This has been a wonderful year. Thank you all for your loyalty, curiosity, and good company.

We have said goodbye to our visiting scholars: Vesna Aleksic, an American Councils’ Junior Faculty Fellow from the Department of Geoeconomics at Megatrend University in Belgrade, Serbia; Neven Andjelic, Fulbright scholar from the Center for Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Studies in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina; Pavel Balditsyn, from the Department of Journalism at Moscow State University in Russia; Reyila Dawuti, professor at Xinjiang University in China; Victor Doenninghaus, a postdoctoral scholar at the Albert-Ludwigs University in Freiburg; Tobias Holzlehner, the BPS Mellon-Sawyer Postdoctoral Fellow from the Department of Anthropology, University of Alaska, Fairbanks; Denis Kozlov, a postdoctoral fellow from Canada, who taught our Soviet history course in the spring to great acclaim; Rajna Sosic, an American Councils’ Junior Faculty Fellow from the Department of Archaeology at the University of Zagreb, Croatia; and Julien Zarifian, Ph.D. candidate at the French Institute of Geopolitics, Saint Denis University, France.

Also gone are our four CASE fellows from Irkutsk University and the University of Ekaterinburg in Russia (Maria Guzikova, Ludmila Igumnova, Dmitry Kozlov, and Andrei Menshikov), who were here as part of a Field Development Project funded by the Carnegie Corporation and co-sponsored by the Centers for Advanced Studies and Education (CASE) in Russia and UCB. The project brings Russian scholars to Berkeley for two-week visits to help them review literature in their fields, meet with colleagues, participate in workshops, and design new courses. Our first four fellows benefited tremendously from this opportunity and enjoyed themselves very much — and so did we. The five main reasons the first CASE visit went so well were Christine Evans, Jody LaPorte, Regine Spector, and Susanne Wengle, the graduate students who did most of the work, and of course our own Kalynn Yastro, who made it all possible.

But the saddest departure of all is that of our long-time Newsletter editor, outreach coordinator, and all-around wonderful person, Stella Bourgoin, who has decided to spend more time at home with her baby daughter, Adele Marie. We will miss her very much, hope she will come see us often, and wish her and Adele the very best.

Finally, this year is the 50th anniversary of the founding of our institute. To mark the occasion, we are organizing a special conference: “Remembering 1957: The Cold War and the Development of Slavic Studies at Berkeley.” All the participants are ISEEES special friends and alumni. The date is Wednesday, October 3. Please come and help us celebrate!

Thank you all again! Have a good summer and come back for more in the fall.

Yuri Slezkine
ISEEES Director
Professor of History
New Courses in 2006-7 Supported by ISEEES

ISEEES, with partial assistance from the Department of Education grant under Title VI, was pleased to help in funding of the following new courses in 2006-7:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course Code</th>
<th>Course Title</th>
<th>Instructor</th>
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<tr>
<td>Anthro 188</td>
<td>Chinese Muslims: Religious History and Ethnography</td>
<td>Rahile Dawut, Professor of the Humanities, Xinjiang University, China</td>
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<tr>
<td>Econ 163</td>
<td>Special Topics in Economic Systems (Post-socialism)</td>
<td>Melanie Feakins, Visiting Assistant Professor in the Social Sciences, UCB</td>
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<tr>
<td>Geog 170</td>
<td>Post-socialist Spaces</td>
<td>Melanie Feakins, Visiting Assistant Professor in the Social Sciences, UCB</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hist 100.3</td>
<td>Polish-Jewish Relations in the 20th Century</td>
<td>Konstanty Gebert, Journalist and News Editor, Warsaw</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAS 150.3</td>
<td>Europe and Human Rights: History, Theory and Practice</td>
<td>Neven Andjelic, Fulbright Scholar, Sarajevo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Journ 234</td>
<td>International Reporting: Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Sandy Tolan, Lecturer in the School of Journalism, UCB</td>
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<tr>
<td>Music 139.1/</td>
<td>Russian-Jewish Music: History and Today</td>
<td>Izaly Zemtsovsky, Visiting Associate Professor in IAS, UCB</td>
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<td>NES C26/</td>
<td>Introduction to Central Asia</td>
<td>Sanjyot Mehendale, Lecturer in Near East Studies, UCB</td>
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CAMPAIGN FOR THE COLIN AND ELSA MILLER ENDOWMENT FUND

The Annual Colin Miller Memorial Lecture honors the memory of a man who was devoted to the Center for Slavic and East European Studies (as ISEEES was called then). After more than twenty years as a journalist and as a radio and television producer, Colin Miller came to Berkeley and audited a variety of courses on Soviet history, politics, and foreign policy, particularly in the area of Soviet-American relations. His interest in the field of Slavic, East European and Soviet studies drew the attention of the Chancellor of UC Berkeley who appointed him a member of the Center’s Executive Committee. Upon his death in 1983, his widow, Elsa Miller established an endowment in his memory, administered by ISEEES. The endowment funds an annual lecture given by a respected scholar in the field of Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies. Elsa Miller passed away in 1997. Upon her death, ISEEES renamed the endowment the Colin and Elsa Miller Endowment.

Since 1984, when the series was inaugurated, the Colin Miller Memorial Lecture has become an extremely well known, well attended, and eagerly anticipated event in the life of our Institute, the University of California as a whole, and the field of Russian and East European studies in this country and beyond.

Unfortunately, however, we may not be able to keep doing this at the same level for much longer. The Colin and Elsa Miller Endowment that supports the annual lecture is not very large. The costs attached to the event are growing faster than the principal of the endowment, and soon we will not be able to bring top people to Berkeley anymore.

We would, therefore, like to attempt to raise additional funds in an effort to preserve this valuable tradition. We have been able to progress toward this goal with a generous gift from Elsa Miller’s daughter. Now, we are asking those of you who remember this fine man and friend of the Institute to consider making a donation. Please help us continue the great tradition that is the Annual Colin Miller Memorial Lecture. Send a check, payable to UC Regents, to ISEEES, 270 Stephens Hall MC 2304, University of California, Berkeley 94720, Attention: Colin and Elsa Miller Endowment. Or donate on-line at https://egiving.berkeley.edu/urelgift/index.html. Click “A-Z Giving,” then “Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies, Institute of.” Note in the comments field that the gift is for the Miller Endowment. Thank you.

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Public Lectures in 2006–07 Cosponsored by ISEEES

Neven Andjelic, Lecturer at the Center for Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Studies, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina; Visiting Scholar, ISEEES. “Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Elections.”

Sebouh Aslanian, Visiting Lecturer, University of California, Irvine. “Honor among Merchants: Trust and Reputation in Julfan Armenian Long-Distance Trade.”

Zifa Auezova, Ph.D., Executive Director of the Educational Center Bilm - Central Asia, Almaty, Kazakhstan. “From Zoroastrianism and Tengri Cult to Islam, to Atheism and Back: A History of Faith in Central Asia.”

Pavel Balditsyn, Chair of Foreign Journalism and Literature at M.V. Lomonosov State University, Moscow. “The Image of Americans in Contemporary Russia.”

Nikolai Bogomolov, Ph.D., Moscow State University. “Serebrianyi vek: opyti ratsionalizatsii poniatii.”

Dominic Boyer, Associate Professor, Department of Anthropology, Cornell University. “Beyond Algos and Mania: The Politics of the Future in Eastern Europe.”

Valerie Bunce, Aaron L. Binenkorb Professor of International Studies, Professor of Government, and Chair of the Department of Government, Cornell University. “When American Democracy Promotion Works: Revolutionary Change in the Post Communist World.”

Laurie Cohen, Ph.D., Institute for Political Science, University of Innsbruck, Austria. “Tsar Nicholas II and Baroness Bertha von Suttner: A Caricature Analysis of the First International Peace Conference at The Hague, 1899.”

Rahile Dawuti, Professor, School of Humanities, Xinjiang University, China; Visiting Scholar, ISEEES. “Mazar (Shrine) Visitation and Sufi Rituals Among the Uyghur in Xinjiang.”

Isabelle Delpla, Assistant Professor in Philosophy, University of Montpellier, France. “Topoi of International Justice: The Social Effects of War Crimes Trials in Bosnia-Herzegovina.”

Ann Dwyer, Department of Comparative Literature, UC Berkeley. “Of Hats and Trains: Nikolai Leskov and Fyodor Dostoevsky Between Russia and The West.”

Melissa Frazier, Sarah Lawrence College. “Romantic Authorship in the “Library for Reading”: Writing to Customers and Friends.”

Liz Fuller, Editor-in-Chief of RFE/RL Newsline and Visiting Scholar, Hoover Institution; Aslan Dukayev, Director of the North Caucasus Service, RFE/RL and Visiting Scholar, Hoover Institution. “The Radicalization and Geographic Spread of the Conflict in Chechnya.”

V. P. (Chip) Gagnon, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Ithaca College. “The Myth of Ethnic War: The Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and Beyond.”


Konstanty Gebert, journalist with Gazeta Wyborcza, editor of Midrasz (Poland), and Visiting Professor, Department of History. “The Current Political Situation in Poland: How Bad the Mess?”

Vyacheslav Igrunov, Director of the International Institute for Humanities and Political Studies in Moscow; Duma Deputy (1993-2003) and Deputy Leader of Yabloko. “Putin’s Heirs.”

Michael Kunichika, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, UCB. “The Stone Women of the Steppe: The Cultural Life of a Russian Modernist Artifact.”

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Conferences and Other Events in 2006–2007
Cosponsored by ISEEES

July 10-14, 2006  BH-SSP Summer Institute for Teachers: “Religion and Politics in American and World History”


October 24, 2006  Colloquium: “Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and Freedom Fight”


February 22, 2007 Annual Colin Miller Memorial Lecture: Richard Taruskin, Professor, Department of Music; Class of 1955 Chair, UC Berkeley. “Shostakovich: Some Post Centennial Reflections”


March 15-17, 2007 Conference: “A Leap from the Temple of Culture into the Abyss: Decadence in Central and Eastern Europe”

March 16-17, 2007 Public Performance: “The Silk Road Ensemble with Yo-Yo Ma”

March 17, 2007  Symposium: “Cultural Exchanges Along the Silk Roads”

April 9, 2007  Film Screening: Sergei Miroshnichenko, Film Director. “21-Up” (in Russian with English subtitles); Q and A with the director afterward


April 19, 2007  Seventh Annual Peter N. Kujachich Endowed Lecture in Serbian and Montenegrin Studies: Jasna Dragovic-Soso, Ph.D., Department of Politics, Goldsmiths College, University of London. “Coming to Terms with the Recent Past: Intellectual Discourse and Public Polemics in Post-Milosevic Serbia”


Explaining the Variation in Political Regime Outcomes after Communism: Displacement of the Communist Era Nomenklatura and Democratization

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210 Barrows Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720-1950

Abstract: This article reviews the debates around explaining the variation in political regime outcomes in the post-communist world, and argues that the displacement of Communist-era political and economic elites is a sine qua non of democratization, as illustrated in the recent history of regime change in the 26 post-Communist countries. Spatial and inter-temporal evidence supports the claim that successful anti-Communist mobilizations resulting in the disestablishment of Communist era nomenklatura is a very good predictor of democratization and economic reform. Takeover by anti-communist cadres provides the political agency necessary for institutional renovation and economic reform, which in turn, reinforce the process of democratization. The lack or failure of such a challenge resulted in authoritarianism in the form of super-presidentialism and political capitalism everywhere in the post-Communist world. Alternative explanations of political regime type, based on political culture, religious, imperial, and Leninist legacies, modes of transition, and institutional design, are critically reviewed.

