Notes from the Director

Welcome to the Fall 2014 edition of the ISEEES Newsletter!

First, a word of introduction. As of the summer of 2014, I am the director of the Institute. My specialty is the history of modern East Central Europe with a focus on communism, nationalism and religion. Though my background differs from that of my predecessor, Yuri Slezkine, I do not anticipate major changes in what the Institute does. For one thing, the recent past of places I have studied (like Poland or Czechoslovakia) makes me suspicious of change that claims to be revolutionary. For another, Yuri and his predecessors have made the Institute a productive and welcoming place for a broad constituency of students, faculty and the interested community. We hold a range of talks, workshops, working groups, and other activities that continue to sustain a lively intellectual environment. As events of the recent year show, our region is not diminishing in importance for European and world history, and our work remains as vital as ever.

Besides outgoing Director Yuri Slezkine, I would like to thank last year’s interim Director Jason Wittenberg (Political Science) for maintaining standards of excellence established in previous decades by scholars like Gregory Grossman, Reggie Zelnik, Andrew Janos, George Breslauer, and Vicki Bonnell.

Much of the intellectual and administrative heavy lifting is done by our first-rate staff, and I am delighted to report continuity in our executive director Jeff Pennington and ISEEES program coordinator Zachary Kelly, as well as administrative assistant Louanna Curley and administrative officer Gloria Oré.

This year Pennington and Kelly put together a successful application for another four-year U.S. Department of Education Title VI National Resource Center (NRC) and Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) fellowships grant. With declining Federal dollars for international and foreign language education, this year’s selection was one of the most competitive in the 50-year history of the Title VI program, and we are especially grateful to Pennington and Kelly for their deeply informed, hard work.

As a National Resource Center, ISEEES promotes activities focusing on our region, including language and area studies instruction, scholarly research, funding for library resources, public outreach, and teacher training. One new Title VI initiative will have us focus on partnerships with faculty and students at community colleges and minority-serving institutions.

FLAS fellowships assist in the development of knowledge, resources, and trained personnel for modern foreign language and area and international studies; foster foreign language acquisition and fluency; and develop a domestic pool of international experts to meet national needs. ISEEES works collaboratively with the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures to offer FLAS fellowships to graduate and undergraduate students studying the following languages at
Despite the recent political and military events occurring in our region, Title VI NRC and FLAS support from the U.S. Department of Education for research, teaching, and training focusing on our world area has dropped precipitously. In comparison with Fiscal Year 2010, in FY2014 funding for NRC’s in the Russian/East European/Eurasian area decreased by approximately 40%, while funding for FLAS fellowships decreased by approximately 37%. This also led to a decrease in the number of Title VI centers being funded at universities across the United States, hence the more competitive nature of this cycle’s selection process. ISEEES plans to work with counterpart NRC’s at other universities, as well as with the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies and the Council of National Resource Centers, to explain to the U.S. Department of Education the importance—especially now—of a robustly funded program of university teaching, research, and training in our world area and to urge the Department of Education to increase funding for the study of our important world area.

ISEEES is pleased to be hosting a number of visiting scholars this semester from a variety of countries, including Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Moldova, and South Korea. Please turn to page 10 to read more about them and their research while at UC Berkeley.

Our faculty/graduate student lunchtime seminar series continues to be very successful. This semester we invited former Institute-affiliated graduate students who are now leading scholars in the field to discuss their intellectual trajectories in the context of trends in their disciplines and in the study of our region. Guests included Victoria Smolkin-Rothrock, Assistant Professor of History and Russian and East European Studies at Wesleyan University; Winson Chu, Associate Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; and James Krapfl, Associate Professor of History at McGill University.

The fall was a busy time for ISEEES. On October 21 we hosted Ambassador Cameron Munter, Professor of Practice in International Relations at Pomona College, as our Colin Miller Memorial lecturer. Munter gave an insightful and riveting talk on his thirty years as a diplomat, including as Deputy Chief of Mission in Prague and Warsaw and U.S. Ambassador in Serbia and Pakistan. This was followed a week later by a lecture by Adam Michnik, editor-in-chief of Poland’s largest newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza. Michnik spoke about the accomplishments that Poland has achieved over the last twenty-five years of democracy and the challenges Poland continues to face. In December, ISEEES organized the roundtable on “Russia, the West and the Crisis in Ukraine.” Speakers included Edward Walker, Associate Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Executive Director of the Berkeley Program in Eurasian and East European Studies, UC Berkeley; Beverly Crawford, Adjunct Professor of International and Area Studies and Political Science, UC Berkeley; Gérard Roland, E. Morris Cox Professor of Economics and Professor of Political Science, UC Berkeley; and Andrei Tsygankov, Professor of Political Science and International Relations, San Francisco State University.

Please save the date for the 2015 Berkeley-Stanford Conference, which will be held on Friday, March 6, in the Alumni House on the UC Berkeley campus. The topic of the 2015 conference will be “The Collapse after a Quarter Century: What Have We Learned About Communism and Democracy?” Be sure to check our website http://iseees.berkeley.edu/ for other upcoming events and updates to the calendar. We look forward to seeing you at our events in 2015!

John Connelly
ISEEES Director
Professor of History
I have long been an alarmist about US-Russia relations. While the relationship has seen its ups and downs, I believe the trend has been decidedly negative since the mid-1990s. I’ve also long worried about a possible clash with Russia over NATO expansion, and particularly so after the Bush Administration decided to press – albeit unsuccessfully – America’s NATO allies to offer Ukraine and Georgia Membership Action Plans at the March 2008 Bucharest NATO summit.

Moreover, my Chicken Little view is that Moscow’s relationship with the West today is as dangerous as it was during the early years of the Cold War, and for similar reasons. Like then, the rules of the game and the border separating respective spheres of influence are unclear and contested. Which is why, in brief, we have the current crisis in Ukraine.

