Turkish, German, and other languages, reflecting the multi-ethnic nature of the country (Schulter 2003). Kazakhstan likewise offers education in many languages beyond Kazakh and Russian, even though there is an official policy to develop competence in the Kazakh language among the entire citizenry (Lillis 2007). In contrast, in Turkmenistan schools offering instruction in Uzbek, Kazakh, and other minority languages have been closed down, partially explaining the exodus of Russians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and other people of ethnic minority background from this country.

Nonetheless, even in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan there is a state policy to make the entire citizenry competent in the titular language. The language law adopted in 1997 in Kazakhstan was geared towards this goal. However, the heavily Russified Karaganda region in northern Kazakhstan, where in some towns ethnic Kazakhs constitute 10% of the population, already missed its target date for the elimination of Russian from official correspondence by 2007 (Lillis

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4 For example, Wikipedia, perhaps the most popular source of online information about such facts, lists all the prime ministers of Kazakhstan, Soviet and Post-Soviet, and explicitly states the ethnic Kazakh identity of the last two Prime Ministers of Kazakhstan: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prime_Minister_of_Kazakhstan This post was last occupied by a Slavic person in 1994, leaving non-Slavic persons as Prime Ministers for the 14 of the 16 post-Soviet years, even in Kazakhstan.

5 E.g., Khorezm, Khokand, Turkestan, Chagatai, Bukharan Republic, etc.
Such policies of elevating the titular language, which is at a very weak position vis-à-vis Russian, reminds one of post-colonial Algerian policies to elevate Arabic, which was at a weak position vis-à-vis French.

**Table 2. Languages in the Constitution: Monolingual or Bilingual?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Language(s) in the Constitution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>One: Turkmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>One: Uzbek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Two: Tajik and Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Two: Kazakh and Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Two: Kyrgyz and Russian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is not to suggest that state policies on language and ethnicity are coherent or without any contradictions, but there are clear and observable trends that are symptomatic of a variation among the states in the region, while also indicating a nationalizing thrust in comparative perspective.

**Ideology of Multi-Ethnic Statehood, or Lack Thereof**

The mono-ethnic mythmaking prevalent in all Central Asian republics in the post-Soviet period notwithstanding, these five states differ in terms of whether they espouse an ideology of multi-ethnic/multicultural togetherness. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are most adamant in presenting themselves as multi-ethnic and multilingual political communities.

On the opposite end of the spectrum are Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, declaring themselves as the present day manifestations of an ethnic essence from time immemorial. In this vein, Tajikistan picked the Samanids as its predecessor (which, compared to the Mongols, Chaghatay Khanate, Timurids, and Karakhanids, can be seen as a modest but supposedly pure Tajik dynasty from a thousand years ago) and not one of the more illustrious (supposedly Turkic-Mongol) empires that ruled over present-day Tajikistan and much of Central Asia since the collapse of the Samanids. What is significant is not the size or glory of the dynasty but the ethnic criterion used for its glorification and the retrospective ethnicization of history in general. The Turkic yoke, much like the demonized Tatar yoke in Russian historiography, became a staple of new nationalist Tajik historiography, hence excluding the very sizeable Uzbek and other smaller Turkic minorities from this new identity construction (Hall 2003; Akturk 2006).

Askar Akayev, the former president of Kyrgyzstan, created a project called “Kyrgyzstan is Our Common Home,” which was designed to emphasize the multi-ethnic nature of the country. (Marat 2007) This project was criticized by Akayev’s political opponents, including the current state secretary Adakhan Madumarov, who claimed that “Kyrgyzstan is still the state of the Kyrgyz” (Marat 2007). Furthermore, in official recognition of the multi-ethnic nature of the country, Kyrgyzstan participated in international projects such as the “Democratic Governance in a Multi-cultural and Multi-ethnic Society: Swiss-Kyrgyz Democracy Training Project” (UNESCO 1994). Despite formulating one of the most explicit projects of multi-ethnic statehood in Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan has not been immune to interethnic clashes, as observed between ethnic Tajik and Kyrgyz youth in southern Kyrgyzstan during Kyrgyzstan’s independence anniversary festivities in 2002 (Khamidov 2002). In addition, 78% of Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan want Uzbek to be recognized as an official language along with Kyrgyz and Russian (Khamidov 2002).

Kazakh leadership has perhaps been even more outspoken in emphasizing the multi-ethnic character of the Kazakhstani state. President Nazarbayev is fond of invoking the many peoples living in Kazakhstan and espousing supranational ideologies such as Eurasianism, which is premised on the historical togetherness of Slavic, Turkic, Mongol, and other peoples of the Eurasian steppe. Also in the field of multi-confessional relations, “the government invites national leaders of Orthodoxy and Islam to participate jointly in state events” (NCSJ 2007). Perhaps the most explicit official affirmation and institutional reflection of the multi-ethnic ideology prevalent in Kazakhstan is the Assembly of the Nations of Kazakhstan (Kazakhstan Halkynyn Assambleiasy/ Assambleia Naroda Kazakhstana), also established at the initiative of President Nursultan Nazarbayev. This assembly brings together representatives from the different ethnic and religious groups that together constitute the multi-ethnic Kazakhstani nation.

Uzbekistan occupies a midpoint between Turkmenistan and Tajikistan on the one hand and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan on the other. The state is clearly interested in creating new ethnic myths about an Uzbek essence manifested in the dynasties of Amir Timur among other illustrious empires and khanates in Central Asia, of which the modern Uzbek state is the successor. However, the door to assimilation is open, and, in fact, the new identity is premised on the assimilation of all the residents within the territory of Uzbekistan into the new Uzbek culture (the policy of “Ozbekchilik”), not reaching beyond the current borders to ethnic Uzbeks living in other Central Asian states (Fumagalli 2007). “[T]he territorial understanding of nationality has taken firm root in the population’s mindset,” and Uzbekistan’s official ideology confirms how the “territorial” prevails over the "ethnic" (Fumagalli 2007: 111-112). As such, Uzbekistan resembles classic cases of non-ethnic, territorial nation-building projects premised on linguistic and cultural assimilation of all citizens, aided by the state, as in France and Turkey (Akturk 2007, 2006). However, as in the non-ethnic, territorial nation-building projects mentioned above, in Uzbekistan, too, there is

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6 Information on this assembly can be found in Kazakh, Russian, and English, in its official website at <http://www.assembly.kz/eng/>.
Table 3. Ideology of Multi-ethnic Statehood: Where does it exist?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Is there an official ideology of multi-ethnic statehood?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>No; emphasis on Turkmen ethnicity alone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>No; emphasis on Tajik ethnicity alone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>No; emphasis on territorial belonging and assimilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Yes; such as “Assembly of Nations of Kazakhstan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Yes; such as “Kyrgyzstan is Our Home”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Citizenship and Ethnic Migration: *Oralmans*, Kyrgyz, and Others

One can discern two different methods used in the efforts to ethnically homogenize the citizenry. These can be called “positive” and “negative” discrimination. The first method is to increase the number of titular ethnicities through preferential immigration, prenatal policies, and the like, geared towards the titular ethnicities specifically. The second method is to decrease the number of non-titular ethnicities through deportations, displacement, ethnic cleansing, and genocide, geared towards the non-titular ethnicities specifically. Kazakhstan, and to a lesser extent, Kyrgyzstan, stand out in applying positive discrimination favoring titular ethnicities in immigration and citizenship, while Turkmenistan, and to a lesser extent, Tajikistan, stand out in applying negative discrimination targeting non-titular ethnicities through internal deportations and forced emigration. Uzbekistan, as a state that is neither interested in attracting ethnic Uzbeks abroad to immigrate, nor interested in forcing ethnic minorities out of the country, does not fit into either category (Fumagalli 2007).