Introduction

In terms of political reform towards democracy, post-Communist Eastern Europe and Eurasia is marked by differentiation. The Baltic States and the so-called Visegrad group (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia) have been leaders in democratic reform since the collapse of Communism. Starting in the late 1990s, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and Macedonia also advanced in democratization. According to the 2005 Freedom House report, apart from all the Baltic states and the Visegrad group, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, and Croatia are “free” countries, while Albania, Macedonia, and Georgia moved to the top of the partially free category. Russia, Belarus, Moldova, and the Central Asian republics, as well as Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Bosnia Herzegovina, are lagging behind in democratization. Moreover, the Baltic states and the Visegrad countries became full members of the EU in May 2004, while Romania and Bulgaria early this year, testifying to the fact that these countries are much more advanced in democratization and economic reform than the rest of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics.

In this essay, I argue that the causal factor that best explains the spatial and the temporal variation in democratization among post-Communist countries is whether or not the Communist party elite (nomenklatura) was displaced by an anti-Communist political elite. At the root of my contention is the fact that both democratization and economic reform entail the pluralization of political and economic power by shattering the nomenklatura’s monopolistic hold on both of these spheres. This task was best achieved by an anti-Communist takeover of political power. Institutional choice and Weberian stateness are also important factors that correlate with democratization and economic reform, and I suggest that the disestablishment of the Communist nomenklatura by a new, democratic elite provided the political agency for the right institutional choices while consolidating Weberian stateness. This argument is theoretically sound and empirically robust. It has more analytical utility than the alternative explanations.

Organization of the Essay

First, I define democracy, and outline the relationship between democracy and economic reform. I then present my argument in detail. Afterwards, I review alternative explanations for the differentiation in political and economic outcomes. Finally, I restate my argument very briefly and conclude this essay.

Definitions of Democracy, and Its Relationship with Economic Reform

Any assessment of variations in outcome in terms of democratization depends on the definition of democracy that one uses. Adhering to the near consensus in political science scholarship in the United States on democratization, I use a minimalist procedural definition of democracy. Robert Dahl’s (1971) concept of “polyarchy” is within the minimalist, procedural tradition. Dahl’s polyarchy is defined by seven criteria. The first four relate to the electoral process: government must be vested in elected officials; elections must be free, fair, and frequent; every adult must be allowed to vote; and every adult must be eligible to run for office. The last three relate to civil liberties between elections: freedom of expression, information, and association. Schmitter and Karl (1996) amend this definition by adding two more criteria: that the elected officials should not be subject to overriding by an unelected body (such as the military or the bureaucracy);
and that the polity must be self-governing. Some scholars propose a “thicker” definition of democracy, where they assume a vibrant civil society as a precondition of democracy (Putnam 1993, and 2000; and Skocpol 1999).

However, this is a problematic definition because there are many examples of functioning procedural democracies with multiparty competition that do not have vibrant civil societies, such as in Eastern Europe. Moreover, positing civil society as a precondition for democracy runs the risk of being ethnocentric, as civil society as it is defined in scholarly literature has a long pedigree in Western Europe and the United States. Finally, there are some scholars who propose a definition of democracy that is even more expansive, by including a particular political culture and societal attitudes into the definition. Seymour Martin Lipset throughout his work (1990; 1996), Andrew Janos with his emphasis on “legalistic impersonalism” (2000), Ken Jowitt with the concept of “Leninist Legacy” (1992) and some scholars who take World Value Survey as the foundation of their analyses, represent this expansive definition. One can posit that the alternative definitions of democracy have their value, but not for the assessment of electoral democracy that I will undertake in this essay. Later in this essay, I come back to Jowitt’s Leninist Legacy theory in connection with Marc Morje Howard’s work on civil society.

There is also an argument in favor of a causal relationship between democracy and economic reform. Some argue that economic reform pluralizes economic power, which in turn supports a pluralistic political system by providing funding for alternative sources of information and multiple political parties. There is also an argument that democracy tends to break down economic monopolies and multiply economic power because transparency and electoral accountability, necessary components of democracy, will make it difficult for state-owned enterprises or state-supported private monopolies to continue.

My Argument: Successful anti-Communist Mobilization and Democratization

My contention is that one does not observe significant democratization in countries where the Communist party elites and cadres were not forced out of power. This argument is theoretically sound, because institutional reforms that shatter the political and economic monopoly of the nomenklatura and pluralize power in both realms, which is the foundation of democracy, require a “counter-elite” and anti-Communist cadres for their implementation. I first focus on the individual leaders, then check for nomenklatura continuity in the absence of a Communist-era leader, immediately after the 1989-1990 period, and then trace the changes from 1989-91 to 2005. If the very person who was leading the country under Communism continued to lead the country in the post-Communist period, you certainly do not observe any meaningful democratization or economic liberalization. This category includes a surprisingly high number of cases.

Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, Islam Kerimov of Uzbekistan, Saparmurad Niyazov (Turkmenbash) of Turkmenistan (he died recently), Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan (while he was in power), Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine, Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia and Montenegro, and Ramiz Alia of Albania (7 cases) were Communist leaders before and after the collapse, and during their tenure, we did not witness comprehensive democratization in any one of these countries. They were not leaders of anti-Communist “regimes-in-waiting” (Bunce 2003) who took over with a program to pluralize political and economic power; they simply shifted their discourse, by appropriating nationalism to legitimize their continued leadership. They represent continuity, not change. In another 2 cases, Communist-era party bosses with unambiguous nomenklatura credentials reasserted power after a brief interlude. This category includes Eduard Shevardnadze of Georgia and Haydar Aliyev of Azerbaijan. Hence, in 9 of the 26 post-Communist countries we had undeniable continuity even at the level of the individual leader. In another 4 cases, there was an all-out existential military conflict with the Communist-era leadership, which denied these countries a basic level of peace and territorial stability to allow for democratic development, a category including Croatia and Bosnia against Milosevic leadership in Serbia, and the civil war in Tajikistan, bringing the number to 13 out of 26, or 50% of all cases.

However, it is possible to have a continued dominance of politics by the nomenklatura, even as the individual leader is eliminated. Six cases fit into this category: Russia throughout, Belarus after 1995, Bulgaria and Romania before 1996, and more loosely, Armenia under Ter Petrotsyan and Moldova under Mireea Snegur and Vladimir Voronin fall into this category. Hence, in the overwhelming majority of the cases (19 out of 26: 73%), there was continuity either at the level of the individual leader or in terms of nomenklatura dominance.

Only in seven cases, representing a meager 27% of all cases, an anti-Communist new elite (“regimes in waiting”) assumed power: Sajudis under Vytautas Landsbergis in Lithuania, nationalists in Latvia, liberals under Mart Laar in Estonia, Solidarity under Lech Walesa in Poland, liberal opposition under Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia, anti-Communist liberals in Hungary and Slovenia. These cases recorded the most impressive democratization and economic reform in the early 1990s, immediately after the collapse.

Focus: Eastern Europe

Highley, Kullberg, and Pakulski (1996) discuss the cases of Russia, Hungary, and Poland, and argue that the nomenklatura continuity in Russia was about four times higher than in Poland and Hungary. Russia, of course, is lagging far behind Poland and Hungary in terms of democratization and economic reform. Bunce (2003) argued that in Eastern Europe, “regimes-in-waiting.”
full fledged new elites with their alternative political organizations, have taken over. A striking tabulation of Communist party continuity for Eastern Europe comes from Andrew Janos (2001): Janos demonstrates that, in the first free elections, in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia, Communist parties’ electoral support ranged from 5% to 16%. In striking contrast, in Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, the Communist parties still commanded between 42% (Montenegro) and 56% (Albania) of the vote and held onto power as such. Macedonia occupies an intermediary position with 25%. Steven Fish (1999) argued that the results of the first elections determined the prospects of economic reform.

Focus: Russia

Russia, of course, is the great disappointment in democratization and economic reform. There is a Communist party in Russia, but it has not been in power since the collapse in 1991. So should we include Russia as a case of a “break” with the past, as in Poland and Lithuania? I would argue that there is significant continuity in nomenklatura dominance of post-Soviet Russian politics, even if nominally non-Communist parties have been in power. White and Kryshpanovskaya (1996) argued that a stunning 70% of post-Soviet Russian political economic elite has nomenklatura origins in the Soviet period. More recently (2003) they have argued that a particular segment (power ministries, the so-called siloviki) of the Soviet nomenklatura is taking over under Putin’s leadership. Peter Reddaway (2004) also argues along the same lines. Grigory Yavlinski, an “embedded” politician in the field, criticizes the “nomenklatura government” (Yavlinsky 2001) and the oligarchic, nomenklatura capitalism that emerged in post-Communist Russia (Yavlinsky 1998). Richard Rose (1995) pointed out to the continued condition of an “hourglass society” in Russia, where there is still a big divide between the elites and the masses, politically and economically. Why is there such a stunning continuity in elite cadres and the nomenklatura as a class in Russia, despite the fact that Communists are supposedly overthrown? Steven Fish (1993) demonstrated that Boris Yeltsin, although brought to power by democratic grassroots movements and organizations under the umbrella of DemRossiya, shunned these anti-Communist organizations and chose to work with the nomenklatura in the bureaucracy and the Communists in the legislature. Hence, in the crucial foundational years, a new, anti-Communist elite did not advance to power in Russia. The timing (suddenness) and nature (partial) of the political opening in Russia, along with other factors, contributed to weak anti-Communist organizations in Russia. Yeltsin’s mistakes, his “personalism” in shunning organizations and institutions in general, and especially his shunning of DemRossiya once he became president, reinforced the problem. According to Kryshpanovskaya and White, nomenklatura is still in power 15 years after 1991. Elite continuity clearly makes it very difficult for the Russian state to undertake democratization and pluralize political and economic power.

