Notes from the Director

This has been a very eventful and enjoyable year for all of us. I would like to thank our speakers, students, friends, visitors, associates, faculty, staff, and curious onlookers for providing us with so much timely information, intellectual stimulation, and good company.

Summer is a time for us to say goodbye to a number of our visiting scholars, including two Fulbright fellows: Kristian Atlant of the Norwegian Defense Institute and Nina Bagdasarova from the Kyrgyz Russian Slavic University. We bid a heartfelt doviđenja/довиђења/довидување to three young scholars who came on the Junior Faculty Development Program administered by the American Councils: Kruno Kardov from the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb; Olivera Komar, Vice Chair of the Department of Political Science at the Law Faculty, University of Montenegro; and Maja Muhik, Ph.D. candidate at the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje and an instructor at the South East European University in Tetovo, Macedonia. Lastly, Rustam Burnashev, Associate Professor at the Ablai Khan Kazakh University of World Languages and International Relations, Kazakhstan, and Gohar Shahnazaryan, Assistant Professor of Sociology at Yerevan State University, Armenia, were semester-long fellows on a junior faculty development program administered by the Open Society Institute. We will miss them all!

Also gone are our four CASE scholars from Russia, who were here as part of a Field Development Project funded by the Carnegie Corporation and co-sponsored by the Centers for Advanced Studies and Education (CASE) and UC Berkeley. The project brings Russian scholars to Berkeley for two-week visits to help them review literature in their fields, network with colleagues, participate in workshops, and design new courses. This year’s fellows were Polina Golovatina, lecturer in the Faculty of International Relations at Ural State University in Ekaterinburg; Elvira Kaminskaya, associate professor in the Department of Bilingual Education at Novgorod State University; Oxana Karnauchova, assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy and Cultural Studies, Southern Federal University in Rostov-on-Don; and Artem Lukin, associate professor in the Department of International Relations, Far Eastern National University, Vladivostok. I would also like to thank ISEEES staff members Elizabeth Coyne and Rebecca Richards and our tireless graduate students Alex Beliaev, Sarah Garding, Theocharis Grigoriadis, Cindy Huang, and Susanne Wengle, who worked closely with our visitors to make their brief stay a success.

Summer is also a time to begin planning for the upcoming academic year. Please mark on your calendar the ISEEES Fall Reception, scheduled for Monday, September 22, from 4 to 6 p.m. in the UC Berkeley Alumni House. In addition, ISEEES will co-sponsor the first joint Berkeley/Stanford Reception at this year’s meeting of the American Association
for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS) in Philadelphia, to be held on Friday, November 21, from 7:30 to 9:30 p.m. in Grand Ballroom C of the Philadelphia Marriott Downtown. We look forward to welcoming UCB faculty, students, and alumni attending the AAASS convention, as well as Cal alumni in the Philadelphia area.

Lastly, it is with great sadness that I must relate the passing of a close friend of ISEEES, emeritus professor of geography David Hooson. David passed away May 16 while swimming at Shell Beach in Tomales Bay, one of his favorite spots. David was a prolific scholar in the field of Soviet and East European geography and chair of the Center for Slavic and East European Studies from 1967 to 1970.

He was a renowned authority on the former Soviet Union, notably the Central Asian republics, and his work has greatly influenced the development of geography within the Soviet Union itself. David was a kind, generous, and ever curious friend and colleague. We will miss his smile, wit, incomparable knowledge, and independence of mind. We will always remember him.

Yuri Slezkine
ISEEES Director
Professor of History

Clarification

Jason Morton, the author of 50 Years of Slavic Studies at Berkeley: the Prelude to 1957, which appeared in the Spring 2008 issue of the ISEEES newsletter, would like to clarify a statement made on pg. 6. This statement, which seems to be a direct quotation of Prof. Charles Jelavich, is actually by Prof. Nicholas Riasanovsky, which he attributed to Jelavich. The author apologizes for the ambiguity of this passage, and would like to clarify that he never spoke directly with Prof. Jelavich to verify the accuracy of the statement attributed to him by Prof. Riasanovsky.

UC Berkeley-Yerevan State University Agreement

On March 1, 2008, UC Berkeley Chancellor Robert J. Birgenau and Professor Aram Simoyan, Rector of Yerevan State University in Yerevan, Armenia, signed an agreement establishing a formal relationship to encourage the exchange of faculty, researchers, and graduate students between the two universities. The genesis of this agreement goes back a number of years to collaboration between David Stronach, archaeologist and emeritus professor in the Department of Near Eastern Studies, and archaeologists from Yerevan State University, as they conduct ongoing archaeological digs at the site of Erebuni fortress near Yerevan.

This formal exchange between UC Berkeley and Yerevan State University will further strengthen the already important Armenian Studies Program at Cal, under the executive directorship of historian Stephan Astourian. Founded in 1994, the Armenian Studies Program focuses on the language, literature, history, and culture of Armenia by organizing international symposia and frequent guest lectures on topics related to Armenia. In collaboration with the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies and the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, the Armenian Studies Program sponsors Armenian language classes at the introductory and advanced levels.

UC Berkeley Armenian Studies Program

The Armenian Studies Program organized a series of events in the Spring 2008 semester. Speakers included the novelist Kemal Yalcin, UCLA professor emeritus of history Dr. Speros Vryonis, Armenian ethnographers Dr. Levon Abrahamian and Dr. Verjine Svazlian, researcher and author Dr. Raymond Kevorkian, and Consul General of Armenia in Los Angeles, Armen Liloyan. Additionally, the Armenian Studies Program organized an International Symposium entitled Democratization, Genocide Denial, and the Armenian-Turkish Dialogue: In Memoriam of Hrant Dink. This symposium was made possible by a generous grant from the Harry and Osvanna Chitjian Family Foundation. For more information about the Armenian Studies Program, contact Stephan Astourian, Executive Director, 260 Stephens Hall, #2304, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720-2304. tel: (510) 642-1971, email: astour@berkeley.edu
Public Lectures in 2007-08 Co-sponsored by ISEEES
listed in chronological order

Polina Barskova, poet and Assistant Professor of Russian Literature at Hampshire College. Poetry Reading.

Gary Saul Morson, Chair of the Slavic Languages and Literatures Department at Northwestern University. What is a Quotation?

Dr. Svetlana Broz, cardiologist, author, and lecturer. The Nagging Question: What More Could I Have Done?


Jovana Knezevic, Assistant Professor, Department of History, Stanford University. The Conduct and Experience of Occupation in Serbia during World War I.

Pavle Levi, Assistant Professor, Art and Art History Department, Stanford University. 'Inevitable' Wars: Aesthetics and Ideology in post-Yugoslav cinema.

Burcu Akan Ellis, Assistant Professor of International Relations, San Francisco State University. Shadow Genealogies Now and Then: Urban Muslim Identity in Macedonia.

Robert Bird, Associate Professor, University of Chicago, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures. The Soviet Imaginary.

Lista Djapovic, Senior Research Ethnologist, Ethnographic Institute, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Folk Mourning Poems: Life in Sadness and the Afterworld.

Peter Erdosi, Historian/museologist at the Directorate of Pest County Museums in Hungary. Rome in Budapest - The Heritage of Antiquity in a Modern Central European Capital.

Kristen Ghodsee, Assistant Professor, Gender and Women's Studies, Bowdoin College. Headscarves and Hotpants: Islam, Secularism and Women's Fashion in Southeastern Europe.

Jan Kavan, President of the Fifty-seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Former Deputy Prime Minister, and former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic. The United States and the New Europe: A Discussion of Current Issues.

Gistam Sakaeva, Fellow at the International Center for Tolerance Education, New York, and Project Officer for Reliance, a Chechen NGO. The Aftermath of the War in Chechnya.

Jason Wittenberg, Assistant Professor, Political Science, UC Berkeley. Two Cheers for Hierarchy! Church Institutions and Resistance to Authoritarian Rule in Hungary and Beyond.

Monika Greenleaf, Associate Professor of Slavic Languages and Literatures and of Comparative Literature, Stanford University; Anna Muza, Lecturer in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, UC Berkeley. “The play’s the thing” — Moscow Theater Life in Putin’s Russia, 2007.

Igor Kuznetsov, Professor of Anthropology, Kuban State University, Krasnodar, Russia. The Meskhetian Turks: Between Integration, Repatriation, and Resettlement.

Alexander Skidan, Russian poet, activist and critic. Poetry in the Age of Total Communication.

Ludmila Ulitskaya, Russian writer. A Reading and Conversation with the Writer.


Vladislav Zubok, Associate Professor of History, Temple University; Research Fellow and Summer Projects Organizer, National Security Archive, George Washington University. Zhivago's Children: The Rise and Fall of the Intelligentsia After Stalin.


Mihai Carp, NATO's Principal Desk Officer for Afghanistan. NATO's Current Operations in Afghanistan.

Oksana Bulgakowa, Professor, International Film School, Köln. Theory as a Gesamtkunstwerk.
Conferences, Film Screenings, and Other Events in 2007-08
Co-sponsored by ISEEES

listed in chronological order

August 10-August 30, 2007. Film Series at the Pacific Film Archive: From the Tsars to the Stars: A Journey Through Russian Fantastik Cinema.

Wednesday, August 29, 2007. Panel Discussion: Fawaz A. Gerges, Christian A. Johnson Professor of International Affairs and Middle East Studies, Sarah Lawrence College; Darush Zahedi, Lecturer, International and Area Studies, UC Berkeley; and Ira Lapidus, Emeritus Professor of History, U.C. Berkeley. Islam, Global Politics, and US Foreign Policy.


Thursday, November 8, 2007. Film Screening and Discussion: Stephen the King.


Tuesday, November 27, 2007. Performance/Film Screening: Psyo Korolenko: scholar, composer, and song writer. Tretya Meshchanskaya (1927; 75 min) with an original soundtrack.


Thursday, February 28, 2008. Film Screening: Oksana Bulgakowa, Professor, International Film School, Köln. The Factory of Gestures: Body Language in Film.


Tuesday, March 11, 2008. Film Screening: Binka: To Tell a Story about Silence (Elka Nikolova, 2006), Q&A with director, screening of The Attached Balloon (1967).

Friday, March 14 - Saturday, March 15, 2008. Conference. Legacies of 1989…


The Leninist Legacy and Political Attitudes in Postcommunist Russia

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University of California, Berkeley

Mass Politics in Postcommunist Russia: An Introduction

Although Russia’s postcommunist political history has not been characterized by a smooth transition to democracy, it would be misguided to assume that Russians share a uniform taste in favor of authoritarian political and economic relations. In fact, there is little empirical basis for making strong assumptions about the underlying contours of the political predispositions of the Russian public and the impact of Communist Party rule on opinions about political, economic, and social organization. This essay probes several questions: What is the impact of the “Leninist legacy” on Russian political attitudes? Do Russians have structured beliefs that motivate political behavior? Is there any ideology guiding Russian mass political beliefs?