Kazakh diaspora policy dates back to 1993. One of the primary reasons for its adoption was to bring back ethnic Kazakhs spread around the former Soviet Union due to the collectivization drives. Ethnic Kazakhs immigrating to Kazakhstan through this program are called *oralman*. The government assigns an annual quota for oralman and financially helps them to settle in Kazakhstan. In 2001, for example, the government was providing housing and $60 per person for that year’s quota of 600 families, even though arrivals far exceeded the annual quota and more than 10,000 families arrived in 2001 alone (Kueppers 2003). According to one source, 277,000 oralmans arrived since 1991 (News 2003), while another source puts the total at 500,000 (Diener 2005). The space and the scope of this article does not permit a discussion of the differences between the various groups of oralman in terms of their levels of education, economic and social status, motivations for moving into Kazakhstan, and other such dimensions, yet acknowledges that there might be a great difference between Kazakhs emigrating from China, Mongolia, or Turkey to Kazakhstan. These differences, however, do not change the ethnic nature of the policies and their implication for the relationship between ethnicity and nationality that concerns us in this paper. Encouraging immigration is also seen as a demographic imperative since the country’s population declined from over 16 million to less than 15 million after the collapse of the Soviet Union due to massive emigration (Yermukanov 2005). However, selecting immigrants on the basis of ethnic background is incompatible with a state ideology that is equidistant to all ethnic groups, even though it is still used by many countries, Israel and Germany being two prominent examples (Joppke 2005).

Askar Akayev also signed a decree, to take effect in 2002, encouraging ethnic Kyrgyz immigration much later than the similar Kazakh law (EurasiaNet 2001). The main change brought by this decree is a simplified procedure for receiving citizenship. Nonetheless, in the 1999-2000 period 42,000 Kyrgyz arrived in Kyrgyzstan. An exodus of 20,000 ethnic Kyrgyz from the Tajik civil war contributed to this sum, while many ethnic Kyrgyz groups outside of Kyrgyzstan, such as the Kyrgyz of the Afghan Pamirs, expressed interest in immigrating to Kyrgyzstan (EurasiaNet 2001).

Ethnic Engineering: Deportation, Displacement, and Assimilation

Another method of ethnically homogenizing the population is creating conditions for the emigration of non-titular ethnic groups or even specifically designing policies aimed to force them to emigrate. Turkmenistan, and to a lesser extent Tajikistan, made use of such policies.

The Tajik Civil War led to the ethnic homogenization of this country by leading to the emigration of many Russians, Uzbeks, and members of smaller ethnic groups such as Kyrgyz, of which 20,000 emigrated from Tajikistan to Kyrgyzstan as mentioned above (EurasiaNet 2001). In 2006, the Tajik government offered $500 each to 1,000 families, overwhelmingly ethnic Tajik from the Khatlon region, who volunteered to move into Tursunzadeh, a city heavily dominated (about 80%) by ethnic Uzbeks and home to the largest aluminum smelter in Central Asia, located in western Tajikistan near the border with Uzbekistan. According to officials, there was no ethnic motive whatsoever in the moving of 1,000 ethnic Tajik families to an industrial area dominated by Uzbeks; rather, the policy was motivated by the desire to create new farmlands in the region (Pannier 2006). Tajik-Uzbek conflict had erupted into the international scene later that same year when a Tajik border guard shot his Uzbek counterpart (Najimova 2006).
In Turkmenistan, ethnic minorities faced internal displacement as well as deportations from the country, purges from employment, and various harsh assimilative pressures. The Turkmen state closed down schools that provided education in minority languages such as Kazakh and Uzbek. The government purged all the Uzbek heads of mosques in the heavily Uzbek populated border region of Khorezm/Dasoguz and replaced them with Turkmens (Blua 2004). A former chief mufti, Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah, also an ethnic Uzbek, was sentenced to 22 years in prison (Corley 2004). In a much more appalling policy, reminiscent of German policies under National Socialism, a number of Uzbek women who had married Turkmen men were denied marriage registration and were deported from Turkmenistan with their half-Uzbek, half-Turkmen children to Uzbekistan (Babajanov 2006). According to international observers, apart from losing their employment and being forced to speak and dress like Turkmen, ethnic minorities face internal displacement within Turkmenistan as a regular tool of repression (IDMC 2005).

Preliminary Classification of Ethnicity Regimes in the Central Asian States

Based on the differences between the five states in these areas, one can place Turkmenistan at the mono-ethnic end of the spectrum and Kyrgyzstan at the multi-ethnic end of the spectrum. Within this range, Kazakhstan is similar to multi-ethnic Kyrgyzstan, while Tajikistan is somewhat similar to the mono-ethnic Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan occupies a “neither/nor” middle point that one can identify as non-ethnic statehood (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Spectrum of Ethnicity Regimes in the Central Asian Republics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mono-Ethnic</th>
<th>Non-Ethnic</th>
<th>Multi-Ethnic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A note of caution is necessary here: this is a truncated spectrum on both ends, since it only considers Central Asian states; in other words, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan are not the most characteristic representatives of mono-ethnic and multi-ethnic regimes by any means. Turkmenistan is not apartheid South Africa or Nazi Germany, and Kyrgyzstan is not Canada or the Netherlands in the early 1990s. Given a common post-Soviet orientation towards mono-ethnic nation building that characterizes these five states, I argue that one can nonetheless categorize and differentiate them as such based on their differences.

Concluding Remarks: Central Asian States’ Approach to Ethnicity in Comparative Perspective

There is a general favoritism towards the titular ethnic group, despite the variation I observe in many policy areas, and this stems from the shared perception that each one of the Central Asian states “belongs to” the titular ethnic group after whose name the republic was created by the Soviet authorities. Hence, for example, there is a strong perception that Turkmens and Tajiks should dominate the political, administrative, economic, and other social fields in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, respectively. The idea of mono-ethnic ownership of the state manifests in the ethnic background of political-administrative leadership, in the attempts to increase the demographic and linguistic weight of the titular ethnicities, and in officially sanctioned historical myths. These are common features of all five post-Soviet Central Asian republics. All five republics implemented policies, to varying degrees, that favor the titular ethnic group, and as such, could be justifiably described as “nationalizing” states.

These ethnic “ownership” claims, especially with increased ethnic homogenization and squeezing out of minorities, might lead to more and more confrontations between the titular ethnics and people of minority ethnic backgrounds, as already happened on many occasions. To give an example, the demographically multi-ethnic Kazakhstan witnessed a deadly (but relatively local) clash between Kazakhs and Chechens, a mass brawl between Kazakhs and Turks that left 200 injured, and another one between Kazakhs and Uyghurs that involved 300 people (Lillis 2007). One has to note, however, that such violence is unusual and not characteristic of ethnic relations in Central Asia in general: for example, "the recent violence in France was shocking to Central Asians, including Kazakhs, precisely because they are not accustomed to such ethnic tension."7

Ethno-national delimitation of Central Asia under Stalin and its persistence in present-day politics (and perhaps in perpetuity) are taken for granted in popular and academic publishing on Central Asia. However, it did not have to be so. Counterfactually, one could imagine bottom-up and/or top-down pressures to do away with the ethno-national delimitation of Central Asia as a Stalinist legacy and move towards regional integration and unification. The fact that such a development did not take place (and is in fact is seen as highly implausible if not outright impossible today) is testimony to the entrenchment of a mono-ethnic habitus, ideology, and practice among the region’s elite and probably also among the masses.

In terms of the ethnic-demographic composition they achieved so far, the Central Asian states can be grouped into two: on the one hand, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, where the titular ethnic group constitutes 80-85% of the population; and on the other hand Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where the titular ethnic groups constitute 50-60% of the population.

1 From comments and criticisms of the anonymous reviewer for Europe-Asia Studies on a previous draft of this paper.

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55-65% of the population. Given that the preferential ethnic immigration programs are popular with the latter group, especially Kazakhstan, it would not be surprising if such ethnic preference in immigration and citizenship leads to political and societal confrontation between the titular ethnic group and all the other minorities, which constitute between a third and a half of the population. Immigration and citizenship reforms in the United States and Australia that dismantled the old pro-European, pro-White immigration practices were partially the result of such politicized societal opposition. Though none of the Central Asian states can be considered democratic, the political leadership in most cases has to take into account different ethnic groups in formulating and implementing its policies. Unlike the Kazakh-Kyrgyz dilemma, higher levels of ethnic homogeneity observed in the other three cases bring with them the temptation to seek even greater homogeneity by punitive policies geared towards getting rid of ever smaller ethnic minorities, made visible by the pursuit of purity.