If super-presidentialism is the political institutional reflection of continued nomenklatura dominance (Fish 2005), political or “phony” capitalism is the economic reflection of the same phenomenon. The term “political capitalism” was coined by Max Weber, to describe an economic system where resources are distributed, not according to rational market mechanism such as demand and supply under competitive circumstances, but according to political connections and patrimony. It is used, for example, by Chabala and Daloz (1999) to describe the political-economic dilemma of African politics. In the post-Communist field, Steven Solnick (1999) and Valerie Bunce (1999) demonstrated the institutional opportunity structure that allowed the nomenklatura to steal the state and become the economic elite of post-Communist Russia via privatization. One could think that, once the privatizations are over, you would have a new capitalist class that should favor a true market economy. However, once we realize that the nomenklatura in business owes its status to its political connections, a different picture emerges.

Barry Ickes (2004) provides an excellent argument centered on the concept of “relational capital” in explaining the failure of economic reform in Russia. He argues that the elites who possess relational capital, that is, have connections with the state necessary for privatizations, would be against an economic reform and the “leveling of the field for competition.” This is the logic of political capitalism resisting rationalization and free-market competition. Timothy Frye (2003) provides the data supporting this argument. Based on intensive interviews with 500 members of the economic elite, Frye finds that the owners of enterprises that are founded after 1991, not as a result of privatization but from scratch, are much more likely to support economically liberal and democratic parties and policies, than the owners of the privatized state enterprises or the managers of the state enterprises. The real electoral and socio-political support of democracy and economic liberalization is not from the privatized enterprise owners and directors, but true entrepreneurs who built their businesses from scratch after 1991, who did not become rich because of their “relational capital,” that is, political connections. In short, the nomenklatura-turned-bourgeoisie is not as supportive of democracy and liberalism as the self-made Russian entrepreneurs. Nomenklatura provides the political and economic base for the continued authoritarianism and political capitalism in Russia. To put it in Marxist terminology, nomenklatura capital is the economic “base” of the authoritarian “superstructure” in post-Soviet Russia today.

What is to be done? What would need to happen for the political-economic fortunes of Russia to change? Fish and Brooks (2001) argue that it was the organizational weapon of the Bulgarian liberal party, UDF, which allowed it to defeat the Communists in 1997. A liberal party organized at the grassroots level with a mass membership
and an anti-Communist elite defeated the Communists and took over the government. Fish and Brooks argue that the Russian liberals, such as Chubais, Nemtsov, and Yavlinsky, unlike Bulgarian, Romanian, or Mongolian liberals, shunned grassroots political organization. There is another political mistake that Russian liberals committed: while the Bulgarian UDF was willing to enter a coalition with the MRF (the party of the sizeable Turkish speaking Muslim minority), which gave them the edge over Communists in the crucial first decade after Communism, the Russian liberals severely lacked and still lack such a political bond with the much larger and disenchanted Muslims and other minorities in their country, which makes the pro-democratic, liberal bloc in Russia much smaller than what was the case if they could forge a coalition with Muslim minorities. Had there been a Russian equivalent of UDF, Solidarity, or Sajudis, which as an organization took over the government in 1991 or later via electoral victory, we could see genuine democratization and economic liberalization in Russia, too.

Change over Time: Democratic Takeovers in Bulgaria and Romania, and Limited Advances in Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Georgia, and Ukraine

I have noted that Bulgaria and Romania (under Ion Iliescu) represented cases of nomenklatura/Communist continuity until 1996, as well as Albania, Serbia, Georgia, Croatia, and Ukraine. As expected, these six countries were lagging behind in democratization and economic reform. However, an anti-Communist, Sali Berisha replaced Ramiz Alia in Albania, while liberal democrats defeated Communists in Romania (1997) and Bulgaria (1996). In the latter two cases you had four years of uninterrupted anti-Communist government, and hence, democracy scores of both countries improved drastically. Both countries joined the EU in 2007. What some structuralist analysts prematurely described as insurmountable barriers rooted in economic backwardness, culture, civilization, religion (Orthodoxy), and imperial legacy (Ottoman) amounted to “paper barriers.” Albania also improved its democracy scores under Sali Berisha. Croatia improved drastically after the death of Tudjman and the recent victory of Ivo Sanader, the leader of a Christian Democratized CDU (Fish and Krickovic 2003). Similarly, once Milosevic and Shevardnadze were defeated, both Serbia and Georgia improved their Freedom House scores. A somewhat similar process is underway in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution, but the struggle between the anti-Communist forces and the nomenklatura is far from resolved in Ukraine yet. These seven countries occupy a much better niche in Freedom House scores than countries that still did not replace their nomenklatura based leaderships as of 2005, such as the Central Asian states: Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Russia. Spatial and inter-temporal evidence supports my contention that successful anti-Communist mobilizations resulting in the disestablishment of Communist-era political elites is a very good predictor of democratization. In conclusion, successful political mobilization and takeover of the state by a new, anti-Communist group is a sine qua non of democratization, as illustrated in every country across the post-Communist world. Takeover by anti-Communist cadres provides the political agency necessary for institutional renovation and economic reform, which in turn, reinforce the process of democratization. The lack or failure of such a challenge resulted in authoritarianism or super-presidentialism and political capitalism everywhere in the post-Communist Eastern Europe and Eurasia.

Critical Review of Alternative Explanations: Political “Culture”

Zbigniew Brzezinski (2001), Samuel Huntington (1993; 1996) and Harry Eckstein with his “congruence [of values] theory” (1961; 1975; 1998) have argued that there is a fundamental difference between the Visegrad and Baltic states (all Catholic) on the one hand, and the Balkan states and the rest of the former Soviet states (all Orthodox or Muslim) on the other, and that this difference is based on historically rooted societal “values” and their compatibility with democracy.

This argument enjoyed popularity in academia in the early 1990s, when it appeared that empirically Visegrad and the Baltics were far ahead of the rest of the post-Communist world in democratization and economic reform. Janos (2001) argued that democracy, as it is imposed by Western hegemony, will take root only in countries where there is a legalistic-impersonal tradition. Rupnik (2002) also argued that the “Habsburg factor” is important precisely because it inculcated legalistic-impersonal features. However, it was crudely essentialist arguments based primarily on religion, which became very popular. In Huntington’s formulation, Protestantism and Catholicism are somehow underlying democratic state building. These arguments, unfortunately, are probably still the most popular ones outside academia. However, with the democratization of Bulgaria and Romania in particular, but also Albania, Macedonia, and more recently, Ukraine and Georgia, arguments based on political culture, religion, and Habsburg/Ottoman/Tsarist legacies are not empirically convincing anymore.

There is also a discursive-linguistic variant of the political culture arguments. Tim McDaniel (1996) argued that there is an ideational structure embedded in Russian culture (originated in the intelligentsia, then diffused) that justifies authoritarianism and messianic-chiliastic structures. Nancy Ries (1997) and Richard Anderson (2001) argued that there are discursive and linguistic structures that prevent rational problem solving and/or democratic regime change. Anderson argued that once the linguistic cues, which identified an elite and a mass that are in opposition to each other, disappeared, and linguistic cues that identified a shared identity between the ruler and the ruled emerged, then it became possible for Russia to democratize. It is
more difficult to test these theories and identify their causal mechanisms. But if the linguistic features of Russian discourse “democratized” during Perestroika, why does Russia still have an authoritarian regime today? Did the Russian language rapidly revert back to its old patterns recently?

The Leninist Legacy

Ken Jowitt argued that the Leninist regimes in Eastern Europe called forth certain adaptive responses from these societies, such that public and private realms became fundamentally dissociated and mutually hostile. Individuals became averse to any kind of participation in the public realm, and instead focused their energies in the private realm. Private ends were pursued in complete disregard of their societal results. Leninist legacy hindered the development of rational, legalistic, impersonal political culture that is necessary for democratic development. Ghia Nodia (1992; 1995) also argues that the complete destruction of individuality under Leninism, and especially the destruction of individual economic activity which lies at the heart of individual independence and responsibility, will have long-lasting consequences.

In the face of democratization from Estonia to Bulgaria today, these arguments appear to have failed empirically. However, Jowitt's argument operates on the basis of a thick description of democracy, akin to Putnam’s and Skocpol’s, where a vibrant civil society and participation are seen as definitional criteria of democracy. Marc Morje Howard (2003) validates Jowitt’s predictions at least in one regard, by demonstrating that civil society is significantly weaker even in the most thoroughly democratized post-Communist states in Eastern Europe. Rohrscheider (1999) demonstrated that even in East Germany after unification, civil society remained weak. In sum, Jowitt’s argument about the invasiveness of the Leninist state and its detrimental consequences in the public sphere are proven to be true with regards to the development of civil society, and yet the weakness of civil society does not preclude the development of a procedural democracy.

Transitology Debate: Modes of Transition

Schmitter and Karl (1994) argued for the utility of using the mode of transition and focusing on the balance of power between the opposition and the old regime in explaining variation in political regime type in the post-Communist world. The model has its origins in the Southern European and Latin American transitions from military dictatorships to democracy. They distinguish the modes of transition along two axes: Whether the transition impetus came from the elite or the masses, and whether it occurred via imposition or compromise. The best outcome for them is an elite-initiated transition that proceeds via compromise with the opposition. The second best option is elite imposition, followed by mass-initiated compromise, while mass-initiated imposition (revolution) is the worst outcome.

In a series of articles, Bunce (1995a, 1995b) attacked transitologists’ assumptions. She argued that the nature of authoritarianism was different, much more pervasive and totalitarian, in Eastern Europe than in Southern Europe and Latin America. The agenda for change in Eastern Europe was also much broader, encompassing comprehensive economic transformation as well. Moreover, independent political and economic centers did not exist in Eastern Europe to the extent they did in Southern Europe and Latin America. Bunce argued that transitology is useful precisely to highlight the differences, not similarities, between East and South. Following Bunce, one could suggest that Schmitter and Karl misunderstood Eastern European transitions. First of all, cases of “elite (i.e. nomenklatura) imposed” transitions, such as in Russia, Bulgaria, Romania, or Ukraine, produced the least democratic outcomes as I argued throughout this essay. The most successful democratic transitions occurred where alternative elites overthrew the Communist nomenklatura (mass imposition), as in Sajudis in Lithuania, Solidarity in Poland, and liberals in Czechoslovakia. Whereas in the South, political organizations and centers of economic power were multiple, in the East you had a monopoly of political and economic power. The challenge was to break that monopoly. Compromise between the state and the opposition, where it occurred, led to the partial survival of Communist elites’ power and privilege and hindered democratization and economic reform. Wiarda (2001) contends that transitologists misunderstood even the South, since economic processes were creating alternative centers of economic power and political organization for decades in Southern Europe and Latin America, via trade, liberalization, tourism, and other flourishing sectors. Mode of transition was of secondary importance given the already pluralized socio-economic base.

Institutional Choice and Leadership

Steven Fish argued (1999; 2001a; 2001b) that the combination of a powerful executive and a weak legislature is detrimental for prospects of democratization. This argument is strongly supported by evidence from other regions of the world as well. The only consolidated democratic country with a presidential system in the world is the United States (France has a semi-presidential system). Most Latin American countries and the Philippines, all of which transitioned to democracy with a presidential system, did not become consolidated democracies. Juan Linz (1996) and Arend Lijphart (1996) argued that democracies with parliamentary systems perform better around the world.