Using data from the 1995-1996 and 1999-2000 Russian National Election Studies, I argue that an attachment to values inculcated through the communist experience constitute a structured belief system that persists among the Russian mass public. First, I offer an approach for conceptualizing ideological and cultural legacies in post-Soviet Russia and situate the role of mass politics in the framework of “Leninist legacies.” This will be followed by an analysis of Russian political attitudes in 1995-1996 and 1999-2000. I then introduce a measure for communist attitudinal legacies and test it in a model for two Russian presidential elections.1

Identifying Ideological and Cultural Legacies

Scholarship on postcommunist transitions has been largely framed in terms of the intersection of two primary dimensions: enduring legacies inherited from Leninist structures and the more proximate politics of outcomes experienced in the early years of transition. The broad conclusion of this scholarship is that (1) Leninism imparted both negative and positive inheritances on the societies and states emerging from Communist Party rule in the 1980s-1990s; and (2) that these legacies shaped the context in which early decisions were made and the likelihood that particular institutional choices would be successful in ushering in democracy and capitalism.

Although scholarly consensus notes that mass political attitudes at the time of regime change play a largely insignificant role when compared to that played by political elites (Di Palma 1990; Przeworski 1991), the impact of mass attitudes on regime consolidation following political transition has not been fully scrutinized. For regimes that are attempting to build democratic institutions, mass political attitudes and behaviors might play a significant role in influencing the character of the new institutions. Democracies rely on mass participation and voluntary compliance for claiming and exercising political authority. Moreover, at a theoretical level, the effectiveness of a democracy depends on how well it represents societal interests.

It is within this context that mass politics—and thus the legacies that are embedded within them—gain significance. It seems reasonable to expect that individuals socialized under a previous regime are influenced by the legacies of that regime. Life experienced under a particular political order may shape both the demands and expectations citizens have for their political system. For example, a strong attachment to the ideology of the previous regime could impede the development of political legitimacy in the new regime. Likewise, a legacy of state paternalism could raise expectations for a new regime’s performance. As we consider the variety of transition outcomes across the postcommunist region—from healthy democracies to dictatorships—the incorporation of mass beliefs into our models could prove instructive.

To analyze the impact of legacies on mass politics, it is necessary to outline a framework that can be measured empirically. A useful starting point can be found in a 1997 essay in which Stephen Hanson disaggregates the concept of the “Leninist legacy” first introduced by Ken Jowitt (1992) into four components: ideological, political, socioeconomic, and cultural. Most empirical work on communist-era legacies has demonstrated the effects of political and socioeconomic legacies on postcommunist institutional outcomes (Crawford and Lijphart 1997; Ekiert and Hanson 2003; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Kolodko 2000). Scholarship demonstrating the effects of an ideological and cultural legacy empirically, however, has been less frequent and has primarily emphasized consequences for political parties and associational memberships (Grzymala-Busse 2002; Howard 2003), rather than on mass politics as a whole.

Hanson distinguished between the ideological and cultural legacies as follows: “Ideology, in my use of the term, refers to a formalized and codified definition of the ‘proper’ membership and boundaries of a polity...Culture, by contrast, refers here to the informal norms and daily life practices of social groups in a given region” (238). Hanson argued that the ideological legacy was the first element of the Leninist inheritance to fall away in postcommunist polities due to the ideological vacuum that resulted from the forced uniformity of socialism. Cultural legacies, he posited, were likely to have a stronger impact since the norms and practices of culture “tend over time to become valued for their own sake and therefore to endure long after the institutions which produced them disappear” (238).

In analyzing mass politics, I argue against a sharp distinction between ideological and cultural legacies. On the mass level, ideology is less likely to be associated with the political philosophy that shapes elite rhetoric and is more likely to overlap in substantial ways with the institutions and practices through which politics is experienced (Converse 1964). Rather than establishing a firm boundary between ideology and culture at the mass level, a productive approach is to employ the concept of the “belief system”—defined by Philip Converse as “a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence” (Converse 1964, 207). A useful attribute of the belief system concept for the study of postcommunist mass politics is the separation of interdependent ideas and attitudes from abstract theoretical constructs. Approaching mass political attitudes from the framework of “belief systems” allows us to consider the possibility that individuals may have mutually supporting ideas without consciously connecting those beliefs to a greater philosophical abstraction such as Marxism or liberalism.

The significant growth in reliable surveys conducted in the postcommunist region since the late 1980s provides scholars with an opportunity to look more closely at the contours of Russian political attitudes during this period. It is now possible to look beyond basic responses to specific issue questions to see whether patterns emerge among respondents. If we can find evidence of mass belief systems in Russian attitudes, identifying them will be the first step in understanding the impact of ideological and cultural legacies on mass politics.

**Mass Beliefs: Dimensions and Domains**

The study of political attitudes, predispositions, and ideology in democratic polities has contributed substantially to our understanding of the political space in liberal democracies. Perhaps the most substantial finding has been the near universal existence of the left-right continuum for ideological organization, which is present in all advanced democracies. The political space in many postcommunist regimes, in particular those that resulted from the collapse of the USSR, however, cannot be conveniently summarized along a left-right dimension. In contrast to several of the neighboring Leninist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe (with perhaps the exception of Romania), the penetration of Communist Party ideological and structural oversight in all areas of life was much more pervasive in the Soviet Union. While limited plurality in some areas of public life in Eastern Europe provided societies with an opportunity to consider ideological alternatives to communism that ultimately provided ready alternatives upon the Leninist regime’s collapse, post-Soviet Russia greeted transition in a state of ideological vapidity (Hanson 1997). Moreover, the Communist Party’s complete monopoly on power in all public arenas narrowed genuine political discourse within the general population. For most of Soviet history, “correct” political positions were passed along to the masses to accept and internalize. As a result, political cleavages at the mass level were crude, and ideological alternatives did not undergo meaningful public scrutiny.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, the space previously occupied by the narrow framing of anti-communism emerged containing a heterogeneous mix of positions on a range of political, economic, and social issues. An “anti-communist” position on the economy, for example, could encompass a broad spectrum of beliefs about the market, from support for a social-democratic welfare state to endorsement of laissez-faire liberalism. A substantial range existed within “pro-communist” debate as well, from a reconstituted centrally planned economy to a market system with state ownership of large industries.

Although more fluid than in established democracies, the organization of politics in Russia’s first postcommunist decade was not without some visible structure. Three political parties were elected via party-list voting during each of three parliamentary elections: the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), the liberal Yabloko party, and the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). A pro-presidential party was also elected to each parliament. Additionally, the leaders of the KPRF, Yabloko, and LDPR participated in both the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections. In spite of these basic elements of continuity, however, Russia does not fit into a neat binary left-right, liberal-conservative, or communist-democrat spectrum. The political space is infused with multidimensional, crosscutting conflicts over economic and political organization, state borders, national interests, and national identity.

Bearing in mind the heterogeneity elite-level and party politics exhibited with the expansion of the previously “anti-communist” political space, one is left to speculate about the presence of analogous heterogeneity at the level of mass beliefs. In their ambitious 1999 analysis of party systems in Eastern Europe, Herbert Kitschelt et al. uncovered a high degree of social and ideological structuring on the mass level. The authors found that while the structure of political competition in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria could generally
be summarized by a single dimension, the content of this dimension was not uniform across cases. In some instances, positions on the economy were divisive, while in other cases social and cultural issues constituted the primary cleavages.

This finding raises important questions about whether such variation exists in Russia as well. Russian belief systems, rather than following a liberal-conservative continuum, could exhibit variation in positions with regard to the legacies of the communist past. In particular, since most Russian adults were socialized under the Soviet regime, it is logical to expect that their political opinions are not simply reactions to events in postcommunist politics, but may in fact be largely shaped by their social, economic, and political experience under communism.

Data Analysis

In order to test this “legacy” hypothesis, I analyzed attitudes in four domains where one might find an underlying structure of belief systems: (1) economic organization; (2) the concentration of political power; (3) structure of the state and political community; and (4) the relationship between state order and individual liberties.

Using data from the 1995-1996 and 1999-2000 Russian National Election Studies, I selected twenty variables from the 1995-1996 survey and twenty-five variables from the 1999-2000 study as indicators of the hypothesized domains of political beliefs described above (see also Table 1). In the interest of space, full questions are not repeated below, and brief summaries are included instead. The methodological technique I employed to test for the presence of belief systems among these indicators was factor analysis, which relies on the assumption that the correlations found among observed variables are due to their common dependence on an underlying unobserved variable or variables. In short, if respondents’ answers to the questions exhibited some sort of functional interdependence, factor analysis should help us find it. In both instances, analysis of a series of different model specifications indicated that most of the variance across these indicators was explained by a single dimension, although the level of this explained variance was rather low in both cases—22% in the 1995-1996 data and 20% in the 1999-2000. The low level of total variance explained suggests that there is actually relatively little unifying structure among the indicators listed in Table 1.

Table 1: Indicators of Hypothesized Political Beliefs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Economic organization:</th>
<th>(2) Political power:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. What do you think about the privatization of state property in Russia?</td>
<td>a. Some people believe that the President of Russia should have more powers than the Parliament. Five point scale on who should have more power;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. What do you think about market reforms?</td>
<td>b. Some people think that in Russia everything should be decided by the top organs of government in Moscow, that the center should be strongest. What do you think?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. We must defend our industry against competition from foreign firms (agree/disagree);</td>
<td>c. Are there too few political parties, the right number, or too many? (1995-1996 only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. It is normal when the owner of a prosperous enterprise, using the labor of his workers, becomes richer than many other people (agree/disagree);*</td>
<td>d. What kind of political system would be most appropriate for Russia? (Continuum of Soviet system before perestroika to democracy of Western-type); (1999-2000 only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. All heavy industry must belong to the state and should not be given to private ownership (agree/disagree);</td>
<td>e. Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections is a good/bad way of having a political system; (1999-2000 only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. The state should set food prices (agree/disagree);</td>
<td>f. Political parties are necessary to make our political system work (five-point scale); (1999-2000 only)</td>
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<tr>
<td>g. The government ought to guarantee a job to everyone who needs one (agree/disagree);</td>
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<tr>
<td>h. The state should limit the incomes of the rich (agree/disagree);</td>
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<tr>
<td>i. Private property in land should exist in our country (agree/disagree)*</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>j. The capitalist system is not suitable for Russia (agree/disagree); (1995-1996 only)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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2 The 1995-1996 RNES is available in the data holdings of the Interuniversity Consortium for Social and Political Research (http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/). The raw data file of the 1999-2000 RNES was generously provided to me by Timothy Colton, the principal investigator of the study, which was financed by the National Science Foundation and the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research.