Bibliography


Continued on page 23
Outreach Programs - Pestilence and Public Health

Conference Presentation Report by Elizabeth Coyne

The Office of Resources for International and Area Studies (ORIAS), the cross-regional outreach effort of International and Area Studies, held its annual summer institute for teachers on July 29–August 1, 2008. This year’s interdisciplinary theme, Pestilence and Public Health, attracted a group of forty-two teachers, mostly from middle and high schools throughout the state of California.

Ted Gerber, Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, gave a presentation on behalf of ISEEES entitled, *The HIV/AIDS Epidemic in Russia: Trajectory, Consequences, and Challenges*. The presentation included information about the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Russia, explored the interaction between society, institutions, and the spread of disease, and examined the challenges of studying the disease.

The first case of HIV/AIDS in Russia was recorded in 1987. Due to the Russian system of large scale testing of various groups within the population, there is a considerable amount of data available to study and track the disease. Russia’s monitoring system was inherited from the Soviet system and includes involuntary testing of population groups such as blood or organ tissue donors, pregnant women, anyone with an STD, intravenous drug users, prisoners, conscripts, and workers in certain sectors. In total, approximately 20 million people are tested in Russia for HIV/AIDS each year. Russia’s monitoring system also records the method of transmission for each incidence of the disease.

The number of cases increased slowly until 1995, when a dramatic surge began. The high point in the number of reported cases was in 2001, when 87,671 new cases were reported. Since then the epidemic has continued to grow, but at a decreased rate. Because the epidemic is young, the death rate so far remains low. One of the factors that make the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Russia unique is that it has historically been concentrated among intravenous drug users, accounting for 75-90% of new infections each year. This gives the disease a distinct trajectory. More recently however, there have been signs of increased transmission through heterosexual relationships. In 2004, 30% of new cases were attributed to heterosexual relationships, and 68.3% were attributed to intravenous drug use. Transmission via homosexual relationships remains low, however, it is possible that these numbers are under reported due to social stigma.

The important question is whether or not the HIV/AIDS epidemic will spread from the intravenous drug-user population to the general population through sexual contact. If it does not, the epidemic is less likely to become explosive since the intravenous drug-user community is relatively small. If the epidemic does spread, it would exacerbate the current decrease in Russia’s population. The labor loss due to illness or death would have an impact on Russia’s economy. The military would be affected by a decrease in eligible personnel, and the increased burden on the health system would negatively effect the economy.

The organization of treatment for HIV/AIDS in Russia is unique. There are centers devoted to the treatment of HIV/AIDS, set up so that specialists are concentrated at these facilities. Unfortunately, because treatment of HIV/AIDS is set up in these centers, some patients must to travel significant distances in order to obtain treatment. Isolating treatment for HIV/AIDS from treatment for other conditions also reinforces the stigma associated with the disease. Associations of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Russia with intravenous drug use have also increased the stigma associated with the disease.

In order to understand the challenges facing Russia with regards to HIV/AIDS, the disease trajectory must also be understood. Some predictions, including predictions by the World Bank, have made estimates based on the assumption that the disease will follow the standard heterosexual transmission trajectory in Russia. So far the patterns of transmission between intravenous drug users and the general population remain unclear. The variables that affect the trajectory of HIV/AIDS in Russia include: multiplicity and concurrency of partners, patterns of sexual mixing, condom use, and policy interventions.

Professor Gerber talked about and shared clips from Russia’s “safe sex” campaigns, which started in 1997. There are several condom ads in Russia designed to make condom use socially acceptable. Initially, however, most of the education was conducted by NGOs and Western groups. In recent years, spending has increased dramatically, and it surged to $300 million in 2007 from $4 million in 2000. The increase in government attention has been accompanied by a growing public concern, especially among young people.

Many Russians see HIV/AIDS as a “foreign” disease, or a plague on degenerates. In one survey, 10% of doctors thought that the CIA introduced AIDS into Russia in order to weaken the Russian people, and 81% of doctors associate HIV with Russia’s moral/cultural decline. There are anti-stigmatization campaigns, and the attitudes towards those living with disease have started to shift, but full acceptance has not yet been reached.

HIV/AIDS is a major problem confronting Russian society. Much of the uncertainty about its long-term impact comes from imprecise notions about its future trajectory. While progress has been made in confronting the epidemic, challenges remain, especially in area of stigmatization. There is a need for more research and investment and an integration of HIV/AIDS programs into a broader strategy to address health issues in Russia.

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Dear Reader,

I am very happy to announce that a new endowment, the ISEEES Graduate Student Support Fund, has been established to support graduate students in the field of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. The fund came into existence last year thanks to an initial gift by an anonymous donor as part of the University’s Named Fund Initiative. Under that initiative, gifts from Berkeley faculty for new endowments reserved for graduate student support are matched, dollar for dollar, by the University.

In addition to the generous gift that established this new endowment, our donor recently agreed to supplement the original commitment in the form of a $5,000 challenge match. If we receive the full $5,000 in contributions from donors like you, a total of $10,000 will be added to the fund. Like all University endowments, these funds will be invested and should grow over time. Moreover, we hope to be able to raise additional resources for the fund in future years.

I hope you agree that ISEEES has been very successful in helping support an outstanding multidisciplinary community of scholars. Central to that community is the highly accomplished, talented, and enthusiastic group of affiliated graduate students. Unfortunately, it is becoming increasingly difficult for a state university, even a great one like Berkeley, to compete with the generous multiyear funding packages that our competitors can offer. Accordingly, I have made it a priority of my tenure as Director of ISEEES to help our graduate community.

Please help us take advantage of this unique and very cost-efficient opportunity. To make a contribution to the fund, all you need to do is send a check, payable to UC Berkeley Foundation, directly to ISEEES. Or you can contribute online by visiting the ISEEES website http://iseees.berkeley.edu and clicking on the “Contributing to the Institute” link and then clicking on the “ISEEES Graduate Student Support Fund” link at the top of the page.

We would be very happy to discuss details of the endowment or your gift by phone or e-mail. Jeff Pennington, the executive director of ISEEES, can be reached at jpennington@berkeley.edu or (510) 643-6736.

Warm regards,

Yuri Slezkine, Director
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Associates of the Slavic Center

ISEEES acknowledges with sincere appreciation the following individuals who made their annual contribution to ISEEES in 2008.

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Your gift will qualify you for membership on our annual giving program: Associates of the Slavic Center. Descriptions of membership benefits by level are included below. Thank you for your continued support.

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FLAS Fellowship Awards

Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) fellowships enable US citizens and permanent residents to acquire a high level of competency in modern foreign languages. FLAS funding for Russian and East European languages comes to UC Berkeley through a Title VI grant from the US Department of Education to ISEEES. Applications are accepted through the Graduate Fellowship Office.

**Awards for Summer 2008**

Katya Balter, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, received funding for intensive study of Polish at Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland.

Sarah Cramsey, Department of History, received funding to attend the Institute for Language and Preparatory Studies at Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic.

Scott Edwards, Department of Music, received funding for advanced study of Czech at Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic.

Sarah Garding, Department of Political Science, received funding for intensive study of Serbian at the University of Novi Sad, Serbia.

Julia McAnallen, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, received funding for intensive study of Czech at Palacky University, Olomouc, Czech Republic.

Elena Morabito, Slavic Languages and Literatures, received funding for study of Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian at the University of Pittsburgh Summer Language Institute’s advanced course in Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Belgrade.

Kevin Rothrock, History, received funding for study of advanced Russian at the Center of Russian Language and Culture, Lomonosov Moscow State University in Russia.