The virtues of parliamentarism (and the perils of presidentialism) are manifold: First, parliamentarism increases the quality of the political class, by attracting at least several hundred born politicians (advocates of
the people) into politics, instead of one such person, the President. Second, policies adopted in the parliaments are the results of compromise and deliberation, and hence more hammered out and representative of popular will, which in turn makes them easier to implement, with less resistance. In contrast, under a presidential system, highly unpopular and amateurish policies can be adopted. Such policies are more likely to generate popular resistance. In short, a presidential system is more likely to be not only less democratic but also less effective than a parliamentary system. Third, parliamentary systems are better at building and strengthening intermediary organizations. Presidents tend to be suspicious of their own agents and institutions, because of these intermediaries’ potential to raise challenges against the president. Hence, presidentialism undermines intermediary organizations, hinders institution building, and creates a weaker state than parliamentarism. Fourth, under presidential systems voters tend to identify the regime with the person of the president. Policy failures and popular discontent, which will be focused on the president as the supreme executive, can spill over and evolve into a discontent with democracy as a regime type. As such, presidentialism threatens the durability of democracy by concentrating blame and conflating the person of the president with the regime. Across the post-Communist space, successful cases of democratization all proceeded through parliamentary or semi-presidential designs, including Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Baltic Republics, and Mongolia (semi-presidential). Presidential systems, on the contrary, correlate with authoritarianism (Russia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Central Asian republics).

The successful displacement of the Communist-era nomenklatura, which I argued to be the factor that best explains democratization or lack thereof in post-Communist countries, precedes the choice of institutions. Strengthening of the legislature, reform of the judiciary, and the establishment of rule of law in general, are much more likely under the leadership of new elites that successfully replace the Communist-era nomenklatura.

National Unity and “Stateness”

Alfred Stephan and Juan Linz (2001) argued that a unified, non-fragmented polity is crucial for a stable democracy. They draw contrasts between the Spanish experience on the one hand and the Soviet and Yugoslav experiences on the other. They argue that whether there was a relatively free, democratic election at the national (all Union) level, as in Spain, or in the regional level, as in Yugoslavia, mattered a great deal. Where national contestation was allowed first, political organizations and allegiances that spawn ethnic and regional loyalties emerged (Spain). Where it did not, the country disintegrated and left behind military conflicts, hence creating an inhospitable environment for democratization (Yugoslavia especially, but also many former Soviet republics). There have been many de facto independent countries in the post-Communist space: Serbian republics in Krajina and in Bosnia, Kosovo, Transdniester republic, Chechnya, Nagorno Karabagh, Abkhazia, Adjaria, and Ossetia, among others. Vadim Volkov (2001) approaches the question, not in terms of national unity, but in terms of the state’s monopoly on violent forces, and demonstrates the pervasive role that the illegitimate violent groups (mafia) assumed in enforcing contracts in Russia.

Stateness literature hints at an important issue, since democratization did not occur in any of the post-Communist countries where these de facto republics exist and where the state has broken down. Dankwart Rustow, in his classic article that was in many ways the pioneer of the democratization literature (1970), argued that democracy has no preconditions except for national unity. Weberian stateness can also be discussed in this framework. How does one get national unity and stateness even at the local level under democratic conditions? Part of the answer to this question must involve political parties that cut across ethnic, religious, regional, and other divisions, and unites (and divides) the country in political sentiments, not on the basis of ethnic, linguistic, religious, or other identity-based differences. There have always been such strong parties to fulfill this function in Spain, even predating the Spanish Civil War. In Russia and other countries where national unity and stateness are not firmly established, part of the blame can be attributed to the weakness of the parties themselves, which in turn resulted from the timing and the nature of the first all-Union elections (Fish 1993). Bulgaria, again, provides an example of what should have happened in the cases of failure due to national disunity or lack of stateness. Bulgaria has been governed by a coalition between the leading anti-Communist and minority parties (UDF and MRF, respectively) that established and maintained a democratic majority against the Communists for a crucial period of time when political and economic reforms were undertaken.

Conclusion: The Old Elites and the Democratic “Revolution” after Communism

The argument developed in this essay points to the social origins of the elites in power during the transition away from Communism in explaining the stunning variation in political regime type that emerged among the 26 post-Communist countries. This is a surprisingly Soviet conclusion in retrospect. As is well known, the Bolshevik Revolution and its aftermath witnessed a thorough destruction of the Tsarist political and economic elites, and their replacement by Bolshevik cadres. Bolsheviks knew that a revolution, at the very least, entailed a change of elites. Their violent tactics were of course abhorrent. Nonetheless, one is tempted to conclude, at the end of this essay, that a peaceful but thorough going displacement of the Communist-era nomenklatura from the apex of political and economic power and their replacement with new,
anti-Communist elites is the best predictor of successful democratization. No such replacement of the Communist-era political and economic elite has occurred in Russia yet, and this might be the main reason behind the swift authoritarian slide that Russia suffered over the last 15 years.

In conclusion, successful political mobilization and takeover of the state by anti-Communist groups is a sine qua non of democratization, as illustrated in every country across the post-Communist world. Spatial and inter-temporal evidence supports my contention that successful anti-Communist mobilizations resulting in the disestablishment of Communist-era political elites is a very good predictor of democratization and economic reform. Takeover by anti-Communist cadres provides the political agency necessary for institutional renovation and economic reform, which in turn, reinforce the process of democratization. The lack or failure of such a challenge resulted in authoritarianism in the form of super-presidentialism and political capitalism everywhere in post-Communist Eastern Europe and Eurasia.

References


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Faculty and Students News

Sener Akturk (Ph.D. candidate in Political Science) published “Continuity and Change in the Regimes of Ethnicity in Austria, Germany, the USSR/Russia, and Turkey: Varieties of Ethnic Regimes and Hypotheses for Change,” in Nationalities Papers 35 (1) March 2007; and “Reflections on a Central Eurasian Model: A Foucauldian Reply to Barfield on the Historiography of Ethno-Nationalisms,” in the Central Eurasian Studies Review 5 (2).


Vakhtang Chikovani (lecturer in Slavic Languages and Literatures) has been awarded a NCEER travel grant for his research this year in Georgia.

Anne Dwyer (Ph.D. Comparative Literature) has accepted a faculty position (Assistant Professor) in the Department of German and Russian at Pomona College in Claremont CA.

David Frick (professor of Slavic Languages and Literatures) received fellowships from the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) and the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) for his Wilno book project.

Andrew Janos (professor of Political Science) gave a paper at the Conference on Minorities and Identity Construction in East Central Europe at Indiana University, April 12-15. The title of his lecture was “Romanians and Hungarians in a Changing World: From Nation-Building to Universalism?”

Magda Kay (Ph.D. Comparative Literature, 2007) has achieved a position as Assistant Professor at the University of Victoria in British Columbia, Canada. She filed her Ph.D. in April of this year.
Anastasia Kayiatos (Ph.D. candidate in Slavic Languages and Literatures) has presented several papers during the spring: “Painful Perversities: Shock Therapy and the Psychopathology of Late-Soviet Dissent” at a conference on Queerness and Violence at UC Davis, 2 June 2007; “On Account of Another: the Poetics of Indebtedness and the Writing of the Russian Literary Self,” at a conference on indebted identities at New York University, 31 March 2007; and “The Shocking Soviet Century: or How Russia Learned to Stop Worrying and Love (Like) the West,” at the 17th annual Thinking Gender Graduate Student Research Conference at UCLA, 2 February 2007. In addition, Anastasia will be studying on a Townsend Center Mellon Discovery Fellowship this summer with Professor Mel Y. Chen of Gender and Women’s Studies.

Leonid Khotin, ISEEES Visiting Scholar, was guest editor of The “Siberian Curse” Revisited, a special collection of 12 articles. Two of the articles were written by Leonid. The work was published in the New York journal, Problems of Economic Transition, 49 (9) January 2007. In addition, he co-authored with G. Gezen, a volume entitled, Literaturnaia kritika i literaturovedenie na stranitsakh zarubezhnoi periodiki na russkom iazyke, 1980-1995, with an introduction by Bob Hughes (professor emeritus, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, UC Berkeley). Moskva, 2007. The collection is devoted to expanding the knowledge of the literary process in the Russian emigration in 1978-1995. It contains in chronological order around 3000 abstracts and annotations (pp. 11-444), first published in the Literary Section of the journal Abstracts of Soviet and East European Emigré Periodical Literature (1980 to 1990) and its continuation Zarubezhnaia periodicheskaia pechat’ na russkom iazyke (1990 to 1995). The book is thoroughly indexed (pp. 445-500), including a bibliography of books in a name index, an index of almanacs and anthologies (prose and poetry) published outside the Soviet Union and Russia, an index of Russian émigré publishing houses, etc. The collection is designed for any reader interested in Russian émigré literature.

Jody LaPorte (Ph.D. candidate in Political Science) gave a paper at the ASN Conference in New York in April, entitled, “The Role of Third-Party Actors in Ethnic Conflict: Examining Russia’s Influence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.”

Also in April, Tony Lin (Ph.D. candidate in Slavic Languages and Literatures) presented “A Glance into Shostakovich’s Interio: the Violin Sonata and the Viola Sonata” at the Kentucky Foreign Language Conference, Lexington.


Gregory Newmark (Ph.D. candidate in City and Regional Planning) gave a paper at the Association of European Schools of Planning (AESOP) Young Academic Network, Slovak University of Technology, Bratislava, in February of this year. The title was “The Equity Impacts of Suburban Shopping Malls on Shopping Travel Behaviors in Central and Eastern Europe.”

Irina Paperno (professor of Slavic Languages and Literatures) was Guest Editor of a special issue of Russian Literature 61(1-2), 2007 [Amsterdam: Elsevier], entitled, Intimacy and History: The Gercen Family Drama Reconsidered.” Irina also wrote the Introduction. Other chapters include: “The Family Drama as an Interpretive Pattern in Aleksandr Gercen’s Byloe I Dumy,” by Ulrich Schmid; “Auto-Historiography: Genre, Trope, and Modes of Employment in Aleksandr and Nata’la Gercen’s Narratives of the Family,” by Ilya Kliger; “Gercen’s Tragic Bildungsroman: Love, Autonomy and Maturity in Aleksandr Gercen’s Byloe I Dumy,” by Lina Steiner; “Literary Contexts of Triangular Desire: Nata’la’ja and Aleksandr Gercen as Readers of George Sand,” by Kate Holland; and “Restaging the Gercen Family Drama: Tom Stoppard’s Shipwreck and the Discourse of English Herzenism,” by Thomas Harlan Campbell.