3 While many questions were repeated in both surveys, several questions appear only in one survey. In some instances, insufficient response rates in one survey year necessitated removing the variable from consideration.
(3) Structure of state and political community:

| a. The Soviet Union should never have been dissolved (agree/disagree); |
| b. Should Russia seek out its own path of development or utilize the experience of the West?† |
| c. Russia should strive for economic and political organization with the former Soviet Republics (agree/disagree); (1995-1996 only) |
| d. Russia and Belarus should unite in a single state (agree/disagree); (1999-2000 only) |
| e. Russia and Ukraine should unite in single state (agree/disagree); (1999-2000 only) |
| f. Ethnic Russians in Russia should have certain advantages over all other nationalities (agree/disagree); (1999-2000 only) |
| g. Are you proud to be a Russian citizen? (1999-2000 only) |

(4) State order and individual liberties:

| a. Order should be introduced at all costs, even if citizens’ rights are violated (five-point scale); |
| b. The rights of the individual must be defended even if guilty people sometimes go free (agree/disagree); |
| c. In any society there will always be a need to forbid the public expression of dangerous ideas (agree/disagree); |
| d. It is better to live in a society with strict order than to give people so much freedom that they may destroy society (agree/disagree); † |
| e. How important to you are providing social guarantees to the people? (1999-2000 only) |

*This indicator met my threshold acceptance as a correlate for the underlying unobserved factor for 1995-1996 only. †This indicator met my threshold acceptance as a correlate for the underlying unobserved factor for 1999-2000 only. Bold letter is used to represent indicators that demonstrated interdependence in the factor analysis model. These are the indicators that correlate with the underlying unobserved factor ($\lambda > .40$).

Nevertheless, some interdependency does exist, and therefore I estimated a factor analysis model with a single-factor solution. I found that eleven of the twenty variables examined from the 1995-1996 data and thirteen variables from the 1999-2000 data met my threshold acceptance ($\lambda > .40$) as a correlate of the underlying unobserved factor. These indicators are in bold lettering in Table 1. I found a considerable degree of resemblance between the analyses of the two time periods, with most indicators that were included in both analyses exhibiting strong similarities with regard to size and direction of factor pattern ($\lambda$) coefficients.

As Table 1 suggests, there is a strong correlation between attitudes with regard to economic concerns. Individuals who were against privatization were also opposed to market reforms and tended to support strong state involvement in the economy. Additionally, several indicators from the other hypothesized domains also have significant correlations to the underlying factor. From the hypothesized domain of state structure, the question about the dissolution of the Soviet Union is significant in both surveys, and the variables measuring Belarus-Russian unification, Ukraine-Russian unification, and following the example of the West show a high correlation with the factor in the 1999-2000 data. From the other two hypothesized dimensions, the importance of order over freedom and the preference for a political system like that of the Soviet Union, also correspond to this factor solution for the 1999-2000 data.

When analyzing evidence from both time periods, it appears that the underlying dimension captured here is a system of attitudinal constraint with regard to an attachment for values and institutions carried over from the communist experience. Respondents who supported a greater role for economic central planning also tended to support other attitudes consistent with communist values in general, and specific policies of the previous communist regime in particular. They generally conceived of their political space as one that included the former Soviet republics of Belarus and Ukraine, supported the Soviet form of government, believed that the Soviet Union should not have been dissolved, were against following the Western example of development, and prioritized societal order over individual liberties. Likewise, individuals who preferred a greater role for market forces in economic organization generally supported a political system closer to democracy, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, independence for Belarus and Ukraine, individual liberties, and a Western development model.

Examination of the questions that did not correlate to the one-factor solution lends further support to the substantive interpretation of a dimension organized around the lived communist experience. First, the two variables from the 1999-2000 data intended as indicators for structure of the state and political community that did not correspond to the factor—pride in Russian citizenship and belief that ethnic Russians should have additional advantages—were not part of previous Communist Party rhetoric or Marxist-Leninist ideology. Rather, they likely measure views of Russian nationalism, which might also be an aspect of one’s perception of the political community, but are not necessarily components of a belief system structured around the legacy of communist values. Second, the questions measuring attitudes toward centralized federal power and the presidency have an almost zero correlation with the underlying factor. This suggests that there is no perceptible
relationship between attitudes toward these specific questions of division of political power and other indicators in the model. To the extent that an underlying dimension about the division of political power exists, it does not appear to be connected to an underlying dimension that structures views about economic organization or individual rights. Likewise, views about individual rights and civil liberties do not appear to follow the communist values dimension. With the exception of a prioritization of societal order, attitudes towards freedom and individual rights are not part of this constraint system.

Based on the information provided by these factor analytic models, Russian beliefs and opinions about a broad range of questions relating to the economy, the political community, and political order exhibit attitudinal constraint with regard to only one dimension—the inherited communist experience. If Russians did indeed have structured belief systems about these components that co-varied independently of one another, then these models should have found evidence of more than one underlying component.

A significant substantive conclusion can be drawn from this analysis: while it may be difficult to map the prominent domains of Russian political space as a whole, a belief system structured around the institutional logic of the lived communist experience exists within a segment of the Russian voting-age population. This belief system can be interpreted as evidence of the persistence of Leninist ideological and cultural legacies in mass political attitudes.

**What Does a Mass Communist Legacy Explain?**

In order to better understand how this belief system relates to Russian political behavior, I created two new variables for use in further statistical analyses. The variables in Table 1 that met my threshold for acceptance as a correlate of the underlying factor ($\lambda > .40$) were added together and averaged to create a Likert scale ranging from 0-1 in which each indicator was given equal weight. Essentially, each survey respondent was given a score on this index that signifies the extent to which his/her opinions are reflective of a “Leninist legacy.” A higher score on the index indicates greater attachment to the lived communist experience. Substantively, a person with a score of 0 on the index would hold positions on the economy strongly in favor of marketization, be against the reconstitution of the Soviet political community, and favor the Western developmental model. In contrast, a person with a score of 1 would hold the strongest possible position about state involvement in the economy, be against the dissolution of the USSR, and disagree with the adoption of Western approaches. Individuals with divided views on these points would fall somewhere between the 0-1 range. In practice, the mean score for 1995-1996 was .67, with a lower bound of .11 and an upper bound of 1. Thus, no individual in the survey held views that were fully against the institutions or practices inherited from the communist era. The mean score increased in 1999-2000 to .72 with an empirical range of .31-.98, showing that attitudes became more favorable toward the lived communist experience in the late 1990s.

I used these new variables to conduct five additional statistical analyses. First, I analyzed possible determinants of the communist legacy dimension by estimating an ordinary least squares regression with each index as the dependent variable and several socioeconomic indicators as independent variables (see Table 2). As expected, the greater one’s age, the more likely the individual will have a higher score on the communist legacy index. Similarly, belonging to a union and previous membership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) both correspond to greater support for the persistence of pro-communist attitudes. Likewise, the greater one’s education level, the less likely s/he will exhibit an attachment to beliefs organized around communist institutional logic. Additionally, residence in a regional capital and higher income also negatively correlate with a position favoring the continuation of communist-era institutions and values. These are all socioeconomic characteristics that are typically associated with citizens who endorse the Communist Party of the Russian Federation in elections, which lends further support to the interpretation that this underlying dimension is a belief system structured around the values and institutional logic of life under communism.

### Table 2: Socioeconomic Determinants of Communist Dimension

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slope coefficient (b)</td>
<td>(standard error)</td>
<td>Slope coefficient (b)</td>
<td>(standard error)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.17***</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.11***</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Russian</td>
<td>.02**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.02*</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Orthodox</td>
<td>(-.00)</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>(-.01)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.03***</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02***</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-.10***</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>(-.02)</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ISEEES Newsletter Summer 2008 / 9**
My second set of statistical analysis attempted to understand the particular effect of the observed communist legacy on voting behavior. I analyzed vote choice in the first and second rounds of the 1996 presidential election, which was won by incumbent Boris Yeltsin, and the 2000 presidential election, in which Vladimir Putin emerged victorious after a single round. The method employed was multinomial logistic regression for the first round of the 1996 election and for the 2000 election, and binary logistic regression for the second round of the 1996 election. Since coefficients obtained from logistic regression are of little substantive interest on their own, Tables 3-4 provide the first differences in predicted probabilities for several statistically significant variables (p ≤ .05) in the 1996 vote choice models.


**Table 3: Predicted Probabilities for Determinants of 1996 First Round Vote Choice**

(Coefficients are first differences in predicted probabilities arising from a change from the minimum to the maximum of each variable)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Yeltsin</th>
<th>Zyuganov</th>
<th>Lebed</th>
<th>Yavlinsky</th>
<th>Zhirinovsky</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.01</td>
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<td>-.12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russian Orthodox</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Capital</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Predispositions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Index</td>
<td>-.46</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrist</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Evaluations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeltsin Approval</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p > .1), ***p .001, ** p ≤ .01, *p ≤ .05

1995-1996 Dependent variable: mean (.67); standard deviation (.16); empirical range (.11, 1)

1999-2000 Dependent variable: mean (.72); standard deviation (.12); empirical range (.31, .98)
While there is much of substantive interest in this table, the predicted probability of the communist legacy index is of primary relevance to the present analysis. The first round of the 1996 election suggests that the hypothesized belief system played an important role in vote choice between Yeltsin and Zyuganov. Voters with a maximum score on this factor were 51 percentage points more likely to vote for Zyuganov and 46 percentage points less likely to vote for Yeltsin. No other factor exhibits as substantial a difference in predicting vote choice.

The second round of the 1996 election, in which Yeltsin and Zyuganov participated in a runoff, displayed similar results. While age, income, urbanization, and union membership were the only socioeconomic characteristics to display statistical significance, their overall impact on predicting vote choice is dwarfed by the communist values index. An individual with the highest score on the communist legacy index is 60 percentage points less likely to vote for Yeltsin than someone with no attachment to these values. This stands in stark contrast to the effect of socialist partisanship: a member of a socialist party was only 37 percentage points less likely to vote for Yeltsin. If we evaluate change in predicted probabilities of the more modest difference of one half a standard deviation below the mean to one half a standard deviation above the mean, we see that voters making this change were 14 percentage points less likely to vote for Yeltsin. An analogous movement in age had less of an effect: moving from the 31-40 age range to the 51-60 age range reduced the likelihood of voting for Yeltsin by only 5 percentage points. We see that change in attachment to communist-era values influences one’s vote choice more than a similar degree of change on other variables that exist on a continuum.