Finally, it is important to appreciate that a war with Russia could be every bit as catastrophic as a military conflict with the Soviet Union might have been in the early 1950s. Russia today has far more nuclear weapons than the Soviet Union did then – around 2,000 operational battlefield nuclear weapons, and many thousands more in storage. It also has some 500 strategic launchers and 1,700 deliverable nuclear warheads capable of reaching the United States. And it has a large and modern conventional military equipped with a great many sophisticated weapons.

As a result, a military confrontation between NATO and Russia – even a low-level one precipitated by some kind of accident – would entail the same kind of game of chicken, and the same risks of escalation, as Cold War standoffs like the Berlin airlift, the Berlin Crisis of 1961, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Mishandling Russia

I also believe that the West has contributed to the current crisis. In saying this, I am not arguing that the West is solely, or even mostly, to blame. But I believe the West has mishandled Russia, and that its post-Cold War Russia policy has been unwise and insufficiently risk averse. There has been too much hoping for the best and not enough planning for, and trying to avoid, the worst.

In particular, the United States and its allies made two fundamental, and very consequential, mistakes in Russia policy after 1991. The first was to try to build a post-Cold War security architecture for Europe around NATO expansion. I felt then, and still feel, that it would have been wiser to try to create a European-wide security structure that included Russia – for example, by turning the OSCE, and the other institutions that emerged from the so-called Helsinki process, into a meaningful security organization. If that effort failed, or perhaps in conjunction with it, carefully measured NATO expansion might have been warranted. But no such effort was made.

The second, and related, error was a failure to appreciate just how illiberal, and alienated from the West, Russia was becoming, and to take steps to head off a confrontation before the current crisis. “Illiberal,” I should emphasize, is the appropriate term here, not “undemocratic.” One can argue about whether Russia is in some sense “democratic” — certainly a significant majority of Russians supports both the regime and the current leadership. The real problem is that Russia has become deeply illiberal, and as a result deeply anti-Western and, even more so, anti-American.

At any rate, I believe Western decision makers have been tone deaf about Russia – slow to recognize, or politically unwilling to acknowledge, the extent to which illiberalism, resentment of the West, and growing power were making a clash with Moscow increasingly likely and increasingly dangerous. That should have been made very clear by the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, which I thought then and think now was mostly about Russian objections to NATO expansion. Unfortunately, Western leaders lacked the strategic vision, and the political commitment, needed to avert what has turned out to be an acute geopolitical crisis.
If the first error was mostly Washington’s, the latter was mostly by the U.S.’s European partners, particularly Germany, where the consensus was that relations were fine, that deepening economic ties would placate Moscow and gradually make Russia “European,” and that the EU’s Eastern Partnership program would be viewed as benign by the Kremlin. For European officials speaking the cautious and diplomatic language of the EU, hard power was no longer an important factor in interstate relations in Europe. That, I believe, was and is naïve, and it is one of the reasons why the West failed to get Russia right, and address Russia’s security concerns, before it was too late.

**Why the Crisis Is So Dangerous**

As to why the crisis is so dangerous, I would emphasize two factors. First, I do not agree with the conventional wisdom that ideology is not driving the conflict. On the contrary, my view is that it involves a fundamental clash of principles – or if you prefer, a clash of worldviews. And second, I believe there is an unstable balance of military power along Russia’s western borders that increases Moscow’s incentives to use force.

Prior to the annexation of Crimea, the contending principles were what I call the “Great Power Realism” of Russia, on the one hand, and “Democratism” in the West on the other hand.

Russian Great Power realism begins with a predicative claim that we are transitioning from an international order dominated by a single superpower, the United States, to a multipolar one in which power is increasingly distributed among a number of more-or-less equal “Great Powers.” This prediction is accompanied by a deeply held normative belief that the world will be better off for it. Russia will be, and should be, one of those Great Powers, and as a Great Power it will have, and should have, its own sphere of influence in its “Eurasian” neighborhood. The West should respect Russia’s rights as a Great Power, and it should avoid meddling in Russia’s internal affairs or in the internal affairs of states in Russia’s sphere of influence. Above all, it should cease efforts to draw those states into the Western orbit and to expand the EU, and especially NATO, to Russia’s borders.

Democratism is embraced with at least as much conviction by the West. It holds that every country has a right to be, should be, and can be democratic; that every state, and especially every democratic state, has a right to determine its own external orientation and alliances; and that the West has no right to prevent any country from joining the European institutional order if it meets Europe’s criteria.

Above all, it would be contrary to the West’s democratic values to cede any country, including Ukraine, to Moscow simply because that is what the Kremlin wants, regardless of the preferences of that country’s government and people.

With the annexation of Crimea, there is now another, yet more fundamental principle at stake for the West, a principle that it considers the foundation of a rule-governed international order and of post-World War II European security: there can be no changing of borders of internationally recognized states, especially in Europe, by force.

These contending principles, and the emotions they elicit on both sides, are why backing down for either side is going to be extremely difficult, perhaps even impossible.

The second reason the crisis is so dangerous is the unstable military balance along Russia’s western borders. The fact is that Russia has a great preponderance of military force along those borders, and as a result NATO is now overextended.

Regardless of what one thinks of NATO expansion, it was particularly risky for NATO to take in members that bordered on contiguous Russia (that is, excluding Kaliningrad). Even more risky was the decision to take in members that NATO could not credibly defend, or that it could not credibly defend without taking steps to establish a tripwire type of deterrence – for example, by placing US and NATO troops in harm’s way in militarily vulnerable countries.