Erik R. Scott (Ph.D. candidate in History) contributed a chapter entitled “Uncharted Territory: Russian Business Activity in Abkhazia and South Ossetia” to the recently published volume Russian Business Power: The Role of Russian Business in Foreign and Security Relation (Routledge, 2006) and authored the article “Russia and Georgia After Empire” for the online publication Russian Analytical Digest (www.res.ethz.ch).

Jason Swiecki, BA in Slavic Languages and Literatures, 2006, has been awarded the Drago and Danica Kosovac Prize for the best senior/honors thesis on a subject within Serbian studies. Jason’s honors thesis, filed in spring 2006, was entitled, “The Function of Dialectal Speech in the Works of Stevan Sremac and Dragoslav Mihailovic: A Linguistic-Stylistic Analysis of Ivkova slava, Zona Zamfirova, and Petrijin venac.”

Michelle Viise (Ph.D. Slavic Languages and Literatures) has been hired as Monographs Editor for the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute.

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In early 2006, Fatme, a teenager attending the Karl Marx Professional High School for Economics in southern Bulgaria decided she wanted to live her life by the precepts laid out in the Holy Koran. The 15-year-old befriended Michaela, a like-minded young woman who had also embraced a more orthodox version of her family’s faith. One day the two girls showed up to class draped in headscarves in addition to their mandatory red and black school uniforms. The principal of their school told them they were in violation of the school’s uniform policy and that they must remove the headscarves. They refused. They were told that they were not allowed to attend school unless they complied. They were sent home.

But the girls were not going to give up that easy, and they filed complaints against the director of the school with the authorities in the small city of Smolyan. For a while the case bounced around at the local level, and the regional inspectorate of the Ministry of Education eventually upheld the decision of the school. The girls were obstinate, and it was not long before a local (but foreign-funded) Islamic nongovernmental organization (NGO) interceded on their behalf and lodged an official complaint directly with the Ministry of Education. The Minister replied that Bulgarian education was secular and conspicuous religious symbols had no place in the classroom. The NGO was led by young Muslim Bulgarians who had studied in Jordan and promoted a more orthodox form of Islam than was traditional for Bulgarian Hanafi Sunnis. They proceeded to file a complaint with the newly established national Commission for the Protection against Discrimination (KZD). The Islamic NGO claimed the girls’ constitutional right to freedom of religion had been violated, and that Bulgaria had a responsibility to uphold the democratic principles it had embraced after the collapse of communism in 1989.

Pictures of the two girls in their headscarves and long Islamic gowns were splashed across the national newspapers, and soon media frenzy ensued about “Islamic fundamentalists” in Bulgaria. A right-wing party seized upon the issue and opportunistically stepped up its protests outside mosques, gathering signatures for citizens’ petitions to silence the call to prayer in cities across Bulgaria. Their anti-Muslim rhetoric struck a nationalist cord with many Bulgarians, weary after nearly twenty years of political and economic “transition” that has seen an erosion of living standards for the majority of the population, and who were looking for someone or something to blame. For the first time in their almost two decades of peaceful postsocialist history, Bulgarians (85 percent of whom were Orthodox Christians) were faced with a religious dilemma that challenged their own still tenuous commitment to the precepts of liberal democracy. The headscarf case and the overwhelming national outcry against the two girls forced the Bulgarian government into the uncomfortable position of having to adjudicate on the potentially explosive issue of “religious rights” for Muslims both before the inquisitive eyes of the Western powers and in the court of public opinion, all just six months before Bulgaria was scheduled to join the European Union.

For many observers, there were striking similarities between the Bulgarian and French headscarf cases, with both European Muslim minorities mobilizing the language of freedom and human rights to advocate for Islamic dress in public schools. But reading the headscarf case in Bulgaria as a replay of the 2003-2004 French headscarf affair in the Eastern European context would miss the important ways in which the Bulgarian case differed. First, the Muslim community in Bulgaria that made up somewhere between 12-20% of the population in 2006 was not an immigrant community, but rather the indigenous descendents of Turkish, Roma and Slavic Muslims who have been in the country for centuries. Second, the modern presence of Islam in Bulgaria is not the result of a Christian imperialist project in Muslim lands (as in France), but a remnant of the country’s 500-year colonization by a Muslim, Ottoman Empire. The Bulgarians’ desire to ban headscarves might be analogous to something like the Algerians wanting to ban baguettes; it might seem silly and unnecessary, but one can understand why it might be of national importance to do so (and certainly no sillier than “freedom fries” or “freedom toast”).

Third, the majority of Bulgaria’s Muslim minority is ethnically Turkish and their “mother” country, Turkey, was a decidedly secular republic that had a sweeping headscarf ban already in place. Fourth, Bulgaria’s geopolitical position vis-à-vis the international community was weak and the Bulgarians had been subjected to more than fifteen years of aggressive American “democracy assistance” since the end of the Cold War. As a new member of NATO and the home of America’s new permanent military bases in East Europe, the Bulgarian government was vulnerable to U.S. interference in its internal affairs, particularly with regards to the protection of what many Americans believe to be the “first freedom” of “religious rights.” Thus, Bulgaria in 2006 was under a whole different
set of pressures informed by a radically different colonial history than France in 2003.

In the summer of 2006, the antidiscrimination commission’s announcement that it would consider the headscarf case ignited a heated national debate, and more details of the case emerged daily in the press together with passionate editorials on both sides of the issue.7 The two women, and the members of the NGO that represented them, were Slavic Muslims (or “Pomaks” - the descendants of ethnic Bulgarians who converted to Islam during the Ottoman era).8 These Pomaks had close connections with Arab Islamic influences (through their education in Jordan), and this was taken as evidence of their adherence to a more “radical” form of Islam, one that was perceived as distinctly foreign to Bulgaria. Indeed, although both students came from Bulgarian Muslim families, they were raised with a more moderate form of Islam. Neither of the girls’ mothers wore the headscarf, and members of their own communities felt that the girls were being manipulated by external Islamic influences in the region.9

In fact, the region where the two girls lived was a part of Bulgaria that was increasingly under the influence of local religious leaders funded by international Islamic charities from the Arab world (as opposed to Turkey, which is the traditional patron state of Bulgaria’s Muslim communities).10 Bulgarian Islam, like other forms of Balkan Islam, has a history of being rather syncretistic due to its long contact with both Christianity and Sufi mystical orders.11 Faith had always superseded practice and Bulgarians/Turks were relatively lax with regard to strict Islamic customs such as fasting, avoiding pork and alcohol, or covering their women. Furthermore, Bulgarian Muslims engage in certain practices that many Arab Muslims consider to be forbidden innovations, such as the worshiping of Muslim saints at local shrines, the purchasing of amulets for love, health, protection, etc., or the celebration of the Prophet Mohammed’s birthday. Add to these forty-five years of communist attempts to eradicate religion and to assimilate Muslim minorities,12 and you have a further dilution of Islamic rituals and practice. Thus, after 1989, most Bulgarian Muslim populations emerged with few “pure” Islamic practices and retained only a strong sense of cultural identity as “Muslims.”13 This was the condition that international Islamic charities would hope to rectify, particularly after the outbreak of the Bosnian war in 1992, when the rest of the Islamic world rediscovered their Muslim brethren in what remained of the collapsing “Second World.”

Evidence of more orthodox Arab influences, particularly with regard to the behavior and dress of women, could be found in foreign funded but locally produced Islamic magazines published in Bulgarian specifically for the Pomak population beginning in 2005. Most of the articles stressed the moral duty of women to obey Allah and not provoke the attention of men. But they also emphasized the sinful nature of remaining uncovered and warned that there would be divine sanctions against women who do not comply with the more strict interpretation of Islamic teachings. This extended quotation is from an article in Muysulmansko Obshtestvo (Muslim Society), the magazine published by the same NGO that filed the complaint on behalf of the two girls. It demonstrates the kind of language used to convince Pomak women to wear the hijab.

> Today when young women can be seen in the streets dressed in clothes that barely cover their underwear (and this is taken as normal), when the lifestyle lures women to appear as sexually attractive as possible, when girls and women are disappointed if no one turns their head to look at them, women who do not want to behave in this manner are looked down upon as abnormal. This is an offending case of discrimination. Indeed there are a great number of girls and women who are modest by nature, who do not want to expose themselves and who do not feel miserable if leering eyes are not fixed upon them. Strange as it may seem, wearing the hijab is one of the problems that society has thrust upon girls and women who profess Islam and who want to change the “dress code” and use the headscarf. Ironically, these modest and shy women have to feel uncomfortable for having changed their previous habits of attracting excessive attention. To choose to wear the hijab often provokes surprise (especially from people who happen to know you) and questions as to why you feel you are “better” or “holier” than the others, or why you want to have the appearance of an Arab or Pakistani woman.

The clothes that a Muslim woman wears are not punishment or ordeal; they give her chance to look noble and lady-like without any arousal of carnal appetites. The “veiled” women are not necessarily innocent girls. They can be mothers of big families and women who are married and remarried. The hijab is not an attribute of fake modesty. It delivers a certain message to people. First, the message is that the woman has decided to submit all aspects of her life to the will of God; and second, that she wants to be judged on the basis of her virtues and deeds and not her beauty, elegance and sex appeal.14

Similar types of arguments appeared in the magazine Ikra, a publication from a town just twelve kilometers away from the girl’s home city, and home to the largest mosque built in Bulgaria since 1989. The magazine published a series of articles extolling the virtues of Islam for women while at the same time threatening that they will face divine punishment if they do not obey. An article titled “The Veil: a Categorical Imperative” lays out a strict Islamic dress code for Muslim women:

“Guarding the virtue is one of the major tasks for both men and women. A veiled woman will not attract the
Islam was the only true path to equality between men and women in Western and Westernized societies are still argued that: “Regardless of the advances in women's rights, the decadent influence of the West. Another article in Ikra recommended loose garments that do not suggest the shape of the female body. A woman abiding by the Islamic dress code can be compared to a sealed letter, the contents of which will be disclosed only to the addressee. A woman wearing light clothes can be compared to an announcement that can be read by anyone. We are eyewitnesses of the decadence of society and of the corruption of moral values. In order to protect the Moslem woman, Allah commanded that she should stay at home earnestly and with dignity and that she should not go out uncovered like the women in the pre-Islamic time of ignorance and that she should not expose her beauties. Hopefully you understand the situation that a woman would face if she shuts her eyes and plugs her ears before these words. Let both men and women know that there is a path to follow and those who go astray shall be punished accordingly."