### Table 4: Predicted Probabilities for Determinants of 1996 Second Round Vote Choice

(Coefficients are first differences calculated from logistic regression; Vote for Zyuganov=0 and Vote for Yeltsin=1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>First Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socioeconomic</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Capital</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Predispositions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Index</td>
<td>-.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Partisan</td>
<td>-.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrist Partisan</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Partisan</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Candidate Evaluations</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeltsin Approval</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeltsin Thermometer</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhirinovsky Thermometer</td>
<td>-.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=1,806
In contrast to the results of the 1996 election, the communist legacy index is not among the statistically significant variables influencing vote choice for the top two finishers in the 2000 presidential election, Putin and Zyuganov. It appears, rather, that candidate evaluations play a more significant role in determining vote choice in 2000. This could be the result of a variety of factors. First, as Russia moves further away from its Soviet past, the strength of attachments to beliefs established through communist-era socialization may be declining as well. This is somewhat curious, however, considering that the mean level of the communist legacy index was actually higher in the 1999-2000 sample than among the 1995-1996 respondents. Second, perhaps the perceived ideological distance between Putin and Zyuganov in 2000 was not as significant as that between Yeltsin and Zyuganov in 1996. Since Putin achieved a reputation as a Soviet-style technocrat reminiscent of Leonid Brezhnev, it is possible that those individuals with a strong attachment to the values and institutions of life under communism perceived Putin as a viable option for representing those values. If so, then it is logical that variables other than scoring on the communist index would determine a vote choice between Zyuganov and Putin. Lastly, as mentioned earlier, the belief system organized around the persistence of communist-era values appears to be present within only a fraction of the Russian mass public—a fraction that is likely concentrated in an older population that is slowly undergoing cohort replacement.

Tables 3-4 show only the direct results of the communist legacy belief system. By evaluating vote choice as a series of stages, however, it is possible to consider the indirect effects as well. In *The New American Voter* (1996), Warren Miller and Merrill Shanks propose a multi-stage approach for analyzing voting behavior based on the belief that the causal ordering of individual-level vote choice occurs at different stages of time based on the proximity to the actual vote. They argue, for example, that socioeconomic indicators are generally fixed at a much earlier stage than an individual’s issue preferences or evaluation of candidates. As such, these indicators are likely to affect vote choice at multiple stages, by shaping political predispositions, issue preferences, and evaluation of incumbents.

Since the communist-era belief system is primarily a reflection of political, social, and economic predispositions that were formed prior to considerations about candidate qualities, I analyzed the models without including the indicators for candidate evaluations (Table 5) as a way of measuring the indirect effects of the communist index on vote choice. The results suggest that this belief system exhibits substantial indirect influence on vote choice. The difference between direct and indirect effects in 2000 is particularly pronounced. While the communist values index is a statistically insignificant variable in the full model, it appears to have some indirect effects. As expected, those with a higher score on this index are less likely to vote for Putin and more likely to vote for Zyuganov. It appears that while the direct effects of the belief system are muted in the final vote decision, positioning on this dimension likely affected candidate evaluations, which appear to have played the most substantial role in vote choice.

### Table 5: Indirect Effects of Communist Values Belief System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Yeltsin</th>
<th>Zyuganov</th>
<th>Lebed</th>
<th>Yavlinsky</th>
<th>Zhirinovsky</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996 Round 1</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1st differences in predicted prob.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(+-standard deviation /2)</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996 Round 2</td>
<td>-.66</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1st differences in predicted prob.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(+-standard deviation /2)</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>(.00)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1st differences in predicted prob.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(+-standard deviation /2)</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The index variable was not statistically significant for the Zhirinovsky vote choice in 2000.*
Conclusion: Present, But Weakening Legacy

On the surface, the impact of the communist legacy index on vote choice appears intuitive. Similarly, most suppositions about the importance of various Leninist legacies on postcommunist outcomes seem logical on a conceptual level. The greater challenge is demonstrating their effect empirically. Most hypotheses of the determinants of communist partisanship and support for communist candidates are based on socioeconomic indicators, such as level of education and urbanization, as well as negative responses to current conditions—not underlying political predispositions. In contrast, the empirical results presented here suggest that attachment to values acquired through socialization under the Soviet system serves as a form of ideological constraint among a segment of Russian voters. This belief system is evidence of the persistence of Leninist ideological and cultural legacies in mass public opinion.

Furthermore, this belief system appears to have had a greater influence than socioeconomic indicators on 1990s voting behavior. These results suggest that while socioeconomic indicators did have a direct effect on vote choice for Zyuganov in 1996 and 2000, these variables also had an indirect effect that was mediated through the communist legacy belief system. Likewise, even though the direct effects of this belief system diminished by 2000—lending support to the assertion that the Leninist legacy on postcommunist attitudes is declining—attachment to communist era values continued to display substantial indirect effects at earlier stages in the vote choice decision.

The communist legacy belief system identified in this study, however, represents only a part of Russian mass beliefs. Not all questions relating to state structure, political power, and individual rights and liberties fall along this communist values dimension. Other attitudes might align along dimensions that were not uncovered in this analysis. Yet, it is worth emphasizing that those indicators that did not correspond with the communist values dimension did not appear to exhibit any patterns suggesting an alternate form of structured ideological constraint.

Additionally, while the communist legacy belief system is the only visible form of ideological constraint among the sample of the Russian voting-age population surveyed in the 1999-2000 RNES, it is not necessarily the universal belief system for all Russians. The dimension uncovered here explained less than 25% of the overall variance in responses to the questions included in the factor analysis. There is much variance in mass beliefs that is unaccounted for. While some Russians appear to exhibit a belief system structured along the institutional logic of communism, for others it does not appear to play an influential role. In fact, those that do exhibit this belief system are probably clustered within an older and more rural demographic, although this has yet to be empirically demonstrated.

The finding of a mass belief system in Russia that is representative of the legacies of having lived under communism has several implications for our understanding of Russian mass politics and the democratization of postcommunist regimes. First, it raises several questions about the role of ideological and cultural legacies carried over from life under the previous regime on postcommunist politics. How do these artifacts, which continue to shape attitudes and opinions after regime change, affect a democratizing regime’s ability to establish and maintain effective, representative institutions? While one would expect that the strength of this belief system would diminish over time—an expectation confirmed by the analysis of the 2000 presidential election presented here—does the persistence of this attachment in the early years after regime change present particular challenges? Given the importance that scholars have credited to “lock-in” effects in the early years of postcommunist institutional reforms (Fish 1999), it is worth considering whether attachments to this belief system in the early years might have shaped subsequent trajectories of both mass ideology and elite rhetoric.

Lastly, while it appears that the communist legacy belief system is declining in its significance as a predictor of vote choice, no other mass belief system has developed to take its place. After almost a decade of more open political discussion and contested elections, Russian mass politics continued to be framed in terms of the previous regime’s discourse. Perhaps the antecedent regimes in postcommunist cases affect latter-day political beliefs and competition more deeply than previously thought. If so, Leninist legacies could have consequences for democratization and regime consolidation that extend beyond their impact on institutional and elite-level variables to include their influence on mass attitudes and behaviors as well.

References


News From BPS

BPS Name Change

The Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post Soviet Studies (BPS) has been renamed, and it will be known from now on as the Berkeley Program in Eurasian and East European Studies. The program will retain the acronym BPS. "East European" was added because it was suggested that "Eurasia" is understood these days to mean not "Europe and Asia from the English Channel to Chukotka" but the territory of the former Soviet Union only, and it was deemed important that it be clear that the geographic reach of BPS extends to both the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

ISEEES/BPS Travel Grant

Beginning July 1, 2008, the BPS and ISEEES conference travel grant programs will be consolidated, and from now on, BPS will run a single program. Conference travel grants will be awarded to affiliated graduate students who are on the official program of a professional conference or workshop, up to $400 per grant, and no more than one grant per student per year. To apply, email Dr. Edward W. Walker (eww@berkeley.edu) a description of the event (e.g., conference title), a description of your role in the event (e.g., "presenting a paper" or "discussant on a panel") along with a brief budget. This will then be forwarded to the Fellowship Committee. The application must be submitted well in advance of the proposed travel date.

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**MEMBERS**
Michael Patrick Richards*

* gift of continuing membership

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Utopia as a Genre of Political Action

Nina Bagdasarova

Nina Bagdasarova is Associate Professor of Psychology at the Kyrgyz Russian Slavic University in Bishkek and a visiting scholar with ISEEES during the 2007-2008 Academic Year. This paper was presented at Stanford, at the Utopia's Coasts: Stoppard in New York and Moscow Conference (5/22-5/23, 2008), comparing the American and Russian productions of Tom Stoppard's The Coast of Utopia: Voyage, Shipwreck, Salvage.

The present analysis is based on the works of Olga Freidenberg and Vladimir Propp, the famous Russian literary theorists of the 20th century. The origin of genre (as Olga Freidenberg had shown in 1920s) is myth and ritual, and thus genre is inevitably connected with vibrant community life and the spirit of communion and belonging. But on the other hand, genre has a firm logical structure and a strict set of rules, which are referred to as the laws of genre; as a result it possesses a certain power over the heroes, the plot, and the author himself. And of course these rules in some way condition the spectators'/readers' feelings and thoughts.

Does this sameness of the internal and external logic have a strictly formal character, or can we find through analysis of genre that our everyday life is much closer to art than we usually expect? Analysis of utopia as a genre can be especially useful in the attempt to answer this question. It should be noted that according to Frederic Jameson, the utopian and mythic aspects of mass culture (which saturates our existence, so in essence we all are living within it) are really closely connected. But while his approach considers utopias primarily as our inner fantasies, I am going to use genre analysis to illustrate that there is also a connection between utopias and the outward reality of social and political life.

In his book The Historical Roots of the Wondertale, Vladimir Propp defines the structural elements of genre analysis. Propp uses basic elements to analyze the genre of the “Wonder Tale” (volshebnaya skazka) – the genre group of folk tales. These elements are first of all: “the hero” and “the space.” Later in this analysis, “the time” will be examined as such an element as well.