As it happened, NATO accepted two very small, and very vulnerable, countries that border on Russia – Estonia and Latvia. And it accepted a third – Lithuania – that does not share a border but is proximate to Russia and is also small and militarily highly vulnerable. In none of these cases did NATO make the hard choice of establishing a meaningful military deterrent as part of the accession process.

As a result, we are now in a situation where NATO’s Article 5 obliges all NATO-member-states (albeit somewhat ambiguously) to come to the collective defense of any other member-state if attacked. But it is very difficult to see how the West could do so were Estonia...
and Latvia to be invaded by Russia quickly and in force.

Moreover, there is a risk that we will find ourselves in the kind of competitive mobilization game over the Baltics that helped precipitate World War I. Consider what might happen next year when Russia undertakes, as planned, large-scale military exercises in its Central Military District, and masses troops in the vicinity of the Baltic states. By then, the U.S. and other NATO countries will have prepositioned significant military hardware in the Baltic states, and new rapid reaction forces will be available for deployment in response to the Russian troop presence exercises. Their purpose is to serve as a deterrent to a Russian invasion, so NATO presumably would order their deployment. And that, in turn, would give Moscow cause, and an excuse, to act preemptively.

The problem, in short, is that Putin and his advisors may conclude that the West has neither the power nor the will to dislodge a Russian army that quickly occupies Latvia and Estonia, that has tactical nuclear weapons at its disposal, and that is backed by Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal. And the Kremlin may also conclude that NATO would collapse if Western governments and publics turn out to have very different tolerances for risking war with Russia should it attack Estonia and Latvia.

I should make clear that I am not saying that NATO membership is not an important deterrent – it is, and it is easy to understand why Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are very relieved to be part of NATO today. But the efficacy of that deterrent is limited, and the incentives to preempt by Moscow significant.

Finally, it is worth considering possible answers to the question of how Putin would react if the West crosses an implied Kremlin redline – say, by providing lethal weapons to Ukraine, by discussing NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia, or by placing ground troops, armor, or aviation permanently in the Baltic states.

I do not think Putin is so reckless as to risk outright war with the West, but he might be, and particularly so if the Russian economy completely tanks and he feels politically cornered. It is important to appreciate that Moscow may react asymmetrically to perceived threats from NATO – for example, it might respond to a U.S. decision to arm Ukraine with military pressure on Georgia, or by organizing or encouraging cyber-attacks on Western governments or, more likely, businesses.

At any rate, my view is that it would be extremely irresponsible for Western leaders to proceed as if a small risk of a catastrophic event is not worth worrying about.

**U.S. policy today: Four general points**

Let me turn finally to the U.S. policy response to Russia’s role in the Ukraine crisis and begin with four general points.

First, I think the Obama Administration has made mistakes in handling Russia and in responding to the Ukraine crisis – for example, Victoria Nuland’s appearance on the Maidan in support of the opposition to Yanukovich, and Obama’s uncharacteristically gratuitous comment about Russia being a “regional power” that was acting out of weakness rather than strength. Nonetheless, I think much the most important mistakes in U.S.-Russia policy predate this administration, and that Obama has been, and will continue to be, appropriately cautious in reacting to the crisis and in dealings with Russia generally. As I just suggested, Russia is not Iraq, and a military confrontation with Moscow is more dangerous by orders of magnitude.

As a result, while the Administration has been clear in his opposition to the annexation of Crimea and the Kremlin’s destabilization of eastern Ukraine, Obama has avoided responding by grandstanding, or with hyperbole and personal attacks on Putin (unlike many in Congress). He has worked with Washington’s key allies to maintain a united front vis-a-vis Russia, notably on a sanctions regime, and he has slowly and quietly taken important steps to reinforce deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank, including in the Baltic republics (which I will discuss in a moment). All this, I believe, reflects a prudent response to a dangerous crisis, the seeds of which were sown long before he came into office, and where U.S. hard power options are limited.

Second, while a Republican-majority Senate will mean increased pressure on Obama to be tough with Moscow, I think the Administration will resist that pressure as long as the violence in eastern Ukraine does not escalate and Moscow does not ratchet up military pressure on Georgia, Moldova, or the Baltic republics, or engage in even more dangerous acts of brinkmanship with NATO.

Third, I believe that the mood of the American public is going
to help Obama keep congressional hawks in check. There is little public appetite for making any real sacrifices, or taking any real risks, in Ukraine, especially military risks.

As suggested in the next slide, which is from a Chicago Council of Global Affairs survey published earlier this year, support for foreign activism has fallen significantly since Obama came into office, particularly among Republicans and Independents.

Public support for the use of force in response to the Ukraine crisis is likewise low, as shown in the next slide from the same survey. Note that only 42-44% of those surveyed support military action if Russia were to invade the Baltic states, and even fewer – some 27-32% – support a military response to a Russian invasion of Ukraine.

That said, I would not take this to mean that the U.S. would fail to respond militarily if the Baltic republics actually were attacked by Russia. I think it would. Public opinion can change rapidly, especially if American troops were to be killed as a result. I also believe that the U.S. political elite takes the country’s Article 5 obligations very seriously. But what is not clear is how Washington would respond, or whether other members of the Western alliance would live up their Article 5 obligations.

Nonetheless, Republicans will ramp up criticism of Obama’s foreign policy in the remaining two years of his presidency, and particularly so in anticipation of a Hillary Clinton presidential run in 2016. But I expect the president to continue to avoid being drawn into expensive and ineffectual military conflicts. With respect to Ukraine, the objective will be to do what is possible to help Kyiv economically and militarily – more on this in a moment – and to increase deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank, but to do so without provoking military escalation by, or direct confrontation with, Moscow.