Charles Shaw, History, received funding for intensive study of Uzbek through the American Councils Eurasian Regional Language Program at Tajik State National University in Dushanbe.

**Awards for AY 2008-2009**

Nina Aron, Department of Anthropology, received a fellowship to study Russian.

Sarah Garding, Department of Political Science, received a fellowship to study Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian.

Cammeron Girvin, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, received a fellowship to study Bulgarian.

Mark Keck-Szajbel, Department of History, received a fellowship to study Hungarian.

Jody LaPorte, Department of Political Science, received a fellowship to study Russian and research government policies and practices regarding mass demonstrations in post-Soviet Azerbaijan and Belarus.

Kevin Rothrock, Department of History, received a fellowship to study Russian in Moscow for the 08-09 academic year.

Malgorzata Szajbel-Keck, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, received a fellowship to study Czech.

Cozette Tran-Caffe, School of Public Policy, received a fellowship to study Hungarian.

BPS Fellowship Awards

**Awards for Summer 2008**

Alexandre Beliaev, anthropology, received a Summer Language Fellowship to study Latvian in Riga.

Dace Dzenovska, anthropology, received a Summer Research Fellowship for field research in Riga, Latvia.

Cindy Huang, anthropology, received a Summer Research Fellowship for dissertation work in Berkeley.

Anaita Khudonazar, Near Eastern studies, received a Summer Research Fellowship for field research in Central Asia.

Marcy McCullaugh, political science, received a Summer Research Fellowship for field research in Moscow.

Andrej Milivojevic, history, received a Summer Research Fellowship for work on his dissertation in Berkeley.

Zhivka Valiavicharska, rhetoric, received a Summer Research Fellowship for field research in the Balkans.

Elizabeth Wenger, history, received a Summer Language Fellowship to study German and do research in Germany.

**Awards for AY 2008-09**

Sener Arturk, political science, received a Dissertation Fellowship.

William Quillen, music, received a Dissertation Fellowship for work on his dissertation in Berkeley.

Brian Scholl, economics, received a Dissertation Fellowship to work on his dissertation in Berkeley.

Zhivka Valiavicharska, rhetoric, received a Dissertation Fellowship to conduct field work in the Balkans.
Faculty and Student News

Sener Akturk, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science, taught Comparative Politics and Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Bogazici University, Istanbul, during the summer session. He also published several op-eds in Turkish newspapers on South Ossetia, Olympics in Beijing, and the rights of Alevis and Kurds.

Melanie Feakins, visiting lecturer with ISEEES, received a research fellowship at the Kennan Institute in Washington DC and will be in residence there from September 2008-June 2009. She also published an article in Washington DC and will be in residence there from September 2008-June 2009. She also published an article titled "Off and Out: the Spaces for Certification—Offshore Outsourcing in St. Petersburg, Russia" in Environment and Planning A 39(8) 1889 – 1907. She will also publish an article titled "Offshoring in the Core: Russian software Firms Onshoring in the USA" in the first 2009 issue of the journal Global Networks.

Jacqueline Friedlander (Ph.D. in Russian History 2007, dissertation "Psychiatrists and Crisis in Russia, 1880-1920") was awarded the Ruth L. Kirschstein National Research Service Award: a post-doctoral fellowship at Rutgers University's Institute for Health, Health Care Policy, and Aging Research for 2008-09.


Shorena Kurtsikidze, Graduate Assistant at the Department of Near Eastern Studies, and Vakhtang Chikovani, lecturer in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, published a new book on Georgia titled Ethnography and Folklore of the Georgia-Chechnya Border – Images, Customs, Myths & Folk Tales of the Peripheries. The aim of this book is to acquaint a wide audience with the traditional culture of the Christian and Muslim highlanders who live on the border of Europe and Asia in the central part of the Caucasus Main Mountain Range. Under one cover, the publication features unique materials on visual anthropology, ethnography, mythology, and folklore of the region. The publication includes original translations of Georgian folk tales and myths. ISBN 9783895863288 (Hardbound). LINCOM Studies in Anthropology 09.

A 39(8) 1889 – 1907. She will also publish an article titled "Off and Out: the Spaces for Certification—Offshore Outsourcing in St. Petersburg, Russia" in Environment and Planning A 39(8) 1889 – 1907. She will also publish an article titled "Offshoring in the Core: Russian software Firms Onshoring in the USA" in the first 2009 issue of the journal Global Networks.

Amita Satyal received her Ph.D. in History and started a tenure track position as Assistant Professor at the Department of History, Rutgers-Newark University.

The Peter N. Kujachich Endowment in Serbian and Montenegrin Studies provided six awards in the March 2008 competition.

Harold P. Smith, Jr., Distinguished Visiting Scholar and Professor at the Goldman School of Public Policy, gave two lectures while cruising on the Dnieper River and the Black Sea: Cooperative Threat Reduction in Ukraine and European Missile Defense. The members of the audience were alumni of the universities of California, Stanford, North Carolina, Georgia, and the military academies.

Undergraduate student Kathryn Wallace was this year’s winner of the undergraduate Josef Hašek SVU Student award. She was awarded the prize for her well-documented study “Rock, n’ Revolution: Rock Music and Czech Politics in the 1960s-1970s."

Kujachich Endowment Awards

The Peter N. Kujachich Endowment in Serbian and Montenegrin Studies provided six awards in the March 2008 competition.

A travel grant was awarded to Elena Morabito, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, to attend a summer language program in Serbia in order to increase her level of professional competency in the Serbian language. Upon her return, Elena is expected to teach Serbian at UC Berkeley in the 2008-09 academic year.

Brian Scholl, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Economics, received a grant to conduct summer field research on grassroots democracy reform in Serbia and its impact on local Serbian communities.

Lastly, Zhivka Valiavicharska, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Rhetoric, was awarded a grant to conduct extended field research in Serbia on the topic of the “region-alizing” of Southeastern Europe.
Recent Graduates

Natasha May Azarian was awarded a Ph.D. in December 2007 by the Department of Education for her dissertation “The Seeds of Memory: Narrative Renditions of the Armenian Genocide Across Generations.”

Zygmunt Ronald Bialkowski was awarded a Ph.D. in December 2007 by the Department of History for his dissertation “The Transformation of Academic Criminal Jurisprudence into Criminology in Late Imperial Russia.”

Edward Farnsworth Bodine was awarded a Ph.D. in December 2007 by the Department of Education for his dissertation “Community, Choice and the Organization of Schools under Radical Decentralization: Two Polish Case Studies.”

Heather Lynn Carlisle was awarded a Ph.D. in December 2007 by the Department of Geography for her dissertation “Environment and Security in the Aral Sea Basin.”

Anne Elizabeth Dwyer was awarded a Ph.D. in December 2007 by the Department of Comparative Literature for her dissertation “Improvising Empire: Literary Accounts from the Russian and Austrian Borderlands, 1862-1923.”

Jacqueline Susan Gehring was awarded a Ph.D. in December 2007 by the UC Berkeley Law School’s Jurisprudence and Social Policy program for her dissertation “Race, Law, and Politics in the European Union.”

John Dewey Holmes was awarded a Ph.D. in May 2008 by the Department of History for his dissertation “The Life and Times of Noah London: American Jewish Communist; Soviet Engineer; and Victim of Stalinist Terror.”

James Herbert Krapfl was awarded a Ph.D. in December 2007 by the Department of History for his dissertation “Revolution with a Human Face: Politics, Culture, and Community in Czechoslovakia, 1989-1992.”

Michael Mitsuo Kunichika was awarded a Ph.D. in December 2007 by the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures for his dissertation “The Pendent for the Primitive: Archaeology, Ethnography, and the Aesthetics of Russian Modernism.”

Renee Perelmutter was awarded a Ph.D. in May 2008 by the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures for her dissertation “Referential Negation: Syntax/Semantics of Negative Construction and their Interaction with Narrative Structure in Modern Russia.”

Jonathan Craig Stone was awarded a Ph.D. in December 2007 by the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures for his dissertation “Conceptualizing ‘Symbolism’: Institutions, Publications, Readers, and the Russian Propagation of an Idea.”