According to Propp, the wonder tale is a reflection of initiation rites. The hero (because of the strict laws of the genre, determined by the logic of the ritual) is going to a wonderland (“tridesiatoe tsarstvo”) – a space that within the ritual action is nothing but a “land of the dead.” The adventures of the hero in the wonderland are analogies of initiation trials, which symbolize death. From this travel, the hero always returns as a renewed, or, more precisely, regenerated person.

The epigraph to this presentation is part of the argument between Herzen and Bakunin at the end of Stoppard’s Shipwreck. This small fragment examines one critical theme that is present (implicitly or explicitly) in any utopian discourse - the theme of revolution. This theme is central for anyone who thinks about social problems and the social order that causes them. Utopia is a changed social order, and this change is always connected to the idea of revolution. But the concept of revolution is never incontestable or inarguable. It always stays the center of different collisions, the focal point of contradictions and intersections. So does utopia as we view it today. That in many ways is what the Tom Stoppard’s trilogy is about. The play’s title and its success both in Russia and the U.S. show that utopia and revolution are somehow important for us today. Why is that so?

The subject of this analysis is the so-called “classic” or early modern utopia – the group of texts located between the realms of literature and political thought, which contains narratives of almost 3 centuries. We can start from Thomas More’s Utopia, the first real utopian text, and stop around the end of the 19th century, when this genre experienced important transformations and became a part of fiction and mass-culture. These utopian texts formed the views not only of the revolutionary community of Herzen and Bakunin but of the entire Russian revolutionary movement as a whole.

Bakunin ... A peasant revolution, Herzen!
Herzen Stop!
... “Destruction is a creative passion!”
You’re such a child!
We have to go to the people, bring them with us, step by step...
The village commune can be the foundation of true populism, not Aksakov’s paternalism and not the iron bureaucracy of a socialist elite, but self-government from the ground up.
Russian socialism!
Tom Stoppard. Shipwreck
He possesses new (magic) abilities and a new identity. *Thus, the wonderland is the space that produces the transformation of the hero.*

Using this scheme we can try to explore utopia as a genre as well. The first difficulty that we are dealing with is that there are no heroes in classic utopias. There is a space though. Usually the space is at the center of utopian narrative, which is why architecture (especially the idea of the city) has so many intersections with utopia. And this space within the narrative is already transformed. That’s not the space of ordinary reality, but it’s definitely not the space of “wonderland” (tridesiatoe tsarstvo) either. That is a real space but after a certain transformation.

Utopia is a space where all the changes have already occurred. The process of transformation is located outside of the utopian content. But it’s not too hard to reconstruct the meaning of this process – those transformations, which are described in utopias, are the results of a revolution. Thus, revolution is the meaning of the transformation. And then there are also the heroes who “produced” this transformation – those are the heroes of the revolution. So where are these heroes in utopias? Why don’t they live in the new perfect world that they have founded? We can use Propp’s method in order to understand the nature of utopian genre. Like Propp, who considered the real rituals of initiation to analyze the fairy tale, we can look at real revolutions and utopian projects to analyze the genre of utopia. It’s quite important to evoke Russian/Soviet history here (though we can use other histories for that as well).

There was a large discourse in Russian and Soviet cultures dedicated to revolution and its heroes. Within this discourse, the heroes of revolution were always the figures of sacrifice. The theme of self-sacrifice was the main motive that defined a revolutionary’s “habitus”. Self-denial, self-devotion, self-giving – those were the characteristics of revolutionaries, who usually didn’t have a family, didn’t sleep enough, traveled too much and too far, spent half of their life in prison or in exile and so on. Furthermore, the revolutionary’s biography concluded with a heroic death. They always die at the end of the story. What is particularly interesting for us and for our further analysis is that the sacrifice continues ceaselessly after the victory of the revolution. Similarly, the transformation of space – “the construction of the New World” – is also continuing in an endless cycle.

In the Soviet Union, the Party (Bolshevik and later Communist) was separated from the rest of society – the Party and the masses were always going together but separately – exactly because of this function of sacrifice. The main responsibility of a Party member was to be ready for self-sacrifice. “Communists, first!” (“Kommunisty, vpered!”) – is a line from the famous Soviet poem, which expresses this discursive position best, stating that Communists are destined to be the first ones to step into the fire and receive the enemy’s blows as the vanguard of the revolutionary society. (“The Party is a vanguard of Soviet Society” was a popular Soviet slogan that also contented this idea.)

So this is the hero that produces the utopian space. The nature of this hero allows us to define the nature of the utopian genre. Unlike the wonder tale, which is based on the solar “heroic” myth, utopia is a “myth of origin”. This kind of myths tells the story of a first man’s sacrifice (for example the Hindi myth about first-man Purusha, the Chinese myth about Pangu, or the Scandinavian one about a giant Imir). This sacrifice leads to the emergence of the new universe or, very often, literally transforms the dead hero into the universe.

So the cosmos derives not directly from the chaos but from the body of the hero. And chaos cannot be transformed into the cosmos unless the sacrifice lays in the foundation of the universe. Thus, utopia is really closely connected with the idea of a sacred place and sacred time where the basic cosmic transformation took place at the moment of the beginning. Thereby it becomes clear why there are no heroes within utopian space. The death of the hero is a fundamental condition of the birth of the new world (namely this transformed space). And it is fascinating how precisely this rule of the genre is realized in real life social practice. Yet the myth of origin and sacrifice rituals are connected not only with space and a sacred place but also with time. The ritual that reproduces the moment of origin
requires a special moment. This moment is also sacred, and it constitutes an interruption of the flow of ordinary or profane time. Participation in the ritual is an opportunity to be initiated into eternity (at least for this short period of sacred time). That fits quite well to all literary utopias. Usually time stops there and history is accomplished.

But there is a major difference between utopian and mythic structures, and here the primal myth transforms as it brings about the appearance of a new genre. The moment of sacrifice in a myth is only a moment. Afterward, time transforms back into a flow, and life starts as a continuance. In a utopian narrative, however, time stops.

So what happens with time in the real world after the Russian revolution? We cannot say that time stopped there. There was a history during socialism. But this history was the history of the revolution. The permanent countrywide struggle, battle, and (most importantly) sacrifice were the foundation of the background of Soviet life. It’s a well-known fact, for example, that all agricultural activity in Soviet time was called the “Fight for the Harvest” (Битва за урожай), despite the traditional view of agriculture as a symbol of peace. Thus, we can say that in some sense time froze at that period of history. But in reality, the very moment of struggle—the moment of revolution—transformed from the moment into the lasting flow of time. This lasting moment eventually becomes eternity, a moment that should last forever. And that is why socialism is an anti-utopia rather than utopia and why socialists could not create “socialism with a human face” (“socialism s chelovecheskim litzom”) despite all of the positive achievements of the socialist order. The structural requirement from this kind of anti-utopia is to constantly be in struggle and keep sacrificing.

where the refrain states that “there is a beginning to the revolution, there is not an end to it” (Есть у революции начало, нет у революции конца).

So we can conclude that the genre of classic utopia (by its structure) is a variant of a myth of origin. The original myth examines the moment of beginning consisting of a hero’s sacrifice that brings about the emergence of the universe, space, and time. The new world and life within it are the result of this sacrifice. But the primal myth structure is modified in utopia, and we don’t have a story about the hero’s death within the utopian narrative. Nevertheless, we have this aspect of sacrifice in the social reality connected with utopia. The real utopian world becomes the eternal moment of beginning, endless sacrifice, and permanent revolution. Thus, the nature of the utopian genre as a political action changes and turns into revolution. In fact, according to laws of genre and primal genre structure, we can discuss utopia and revolution as identical phenomena. Hence, while rethinking utopia, we should rethink revolution as well.

There is another important point within this analysis. We can not consider revolution outside of history, just like we can not avoid the fact that “classic” i.e. early modern utopias belong to a specific place (or at least a specific culture), which is Europe, and a certain time – the time when two new social classes emerge and gain influence. Those classes are the Bourgeoisie and the Proletariat, and all that we know so far about revolution is strongly connected to these two classes.

According to many authors, starting with Utopia by Sir Thomas More and continuing with later utopias, the genre itself contains a strong critique of the nascent capitalist order. But this critique was double fold from the very beginning. On one hand, there was a protest against aristocratic hierarchy, and this protest could be considered a part of the new ideology. Indeed, old concepts of justice and equality obtained a new meaning at the time of appearance of first literary utopias. The renewed meanings of these concepts some time later became an obvious part of revolutionary ideology of the bourgeoisie. But the same concepts of justice and equality already contained the protest against the bourgeoisie itself and against inequality and injustice that was generated by bourgeois social order, and thus they undermine this order. That is why Marx never regarded the bourgeois revolution enough and welcomed the proletarian revolution.

So what kind of revolution is supposed to occur within the utopian narrative? I would like to argue that classical utopia is the story of the proletarian revolution. Despite the shifting of the social order, the emerging “liberal utopia” doesn’t stop time. Moreover, as Frank Ankersmit shows in Sublime Historical Experience, the bourgeois revolution caused the appearance of historical thinking and historical perception of reality. We can say that the connection
between utopia and social changes after the bourgeois revolution is a connection between ideas and reforms, and this kind of connection never produces a radical change of social order. Or, more precisely, we cannot say that these changes may ever satisfy utopian criteria of equality and justice. Only proletarian revolution (as we know hitherto) provides access into the “realm of freedom.” From this point of view, Marx’s model of history has an end, and this end is utopia itself. The same thing can be seen from genre analysis of utopian texts: utopia and revolution are structurally identical phenomena.

Thus, the argument between Herzen and Bakunin in the epigraph doesn’t appear now to be just an argument about means of a political struggle. Tom Stoppard made these characters argue about the most important thing for them at the moment. Hotheaded Bakunin understands that bourgeois revolution cannot be the path to the realm of utopia. Wise Herzen anticipates in this dialog the awful consequences of any revolution. Why is Herzen so confident about his prophecy? Naturally, Stoppard himself is well aware of the history of 20th century revolutions, but he tries to explain us Herzen’s political choice. This argument is affected not only by Herzen’s political intuition but also by the writer’s perception of Bakunin’s phrases. The rhetoric of revolution scares Herzen very much. This bloody genre itself makes him very cautious. At the same time, he cannot deny his utopian dream either.

Stoppard put a lot of effort in order to try to reproduce the Russian “language space” of the mid-19th century. The main contradictions of these semantics culminate in the final “Shipwreck” argument. Stoppard’s Herzen isn’t just looking for another way for social transformation. He is longing for a path to a new world, which lies beyond the revolution. And this of course is not so much about Herzen himself as much as it is about us and our here and now. This is a theme dealing with our fear and our discretion. Should we be afraid to think about revolution after all that happened during the 20th century? Should we stop thinking about a utopian future? The one important thing that we can get from our genre analysis is that we cannot think about utopia and revolution separately. They are the same. And it definitely requires courage to think about these things today. Yet people will never stop thinking, even if it’s really difficult.