Fourth, the United States is facing many serious foreign policy challenges other than Ukraine. Iraq, Syria, Iran, ISIS, China, economic weakness in Japan, and Europe’s Euro and growth crises are all competing for White House attention, and that is not going to change over the next two years. This, too, makes it more likely that the Obama Administration will respond carefully and deliberately in Ukraine.

### Three key policy decisions

So let me turn to three key policy arenas for Washington: (1) sanctions on Russia; (2) assistance to Ukraine (including military assistance); and (3) reinforcing NATO’s eastern defenses.

#### 1. Economic sanctions on Russia

This is not the place to discuss the efficacy of sanctions, but let me simply state that I think that Western governments, and especially Washington, will find it politically difficult to lift those sanctions.

Once imposed, sanctions are typically difficult to lift – consider American sanctions on Iran. But that will be particularly true for sanctions on Russia because of the annexation of Crimea. Had Crimea not been annexed, a compromise might be possible based on a ceasefire in the Donbas and some kind of autonomy for Crimea, along with guarantees that Ukraine and Georgia would not join NATO. (Even this would have been hard for Western governments to swallow, however, because that is what more-or-less happened in Georgia after 2008, and Western governments would be reluctant to ignore Russian military intervention in a neighboring state a second time.) A compromise along those lines might in turn have provided Western governments with the political room needed to lift some, most, or even all sanctions.

The annexation of Crimea, however, makes it hard to imagine Western governments, Washington in particular, agreeing to business as usual with a government that has occupied and annexed the territory of a European sovereign state. That is particularly true given the many international agreements Moscow violated by its actions in Ukraine, including the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the UN Charter, the Helsinki Accords, and the Black Sea basing agreement with Ukraine, to name but a few. As a result, it would be a major domestic political challenge, particularly in Washington, to sell some kind of “grand bargain” with a government that had so clearly violated previous international legal commitments.

In short, I think sanctions will remain in place for years, at least for the most part, even if we see a ceasefire take hold in the Donbas.

#### 2. Assistance to Ukraine

I believe the Obama Administration is going to continue to provide economic assistance to Ukraine and to support assistance from its allies, the IMF, and other multilateral institutions. However, that support is going to fall far short of what is needed
Faculty

George Breslauer (Political Science) retired from the position of executive vice chancellor and provost on April 1, 2014 and became “Professor of the Graduate School.” He was also elected to membership in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in April 2014 and was formally inducted into the Academy in October 2014.

David Frick’s (Slavic) book, *Kith, Kin, and Neighbors: Communities and Confessions in Seventeenth-Century Wilno* (Cornell UP, Ithaca, 2013), has received three awards: (1) Under the auspices of ASEEES: The Kulczycki Book Prize in Polish Studies for the best book in any discipline, on any aspect of Polish affairs; (2) Przegląd Wschodni Award, Foreign Works (Warsaw University School of Eastern Europe); and (3) Joseph Rothschild Prize in Nationalism and Ethnic Studies (Association for the Study of Nationalities).

Luba Golburt's (Slavic) new book, *The First Epoch: The Eighteenth Century and the Russian Cultural Imagination* was released by the University of Wisconsin Press as part of the Wisconsin Center for Pushkin Studies series.

Irina Paperno's (Slavic) new book “*Who, What Am I?*” Tolstoy Struggles to Narrate the Self was released by Cornell University Press.

Gérard Roland (Economics) presented a paper “Transition in Historical Perspective” at the May 6-7 Conference in Budapest on Transition in Perspective.


Graduate Students

Caroline Lemak Brickman (Slavic) had her translation of Yuri Lotman’s *Ne-memuary* published with Dalkey Archive Press as *Non-Memoirs*. Evgenii Bershtein, Slavic PhD Berkeley ‘98, edited the book and co-authored the afterword.

Bathsheba Demuth (History) returned from Chukotka and won a Reinhard Bendix Memorial Fellowship from UC Berkeley to return to the Bering Straits region in the summer of 2015.

Cameron Girvin (Slavic) was awarded a travel bursary from the Association for Computers and the Humanities toward his participation in the Digital Humanities Summer Institute, which took place at the University of Victoria in June 2014.

Joseph Kellner (History) gave a public lecture in Moscow at the social club “Tsiferblat” titled “Russophobia in American Politics” on October 11, 2014.

Yana Skorobogatov (History) presented a paper titled “Revolution on their Mind: Writing a Solidarity Letter Under Brezhnev” at the Annual Interdisciplinary Graduate Student Conference (Theme - “Dumpster Diving and Sustainability: Managing the Limited Resources of Culture”) at the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures at Princeton University on October 17, 2014.

Save the Date

**Upcoming event during the Spring 2015 semester**

**15th Annual Peter N. Kujachich Lecture in Serbian and Montenegrin Studies**

Tuesday, April 28, 2015
5:15 p.m.
Toll Room, Alumni House
UC Berkeley Campus

**Please note that event details may change. Updates will be sent out by email and can be found online at**

http://iseees.berkeley.edu/.

ISEEES Newsletter Fall 2014 / 7
Make a Gift to ISEEES!

The loyal support of private donors like you supplements the funding we receive from other sources and enables us to meet the standards of excellence required of us by the University of California, Berkeley as an organized research unit and by the U.S. Department of Education as a Title VI National Resource Center. Your support helps to expand and sustain a robust area-specific international education for our students, furthers research opportunities for faculty focusing on our region, and allows us to respond to new programming opportunities and to expand public outreach.

Our Federal and state funding have faced continued reductions, compelling us to draw more and more on our modest endowments to maintain the superior programming and research and academic support our student, faculty, and public constituents have come to expect. As a result, we have expanded opportunities for more targeted giving in order to encompass a variety of ISEEES programs. Contributions of any size are appreciated and contribute directly to ISEEES’s continued accomplishments. We would be very happy to discuss details of these funds or other giving opportunities. Jeff Pennington, executive director of ISEEES, can be reached at jpennington@berkeley.edu or (510) 643-6736.