Another article in a different issue of Ikra, “The Code of Conduct for the Muslim Woman,” repeats the same imperatives about women’s clothing, emphasizing that women who dress appropriately are more precious and valuable than those who do not, and warning that there will be consequences for those who do not comply:

"A Moslem woman must cover her body. However this is not to be interpreted as an approval to wear tight or gossamer clothes! When a woman goes out in the street dressed in a garment of which Islam approves, she will not provoke lechery because the Islamic dress code recommends loose garments that do not suggest the shape of the female body. A woman abiding by the Islamic dress code can be compared to a sealed letter, the contents of which will be disclosed only to the addressee. A woman wearing light clothes can be compared to an announcement that can be read by anyone. We are eyewitnesses of the decadence of society and of the corruption of moral values. In order to protect the Moslem woman, Allah commanded that she should stay at home earnestly and with dignity and that she should not go out uncovered like the women in the pre-Islamic time of ignorance and that she should not expose her beauties. Hopefully you understand the situation that a woman would face if she shuts her eyes and plugs her ears before these words. Let both men and women know that there is a path to follow and those who go astray shall be punished accordingly."

These articles, published in Bulgarian and circulated in region where the girls lived, combined with regular lectures and seminars held by Islamic NGOs working among the Pomaks certainly contributed to the increased number of young women wearing the hijab between 2004 and 2006. For those who promoted it, the hijab symbolized a kind of moral superiority over the decadent influence of the West. Another article in Ikra argued that: “Regardless of the advances in women’s rights, women in Western and Westernized societies are still subjected to and forced to see themselves as commodities to be bought and sold.” According to this same article, Islam was the only true path to equality between men and women: “Islam is the final religion and therefore, our last real chance. Its high level of responsibilities encourages humanity to raise itself above unhealthy emotions and underdeveloped instincts. Once we succeed in that challenge, then and only then, will humanity be strong enough to implement equity for all.”

This importation of new dress requirements for women in terms of the mandatory wearing of headscarves and modest, loose clothing with only the hands and feet visible is starkly at odds with mainstream Bulgarian fashion for women. In fact, local fashions for women in Bulgaria are the opposite of the modesty promoted by Islam. In Bulgaria, and perhaps in postsocialist Eastern Europe in general, clothing styles for women are quite provocative by prudish American standards. For young women in particular, necklines often plunge over demi-cup push-up bras so that their breasts are exposed all the way to the pink edges of the areola. The most popular skirt length barely touches the very top of the thigh, and Bulgarian girls have mastered the art of always bending at the knees rather than the waist when retrieving something from the ground. If pants are worn, they are often cut as low as anatomically possible, and after 2003, combined with visible thong underwear for the ubiquitous “whale tail” look. Exposed abdomens are par for the course in the summer. Other popular looks in the bigger cities are the sheer blouse without a bra, or the white pants or skirt with dark lacy lingerie visible underneath. One male American friend once joked that being in Sofia, the Bulgarian capital, was like “walking around in a soft porn movie.”

All of these provocative fashion options for women were broadcast out of the big cities and into small towns in the Pomak regions via 24-hour Bulgarian chalga (pop-folk) music channels. On stations such as Vesselina TV and Payner Planeta, silicone-enhanced, bottle-blond chalga singers crooned and danced their way through five-minute video clips in the skimpiest of outfits, and it was from popular artists like Desislava, Maria, Gergana, and Anelia that most young women, both Christian and Muslim, took their fashion guidance. On the streets of Pomak cities in the summer, the vast majority of women were not covered and a good subset of those were dressed in what they considered to be the latest fashion – whether it was bare midriffs or exposed g-strings.

In fact, provocative “European” dress with short skirts and high heels was a symbol of urbanity, of those who do not work in agriculture. In a culture where the word “villager” was equated with uncultured backwardness and stupidity for both men (selenin) and women (selenka), many young Pomaks were keen to avoid any association with their rural roots, particularly since many of the Muslim regions were relatively impoverished. Perhaps one result of this was that many Pomak women dressed even more provocatively than the already quite liberal style of dress common for women.
Bulgarian Christian women. Thus, in 2005 at least, the majority of women in the Muslim towns in the Rhodopi dressed like Bulgarian women in small towns throughout the country, and women’s fashion had not yet become the marker of a Muslim town versus a Christian one.

If the new Islamic fashion was at odds with mainstream “European” dress, it was also at odds with traditional Pomak dress for women. Older Pomak women typically wore a long colorful printed dress (fustan) with an apron (mendil) and a colorful headscarf (kurpa) tied loosely under the hair or beneath the chin. There was usually some hair visible above the forehead (like the scarves worn by the stereotypical “babushka”). On the other hand, the younger women and some older women embracing the new Islamic dress code tended to wear a monochrome gown (shamiya), long button-front over-dress (manto), or simply modest “regular clothing” with a single-colored, larger headscarf (zabradka) that completely covered the hair and neck. This new way of dressing was often called the “Arab style” (arabski stil) by women who preferred traditional Pomak clothing. In fact it did not represent the Islamic dress of any one foreign country, but was a local interpretation of what “proper” Muslim women should wear.

Thus, as the case moved forward in the Commission for the Protection against Discrimination (KZD), there were many levels of tension involved in the question of whether the two girls would be allowed to wear their headscarves in public school: both between Christians and Muslims and between moderate/secular Muslims and their newly devout co-religionists. More importantly, there was the question of the role of women in Islam, and whether these new practices could be reconciled with the Bulgarian government’s commitment to uphold gender equality.

In fact, the issue of equity between men and women would be one of the key factors in the debates. On June 17, 2006, the two students and a representative of the Islamic NGO, the Union of Islamic Development and Culture (UIDC), appeared before the KZD in Sofia to give testimony in support of their complaint. The following is an excerpt from the transcript of the hearings. Selvi Shakirov was the Deputy Director of the UIDC. Irina Muleshkova was a member of the antidiscrimination commission and the Chairperson of the committee hearing the case:

Selvi Shakirov: The headscarf for the woman in Islam is not a religious symbol; it is a religious dogma. And when a girl, a woman is convinced of the essence of the Islamic religion, she makes the decision to put on such clothing with desire and conviction. And this right should not be denied to this individual whoever she is. This right should exist, and she should be allowed to have it, I am saying again, so that we don’t hurt her dignity, feelings, convictions, religion, etc.

Irina Muleshkova: I would like to ask you, is there special clothing for men, which is also worn by inner conviction?

Shakirov: No.

Muleshkova: There isn’t. A second question: Are men and women equal?

Shakirov: Yes.

Muleshkova: In what sense?

Shakirov: That everyone is “equal in front of the law,” as they say.

Muleshkova: Are they only equal in front of the law?

Shakirov: Yes.

Muleshkova: There is no equality in front of God? Is this how I should understand you?

Shakirov: Of course there is. But in Islam, the difference between man and woman – there is a physiological, there is also psychological difference, and Islam defines norms for both men and women. There is such a norm in clothing, which is subjected to the voluntary choice and conviction of the specific woman or girl – she herself can make a choice. When she is convinced… That is it. And I believe that right now we are not somewhere where we are judging the Islamic religion. These are things that are very deep and those who want to get to know this religion can do it. And I am saying again, the personal freedom of the individual to choose for himself, to decide what is good, and when he is convinced [of what is good], to be given this freedom.19

In this brief exchange, Shakirov, a Pomak who studied in Jordan, starts by claiming that wearing a headscarf is necessary for Islamic women and that they should have the right to choose to wear it once they have the “conviction” to live their lives in accordance with the precepts of the Koran. When questioned about whether or not men and women are equal in Islam, he becomes defensive and argues that the purpose of the commission is not to judge Islam, but to guarantee the individual rights of the girls in question, because religious freedoms are guaranteed under the Bulgarian constitution. Banning headscarves is a violation of religious rights.

Alternatively, Irina Muleshkova – a law professor who worked with women’s NGOs for fourteen years – was no doubt well informed of the international precedents regarding headscarves. By asking Shakirov whether men and women were equal in Islam, Muleshkova was drawing attention away from the question of individual rights and toward the broader societal goal of “gender equality,” which various courts around Europe as well as the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) had mobilized to uphold the headscarf ban. In the case of Sahin v. Turkey,20 the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg upheld the Turkish headscarf ban because “gender equality” was “recognised by the European Court as one of the key principles underlying the [European] Convention [on Human Rights] and a goal to be achieved by member States of the Council of Europe.” The court also invoked the Dahlab v. Switzerland case21 and asserted that the headscarf “appeared
to be imposed on women by a precept in the Koran that was hard to reconcile with the principle of gender equality.” 22 In France, the headscarf ban was also justified in terms of upholding gender equality. 23

But Shakirov’s argument disregarded this question of equality and returned in the end to the question of “choice” using the liberal “rights” language employed by governments and activists that opposed headscarf bans in Western Europe. For instance, in a 2004 speech at the European Social Forum entitled, “Hijab: A Woman’s Right to Choose,” Salma Yaqoob emphasized the importance of free will and choice with regard to the French ban on headscarves. 24 The motto of the British-based Assembly for the Protection of the Hijab (Pro-Hijab) also focuses on individual liberty: “Hijab: Our Freedom. Our Choice. Our Right.” 25 The website includes an informational leaflet called “Hijab: Know Your Rights” which quotes the relevant passages from the European Convention on Human Rights and instructs women that: “It is important to know your rights in order to be able to uphold them.” American NGOs such as Human Rights Watch (a corporate sponsor of Pro-Hijab), also stated publicly that the French law banning the hijab in schools violated “the rights to freedom of religion and expression,” further explaining that the law was based on the false premise that Muslim women could not choose what was in their best interests. 26 The local Bulgarian affiliate of Human Rights Watch, the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, also claimed that banning Muslim women from wearing the headscarf was a violation of their constitutional right to religious freedom. 27 From the “pro-choice” point of view, religious freedoms are not incompatible with state commitments to uphold gender equality or, indeed, any other type of “human right,” but should be given priority and in practice tend to trump other types of “rights.”

But the Bulgarian government did not agree. On July 27, 2006, the KZD found in favor of the Ministry of Education and fined all parties for allowing the two girls to wear their headscarves to school for as long as they did. They even fined the Islamic NGO for inciting “discrimination” by bringing the complaint forward in the first place. The head of the KZD, a Bulgarian Turk, supported the decision, and the Islamic NGO decided not to appeal the case. Public opinion was solidly behind the decision, and a subsequent headscarf case at a medical university in Plovdiv also ended in a ban on religious symbols using the Smolyan case as a precedent. The KZD relied on two key arguments in its written decision. The first was that Bulgarian education was “secular” and the second was that the state had a duty to uphold women’s rights.

The Bulgarian decision to ban headscarves cited two paragraphs from the European Parliament 2005 Resolution #1464, “Women and Religion in Europe.” 28 The first paragraph reads:

“It is the duty of the member states of the Council of Europe to protect women against violations of their rights in the name of religion and to promote and fully implement gender equality. States must not accept any religious or cultural relativism of women’s human rights. They must not agree to justify discrimination and inequality affecting women on grounds such as physical or biological differentiation based on or attributed to religion. They must fight against religiously motivated stereotypes of female and male roles from an early age, including in schools.” 29

Clearly, the Bulgarian Commission understood that claiming to defend women’s rights was exactly the language that it needed to justify its decision and avoid a lawsuit in the European Court of Human Rights. And certainly the idea of protecting women’s rights was popular and desirable to most Bulgarians.