(Endnotes)

1 O. Freidenberg. Poetica sujeta i zhannra (The Poetics of Plot and Genre) - Labirint, Moscow, 1997. See also Image and Concept: Mythopoetic Roots of Literature by Olga Freidenberg and Vyacheslav Ivanov. - Gordon & Breach Publishing Group


3 About genre “beyond” the text: Paul Coble “Objectivity and Immanence in Genre Theory” in “Genre Matters” by Garin Dowd, Lesley Stevenson & Jeremy Strong – Intellect Books, Bristol UK/Portland, OR, USA, 2006

4 Fredric Jameson Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture - Social Text, No. 1, (Winter, 1979), pp. 130-148

5 V. Propp. Istoricheskie Kornivolshebnoi Skazki (The Historical Roots of the Wonder Tale) – Labirint. Moscow, 2004

6 We don’t discuss now “a narrator” who may have quite complicated connections with the hero and the author figures. This issue requires the special analysis

7 The Moloch – is another rhetorical figure which is strongly associated with histories of revolutions and represented at the same time the mythic image that became famous because it had eaten its own children.

8 Compare also Giorgio Agamben’s analysis of time – synchronic/diachronic time’s combination in Playland and for further discussion Marx’s and Benjamin’s concepts of time in Time and History. (Giorgio Agamben Infancy and History – Verso, NY, 1993 – p.78-80 and 99-105)


10 Karl Marx. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte – Mondial, 2005

11 Frank Ankersmit. Sublime Historical Experience. (Cultural Memory in the Present) - Stanford University Press, 2005
Contemporary Critical Inquiry through the Lens of Post-Socialism: this was the problem space taken up by the 2008 SOYUZ Post-Socialist Cultural Studies Conference at U.C. Berkeley April 24-26. How might the lens of post-Socialism frame and filter critical inquiry? What connections, disjunctures, or trajectories might the lens of post-Socialism reveal?

Dominic Boyer and Alexei Yurchak’s keynote address set the agenda for the weekend. Their work addressed a contemporary question: When is “truthiness” possible, and when is it funny? In their answer, Boyer and Yurchak identify a genre of humour, stiob, common both to “late Socialism” and “late capitalism.” We get the joke when, in 1986, a Leningrad rock singer plants an article in the leading Party newspaper, indistinguishable in idiom and style from “actual” Party pieces, denouncing rock music as decadent. Once the author’s identity is revealed, the laughter comes both from re-reading the article as a spoof and from – more interestingly – readers’ confusion with their own reactions to the original. The laughter and the discomfort are as keen for contemporary U.S. viewers of Stephen Colbert’s newscasts. Why? Boyer and Yurchak isolate two conditions upon which this humour, and the ironic sensibility that animates it, rests: a hypernormalization of discursive forms and then overidentification of the jester with the form. While mimesis is a central concept in this work, Boyer and Yurchak do not explicitly raise themes of “authenticity”; the challenge to Cold War presumptions of “real” belief in one camp versus “faked” public participation under socialism lies in the very demonstration of plays on “authenticity” in both East and West. Identifying stiob and its conditions of possibility both there and here, then and now, makes the argument. Beyond its own conclusions, the keynote thus set the agenda for conferees in advancing an implicit argument for rejecting parochialism that some would assign to post-Socialist studies, expanding the frame, and testing methods and conclusions across sites of critical inquiry.

The idea of practical jokes – playing on attention to practice, performance, timing, assumptions, disjuncture – captures many themes and sources of pleasure and energy that turned up over the course of the conference. While Boyer and Yurchak’s work took discursive forms as its object, other participants inclined to ethnography. A preoccupation with subjectivity and epistemic milieu informed many lines of inquiry, with varying degrees of thoughtfulness and persuasiveness. Many participants found that the unfamiliar ground of post-Socialism offers a fertile space for reconsidering figures that, elsewhere in scholarship, are devolving to trope: the neoliberal, the modern, the transnational, the entrepreneurial, the social. Cindy Huang suggested panelists view the neoliberal as a shifting assemblage of practices and ethical orientations rather than a given demographic, and Zhanara Nauruzbayeva’s study of the entrepreneurial dispositions and practices of the Union of Artists of Kazakhstan pointed a way this might be done. Pietro Calogero challenged the trope of “the modern” in city planning, comparing Soviet technocrats with new “transnationals” in post-Taliban Kabul; Kevin Karpiak took on “the social” with work on policing the post-social in France. Natalia Roudakova’s work on Russian journalists identified a certain subject position, in this case journalists’ social location between intelligentsia and nomenklatura, as generative of a form of moral authority.

The post-Socialist reshaping of terrain, specifically the disappearance of iron curtains and geopolitical divides and emergence of new borders and attempts at transversing them, also offered a fertile ground for fresh considerations of locality and epistemic milieu. Harsha Ram advocated a “geopoetics of history,” proposing that concepts are not only historically but geographically situated. Jennifer Dickson explored “geosemiotics” in displays of public exhortation on the billboards and advertisements of Western Ukraine; Dace Dzenovska took up treatments of difference, “European” tolerance, and post-colonial sensibilities in Latvia; Marianne Liljestrom, the situatedness or transnationality of feminist knowledge. A powerful set of papers on post-Soviet labour migration set up a field of resonance between Alexia Bloch’s work on geographies of intimacy and power occupied by Slavic women migrants and Turkish male patrons; Ayse Akalin’s work on affect and care labour by Central Asian women caring for elderly members of Turkish families; and Nona Shahnzarian’s work on Armenian care workers in Los
Angeles. Is care or intimacy what the female migrant gives, or is it a new form of intersubjectivity drawn around old lines of gender and new lines of flight?

The salience of “post-Socialism” as a framing device derives in part from this recognition that milieu extends beyond geography, implicating subjectivity and epistemology. One question left hanging at the end of the conference involves a resurrection of some limiting framings of bygone paradigms. As the referent, state Socialism, recedes farther into the past in many of our sites of inquiry, the field of post-Socialism is challenged to reconsider its own interpellation. Many departments and granting agencies are reverting from “post-Socialist” to “Eurasian” studies, or other, older, geographic designations. The work that this post-Socialist studies conference elicited—on sites from Viet Nam, to Afghanistan, to Bosnia—makes a case for halting the slide towards regional studies. Neither “regional” nor “globalized” describes local iterations of response to a well-traveled form. And just as post-Socialism is not neatly contained in one geographic zone, neither is it neatly encapsulated in one time period. To recognize Socialism as a powerful frame for subject formation is to grant that post-Socialism may yet be constitutive of the life experience of many in complex and unpredictable ways. Both the specificity and compelling connections that the concept of post-Socialism allows wash out in a switch to geographic or epochal formulations. The field is open for forging new concepts that capture the strengths of “post-Socialism” as a framing device while conveying the freshness of contemporary lived experience. In the meantime, post-Socialism remains fruitful terrain as a topography of inquiry.

The last word at the conference went to Zsuzsa Gille, who invoked Gramsci’s sense of politics, politics versus apathy, to explain why she’s been coming to SOYUZ conferences for the last 15 years: “We bring politics to places one wouldn’t necessarily look for it.” The next SOYUZ conference will be held at Yale University in spring 2009.

The conference was organized by Alexei Yurchak (UC Berkeley), Dominic Boyer (Cornell), Dace Dzenovska (UC Berkeley), Larisa Kurtovic (UC Berkeley), Alex Beliaev (UC Berkeley), and Nina Aron (UC Berkeley). The following U.C. Berkeley organizations joined ISEEES in supporting the conference: Anthropology Graduate Organization for Research and Action; the Institute of European Studies; the Dean of the Social Sciences Division; the Department of Anthropology; the Institute of East Asian Studies; the Kroeber Anthropological Society; and the Townsend Center for the Humanities. The conference was made possible in part through a grant from the U.S. Department of Education under Title VI.

Save the Date

**ISEEES Fall Reception** – Monday, September 22, 2008. Celebrate with ISEEES the beginning of a new academic year. At 4 p.m., at the Toll Room, Alumni House, UC Berkeley Campus. For details, call (510) 642-3230

The **40th National Convention of the AAASS** will be held at the Philadelphia Marriott Downtown, 1201 Market Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, from Thursday, November 20 through Sunday, November 23, 2008.

ISEEES cordially invites UC Berkeley faculty, students, alumni, and ASC members to the **Berkeley/Stanford Reception at the 2008 AAASS Convention** at the Philadelphia Marriott Downtown (1201 Market Street), Grand Ballroom C, on Friday, November 21, 7:30 p.m. - 9:30 p.m.

*If you plan to attend, please R.S.V.P. by e-mail to adubinsky@berkeley.edu prior to Monday, November 17.
Faculty and Student News

Ivan Asher, who received his Ph.D. in 2007 from the Department of Political Science, has been hired by the of University of Massachusetts at Amherst. He will teach courses in political science, comparative politics, and political theory.


Boris Barkanov, Ph.D. candidate in political science, presented at the International Studies Association national conference in San Francisco a paper titled "Constructing the National Interest: The Energy Charter Treaty and Transformations in Russian Policy Thought (1997-2001)." He also presented at the Berkeley Political Science Department Graduate Student Conference the paper "Saving the Gold Mine: Gazprom, Energy Charter Treaty Preferences, and Transformations in Russian Policy Thought (1997-2001)." Additionally, he was awarded a Fulbright-Hays Fellowships for dissertation field work in Moscow, Russia, during 2008-9.

Richard David, J.D. candidate in the Berkeley School of Law, will be working this summer at the Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP law firm in London, whose clients are doing transactions throughout Eastern and Central Europe.

Christine Evans, Ph.D. candidate in history, has been awarded the Mabelle McLeod Lewis Memorial Fund dissertation fellowship for 2008-2009.

Dr. Ruslan Gulidov, Research Fellow at the Economic Research Institute of the Far Eastern Branch of Russian Academy of Sciences, Khabarovsk, gave a talk at the Contemporary Russian Politics Working Group on April 14, 2008 on the "Challenges for Russia's Energy Policy in the Far East."

Shorena Kurtsikidze, Graduate Assistant at the Department of Near Eastern Studies, and Vakhtang Chikovani, lecturer in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, published a new book on Georgia titled Ethnography and Folklore of the Georgia-Chechnya Border – Images, Customs, Myths & Folk Tales of the Peripheries.