Jarrod Mitchell Tanny was awarded a Ph.D. in May 2008 by the Department of History for his dissertation “City of Rogues and Schnorriers: The Myth of Old Odessa in Russian and Jewish Culture.”

Elena Tomlinson was awarded a Master of Architecture degree in May 2008 by the Department of Architecture for her dissertation “The Rroma Neo-Vernacular: An Alternative Aesthetic.”

Jennifer Marie Utrata was awarded a Ph.D. in May 2008 by the Department of Sociology for her dissertation “Counting on Motherhood, Not Men: Single Mothers and Social Change in the New Russia.”

Deborah Hope Yalen was awarded a Ph.D. in December 2007 by the Department of History for her dissertation “‘Evreiskoe mestechko v revoliutsii’: The Jewish Shtetl as Site of Revolutionary Transformation in Early Soviet Culture.”

Berkeley/Stanford Reception at the 2008 AAASS Convention in Philadelphia

ISEEES invites UC Berkeley faculty, students, alumni, and ASC members to the Berkeley/Stanford Reception at the 2008 AAASS Convention in Philadelphia.

If you plan to attend the convention or are in the Philadelphia area, join us on Friday, November 21, 2008, 7:30 - 9:30 p.m. in Grand Ballroom C of the Philadelphia Marriott Downtown, 1201 Market Street, Philadelphia.

* Image contributed by Christopher Landauer, Stanford alumnus, as a gesture of good will between our two equally great universities
The Attitudes of Armenian Youth toward European Culture and Potential Integration with Europe in the Context of Cultural and Ethnic Self-identification

Gohar Shahnazaryan, Ph.D.
Yerevan State University, Department of Sociology

Gohar Shahnazaryan is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Yerevan State University, Armenia. She was a visiting scholar with ISEEES during the Spring 2008 semester and is planning to return to ISEEES soon for another semester to continue her research and curriculum development work.

Historical Overview: On the Crossroads of Europe and Asia

After Armenia became independent, it started to integrate into a comprehensive system of international relationships, including various political, economic, military, and humanitarian associations, such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and also such regional organizations as the Organisation of Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Collective Security Treaty Organization, etc. The integration of Armenia into European political, economic, military, and humanitarian structures can play a decisive influence in that process. At the present moment, out of the basic European structures – European Union, NATO, Council of Europe, and Organization of Security and Collaboration in Europe – Armenia is only a member of the latter two, including the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council.

On July 14, 2004, after the expansion of the Council of Europe, Armenia was included into the European Union’s “New Neighbors” program, and the administration of the country announced its intent to pursue integration into the European Council (at the same time Armenia does not refuse the principle of complementary orientation simultaneously both to the West and to Russia). This “New Neighbors” program intends to build a specific “area of stability” around the EU. In other words, it is directed to achieve democracy among the neighbors of the EU, as well as to increase standards of living. So far, eighteen states have joined this program, including all the countries in North Africa and the Palestinian Authority. A partner country can attain many benefits, including a significant improvement of its relationship with the EU, a mutual opening of markets, and the ability to easily obtain entry permission into member states.

In order to join the program, Armenia has to fulfill a series of agreements: to arrange civil and economic legislation in accordance with European standards; to make changes in the administrative sphere; to reduce the level of poverty and corruption in the country; to provide a comprehensive mechanism that would protect human rights; to hold transparent and fair elections on different levels; etc.

The official relationships between Armenia and the European Union started in 1999. Armenia, like the other two countries of the South Caucasus, signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU in 1999. Before this, communication between Armenia and the EU was not regular, and the aid allotted to Armenia was basically humanitarian (about 30 million euro in a year). Particularly, in 1999 Armenia received aid about 1.5 million euro in order to decrease the after-effects of the financial crisis in Russia.

The main component of the EU’s activity has a consultative character. The EU offers recommendations on changes to legislation and the implementation of laws. Additionally, the EU also provides material support to Armenia for the realization of certain concrete programs. The aid is relatively modest – about 10-20 million euro a year. (The United States provided financial aid of about 75-90 million dollars annually during the several past years, and even more during the 1990s (Khachatryan, 2005).)

In light of these developments, it is very important to stress that Armenia is traditionally considered to be a republic that has close relations with Russia. And at the same time the Armenian government announced that its relations with Western countries, primarily with Europe, are also a priority of the country’s foreign policy. For example, currently 22 out of the 65 political parties registered in Armenia are advocating for Armenia’s admittance into the EU. There are instances where political parties announce that they are changing their orientation from pro-Russian to pro-European. There is also a visible increase in pro-European support within the civil society of Armenia.

But despite such obvious political willingness among political parties and civil society to propel Armenia into the West, there are still questions that in my opinion need to be asked: do the people of Armenia accept the main concepts, standards and values of European culture on a social and psychological level? Whether the potential integration into the European family or even just incorporation of “European elements” into the everyday life of people would be considered a threat to Armenian cultural and national self-identification?

These questions are crucial for our future discussion of the attitudes of Armenian youth toward European values, because while for many Eastern European countries their connection to European civilization and culture is obvious, for Armenia, as well as for other countries in the South
Caucasus, the issue of cultural self-identification is not yet clearly defined.

In general, the issue of Armenian’s self-identification is quite complicated and controversial. Geographically located on the border of Europe and Asia, during various periods of its history Armenia had been under the influence of Babylonian, Hellenistic, and Byzantine empires, as well as Arab, Turkish, and Russian civilizations. These influences created a duality of Western and Eastern cultures not only in poetry, art, music, and architecture, but also in the everyday life of Armenian people. This duality makes it difficult to understand Armenian mentality and, more importantly, complicates cultural self-identification for Armenians.

In this context, it is becoming extremely important to identify and understand the attitudes and perceptions of Armenian youth, which is expected to learn to think, act, and live according to European standards and accept at least the main elements of European culture. Before presenting the data of various sociological surveys conducted among young Armenians during the last 2-3 years and discussing the benefits and challenges of globalization, European integration, and cultural transformations for Armenia, I would also like to analyze this issue from a sociological point of view and bring some theoretical framework in order to better understand the issues at hand.

The process of “Europeanization” could be analyzed from the perspective of sociological theories, which are linking macro and micro levels of society and stressing the duality and interdependence of these levels. Applying, for example, the terms “lifeworld” and “system,” coined by the famous sociologist Jürgen Habermas, the process of “Europeanization” could be understood as an interdependent and interrelated process, taking place on macro- and micro-levels of social life simultaneously (Scott, 1995).

Thus, on one side, there is lifeworld, which refers to people’s experience and behavior in everyday life, or, more concretely, to people’s motivation to become “European” and accept the main elements of European culture. On the other side, there is a system, which refers to the reproduced and institutionalized features of society, such as economic and political institutions and bureaucratic organizations “responsible” for the dissemination of European culture.

As famous sociologist Norbert Elias points out, “society in general is figuration of interdependent people” and “on the one hand, individuals are not isolated entities apart from networks of interdependent, interrelated individuals who constitute them; on the other hand, social fabric (society) has no existence independent of individuals’ activities” (Sibeon, 2004, p.66).

With regard to “Europeanization,” external constrains also do not operate independently of people and people do not remain untouched by social processes and influences. Therefore, there is very strong interdependence among all kind of micro-processes, such as transformations of hierarchy of values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, as well as macro-transformations, such as transformations of political structure, social institutions, and the public discourse.

Armenian Youth and European Values

What are the main values, attitudes, priorities, and cultural values of young Armenian people? Is Armenian youth ready to accept the main concepts and standards of European Union? And what are the attitudes of young Armenian people toward European values and potential integration with Europe in the future?

In order to start this discussion, it is important to understand what are the attitudes of Armenian youth with regard to the primary cultural components advocated by the European Union – human rights and tolerance toward different ethnic, national, religious, and sexual minorities.