GIVING OPPORTUNITIES

ISEEES General Support Fund
The ISEEES General Support Fund is an unrestricted fund that is used to: provide travel grants to affiliated graduate and undergraduate students for the purpose of presenting papers at academic conferences; provide research assistance to affiliated faculty members; convene conferences, open to the public, that examine current topics in Slavic, East European, and Eurasian studies; host an annual reception to foster community building among faculty, students, and the public; and augment the state and grant funds that provide minimal support for ISEEES operations.

ISEEES Graduate Student Support Fund
The ISEEES Graduate Student Support Fund is a new UCB Foundation endowment that was established by a generous gift from an anonymous donor. When fully funded, the ISEEES Graduate Student Support Fund will be used to support graduate students in the field of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. The endowment was launched by the initial gift and matching funds from the Graduate Division. Additional gifts to the Fund are encouraged and gratefully accepted.

Colin and Elsa Miller Endowment Fund
The Annual Colin Miller Memorial Lecture honors the memory of a journalist and radio and TV producer who was devoted to the Center for Slavic and East European Studies (as ISEEES was called before the year 2000). The endowment funds an annual lecture given by a respected scholar in the field of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies.

Hungarian Studies Fund
This fund promotes the teaching of the Hungarian language at UC Berkeley, provides research assistance to faculty and students studying Hungarian topics, and supports lectures, workshops, and conferences devoted to Hungarian studies.

Fund for Romanian Studies
This fund promotes the teaching of the Romanian language at UC Berkeley; supports lectures, workshops, and conferences devoted to Romanian topics; and provides research assistance to faculty and students pursuing Romanian studies.
ISEEES acknowledges with sincere appreciation the following individuals who made their annual contribution to ISEEES between June 2014 and December 2014.

**BENEFACTORS**
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**Support Our Institute!**

Your gift will qualify you for membership on our annual giving program: Associates of the Slavic Center. Descriptions of membership benefits by level are included below. Thank you for your continued support.

**Members (Gifts under $100).** Members are notified in writing about major upcoming ISEEES events.

**Sponsors (Gifts of $100—$499).** ASC Sponsors receive a specially designed gift that bears the ISEEES logo, promoting Slavic and East European Studies at Berkeley.

**Benefactors (Gifts of $500—$999).** ASC Benefactors receive a complimentary copy of a book authored by ISEEES faculty.

**Center Circle (Gifts of $1,000 and above).** Members of the Center Circle will qualify for the Charter Hill Society at UC Berkeley. The Charter Hill Society is Berkeley’s new program designed to recognize donors’ annual giving to the campus. Benefits of this program include a subscription to Berkeley Promise Magazine and an invitation to Discover Cal lecture.

*It is a policy of the University of California and the Berkeley Foundation that a portion of the gifts and/or income therefrom is used to defray the costs of raising and administering the funds. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent allowed by law.*

You can contribute online by visiting the ISEEES website - [http://iseees.berkeley.edu/give](http://iseees.berkeley.edu/give) - and selecting the fund to which you would like to make a gift.

Or send a check, payable to UC Regents, to:

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FLAS Fellowship Awards

Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) fellowships enable US citizens and permanent residents to acquire a high level of competency in modern foreign languages. FLAS funding for Russian and East European languages comes to UC Berkeley through a Title VI grant from the US Department of Education to ISEEES. Applications are accepted through the Graduate Fellowship Office.

Awards for Summer 2014

Megan Barickman, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, received funding to study Russian at Middlebury College.

Brian Egdorf, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, received funding to study Russian at Middlebury College.

Emiliana Kissova, Department of History, received funding to study Russian in Moscow.

Claire Leon, Department of History, received funding to study Polish at the School of Polish Language and Culture at Jagiellonian University in Kraków.

Thomas Lowish, Department of History, received funding to study Russian in Moscow.

Ethan Nowak, Department of Philosophy, received funding to study Russian in Moscow.

Christina Schwartz, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, received funding to study Czech at Charles University in Prague.

Nir Solomon Mate, Department of Psychology, received funding to study Romanian at Transylvania University and the University of the West Timișoara in Romania.

Awards for Academic Year 2014-2015

Megan Barickman, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, received a fellowship to study Polish at UC Berkeley.

Kathryn DeWaele, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, received a fellowship to study Russian at UC Berkeley.

Brian Egdorf, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, received a fellowship to study Czech at UC Berkeley.

Laura Jakl, Department of Political Science, received a fellowship to study Hungarian at UC Berkeley.

Lilija Rudis, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, received a fellowship to study Russian at UC Berkeley.

Alison Zerbe, Department of Linguistics, received a fellowship to study Russian at UC Berkeley.

USSR, the sociology / social history of public education in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the sociology / social history of the social welfare services in the USSR and post-Soviet Moldova.

Mila Oliva is a Visiting Student Researcher with ISEEES during the 2014-2015 academic year. Ms. Oliva is currently a PhD candidate in Cultural History at the University of Turku in Turku, Finland in the Finnish Doctoral Program for Russian and East European Studies at the Aleksanteri Institute. The title of her PhD project is “Creating Action Space. Marketing Practices of Polish Ready-to-Wear Clothes in the Soviet Market, 1956-1982,” for which she will conduct research while in Berkeley.

Katherina Kokinova is a Visiting Student Researcher with ISEEES during Fall 2014. Ms. Kokinova is currently a PhD candidate in Slavic Literatures at Sofia University in Sofia, Bulgaria. While at UC Berkeley, she will be doing research on comparative studies of self-reflection in Vladimir Nabokov’s and Witold Gombrowicz’s works.