The aim of this book is to acquaint a wide audience with the traditional culture of the Christian and Muslim highlanders who live on the border of Europe and Asia in the central part of the Caucasus Main Mountain Range. Under one cover, the publication features unique materials on visual anthropology, ethnography, mythology, and folklore of the region. The book portrays the mysterious subgroup of Georgian highlanders, the Khevsurs, who are considered to be the champions of Georgian patriotism and at the same time, according to one popular theory, are believed to be direct descendants of the last Crusaders. Featuring 158 black and white original photographs and accompanying explanatory texts, the publication gives a detailed description of the exotic religious institutions and examples of material culture of this group of highlanders, illustrating the closeness of their lifestyle to the ways of the Frankish crusaders. The emphasis is on the spheres of folk culture that bear clear traces of centuries of confrontations between two ethnic groups: Christian Georgian highlanders and their neighbors, Muslim Vainakh or Chechen and Ingush. The authors attempt to show how the traditional mode of life of the highlanders affects the contemporary ethnic and political situation in the region. The publication includes original translations of Georgian folk tales and myths. The latter are narratives representing mythologized chronicles of “holy wars” of old times once carried out on the border of Europe and Asia by the ancestors of the Khevsurs. ISBN 9783895863288 (Hardbound). LINCOM Studies in Anthropology 09. 730pp. 158 photographs. 2008.

Tony Lin, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, won 2nd prize at the First Berkeley Piano Competition, organized by the Berkeley Department of Music.

Victoria Smolkin, Ph.D. candidate in history, received the Fulbright-Hays DDRA grant for 2008-2009. She will also present at the conference "Confronting Cold War Conformity: Peace and Protest Cultures in Europe, 1945-1989," part of the Marie Curie Series of Events "European Protest Movements Since 1945," which will take place at the Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic.

Susanne Wengle, Ph.D. candidate in political science, will publish an article titled "The Monetisation of L’goty: Transforming Welfare Politics and Provision in Russia" in the July 2008 issue of Europe Asia Studies. The article is co-authored with Michael Rasell.
Russian Emigration in Historical Perspective: Russians in California

Conference Summary by Elizabeth Coyne, ISEEES Program Representative for Outreach

This year’s teacher outreach conference, on the theme of “Russian Emigration in Historical Perspective: Russians in California,” took place on May 5, 2008, in the Toll Room of the Alumni House, UC Berkeley Campus.

Ilya Vinkovetsky, Assistant Professor with the Department of History at Simon Fraser University, spoke about Russians in Pre-American California. This talk traced the Russian interaction with the Spanish, the Mexicans, and the Native Americans in California prior to its incorporation into the United States. Russians, who operated a colony in Alaska, visited California from 1803 on. Between 1812 and 1841 they even maintained a permanent settlement some eighty miles north of San Francisco. Professor Vinkovetsky examined why they established this settlement (Fort Ross) and what they hoped to gain from California. His talk briefly sketched the interest that the Russians had in California and analyzed what Fort Ross meant to Russian colonial activity on the Pacific Rim.

Anatol Shmelev, Project Archivist at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, gave a presentation on Russians in California: The First and Second Post-revolutionary Waves, 1918-1955. His session examined the two major waves of Russian immigrants to California in the first half of the twentieth century and their influence on the state's cultural and ethnic landscape. Following the revolution of 1917, an estimated one million Russians found themselves abroad. Most of these had participated in the struggle against the Bolsheviks as part of the 'White' (as opposed to "Red") movement. While the bulk of these émigrés settled in Europe and China, several thousand immigrated to the United States, mainly to the New York area and San Francisco (although Seattle and Los Angeles were also significant satellite colonies). While firm numbers are hard to come by, some 10,000 may have settled in the Bay Area. Several churches were established, two major daily Russian-language newspapers were founded, one of which still publishes, and a large number of social and cultural organizations were established, including a Russian Center in San Francisco, which also continues to function. The next major wave came following the end of the Second World War and consisted largely of displaced persons: old-time Russian émigrés escaping Communist China and — to a lesser degree — war-ravaged Europe. This wave added to the existing Russian colony, altering its political and religious character. While some new organizations and churches were founded, and a new newspaper appeared, most of the new émigrés joined existing organizations. This influx breathed new life into the Russian community in California.

Olga Matich, Professor of Slavic Languages and Literatures, UC Berkeley, gave a presentation on Russians in Hollywood/Hollywood on Russia. If there was a single economic reason for going to Los Angeles during the 1920s it was the burgeoning film industry, which specialized in fabrication of the real. It welcomed immigrants into its ranks, especially since many in Hollywood were immigrants who had designed for themselves successful American identities. The popularity of the so-called Russian genre that flourished in Hollywood during the 1920s and early 1930s attracted many Russians, even though most of them had no prior experience in the entertainment industry. They had fled their homeland after the Revolution, mostly with the White Army and Cossack detachments – some as professional military men or volunteers fighting against the Bolsheviks in the civil war. To their chagrin, however, Russia was typically represented in these films as a land of luxury populated by decadent aristocrats on one hand and wild and wooly Cossacks, exotic gypsies, Tatars, and Volga boatmen on the other. Despite the offense the émigrés took at Hollywood’s Russian stereotypes, they became extras, bit players, and consultants on these films, especially because many of them did not have professions that could be readily converted into gainful employment. Poor and dependent on the studios, they ended up commodifying their cultural identities in ways that corresponded to Hollywood stereotypes while maintaining their “authentic” Russian identities within their own community. Olga Matich’s talk examined some of these Russian films and the life of the Russian community, including the history of the first Russian Orthodox church in Hollywood, whose design was based on a church first built for MGMs The Cossacks (1928).

Kerwin Lee Klein, Associate Professor of History, UC Berkeley, gave a presentation titled The History of Immigration in California. His presentation provided a larger historical context for the discussion of specifically Russian immigration, while arguing that California’s particular position was crucial to the creation of a distinctly modern popular culture through which “immigration” and “Americanness” could be defined. Humans have been migrating to the region we call “California” for at least 11,000 years, but if we think of “immigration” as the movement of settlers and sojourners across national borders,
then we can divide California’s immigration history into three distinct periods: a Spanish period, from the late 18th century through the early 19th century; a Mexican period, from roughly 1820 to 1848; and the U.S. period, from 1848 to the present. Although most histories of immigration have focused upon the eastern United States, anti-Chinese movements in California drove the passage of the first federal legislation to regulate immigration by race and/or nationality, The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. As a site on an Asian ocean, with a Catholic heritage, California proved crucial to the construction of national identity in a country dominated by white Protestants. And Hollywood, a notoriously “Jewish” industry, created by immigrants from eastern and southern Europe, generated the narratives and images for a distinctly modern popular culture in the twentieth-century U.S.

Paul Belasky, Professor of Geology and Geography at Ohlone College, gave a presentation about The Third Wave of Russian immigration: California Dreaming at the end of the Cold War. He explained that the immigrants from the Soviet Union in the 1970’s, the so-called Third Wave, came to the United States largely as a result of a Congressional action – the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which placed a condition upon the Soviet Union getting the coveted most favored nation status in trade with the US on allowing ethnic minorities (Jews and others) to emigrate legally from the Soviet Union. Hundreds of thousands of immigrants came mostly from the large Ukrainian and Russian cities (Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and St. Petersburg) and settled in New York, Boston, Chicago, and large Californian cities: Los Angeles, San Francisco, and the rest of the Bay Area. Most of them were college educated. Future tradesmen and entrepreneurs gravitated toward Los Angeles, whereas the engineers and academics settled in large numbers in San Francisco and the future Silicon Valley. They also came to Monterey and merged into a large and varied Russian-speaking community, where representatives of all three waves of Russian immigration in the 20th century, with different ethnic backgrounds and political views, came in close contact for the first time and had a unique chance to vent their frustrations and share perspectives.

Andrei Tsygankov, Associate Professor of International Relations and Political Science, San Francisco State University, gave a presentation titled Russophobia in America after 9/11. His presentation explained that to a number of political circles in America, a dependent and insecure Russia is a preferred partner because it creates fewer problems for executing their grand plans. Since its opposition to the war in Iraq, Russia has been asserting its interests in the world and insisting on a different, more equal relationship with the United States. In the absence of the White House’s strong commitment to a new partnership with Russia after 9/11, Russophobic groups in the American establishment have been able to influence decision-making processes and greatly contribute to shaping the image of Russia in the Western media.

Funding Opportunities

Funding Deadlines for Graduate Students, Summer 2008

ISEEES/BPS

ISEEES/BPS Travel Grants provide limited travel support for ISEEES/BPS affiliated graduate students. Grants up to $400 are awarded to students who are on the official program of a professional conference or workshop. Awards are made on a first-come, first-served basis and are limited to one grant per student per year. Deadline: none. To apply, send request with budget to Dr. Edward W. Walker, BPS, UC Berkeley, 260 Stephens Hall #2304, Berkeley, CA 94720-2304; Tel: 510-643-6736; eww@berkeley.edu

The Drago and Danica Kosovac Prize is awarded for an outstanding senior or honors thesis in the social sciences or humanities that researches some aspect of Serbian culture or history. Cal undergraduate students are eligible to apply. The application includes submission of the thesis and two letters of recommendation. No electronic or faxed applications will be accepted. Deadline: none. To apply, contact Jeffrey Pennington, ISEEES, UC Berkeley, 260 Stephens Hall #2304, Berkeley, CA 94720-2304; Tel: 510-643-6736; jpennington@berkeley.edu

OSEES/BPS

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Collegium Budapest

Institute for Advanced Study Junior Fellowships offer 7500 euro/5 mos; 12,500 euro/ academic year for research in Central and Eastern Europe. The preferred areas of study are the following: European studies, communication and social networks, theoretical biology, theoretical finance, political economics, history, and anthropology. Applicants must be graduate or postdoctoral students. Deadline: June 30, 2008. Contact: Collegium Budapest, Vera Kempa, Szentháromság u. 2., H-1014 Budapest, Hungary; Tel: 36-1-22-48-300; Fax: 36-1-22-48-310; vera.kempa@colbud.hu; http://www.colbud.hu/programme/junior.shtml

Kosciuszko Foundation

Metchie J. E. Budka Award in the amount of $1,500 is given for outstanding scholarly work in Polish literature (14th Century to 1939) or Polish history (962 to 1939). The competition is open to graduate students at US universities and to postdocs in their first three years. Deadline: July 16, 2008. Contact: Metchie J. E. Budka Award, The Kosciuszko Foundation, 15 E 65th St., New York, NY 10021-6595; Tel: 212-734-2130; Fax: 212-628-4552; thekf@aol.com; http://www.kosciuszkofoundation.org/Competitions_Budka.html

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Public Lectures... Continued from Page 3

Xavier Bougarel, Head Researcher, French National Center for Scientific Research. The Place of Balkan Muslims in the Shaping of European Islam.