In general, in this survey of Armenian youth, 82.0% agree that all people are equal and have equal rights. However, only 51.0% think that all nations are equal, that there are no “good” and “bad” nations. There are some differences among young people from Yerevan (capital) and the rural regions, as well as among those who are enrolled in any kind of educational programs and those who are not (Shahnazaryan, 2005).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Have difficulty to answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>All people are equal and have equal rights.</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>All nations are equal: there are no “good” or “bad” nations.</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Men and women have equal rights.</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Each person has a right to have any kind of religious beliefs.</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Society doesn’t have a right to punish people for their &quot;non-traditional&quot; sexual orientation.</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Another interesting issue is the level of tolerance toward different social, ethnic, and religious groups, which is widely considered an important aspect of democracy and civil society. Armenian youth is more tolerant when it comes to equality between men and women and less tolerant to sexual minorities. One fifth of the young men and women polled accept that there can be Armenians who are not members of the Armenian Apostolic Church.

**Table 2:** Respondents have been asked to continue the sentence: **I think that...** (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Have difficulty to answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Women should have an equal opportunity to participate in political and social life of society.</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Women should have equal opportunities to own businesses and hold leading roles in public and private organizations.</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Men and women should share all responsibilities, including childcare, housework, etc.</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Tables 3-5:** Respondents have been asked to continue the sentence: **I would not mind if...** (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Have difficulty to answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Members of different nationalities live in Armenia and have the same rights as Armenians.</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>I am supposed to work/cooperate with a representative of a different nation.</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>My close relative (a man) marries a foreigner.</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>My close relative (a woman) marries a foreigner.</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Have difficulty to answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Some Armenians are not members of the Armenian Apostolic Church but a religious minority group.</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>I have to work with members of other religious groups.</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Some of my close relatives (referent others) are members of religious minority.</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Have difficulty to answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>There are representatives of sexual minorities in Armenia.</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>I am supposed to work with a homosexual man or woman.</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>I have a close relative/referent other who is homosexual.</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is worthwhile to examine the level of tolerance of young people toward different socio-demographic groups in various aspects of social life and social institutions. As it turns out, a majority of young people are ready to cooperate and be colleagues of members of ethnic minorities. At the same time there is an apparent increase in discriminatory and non-tolerant attitudes when it comes to more “intimate” spheres, such as family members, relatives, and even neighbors. The table below is a very good illustration of this.

**Table 6:** **Whom would you not want to have as a neighbour?** (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Would not want as neighbor</th>
<th>Doesn't Matter</th>
<th>Difficult to Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Members of other nations</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Members of ethnic minority groups living in Armenia</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Again the level of tolerance toward different minorities depends on a person’s gender, the area they live in, and family income. Thus, young people from villages, with a relatively high income, tend to be less tolerant. Gender influence on the level of tolerance requires special attention. The level of tolerance toward all kinds of minorities is obviously higher among young women than men. Thus, more than half female respondents are ready to make a friendship with people with AIDS and members of sexual minorities (56.9% and 54.3% accordingly), 69% of young women are ready to cooperate with members of ethnic minorities, and 87.7% with physically disabled people.

Another interesting difference was observed during a discussion of inter-ethnic marriages. According to the surveys, 34.0% of young people are against marriage between an Armenian man and a non-Armenian woman, 40.9% are against marriage between an Armenian woman and a non-Armenian man. But it seems that the issue of inter-ethnic marriages is not viewed separately from the religious issue, because the majority of respondents (almost 60.0%) are quite accepting of marriages between Armenians and other Christians. In fact, there is a trend among Armenian youth to identify ethnic and religious affiliation and consider them as similar categories.

Finally, I would like to discuss the attitudes and perceptions of Armenian youth toward the process of European integration and European culture in general and their perception of similarities and differences between Armenian and European cultures.

The vast majority of respondents (70.5%) think that Armenian culture and mentality are unique and could not be compared to any other culture, 7.4% agree that Armenian culture is a part of Middle Eastern culture, and only 6.9% consider Armenian culture to be a part of European culture.

At the same time, the view of Armenia as a unique, incomparable culture is more prevalent among students compared to non-students (74.3% and 66.3%), especially among those who live in the capital. In fact, more educated and informed respondents show greater ethno-centrism. This is an interesting phenomenon that needs a deeper and more detailed socio-psychological analysis.

At the same time, almost 60% of respondents think that there is no contradiction between Armenian and European culture, and that it is possible for Armenia to integrate into Europe while retaining its traditions, cultural values, and norms.

It is evident from the data that the level of tolerance decreases drastically when the question comes to ethnic minorities within Armenia, compared to representatives of different nations in general. Drug abusers, as well as alcoholics and homosexuals are seen as most threatening. At the same time, lack of tolerance toward these groups is considered a positive trend and is always discussed in the context of national security and state building.

Where there is a question of national security, it is always related to the violation of human rights. And if, for example, some religious sects are threatening our national security, they should leave our country, because all these programs are very well developed strategies to destroy our country (participant of focus-groups discussion, male, 24).

Table 7: Which of the statements below do you agree with the most? (%)
I am not sure that we can live one hundred percent according to European standards. We are not Europe and not Asia, we are on the crossroads (focus groups discussion participant, woman, 23).

During our history we have always been more European than Asian, but we have been under the influence of Middle Eastern countries so much that there are many elements of Asian culture, which we consider to be our own (focus groups discussion participant, man, 27).

I think our culture now is at a critical point. We have to make our choice and understand what we want. And it's all about changing our mentality and our behavior (focus groups discussion participant, woman, 29).

So, what is positive and negative in European culture according to Armenian youth? Freedom, economic prosperity, and the rule of law have been mentioned as positive characteristics and values. Homosexuality, egoism, and lack of individual responsibility are viewed as negative characteristics.

It is very interesting that despite some of the negative, sometimes even radical, attitudes of Armenian youth toward different aspects of European culture, 72.7% want to see Armenia as a member of the European Union in the future, and 17.5% could not define their position very clearly.

At the same time, the majority of young people, regardless of educational background, economic status, and whether they live in the capital or in rural areas, are quite realistic and understand that

This is not a question that can be resolved in the near future, and we have to change so many things in our political and economic situation, as well as change our mentality, and, most importantly, we have to understand the value of an individual and of human rights (participants of focus group discussions).

Conclusion

Both qualitative and quantitative data of different sociological surveys conducted in Armenia during the past several years show that the absolute majority of Armenian youth think that Armenian culture is unique and incomparable to any other cultures. At the same time, young people think that it is possible to accept some European values and incorporate them into Armenian culture. The positive aspects of European culture the respondents enumerate are freedom, civilization, and respect for the rule of law. The negative aspects are homosexuality, egoism, too much liberty and lack of individual responsibility. In general, young people show more tolerance toward different minorities in the labor sphere and much less tolerance when it comes to friendship, family, etc. There are also obvious gender differences: young women are more tolerant than young men. There is also an interesting conclusion from the data, which shows that young people who are more educated and informed tend to be more supportive of ethno-centricism. Understanding this phenomenon will require deeper, more detailed socio-psychological analysis.

Works Cited:


Continued from page 12
Events are subject to change. For current information on ISEEES-sponsored events, please call (510) 642-3230. For all other events check the website of the sponsoring organization.

**Monday, November 10, 2008.** Poetry Reading. Valzhyna Mort, a poet from Belarus will read his poetry at 4:00 p.m. in 160 Dwinelle Hall. Sponsored by the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures and ISEEES. For additional details call 510-642-2979. Valzhyna Mort was born in Minsk, Belarus in 1981. Her book, Factory of Tears, (Copper Canyon Press, 2008), was the first bilingual Belarusian-English book of poetry ever published in the United States. There is an urgency and vitality to Mort's poems, in which intense moments of joy leave the darkness. Set in a land haunted by the specter of Soviet history and marked by the violence of the recent past, her work moves within universal themes-lust, loneliness, the strangeness of god, and familial love. Valzhyna is famed throughout Europe for her remarkable reading performances.