Simo Mikkonen is a Visiting Scholar with ISEEES during the 2014-2015 academic year. Dr. Mikkonen is a Finnish Academy Research Fellow in the Department of History and Ethnology at the University of Jyväskylä, Finland. His main research interests are in Soviet history after WWIIL While at UC Berkeley he will conduct research on East-West cultural exchanges and transnational networks of the art world. He is also interested in the Russian emigration in China, particularly in Shanghai 1917-1949.

Petru Negură is a Visiting Scholar with ISEEES during the 2014-2015 academic year. Dr. Negură is a lecturer at “Ion Creangă” State Pedagogical University in Chișinău, Moldova. His current research topics are the sociology / social history of intellectuals in Eastern Europe and former USSR, the sociology / social history of public education in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the sociology / social history of the social welfare services in the USSR and post-Soviet Moldova.

Ina Piošová is a Visiting Student Researcher with ISEEES during the 2014-2015 academic year. Ms. Piošová is currently a PhD candidate in Czech literature and Theory of Literature in the Faculty of Arts at Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic. While at UC Berkeley, she will be researching her dissertation: “Revision of the Ideology in the ‘Normalization Period’ of Czechoslovakia (1968-1989).”

Pavla Šýkorová is a Visiting Student Researcher with ISEEES during the 2014-2015 academic year. Ms. Šýkorová is currently a PhD candidate in the Faculty of Education at Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic. While at UC Berkeley, she will be researching her dissertation: “The aspects that impact individual student reading.”
to prevent real hardships for Ukrainians over the coming winter, and indeed for at least the next two or three years.

That is true for many reasons, but three particularly important ones are, first, the extent of Ukraine’s needs; second, concerns about Ukraine’s ability to make good use of significant economic assistance without major radical internal reforms; and third, public skepticism in the United States, including among Republicans, about the efficacy of economic assistance. The lingering effects of the Great Recession mean that the U.S. public is not in a particularly generous mood at present. Moreover, Ukraine’s economic needs should be seen in the context of other major international economic demands on Washington, including very serious economic problems in Europe and Japan.

U.S. Assistance to Ukraine in 2014

1. Multilateral financial: IMF, EBRD, OECD, etc. (e.g., U.S. share of $7 b IMF SBA, more in 2015)
2. Sovereign loan guarantee ($1 billion)
3. Non-military bilateral assistance, including emergency humanitarian aid ($320 m)
4. Non-lethal military assistance ($118 million)
5. Lethal defensive military equipment ($0)
6. Offensive lethal military equipment (e.g., tanks, aviation, attack helicopters) ($0)

As a result, I expect more of what we have witnessed to date, which is modest direct economic assistance from Washington and indirect support through multilateral institutions, above all the IMF. As shown in the next slide, this year Washington has supported multilateral assistance, particularly through the IMF; provided Kyiv with a $1 billion sovereign loan guarantee; and ponied up $312 million in direct non-military aid. My guess is that these amounts will increase somewhat next year, and may continue if Ukraine engages in the kind of radical internal reforms that Georgia embraced after its 2003 Rose Revolution.

That said, I don’t mean to imply that economic assistance from the United States, IMF, the EU, and other foreign sources is not important to Kyiv – it is, indeed critically so. Without it, default on Ukraine’s foreign debt is certain, and economic hardships will be much worse. But foreign assistance is not going to turn the economy around quickly, particularly given Moscow’s very considerable economic leverage over Ukraine. It is accordingly going to be viewed as inadequate by the Ukrainian public. Indeed, some Ukrainians will eventually blame the IMF, and the West, for making matters worse, just as the Russian public viewed similar assistance to Russia in the 1990s as inadequate and foreign lenders and governments the cause of hardship rather than relievers of pain.

This brings me to the controversial question of U.S. military assistance to Ukraine. Washington provided $118 million in non-lethal military assistance to Kyiv in 2014, including night vision goggles, body armor, helmets, military binoculars, counter-motor radar systems, and small craft, as well as increased military training and advising.

This non-lethal assistance is also likely to increase, perhaps significantly, next year because the Administration will want to deflect pressure from Congressional hawks to provide lethal assistance.

While this has not been made public to my knowledge, I also suspect that Washington has also been providing, and we will continue to provide, Kyiv with important military intelligence.

The key debate in Washington, then, is about whether to give or sell lethal weapons to Kyiv, such as anti-tank weapons and shoulder-fired anti-aircraft (MANPADs). Congress has been considering a number of bills in support of Ukraine, including the “Ukraine Freedom Assistance Act,” which cleared the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously on September 18. It requires the president to apply sanctions on certain Russian companies and amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to designate Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova as “major non-NATO allies for purposes of that Act and the Arms Export Control Act.” It also “authorizes the president to provide lethal military assistance to Ukraine,” as follows:

Providing defense articles, defense services, and training to the Government of Ukraine for the purpose of countering offensive weapons and reestablishing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, including anti-tank and anti-armor weapons; crew weapons and ammunition; counter-artillery radars to identify and target artillery batteries; fire control, range finder, and optical and guidance and control equipment; tactical troop-operated surveillance drones, and secure command and communications equipment. It authorizes $350 million in fiscal year 2015 to carry out these activities.

On December 4, 2014, the House approved Resolution 758 that, among other provisions, “calls on the President to provide the Government of Ukraine with lethal and non-lethal defense
articles, services, and training required to effectively defend its
territory and sovereignty.”

The key words here, however, are “authorizes” and “calls
on.” Neither the Senate bill nor the House resolution compel
the president to do anything, and Obama would likely veto –
successfully – a bill that made him take significant steps that he
thinks contrary to U.S. national interests.