Subsequent to this decision, the Ministry of Education issued a verbal order and all schools in the Smolyan region were forbidden from allowing female pupils to wear headscarves to class. All young women wishing to maintain their Islamic dress would now study through a distance learning scenario and would come to the school only for their exams at the end of the year, isolating them from the rest of the student body, but not technically denying them their right to an education. 30 As of March 2007, there were several new complaints filed with the KZD by Pomak girls and their families in the Smolyan region, and the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee was considering the possibility of bringing a case against the Bulgarian government before the United Nations Human Rights Commission. Local religious leaders, however, feared that the additional complaints and the U.N. case might force the Bulgarian parliament to pass a law like the French legislation against conspicuous religious symbols in schools, a sweeping ban that would be much harder to challenge since it would be upheld in European Court of Human Rights as the Turkish ban was. 31 As of May 2007, both sides seemed determined to stand their ground. Whatever happens in the coming months, there is no doubt that the headscarf “affair” in this new EU member state has opened yet another front in the ongoing struggle to combine Western tolerance and religious pluralism with increasingly the more orthodox “corrections” to historically moderate forms of European Islam. And Bulgaria, which has always been a crossroads between East and West, a place where Islam and Christianity have co-existed in relative peace for centuries, will be an important testing ground for these issues, and deserves much closer attention that it has hitherto been afforded.

Kristen Ghodsee has her Ph.D. from the University of California - Berkeley and is an Assistant Professor in Gender and Women’s Studies at Bowdoin College. She is the author of The Red Riviera: Gender, Tourism and
Postsocialism on the Black Sea (Duke University Press, 2005), and numerous articles on gender, civil society and Eastern Europe in journals such as Signs, Women’s Studies Quarterly, Women’s Studies International Forum and Human Rights Dialogue. She is the recipient of national fellowships from Fulbright, NCEEER, IREX and ACLS as well as the winner of a residential research fellowship at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in 2005-2006. She is currently (2006-2007) a Member in the School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, NJ where she is finishing her second monograph: Miniskirts and Minarets: Gender, Aid and Islam on the Edge of Europe.

Endnotes

1 The author would like to thank NCEEER, IREX, ACLS, Bowdoin College, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and the Institute for Advanced Study for their generous support of this research. Special thanks to Joan W. Scott who has been an invaluable interlocutor on the issue of headscarves in France and to Susanna Hecht, Rosalind Morris, Lisa Wedeen, Amy Borovoy, Jennifer Pitts, C.K. Lee, Jennifer Scanlon, Maria Stoilkova, Anelia Atanassova and Christian Filipov for their unflagging intellectual and moral support.


4 12.2% is the official number from the 2001 census, but the Deputy Chief Mufti of all Bulgarians believed that the percentage was closer to 20% in the summer of 2006. Author’s interview with Vedat Ahmed in Sofia in August 2006.

5 Although Giyatri Spivak argues that the Ottoman imperialism was qualitatively different (and therefore somehow more acceptable) that Western European imperial projects, most Bulgarians would not make allowances for these fine scholarly nuances. See: Spivak: “The Question of Cultural Studies,” in Outside in the Teaching Machine, New York: Routledge, 1993.


8 Although it is important to note that this is contested by many Pomaks themselves who believe themselves wither to be a completely distinct ethnic group or the descendents of Arabs who settled in the Rhodopi before Tsar Boris I Christianized the Slavs in the 8th century. See: Petya Kabakchieva, “From Local to Regional Identity: The Possible Construction of ‘Cross-Border’ Regional Identity – Case Study of a Border Region, Smolyan,” Nexus Research Project paper, unpublished, synopsis available online at: www.ceu.hu/cps/bluebird/rgee/see/see_prog_2001jun.pdf, Access date: December 30, 2006; Maria Todorova, “Identity (Trans)Formation Among the Pomaks in Bulgaria,” in Beyond Borders: Remaking Cultural Identities in the New East and Central Europe, Lazlo Kurti and Juliet Langman (eds.) New York: Westview Press, 1997, pg. 63- 82. Interestingly, the Czech Slavonicist P. Shafarik also mentions the theory that the Pomaks are descendents of the Arabs in his 1842 book on Slavic popular history, see: P. Shafarik, Slavianski Narodpis, 1842 cited in Stoyan Raichevsky, The Mohammedan Bulgarians (Pomaks), Sofia: Bulgarian Bestseller – National Museum of Bulgarian Books and Polygraphy, 2004, pg. 15.

9 Author’s interviews in the region in 2005-2006.

10 Kristen Ghodsee, “Examining ‘Eastern’ Aid: Muslim Minorities and Islamic Nongovernmental Organization in Bulgaria,” Anthropology of Europe.


18 Ibid.


25 See www.prohijab.net


27 Author’s interview with Krassimir Kanev in 2006.


30 Author’s interview with Dr, Krassimir Kanev, Chairman of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, in Sofia on March 2007.

31 Author’s interview with Hairaddin Hatim, Regional Mufti of Smolyan in Smolyan in March 2007.
Remembering the Russian Revolution: 1917-2007

This year’s teacher outreach conference, on the theme of “Remembering the Russian Revolution, 1917-2007” took place on Saturday, April 14.

Yuri Slezkine, director of our Institute, opened with “Revolution as Reformation.” While conducting research on the “Old Bolsheviks,” Slezkine developed a comparison between Marxism and Nationalism to that of an apocalyptic millennialist faith, like a cult or sect, due to its members’ emphasis on their sense of chosenness and apocalyptic expectations. Although Marxism claimed no supernatural being or any organized rituals, there was still an emphasis on faith; providence was called historical necessity; the fatal corruption of the world was called capitalism; and an imminent collective salvation leading to the millennium, they called Communism. Their armageddon was revolution. But when the state collapsed after just one generation, there was no faith left—no one took the “original prophecy” seriously. Why did Bolshevism not last? Slezkine suggested several possible reasons: the Marxist prophecy was too scientific, and thus falsifiable; Marxism insisted on managing the economy as their central mission; the non-transcendental nature of the Marxist faith; or its narrow conception of human nature, of people’s basic needs—for example, there were no rites of passage for birth, marriage and death. Marxism banned popular belief, but didn’t replace it with anything meaningful. Christianity attached itself to the Law of Moses; Mohammed codified Arab common law. The Bolshevik Revolution can be said to have been Russia’s Reformation—the transformation of not only peasants to Soviets—but Soviets into self-monitoring, self-censoring subjects. Now, most Russians today draw a rigid line between themselves and authority, possibly due to the incomplete nature of Marxism as a faith.

Amir Weiner, associate professor of history at Stanford University, presented “Robust Revolution to Retiring Revolution: The Life Cycle of the Soviet Union, 1945-1968.” Weiner began with the question that, as Stalin began to visibly age, Soviets wondered what would life be like without him? They grappled with the reality that one day, there would be no Stalin. Weiner addressed the correlation between the institutional order of the Soviet polity after World War II and how it coped with changing circumstances. The institutional order was built upon three pillars: economic order, political order of a single Party dictatorship, and mass state terror. What was to be done upon Stalin’s death in 1953? State terror was to be demolished as inefficient. Newspapers called for a reduction in the Party’s political and economic power. But nothing happened–no changes were made. While the Soviet Union experienced growing exposure to the outside world, Khrushchev came across as uncharismatic; to the modern world he looked like an uncultured, uncivilized peasant. Even the Communist Youth League in the late 1960s appeared detached from reality. They did not know the sacrifices of their fathers. The Party was unable to maintain the utopian drive, and rather than continue talk of an expanding Socialist horizon, talk instead focused on building borders and walls. At 50, it struggled to maintain the importance and relevance of its achievements, but in the end the Party was unable to keep itself—like its former leader—from ageing.

Elizabeth McGuire, Ph.D. candidate from our department of history, spoke on “Russia’s International Revolution: The Children of 1917.” She explained that the influence of the Russian Revolution on Chinese revolutionaries gave birth to the Chinese Revolution. She compared the series of events to the chapters in a romantic relationship—the thrill of the initial attraction, getting to know one another, commitment, children, disillusionment and divorce, regret, and nostalgia. After 1917, Chinese radicals became interested in Russia, and began to travel there and bring back reading material. At the same time, the newly founded group CommIntern (Communist International) sent representatives to China to try to organize the Chinese. CommIntern set up schools in Moscow and China to train young revolutionaries from all over the world. The children were taught Marxism, how to run an underground party, and how to create propaganda. Other children were the products of romances between the older students of the CommIntern schools, whom McGuire called the “love children.” In 1933 the InterDom school was established for children of famous international revolutionaries. In 1943 the CommIntern was shut down as resources were being directed towards the war. When the Germans invaded, some children were sent to Nazi labor camps, others were left to scavenge in the forest. When the remaining children were shipped back to China, it was difficult for them to reintegrate into Chinese society—culturally and linguistically they were Russian. They ran wild and were disobedient. Some of their parents did not want to be reminded of the “love children” from their youth, from their revolutionary days, and shunned them. However, in the 1950s there was a massive Russification campaign in China. There was a big demand for Russian speakers, which provided jobs for the InterDom children. Today, what is left of the Sino-Soviet romance is simply nostalgia. Reunions have been very popular among the former children, who come together to sing the songs and dance the dances of their youth.
Gregory Freidin, professor of Slavic languages and literatures and director of interdisciplinary studies in humanities at Stanford, spoke on “The Russian Revolution through Contemporary Prose and Poetry.” Stalin in 1933 called these writers the “engineers of the human soul.” Freidin compared the revolution to a literary contest between the narrative of Marxism and Leninism on one side, and the products of the authors on the other. Imaginative literature was at the forefront in the struggle for legitimacy and therefore the struggle for power. However, it was the authors and artists who legitimized the USSR in the eyes of the international community, so the Party acknowledged and welcomed them. Freidin recommended that when teaching revolution-era literature, one would do well to include Soviet film as an example of the contemporary Communist orthodoxy. Not only is Soviet film visually compelling, but it is almost a naïve version of the correct ideological line, meant for public consumption for a largely illiterate population. For a teacher’s reading list, he recommended at least the Communist Manifesto, and short poetry and fiction by writers such as Zinaida Hippius and Aleksandr Blok, along with Evgeny Zamyatin, Isaac Babel, Mikhail Bulgakov, and Boris Pasternak. Friedin also suggested that students read Andrei Platonov, the true proletarian writer, to understand what the world looked like through the eyes of a worker.