**Wednesday, November 12, 2008.** Lecture: *European Missile Defense: Why Now?* by Harold P. Smith, Distinguished Visiting Scholar and Professor, Goldman School of Public Policy. At high political cost in the international community, the Bush Administration is attempting to deploy a missile defense in Europe as rapidly as possible to protect many of America’s European allies from nuclear tipped missiles launched from Iran. While there is little question that Iran intends to build a nuclear weapon, there is considerable question regarding when such a weapon could be deployed by ballistic missile and under what conditions would it be used. 12-2:00 p.m., 119 Harris Room, Moses Hall, UC Berkeley. Sponsored by ISEEES, Institute of International Studies. For more information, call 510-642-1474.

**Wednesday, November 12, 2008.** Lecture: *Shifting Religious Affiliations in Central Asia* by Professor Olivier Roy, EHESS, the School of Advanced Studies in Social Sciences in Paris. Most observers during the 1990’s spoke of the pattern of “Wahhabisation” of Islam as a process of political radicalization in the Muslim world. Professor Roy will discuss how this pattern might be giving way to a more complex phenomena, where Wahhabisation is pervasive inside government sponsored Islamic institutions.

**Thursday, November 13, 2008.** Lecture: *Blue Helmets, Black Markets: The Business of Survival in Sarajevo* by Peter Andreas, Professor, Brown University. Peter Andreas traces the interaction between these formal front-stage and informal backstage activities, arguing that this dynamic created and sustained a criminalized war economy and prolonged the conflict in a manner that served various interests on all sides. For comparative insights, the analysis is also extended to other cases, including the battles of Leningrad, Grozny, and Falluja. 12:30 p.m., 223 Moses Hall, UC Berkeley. Sponsored by ISEEES, Institute of International Studies. For more information, call 510-642-7747.

**Thursday, November 13, 2008.** Lecture: *Post-Soviet Maverick: Belarus' place in Europe* by Dr. Galina Miazhevich, Research Associate at the University of Manchester, who is about to begin a three-year funded research project entitled "State Media, Xenophobia and Post-imperial Identity in Belarus" (the project is hosted by Rothemere American Institute in conjunction with Christ Church College and Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism). At 4 p.m. in 270 Stephens Hall. Sponsored by ISEEES. For more information call 510-642-3230.

**Thursday, November 13, 2008.** Lecture: *Security & Energy in the Black Sea Region: A Romanian Perspective* by his Excellency Ambassador Adrian Vieriţa, ambassador of Romania to the United States. The Black Sea region has recently been the focus of attention from a political, military and economic standpoint. This fact is due in large part to the region’s geopolitical location as a gateway to energy supplies. Ambassador Vieriţa will discuss these topical issues from the perspective of Romania as the largest EU member state in the Black Sea region.
Monday, November 17, 2008. Lecture: *History's Greatest Heist: The Bolshevik Looting of Russia* by Sean McMeekin, Assistant Professor, Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey. Sean McMeekin draws on previously undiscovered materials from the Soviet Ministry of Finance and other European and American archives to expose some of the darkest secrets of Russia's early days of communism. Building on one archival revelation after another, the author reveals how the Bolsheviks financed their aggression through astonishingly extensive thievery. 12-1:30 p.m., 270 Stephens, UC Berkeley. Sponsored by ISEEES. Call (510) 642-3230 for more information.

Thursday, November 20, 2008. Performance: Kitka will perform *Lullabies and Songs of Childhood.* The gentle rhythms, lilting melodies, and poetic texts of traditional lullabies give voice to the innermost psyche of a mother. Through this voice, a child is ushered to the gateways of dreams, language, and culture. Kitka has collected and arranged a stunning set of Eastern European cradle songs, together with songs sung by the young, songs sung by grown children confiding in or remembering their parents, and songs that reflect on youth and aging. At 12 p.m. at Laney College, 900 Fallon Street, Oakland CA. For tickets, call 510-444-0323. [http://www.kitka.org/](http://www.kitka.org/)


Friday, November 21, 2008. Berkeley-Stanford Reception at the 2008 AAASS Convention. ISEEES invites UC Berkeley faculty, students, alumni, and ASC members to the Berkeley/Stanford Reception at the 2008 AAASS Convention in Philadelphia. RSVP by November 17 by calling Andrei Dubinsky at 510-642-9107, or by emailing adubinsky@berkeley.edu. At 7:30 p.m., in Grand Ballroom C of the Philadelphia Marriott Downtown.


November 23, 24, 2008. Performance: *Kafka Fragments* by György Kurtág. Set musically to excerpts from Kafka's diaries and letters, this devastating two-character drama astonished audiences and critics alike. The production is distinguished by Geoff Nuttall's intensely dramatic accompaniment and Peter Sellars's wrenching and incisive direction. November 23 – 7:00 p.m. November 24 – 8:00 p.m. Zellerbach Playhouse, UC Berkeley. Tickets $68. For more information call 510-642-9988 or go to [http://www.calperfs.berkeley.edu/presents/season/2008/20th_century_and_beyond/kf.php](http://www.calperfs.berkeley.edu/presents/season/2008/20th_century_and_beyond/kf.php)


Wednesday, December 3, 2008. Dinner followed by a lecture by Edward Walker, Executive Director of the Berkeley Program in Eurasian and East European Studies; Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, UC Berkeley on *Russia and the West After the Georgian Crisis.* Dinner Reservations required by Monday, December 1. 7:50 p.m. - 9:00 p.m., Dominican University, Caleruega Dining Hall, Creekside Room, Magnolia at Palm Avenue, San Rafael, CA. Sponsored by the World Affairs Council. For tickets, go to [http://www.itsyourworld.org/assnfe/ev.asp?ID=2372&SnID=1911205031](http://www.itsyourworld.org/assnfe/ev.asp?ID=2372&SnID=1911205031).
Funding Opportunities

After ISEEES-sponsored grants, opportunities are listed alphabetically by funding source. For additional funding sources, check our website <iseeess.berkeley.edu/funding.html>.

ISEEES

ISEEES/BPS Travel Grants provide limited travel support for ISEEES/BPS affiliated graduate students. Grants up to $400 are awarded to students who are on the official program of a professional conference or workshop. Awards are made on a first-come, first-served basis and are limited to one grant per student per year. **Deadline: none.** To apply, send request with budget to Dr. Edward W. Walker, BPS, UC Berkeley, 260 Stephens Hall #2304, Berkeley, CA 94720-2304; Tel: 510-643-6736; eww@berkeley.edu

The Drago and Danica Kosovac Prize is awarded for an outstanding senior or honors thesis in the social sciences or humanities that researches some aspect of Serbian culture or history. Cal undergraduate students are eligible to apply. The application includes submission of the thesis and two letters of recommendation. No electronic or faxed applications will be accepted. **Deadline: none.**

The Peter N. Kujachich Endowment in Serbian and Montenegrin Studies offers awards in 2008-09 to faculty and/or graduate student projects that focus on the experience of the Serbian and Montenegrin peoples. To apply, send a proposal with a budget. **Deadline: March 21, 2009.**

The Hertelendy Graduate Fellowship in Hungarian Studies provides partial support (tuition/stipend) in 2009-10 academic year to UC Berkeley-enrolled graduate students working in Hungarian studies and/or US-Hungarian or European (including EU)-Hungarian relations. Applicants may be of any nationality and citizenship, but must be US residents at the time of application, and must plan to pursue a career in the US. Fields of study focusing on Hungarian-US, Hungarian-Europe, or EU-Hungarian Studies within the fields of history, language, culture, arts, society, and/or politics are acceptable. No electronic or faxed proposals will be considered. **Deadline: March 21, 2009.**

For ISEEES funding contact: Jeffrey Pennington, UC Berkeley, 260 Stephens Hall # 2304, Berkeley CA 94720-2304; Tel: 510-643-6736; jpennington@berkeley.edu