Tony Wood, Assistant Editor, New Left Review. Chechnya After Putin.

Oleg Proskurin, Independent Scholar, Emory University. On Gogol's So-Called Realism, or “The Dead Souls” as a Roman-a-Clef (in Russian).

William Kirby, Geisinger Professor of History and Former Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Science, Harvard University. Chinese, European, and American Universities: Challenges for the 21st Century.

Kemal Yalcin, novelist and Lecturer at the University of Bochum, Germany. Presentation of his novel “You Rejoice My Heart”.


Geoff Roberts, Professor of History at University College Cork, Ireland. Stalin as Warlord: Beyond Myth and Propaganda.

Nikola Theodosiev, Senior Assistant Professor, Dept. of Archaeology, Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, Assistant Director, the American Research Center in Sofia, and AIA Samuel H. Kress Lectureship in Ancient Art. Ancient Thrace during the First Millennium BC.


Nozima Kamalova, Visiting Scholar, the Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford University; Founding Chair, the Legal Aid Society of Uzbekistan. Human Rights and the War on Terror in Uzbekistan.

Martin Putna, Associate Professor of Comparative Literature, Charles University in Prague. Vaclav Havel’s Religion in the Context of European Secularization.


Dr. Speros Vryonis, Jr., Emeritus Professor of History, UCLA. The Mechanism of Catastrophe: The Turkish Pogrom of September 6-7, 1955 and the Destruction of the Greek Community.

Kristian Atland, Visiting Fulbright Scholar at ISEEES, Senior Analyst at the Norwegian Defense Research Institute. The Arctic: Russia’s New Empire?

Vadim Volkov, Associate Professor of Sociology at the Department of Political Science and Sociology at the European University in St. Petersburg. Defending the European University at St. Petersburg: The Case of Civic Activism.

Zoltan Barany, Frank C. Erwin, Jr., Centennial Professor of Government at the University of Texas, Austin. Building Democratic Armies.

New Online Resource for Polish Studies

The National Library of Poland launched an international educational exhibition presenting the history of cohabitation of various ethnic groups in the territory of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It is accessible online at http://www.commonwealth.pl

There you can learn about following ethnic groups and cultures: Armenian, Italian/Latin, French/Cisterian, German/Prussian, Lithuanian, Ruthenian/Byzantine, Islamic/Tatar, Jewish, and Polish. You can also watch high quality videos (with English subtitles or in English), download various files to your iPod, read and download various texts (pdf), and more. You can also visit the Polish National Digital Library online at http://www.polona.pl/dlibra
In Memoriam: David Hooson

David J. M. Hooson, professor emeritus of geography, former chair of the Center for Slavic and East European Studies at the University of California at Berkeley, and a prolific scholar of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, national identities, and the history of geographic ideas, died on May 16th. He drowned during his regular swim at Shell Beach in Tomales Bay, near his home in Marin County's Inverness Park, a small unincorporated community adjacent to Point Reyes National Seashore.

Hooson earned his B.A. and M.A. in geography at Oxford University in 1948 and 1950, respectively. He received his Ph.D. in geography in 1955 at the London School of Economics. Before going to UC Berkeley, he taught at Glasgow University, the University of Maryland from 1956 to 1960, and the University of British Columbia from 1960 to 1966. In 1966, he joined UC Berkeley's Department of Geography and chaired it from 1970 to 1975. As chair of the Department of Geography, he led an effort to diversify the department and hired the department's first African American and female professors. He was awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship in 1976. From 1985 to 1986, Hooson served as the geography department's acting chair. In addition, Hooson was the Dean of Social Sciences at UC Berkeley from 1977 to 1980 and chair of the Academic Senate Committee on the Status of Women and Minorities from 1981 to 1982.

Professor Hooson chaired CSEES (as ISEEES was called then) from 1967-1970 and continued to be involved with our activities after his tenure. He was a renowned and revered authority on the former Soviet Union, notably its Central Asian republics, and his work profoundly influenced the development of geography within Russia itself. In addition to his two major books, *A New Soviet Heartland?* (1964) and *The Soviet Union: People and Regions* (1966), Hooson's essays appeared in scores of books and periodicals within and beyond geography. His work made a significant impact on geography within the Soviet Union, and his publications reportedly spurred a passionate discussion in the Soviet Union.

His edited volume, *Geography and National Identity* (1994), was a path-breaking collection of global breadth. In his own essay, Hooson noted that the disintegration of the Soviet Union required redrawing “mental maps of this enormous slice of the earth’s surface” and rediscovering peoples whose regional attachments were “part of their life blood and their collective soul.” “The costs of geographical ignorance can be enormous,” he warned at a Berkeley commencement in 2001, “if also combined with arrogance, as many foreigners see the United States now.”

Beyond his brilliant teaching and his creative and cautionary scholarship, David Hooson’s legacy endures in the extraordinary warmth and compassionate generosity of his relations with colleagues, students, family, and neighbors. He claimed his exuberant beard led some to see him as Darwin, others as Santa Claus. “If I can achieve such virtual fame simply by not shaving,” he told Berkeley geography grads, “think what you can do.” His delight in life, his sense of fun, and his inexhaustible kindness enriched and endeared him to every community graced by his presence.

Hooson was known by family, friends, and colleagues for his immense knowledge of international affairs, his good humor and light-heartedness, and a fondness for dancing to big band music. "He was a wonderfully warm-hearted, loving man who valued kindness above everything," said his widow, Cariadne Margaret Mackenzie-Hooson. "He left life with the loose ends tied up, his family at peace. Several people have said that he had given us what we needed." In addition to Mackenzie-Hooson, Hooson is survived by a son, Roger Hooson of Berkeley, a daughter, Claire Hooson of Belmont, California, a brother, John Hooson of Wales, a sister, Helen Wright of England, and a previous wife, Alison Rayner-Hooson of Point Richmond, California.

The Geography Department will organize a memorial service at the Faculty Club in early September. We will inform you of the date once it has been set. The Royal Geographical Society is also planning a memorial in London in mid-September.

Acknowledgement: With thanks to Professor David Lowenthal and UC Berkeley Media Relations for providing parts of the text, and to Christopher Irion Photography for granting permission to use the photograph of David Hooson.
By Professor Izaly Zemtsovsky

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In Memory of David Hooson

I met David Hooson about ten and a half years ago in Berkeley without really knowing who he was. Yet that meeting amazed me in such a way that I can see it so vividly now as if it happened a day or two ago. Just imagine – an older professor, with a rare beard a la Leo Tolstoy or, rather, Charles Darwin, modestly comes to my apartment with a suitcase of his former student who visited the town. It turned out that the student, who planned to stay with us, had no time to bring his belongings himself, and his old teacher did it for him. It was indeed David Hooson, a famed geography professor at UC Berkeley. He introduced himself; we talked a bit, and it immediately became clear to me that we should meet again. I have a keen interest in geography but by no means was that the only reason. It was something so natural, charming, and deep in Hooson’s personality; such a quiet freedom literally breathed from his simple behavior, delicate look, and uniquely calm way of speaking, that talking to him was, without exaggeration, a kind of soothing, therapeutic experience. He was caring and supportive but never obtrusive. His generosity for professional compliments and gentle readiness to help inspired me.

Soon I learned a small yet characteristic detail; the Internet was not his forte, and it meant a lot to me as a newcomer who has been struggling with numerous technical problems along the virtual lines. I realized that for David it was a kind of philosophical attitude – he did not like to litter his mind with a myriad of unnecessary information we’re forced to go through when working on the Internet. His freedom – and above all the freedom of thinking and feeling – was much dearer to him than an extra bit of accidental data one could get online.

My wife, Alma Kunanbaeva, a specialist in Central Asia, immediately felt the same support and trust in her professional strength that literally radiated from David. He and his wife, Cariadne Margaret Mackenzie-Hooson, used to attend all the local conferences and meeting where we both or separately presented our papers. When about a year ago we opened a new cultural venue in Berkeley, the Silk Road House, David was among the first who supported us morally, professionally, and even financially. It was UCB Professor Emeritus David Hooson who on April 15th, 2007, opened our series of open lectures with a remarkable talk titled Peoples in Between: Silk Road Geography and donated to SRH a part of his rich and a matchless library. That library is indeed a phenomenal collection of rare geographical books in English, Russian, and other languages, particularly devoted to the former Soviet Union and the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia, i.e. practically to the entire Eurasia.

Professor Hooson was a pioneer in the American (and apparently in the entire Western) geographical investigation of the former Soviet Union and territories that were once under its control, and that shall not be forgotten. His early books – A New Soviet Heartland? (1964) and The Soviet Union – A Systematic Regional Geography (1966) – are still worth a close reading and addressing for references.

David Hooson belonged to such rare category of people whose very presence gives meaning to life. Like the great Greco-Roman geographer Strabo, he believed that the ultimate end of geography is happiness – the happiness that stems from knowing as much as we can about our world. He was gifted not only in having that happiness but also in giving it to numerous friends, colleagues, and students. He will be deeply missed by many.
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Funding Deadlines for Postdocs, Summer 2008

**Fulbright Scholar Program**

Fulbright New Century Scholars Program allows thirty top academics and professionals to collaborate for a year on a topic of global significance. Applicants must be postdocs or faculty. **Deadline: July 17, 2008.** Contact: The New Century Scholars Program (MSI), Council for International Exchange of Scholars, 3007 Tilden St., NW, Suite 5L, Washington, DC 20008. Tel: (202) 686-6252; Fax: (202) 362-3442; NCS@cies.iie.org; http://www.cies.org/

**Library of Congress**

Kluge Center offers Kluge Fellowship in the amount of $4,000/mo for 6-12 months for residential research in the collections of the Library of Congress. The competition is open to scholars who have received a terminal advanced degree within the past seven years in the humanities, the social sciences, or in a professional field such as architecture or law. Exceptions may be made for individuals without continuous academic careers. Applicants must be postdocs or faculty. **Deadline: August 15, 2008.** Contact: John W. Kluge Center Office of Scholarly Programs, Library of Congress LJ 120, 101 Independence Ave SE, Washington DC 20540-4860; Tel: 202-707-3302; Fax: 202-707-3595; scholarly@loc.gov; http://www.loc.gov/loc/kluge/