Accordingly, unless the war in eastern Ukraine escalates
significantly, I think Obama is going to resist pressure to provide
lethal equipment to Kyiv. And if he does decide to go forward with
it, it will be limited. As Obama has repeatedly argued, U.S. anti-
tank and other defensive weapons are not going to allow Ukraine
to take back all of the Donbas or Crimea by force. They might,
however, provoke Moscow into invading or attacking Ukrainian
military assets much more aggressively, including assets well
behind Ukrainian lines, using aviation and cruise or even ballistic
missiles.

Finally, a quick word about Ukrainian membership in the EU
and NATO.

Washington will continue to support Ukrainian membership
in the EU, but Ukraine’s acute economic crisis and deeply rooted
governance problems mean that actual membership is at best
days down the road.

As for NATO, I do not believe there is any chance – full
stop – that Ukraine will be asked to join unless Ukraine exercises
de facto sovereignty over all of its territory, including Crimea.
That is not going to happen for a very long time, if ever. Article
5 means that Ukrainian accession would effectively put NATO at
war with Russia. No American president, no matter how hawkish,
could believe that going to war with a nuclear-armed Russia was
worth the benefits of bringing Ukraine into NATO.

Moreover, accepting new members requires a treaty
amendment, which in turn requires approval by all NATO
member-states. I suspect that there are far more member-states
that would veto Ukrainian accession than member-states that
would support it were it to come to a vote. And I suspect that
that is what French President Hollande told Putin at the airport in
Moscow earlier this week.

**3. Reinforcing NATO’s eastern defenses**

Even before NATO’s September summit in Wales, the U.S.
and its NATO allies were taking steps to increase the alliance’s
land, navel, and air forces along NATO’s eastern borders.

Among other measures, NATO reinforced its Baltic Air
Patrol (the number of rotational fighter jets has gone up from 4
to 16). Those jets, which had been stationed in Lithuania, have
begun using airfields in Estonia and Latvia. NATO naval vessels
also increased patrolling in the Baltic and Black Seas (albeit in
the latter case in compliance with the limitation of the Montreux
Convention). And NATO stepped up military exercises, training,
and rotational forces in the eastern member-states, and kept
AWACs surveillance planes on constant patrol over Poland and
Romania to monitor Russian and separatist military movements.

Significant additional measures were agreed to at the Wales
Summit. The Alliance formally adopted a “Readiness Action Plan”
that calls for increased defense spending and for “a more balanced
sharing of costs and responsiveness.” Those member-states that
are spending less than 2% of GDP on defense, and of that less than
20% on procurements, are supposed to reach those targets within
a decade as “economic growth improves.” While it is unlikely that
these norms will be met by all NATO members, there will likely
be a slow but steady increase in military expenditures across the
Alliance, and particular increases in defense spending by NATO’s
eastern members.

In addition, NATO agreed to improve its existing Rapid
Reaction Force by establishing a new “Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF),” which is slated to be in place by the end of 2015. Comprised of some 3,000 to 4,000 troops, initially from Germany, Denmark, and Norway, it is designed to be deployable within days. The Alliance also agreed to establish permanent command and control facilities in the east, and to continuously rotate forces on the territories of the “eastern Allies” (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania) through 2015.

Separately, Britain, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and Norway also announced plans to form a non-NATO Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) before 2018.

Meanwhile, the U.S. military has taken a number of its own “assurance” and “deterrence” measures in the east. It has increased military assistance to NATO’s eastern member-states, including increased training exercises and interoperability assistance. “Rotational” U.S. Army small units are to remain in Poland and the Baltic states at least until next year and perhaps beyond. (These troops would then “rotational” only in the sense that they would not use permanent bases, with all the associated costs, including family housing, and would be in theater for relatively brief periods before being replaced.)

Doubtless most alarming to Moscow, however, are U.S. plans to keep a third “Brigade Combat Team” (BCT) in Europe on a “permanent rotational” basis (the other two are truly “permanent” in the sense they are based in Europe). The additional armored BCT will conduct regular exercises with the U.S. European allies for the time being, although Moscow will doubtless assume, with reason, that they may at some point engage in exercises in Ukraine and Georgia as well.

In early October, the nature of these plans was fleshed out when the Army announced that it was assigning the 1st Brigade Combat Team of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division, the home base of which is Fort Hood, Texas, to the U.S. European Command.
what Russia can do about it.

For the time being, the primary response has been brinkmanship, particularly but not only along NATO’s frontiers. The nature of this brinkmanship was described at length in a November 10 report from the European Leadership Network, entitled “Dangerous Brinkmanship,” that detailed some 40 “incidents involving Russian and Western militaries and security agencies” over the past eight months. The bulk of the incidents have occurred in Baltic Sea, as shown in the slide. While the report avoids directly blaming Moscow for the incidents, it calls on the Kremlin to “urgently re-evaluate the costs and risks of continuing its more assertive military posture,” and on Western governments to try to persuade Russia “to move in this direction.”

This brinkmanship makes the crisis in Russia’s relations with the West all the more dangerous. A single incident, even if unintentional, could escalate into a broader confrontation. In engaging in these acts, the Kremlin is signaling that it is extremely concerned about its deteriorating security environment. It is also signaling that it has a higher tolerance for risk than the West.

Beyond that, Moscow is going to build up its own military assets along its western borders, notably in Crimea, Kaliningrad, and Belarus. And it may at some point withdraw from the INF Treaty and deploy nuclear-armed ballistic and cruise missiles that target Western Europe.

**Conclusion**

I believe that this crisis started out dangerous and has since become more dangerous. A military confrontation between NATO and Russia is not a remote possibility. Early on, before the annexation of Crimea, I thought that statesmanship might produce a “grand bargain” entailing formal neutrality for Ukraine and Georgia, along with conventional and nuclear arms control agreements. Unfortunately, I believe that the annexation of Crimea has effectively taken that option off the table, at least for the next two or three years.