American Association of University Women

Offers Dissertation Fellowships of $20,000, Postdoctoral Research Leave Fellowships of $30,000, and Summer/Short-Term Research Publication Grants of $6,000 for women doctoral candidates completing dissertations, or scholars seeking funds for postdoc research leave or for preparing completed research for publication. Applicants must be US citizens or permanent residents. **Deadline: 11/15/2008.** Contact: AAUW Educational Foundation, Dept. 60, 301 ACT Drive, Iowa City, IA 52243-4030, Phone: 319-337-1716 ext. 60, aauw@act.org; http://www.aauw.org/education/fga/fellowships_grants/american.cfm

Brookings Institution

The Brookings Institution Research Fellowship offers a stipend of $23,000 and up to $1,500 supplementary assistance for reimbursement of expenses for research-related travel, copying etc. Fellows will conduct their research in affiliation with one of four participating Brookings research programs: Governance Studies, Foreign Policy Studies, Metropolitan Policy, and Global Economy and Development. **Deadline: 12/1/2008.** Contact: The Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington DC 20036; Tel: 202-797-6000; Fax: 202-797-6004;brf@brookings.edu; http://www.brook.edu/admin/fellowships.htm

DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service)

Grants for study and research in Germany with monthly stipend for 1-10 months, insurance, and international travel subsidy. For Berkeley undergraduate seniors, graduate students, and postdoctoral scholars (2 years or less beyond the Ph.D.) to undertake up to 10 months study and research in Germany during the next AY. **Deadline: 11/15/2008.** Contact: Graduate Fellowships Office, 318 Sproul Hall #5900; Tel: 510-642-0672; Michael Sacramento, msacram@berkeley.edu, Tel: 510-642-7739; http://www.grad.berkeley.edu/admin/deadlines.shtml

Fulbright Scholar Program

The Fulbright Senior Specialists Program receives project requests from Fulbright Commissions and US Embassies Worldwide. The award includes international economy fare travel and approved related expenses, plus a $200 per day honorarium. **Deadline: Rolling.** Contact: Council for International Exchange of Scholars, Attn: (specify country or program), 3007 Tilden Street, NW, Suite 5L, Washington D.C. 20008-3009; Tel: 202-686-4000; Fax: 202-362-3442; Ryan Hathaway, Senior Program Coordinator, rhathaway@cies.iie.org, Tel: 202.686.4026; http://www.cies.org/specialists

International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX)

Individual Advanced Research Opportunities for two- to nine-month grants are available to predoctoral and postdoctoral scholars for research at institutions in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia. US citizens and permanent residents are eligible to apply. Scholars in policy
research and development, and cross-disciplinary studies are strongly urged to apply. **Deadline: 11/17/2008.** Contact: IREX, 2121 K St NW, Ste. 700, Washington DC 20037; Tel: 202-628-8188; Fax: 202-628-8189; iaro@irex.org; http://www.irex.org/programs/iaro/index.asp

**Kosciuszko Foundation**

*A Year Abroad Program at Jagiellonian University* offers an opportunity for American graduate students, postdoctoral fellows and faculty to study Polish language, history, literature, and culture for credit. **Deadline: Check website.** Contact: Year Abroad Scholarship Program, The Kosciuszko Foundation, 15 E 65th St, New York NY 10021-6595; Tel: 212-734-2130; Fax: 212-628-4552; http://www.kosciuszkofoundation.org/EDScholarships_US_YearAbroad.html

**Social Science Research Council (SSRC)**

**Eurasia Program** offers a Predissertation Training Fellowships of up to $7,000. Graduate students in their first or second year are invited to apply for language learning support at a recognized program in US or abroad; formal training away from one’s home institution to acquire analytical or methodological skills normally unavailable to the candidate; well-defined exploratory research expressly leading to the formulation of a dissertation proposal. No more than four months may be spent outside the US. **Deadline: 11/13/2008.** Contact: Eurasia Program, Social Science Research Council, 810 Seventh Ave, New York NY 10019; Tel: 212-377-2700; Fax: 212-377-2727; eurasia@ssrc.org; http://www.ssrc.org/programs/eurasia

**Townsend Center for the Humanities**

Dissertation Fellowships for $18,000 are available to graduate students in the humanities advanced to candidacy by next June. Fellows will participate in the Townsend Fellowship Group, meeting weekly. **Deadline: 11/14/2008.** Contact: Townsend Center for the Humanities, 220 Stephens Hall # 2340; Tel: (510) 643-9672; harriskornstein@berkeley.edu; http://townsendcenter.berkeley.edu/research_support.shtml

**UC Berkeley**

UC Berkeley offers Graduate Division Summer Grants for $3,200 plus fees for three units. Designed to provide financial assistance to doctoral students in the humanities, social sciences, and professional schools during the summer months. **Deadline: 11/12/2008,** check for different deadlines. Contact: Graduate Fellowships Office, 318 Sproul Hall # 5900; Tel: 510-642-0672; http://www.grad.berkeley.edu-financial/deadlines.shtml

**Wenner-Gren Foundation**

The **Historical Archives Program** offers grants up to $15,000 to encourage the preservation of unpublished records and other materials of value for research on the history of anthropology. Applicants must present a proposal describing the significance of the subject for the history of anthropology, the topics to be covered, and the interviewer's qualifications. **Deadline: No deadline.** Contact: Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research Inc., 470 Park Avenue South, 8th Floor New York, NY 10016; Tel: 212-683-5000; Fax: 212-683-9151; http://www.wennergren.org

**Woodrow Wilson Center**

**East European Studies program** offers **Short Term Grants** for up to one month of research in Washington DC., for graduate students and postdocoral fellows. Funds up to one month of specialized research in East European and Baltic studies that requires access to Washington DC and its research institutions. Grants do not include residence at the Wilson Center. **Deadline: 12/1/2008.** Contact: East European Studies, Woodrow Wilson Center, One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington DC 20523; Tel: 202-691-4222; Fax: 202-691-4001; ees@wilsoncenter.org; http://www.wilsoncenter.org/

**Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation**

**Charlotte W. Newcombe Doctoral Dissertation Fellowships** of $23,000 are granted for 12 months of full-time dissertation writing. Designed to encourage original and significant study of ethical or religious values in all fields of the humanities and social sciences. Applicants must have fulfilled all pre-dissertation requirements and expect to complete their dissertations by the end of the award term. **Deadline: 11/14/2008.** Contact: Charlotte Newcombe Dissertation Fellowships, Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation, P.O. Box 5281, Princeton, NJ 08543-5281; Tel: 609-452-7007 (Shelia Walker, Program Associate, ext. 131); Fax: 609-452-7828; charlotte@woodrow.org; http://www.woodrow.org/newcombe/

**World Learning, Inc.**

**Democracy Fellows Program** is a Junior, mid-level, and senior fellowships designed to help promote and strengthen the evolution of democratic practices and institutions in transitional or emerging democracies. Democracy Fellows are assigned to overseas USAID field missions or offices in Washington, D.C., usually for a one-year term. Amount is variable. **Deadline: Rolling.** Contact: Democracy Fellows Program, World Learning, 1015 15th St NW Ste 750, Washington DC 20025; Tel: 202-408-5420; dfp.info@worldlearning.org; http://www.worldlearning.org/wljd/cssc/dfp/index.html
The Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies and the Institute of European Studies at the University of California, Berkeley are pleased to announce the establishment of a new European Union Center of Excellence at UC Berkeley. A joint effort of these two Institutes, the EU Center is funded for three years with a €300,000 grant from the European Commission in partnership with these Institutes and is working in cooperation with the School of Public Health, the Institute of Governmental Studies, the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, and the Boalt Hall School of Law. With the creation of this EU Center of Excellence, UC Berkeley will play a vital role in promoting a deeper understanding of the European Union and raise the level of dialogue and discourse on transatlantic relations throughout the State of California.

The EU Center is co-directed by Beverly Crawford (bev@berkeley.edu), associate director of the Institute of European Studies, and by Jeff Pennington (jpennington@berkeley.edu), executive director of the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. Ms. Noga Wizansky (nwizansk@berkeley.edu) serves as the Center's assistant director.

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