Anne Nesbet, associate professor in our department of Slavic languages and literatures and the program in film studies, presented “Revolutions in Film.” Evgenii Bauer was the most important director in the Soviet Union before the Revolution, Nesbet explained, and his pre-Revolutionary films employed the use of long sequence shots and morbid endings. Lev Kuleshov and Sergei Eisenstein created works that were radically different from Bauer’s films. Kuleshov’s “On the Red Front,” (1920) appealed more to the new Revolutionary audience. Kuleshov and Eisenstein employed American methods of editing and montage, borrowed from directors such as D.W. Griffith. Nesbet showed images from Eisenstein’s film “Battleship Potemkin,” and explained the emphasis of the use of diagonal lines in the film which represented dialectical tension, including in the infamous “Odessa Steps” scenes. It was important for every shot to demonstrate conflict. She encouraged the attendees of the conference to participate in her presentation, to offer criticism and interpretation.

The conference wrapped up with a presentation by William Quillen, Ph.D. candidate in our department of music: “‘Every Revolution is a Symphony’: Music and Song in the Early Soviet Years.” Quillen explained that art and culture were initially low on Lenin’s priority list, that basic education was more important. Soviet musicologists gave brochures to factory workers to culture them, and even directions on how to behave in a theater. During this period both Modernist compositions and “Soviet Songs” (such as “We, Red Soldiers” and “We Boldly Go to Battle”) dominated. In the early 1920s, Modernist Soviet composers captured the sounds of everyday life, for example Aleksandr Mosolov’s “The Factory,” and Vladimir Deshevov’s “Rails.” “The Factory” is an episode from the ballet “Steel” (1926-1928). RAPM, the Russian Association of Proletarian Musicians founded in 1923 was an anti-Western, anti-Modernist, and anti-folklorist group. They proclaimed that mass songs, otherwise known as popular songs or worker’s songs should be the basis of Soviet music. Ironically, when one listens to these songs one can hear that they are not authentic, that in fact they sound like 19th century romantic songs. In 1929 Henry Cowell, one of the most important innovators in the history of American music, was the first American composer to be invited to the Soviet Union, where he played what was considered “radical” music, to mixed reviews.

Further reference:
http://www.alexanderpalace.org/palace/index.html
A history of the Romanov family, first-person accounts and images of the 1917 Revolutions, and a photographic tour of the Alexander Palace
http://www.uea.ac.uk/his/webeurs/russia/welcome
History of the Soviet Union, from the School of History, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. Links to English translations of primary sources and links to other web sites
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/modsbook39.html
The Internet Modern History Sourcebook. Links to English translations of primary sources and links to other web sites.
Fellowship and Other Opportunities

**THE REGINALD E. ZELNIK GRADUATE STUDENT SUPPORT FUND**

A new UCB Foundation endowment has been established by a generous gift from an anonymous donor. The Reginald E. Zelnik Graduate Student Support Fund, named after an especially beloved faculty member, has been set up to benefit graduate students in the Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies that is administered by the Institute of Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies. The endowment was launched by the initial gift and matching funds from the Graduate Division. Additional gifts to the Fund from friends, family and colleagues are encouraged and gratefully accepted.

**ISEEES Travel Grants** provide limited travel support for academics and ISEEES-affiliated graduate students. Awards up to $400 are made to those presenting a paper at a meeting of a recognized scholarly organization. Awards are made on a first-come, first-served basis, and priority is given to those who did not receive ISEEES funding in AY 05-06 or 06-07. Deadline: on-going. To apply send request with budget to: Barbara Voytek, ISEEES, UC Berkeley, 260 Stephens Hall # 2304, Berkeley CA 94720-2304.

**The Drago and Danica Kosovac Prize** is awarded to a UCB undergraduate for an outstanding thesis (senior or honors) in the social sciences or humanities that researches some aspect of Serbian history or culture. Applications include submission of the written work and two letters of recommendation. No deadline. Contact: Barbara Voytek, ISEEES, UC Berkeley, 260 Stephens Hall # 2304, Berkeley CA 94720-2304; Tel: 510-643-6736; bvoytek@berkeley.edu.

**Kosciuszko Foundation**

The Metchie J. E. Budka Award provides $1,500 for an outstanding scholarly work in Polish literature (14th Century to 1939) or Polish history (962 to 1939). The competition is open to grad students at US universities and to postdocs in their first three years. Deadline: 7/18/2007. Contact: Metchie J. E. Budka Award, The Kosciuszko Foundation, 15 E 65th St, New York NY 10021-6595; Tel: 212-734-2130; Fax: 212-628-4552; thekf@aol.com; http://www.kosciuszkofoundation.org/.

**Library of Congress**

Kluge Center Fellowships provide $4,000/mo for 6-12 months of research in the collections of the Library of Congress. Scholars who have received a terminal advanced degree within the past seven years in the humanities, the social sciences, or in a professional field such as architecture or law are eligible. Exceptions may be made for individuals without continuous academic careers. Applicants may be US citizens or foreign nationals. Deadline: 8/15/2007. Contact: John W. Kluge Center Office of Scholarly Programs, Library of Congress LJ 120, 101 Independence Ave SE, Washington DC 20540-4860; Tel: 202-707-3302; Fax: 202-707-3595; scholarly@loc.gov; http://www.loc.gov/loc/kluge/.

**Wenner-Gren Foundation**


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Recent ISEEES-Supported Publications and Publications by Institute Affiliates

Ronelle Alexander


Polina Barskova

“Off-Center: Towards the Problem of Marginality in the Early Soviet Film.” ISEEES Newsletter 23(2), Summer 2006.

Olga Gurevich


Magdalena Kay


Anaita Khudonazar


Elif Kale Lostuvali


Andrej Milivojevic and Milos Besic.


Jason Wittenberg


Izaly Zemtsovsky

“Icebreaker Three: the Caucasus in the US.” CCAsP Newsletter 9, Spring 2006.
Public Lectures Continuation...

Renate Lachmann, Ph.D., Konstanz University, Germany. “The Fascination with Secret Knowledge in Literary Texts (Hoffman, Pushkin, Poe, Wells, Bulgakov).”

Dmitry Lisitsyn, Board President of Sakhalin Environment Watch; Irina Bogdan, Board President of Ecodal; Marina Rikhvanova, Co-Founder and Co-Chair of Baikal Environmental Wave; Sergei Berezunz, Director of the Phoenix Fund. “More Valuable than Oil: The Impacts of Russia’s Energy Policy.”

Olga Litvak, Assistant Professor, Department of History, Princeton University. “Portrait of an Artist as a Young Man: Marc Chagall’s Experiments in Russian-Jewish Self-Fashioning.”


Olga Matich, Professor, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, UCB. “Aesthetic Counterparts: Andrei Bely, Wassily Kandinsky, and the Impulse to Abstraction.” Respondent: Molly Brunson, UC Berkeley

Donald Miller, Professor of Religion and Director of the Center for Religion and Civic Culture, University of Southern California. “Oral History Perspectives on the Armenian and Rwandan Genocides.”

Renee Perelmutter, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, UCB. “Viewing without a Viewpoint: On Aspectual Choice and Perception Strategies in Modern Russian.”

Sergei Plekhanov, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, York University, Toronto. “New Russian Nationalism: A Challenge to the West?”


Harsha Ram, Professor, Department of Comparative Literature and Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, UCB. “Literary Modernities Western and Near Eastern: The Sonnet in Revolutionary Georgia.”

Harsha Ram, Professor, Department of Comparative Literature and Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, UCB. “The Sonnet and the Mukhambazi: A Study in Western and Near Eastern Literary Modernities.”

Nancy Ruttenburg, Professor New York University. “Dostoevsky’s Democracy: The Ne To and the Demokrat.”

Olga Sedakova, Moscow poet. “Poetry Reading (in Russian and English).”

Kathryn Schild, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, UCB. “The Grand Inquisitor and the Grand Pasha: Reading Dostoevsky Through Pamuk.”

Victoria Somoff, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, UCB. “Ivan Turgenev’s “Mumu” and Interpretation of Muteness: Russian Prose on the Eve of the Novel.”


Diane Thompson, University of Cambridge. “The Problem of Tragedy and Judgment in “Anna Karenina.”

Ilya Utekhin, European University, St. Petersburg. “Poetika zhaloby (na materiale pisem po zhilishchnomu voprosu partiinym i sovetskim nachal’nikam ot prostykh grazhdan).”

Michelle Viise, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, UCB. “Fame, Fortune, and the Holy Spirit in Christian Orthodox Printing in Sixteenth-Century Poland-Lithuania.”

Susan Woodward, Professor of Political Science, The Graduate Center, City University of New York. “Is Democracy Possible in the Balkans? The Debates in and on Bosnia, Kosovo/a, and Serbia.”

Amir Weiner, Associate Professor of Soviet History, Stanford University. “Between Two Seas: Sovereignty, Governance, and Violence between the Baltic and Black Seas, 1930s-80s.”

Christoph Witzenrath, Department of East European History, Humboldt University, Berlin. “Manipulating Subjects: Cossacks, Trade, and Changing Imperial Culture around Lake Baikal, 1696-1701.”

Paul Werth, Associate Professor, Department of History, University of Nevada. “Ecclesiastical Head, Imperial Subject: The Armenian Catholicos at the Junction of Russia’s Internal and Foreign Policy, 1828-1914.”

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**Faculty and Students News continuation**

**Susanne Wengle** (Ph.D. candidate in Political Science) has been awarded an IREX IARO award for field research in the Russian Far East and Siberia for academic year 2007-08.

**Cameron Wiggins** (Ph.D. candidate in Slavic Languages and Literatures) presented a conference paper, “Drama and Authorial Voice in War and Peace,” at the California Slavic Colloquium at Stanford University on April 14, 2007.

Four essays were chosen in the annual Graduate Student Essay Competition held in the spring. The top four were awarded a stipend of $150 and the opportunity to be published in the BPS working paper series as well as to submit a summary to the ISEEES Newsletter. The awardees were: **Danielle Lussier** (Political Science), “The Nature of Mass Communist Beliefs in Postcommunist Russian Political Space;” **Erik R. Scott** (History), “Magic and Authenticity in the Performance of the Nineteenth-Century Russian Gypsy Choir;” **Jarrod Tanny** (History), “The Many Ends of Old Odessa: Memories of the Gilded Age in Russia’s City of Sin;” and **Jennifer Utrata** (Sociology), “Babushki as Surrogate Wives: How Single Mothers and Grandmothers Negotiate the Division of Labor in Russia.” Each of these papers was submitted to the AAASS for their national competition. In addition, a paper by **Amy Moore** (Comparative Literature), “Ukraine’s Paradigm of Perversity: the Postcolonial Misfit in Contemporary Ukrainian Literature,” was also submitted since it was a highly ranked work although not in the top four.
ISEEES acknowledges with sincere appreciation the following individuals who have contributed to the annual giving program, the Associates of the Slavic Center, between February 1 and May 31, 2007.

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50th Anniversary of founding of ISEEES

"Remembering 1957: the Cold War and the Development of Slavic Studies at Berkeley"

Wednesday, October 3rd, 2007