The essence of the problem, as I see it, is that the West cannot give the Kremlin what it wants, which is (1) Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova within Russia’s sphere of influence; (2) acquiescence to Russia’s annexation of Crimea; and (3) no movement of NATO or U.S. forces towards its borders.

Accordingly, I believe we are in for more of what we have seen in recent months. The West will keep its economic sanctions in place – indeed, it is more likely to deepen those sanctions than to lift them. It will continue to try to support Ukraine economically and politically, although that support will fall well short of solving Ukraine’s internal problems, which ultimately can only be addressed by Kyiv. It will continue to provide non-lethal military assistance to Ukraine, and at some point the U.S. may begin providing lethal defensive weapons. Finally, NATO will continue to build up its military presence on its eastern flank.

The Kremlin will respond with economic and military pressure on Ukraine, as well as on Georgia, Moldova, the Baltic states, Finland, and Sweden; with a military buildup on its Western borders; and with continued acts of brinkmanship with NATO. It will also respond asymmetrically to what it considers provocations by the West, including cyber-sabotage (and not merely cyber-espionage). It will make renewed efforts to solidify its ties to Belarus, Armenia, the Central Asian states, China, and other countries that it sees as standing up to the West. And it will try to position itself globally as the leading champion of resistance to Western liberal hegemony, to weaken the West politically and economically, and to promote divisions within NATO and the EU.

How we get out of this lose-lose game is not clear, at least to me. And unfortunately I suspect it is going to last for years. What is critically important, however, is that at some point Moscow and Washington begin to discuss measures that make a military confrontation less likely, just as Moscow and Washington did after the Cuban Missile Crisis.
UC Berkeley Participants at the ASEEES Convention

The 46th Annual Convention of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES) was held in San Antonio, Texas, on November 20-23, 2014.

ISEEES held a joint Alumni Reception with Stanford’s CREEES on Friday, November 21, 2014, at 7:00pm at Guadalajara Grill.

Faculty/Staff Papers
David Frick (Slavic): “Syncretisms across the Five Confessions of Seventeenth-Century Wilno”
Steven Lee (English): “The Avant-Garde’s Asia: Factography and Roar China”
Eric Naiman (Slavic): “Gospel Rape”
Harsha Ram (Slavic): “Velimir Khlebnikov’s Internationalist Utopia”

Student Papers
David Ilmar Beecher (History): “Third Worlds in Third Languages: Yuri Lotman, Paul Ariste, and the Soviet Union’s Most European University”
Daniel Aaron Brooks (Slavic): “A Retribution in Letters: Publishing Blok’s Correspondence, Reshaping the Poet’s Life”
Rhiannon Dowling (History): “Soviet Women in Brezhnev’s Courts: ‘The Case of Two Boys,’ Gender, and Justice in late Soviet Russia”
Aglaya Glebova (Art History): “Made Up: Aleksandr Rodchenko’s Retouched Film Stills”
Eric McCurdy Johnson (History): “From the Decadent to the Futurist City: A Walk through the Streets of Russian Modernism”

Eric Heath Prendergast (Linguistics): “They took our hearth’: Covert Prestige and Overt Marginalization of the Aromanian Language in Macedonia
Brandon Schechter (History): “Cities of Earth, Cities of Rubble: The Spade and Red Army Landscaping”
Charles David Shaw (History): “Tamara Khanum and the Case for Soviet Nationality”
Elizabeth Wenger (History): “Marxism Is Terra Incognita’: Ignorance and Disorder in the Polish Censor’s Office”
Katherine Zubovich (History): “Soviet Architecture and the Home Front: Moscow’s Studios at War, 1941-45”

Panel Discussants
Ronelle Alexander (Slavic): What do Minorities Speak Today? The Fate of Slavic Minority Languages in the Yugoslav Successor States
David Ilmar Beecher (History): Memory Culture and Historical Politics in the Baltic States
Victoria Freda (History): Alternative Russian Biographies and Autobiographies
Eric Naiman (Slavic): Narrative and Linguistic Alterity in Andrei Platonov

Panel Chairs
Daniel Aaron Brooks (Slavic): Sociological Methods: Institutional Construction of Literature across Time
David Frick (Slavic): Monumental Spaces in Eighteenth Century Eastern Europe
Luba Golburt (Slavic): Pushkin and Homosexuality: An Understudied Fragment of the Pushkin Myth in Russia
Jeffrey Pennington (ISEEES): Being There: Budapest—Warsaw—Bucharest—Sofia in 1989
Brandon Schechter (History): Leningrad Under Siege, 1941-1944

Roundtable Participants
Ronelle Alexander (Slavic): Digital Heritages: Innovations in Online Linguistic and Ethnographic Databases
Victoria Freda (History): The Individual and Collective Experience: In Memory of Reginald E. Zelnik
Cammeron Girvin (Slavic): Digital Heritages: Innovations in Online Linguistic and Ethnographic Databases
Zachary Kelly (ISEEES): From Behind the Iron Curtain of Academia: Careers for the Masses
Zachary Kelly (ISEEES): Social Media Outreach for Area Studies Programs
Harsha Ram (Slavic): Asymmetries of Power: Articulating Colonial Agencies in Eurasia’s Past and Present
## Fall 2014 Courses

Selected course offerings and selected area-related courses

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<td>Slavic R5A</td>
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<td>“Either you or I, but both together is out of the question!”: Doubles, Delusions, and Defamiliarization</td>
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<td>Slavic R5B</td>
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<td>Slavic 39O</td>
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The Slavic Department has courses in Armenian, Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, Czech, Hungarian, Polish, and Russian. The German Department offers Yiddish.